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A  UTHOR: 


TAYLOR,  BARTON  S. 


TITLE: 


HELPS  TO  A  CORRECT 
UNDERSTANDING  OF... 


PLACE: 


ALBION,  MICHIGAN 


DA  TE: 


1889 


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r" 


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I 


Taylor,  Barton  S  b.  1820. 

Helps  to  a  correct  understanding  of  nature,  on  the 
basis  of  realism.  By  Eev.  Barton  S.  Taylor  ...  Albion. 
Mich.,  Eogers  &  Wiersema,  1889. 


316  p.    20 


em 


1.  Science— Philosophy.    2.  Nature.       i.  Title. 


Library  of  Congress 


u 


Q17S.T24 


22-14242 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 

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Understanding  of  Mure 


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ON  THE  BASIS  OF  REALISM. 


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BY  REV.  BARTON  S.  TAYLOR,  M.  D. 


»     »       • 


* 


AI^BION,  MICH.: 

ROGERS  &  WIERSKMA. 

1889. 


PREFACE. 


Copyrighted  in  1588  by  Barton  S.  Taylor. 


> 


The  doings  and  mysteries  in  nature  invite  our  search. 
We  see  that  all  earthly  things  are  undergoing  change ; 
what  changes  them  ?  We  discover  that  atoms,  bodies, 
earth,  worlds  are  in  motion;  what  moves  them?  Does 
matter  move  itself?  or  does  something  not  matter  move  it? 
Or  is  there  nothing  that  is  not  matter,  and  is  matter  all 
that  is  ?  What  is  matter  any  how,  is  there  any  such  thing, 
or  are  our  thoughts  of  things  as  solids  mere  delusions? 
What  do  we  know  about  matter,  and  how  do  we  know  ? 
Do  we  know  even  that  we  are,  and  what  we  are  ?  What 
is  man,  an  atom,  a  monad,  an  ephemeron,  dust,  and  noth- 
ing more  ?  Are  all  our  thoughts  baseless  imaginings,  and 
all  our  hopes  delusions  ?    Is  there  no  reality,  and  does  man 

know  nothing  ? 

These  questions  are  so  plainly  answered  in  the  common 
consciousness  of  the  common  world  that  some  of  the  ques- 
tions themselves  seem  absurd ;  but  in  philosophic  science 
they  are  questions,  the  questions  of  the  day,  and  questions 
which  are  often  so  answered  as  to  leave  before  us  only  a 
negation,  a  blank,  a  void.  Where  shall  we  go  to  find 
answers  to  these  questions,  to  books  ?  The  books  of  modern 
science  present  to  us  nature  in  the  garb  of  some  hypotheses. 
The  language  employed  in  describing  facts  is  the  language 
which  the  hypotheses  suggest,  and  the  hypotheses  are  so 
interwoven  with  the  facts  and  the  language  is  so  much  of 
it  bom  of  the  hypotheses,  that  it  is  often  difficult  to  ascer- 


/ 


137614 


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->T' 


4  PREFACE. 

tain  from  books  the  simple  facts.  Before  we  can  know 
whaf  the  naked  facts  are  we  have  to  institute  a  process  of 
analysis,  and  express  to  ourselves  the  facts  in  language 
which  does  not  involve  the  hypotheses.  Instead  of  stating 
the  facts  in  the  common  language  of  men,  and  then  ex- 
plaining them  by  their  hypotheses,  scientists  employ  the 
language  of  the  hypotheses  in  stating  the  facts.  Take  an 
example  or  two  from  • 'Story  of  Creation,"  which  happens 
to  lie  on  the  table  before  me.  This,  for  instance,  p.  14: 
*  'The  tendency  of  all  passive  Energy  is  to  be  converted  into 
active  Energy  until  a  dead  or  uniform  level  is  reached, 
wherein  no  differences  of  separating  power  remain."  The 
casual  reader,  passing  over  this,  might  think  that  the 
author  was  telling  some  new  and  important  fact.  Trans- 
lated, it  becomes  the  familiar  fact  known  to  everybody, 
that  heat  passes  from  a  hot  body  to  adjacent  cool  bodies 
till  they  all  become  of  equal  temperature.  Another  ex- 
ample, p.  138.  The  author  is  describing  how  the  "star 
dust"  became  worlds:  ''As  the  atoms  rushed  together. 
Energy,  which  had  hitherto  existed  in  a  state  of  rest  as 
passive  separation,  became  active  in  molar  and  molecular 
form."  Sifted  from  the  involved  hypotheses,  this  means: 
As  the  atoms  rushed  together  they  became  hot,  and  the 
body  thus  formed  whirled  around  on  its  axis  and  in  an 
orbit.  These  cases,  selected  by  opening  the  book  at 
random,  are  examples  of  the  common  mode  of  stating  facts 
in  all  such  books.  This  writer  thinks  it  possible  to  ex- 
press scientific  facts  in  the  language  of  common  life. 

But  behind  these  hypotheses,  before  these  investigators 
enter  upon  an  explanation  of  nature,  they  assert  that  man 
cannot  know  physical  things,  that  all  that  we  can  know  is 
certain  appearances  which  pass  before  us,  or,  perhaps  only 
our  own  thoughts  and  mental  states;  that  is,  they  are  phe- 
nomenalists  or  idealists,  and  they  explain  nature  according 
to  these  systems  of  metaphysics. 


\ 


w 


i 


PREFACE.  5 

To  present  a  view  of  nature  which  overthrows  all  our 
preconceived  notions  of  it,  is  very  astonishing,  and  it 
gives  us  very  exalted  opinions  of  the  persons  who  can  see 
things  in  such  new  and  extraordinary  aspects.  We  feel 
very  much  abashed  when  they  tell  us  that  we  do  not  know 
anything,  and  that  all  our  opinions  of  nature  are  errors, 
vulgar  follies.  But  when  we  come  to  consider  that  those 
who  thus  abash  us  assert  that  they  do  not  know,  that  no 
man  can  know,  anything  about  real  things,  we  think  it 
possible  that  their  views  may  not  be  entirely  correct. 
They  claim  to  know  nothing  about  reality;  then  possibly 
it  is  not  the  real  world  that  they  have  been  describing 
to  us,  but  an  imaginary  one.  At  all  events,  we  who  be- 
lieve that  we  can  and  do  know  real  things  have  some 
confidence  in  our  observations,  and  wish  to  know  about 
nature  as  it  is  presented  to  us  by  the  facts  which  come 
through  our  senses. 

Very  few  of  the  people  are  idealists  or  phenominalists, 
nearly  all  are  in  some  sense  realists.  The  idealist  tells  us 
that  we  do  not  know  the  things  which  we  call  nature, 
that  we  do  not  know  that  there  are  any  such  things  as 
matter  and  material  bodies.  The  great  common  mind  of 
the  world  replies,  "I  know  better;  I  know  that  there  are 
hard,  solid  things— trees,  houses,  men,  rocks.  I  know 
them  as  they  are,  and  they  are  as  I  know  them  to  be." 
Thus  we  and  our  guide  part  company  in  the  start;  and 
we  do  not  care  much  what  his  speculations  are  about  a 
world  that  he  says  he  does  not  know  anything  about. 
Yet  we  wish  to  know  more  of  these  things  than  we  can  at 
once  discover,  about  the  relation  of  things  to  each  other, 
about  the  phenomena  and  the  doings  and  doers  in  nature. 
If  idealists  go  where  our  realism  will  not  permit  us  to 
follow,  shall  we  therefore  have  no  philosophy  of  nature  ? 
If  phenominalists  have  constructed  their  system  of  physi- 
cal philosophy  in  harmony  with  their  phenominalism,  may 


»    _ 


TT 


6  PREFACE. 

not  we  have,  ought  we  not  to  have,  a  system  of  physical 
philosophy  in  harmony  with  our  realism  ? 

This  writer  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  explanations  of 
many  natural  phenomena  lie  much  nearer  the  surface  than 
where  they  have  been  sought,  and  are  much  more  simple 
than  many  have  supposed.  Nothing  is  so  plain,  simple, 
and  easy  of  access  as  truth.  Nothing  is  so  complicated, 
devious,  and  strange  to  thought  as  attemps  to  explain 
natural  phenomena  on  the  basis  of  a  false  assumption. 

This  work  is  not  an  argument  with  idealists,  or  phenomi- 
nalists,  or  materialists,  or  agnostics,  to  convince  them  that 
they  are  mistaken.  We  assume  that  our  audience  is  com- 
posed of  persons  who  believe  that  our  observations  of 
nature  are  generally  reliable  data  of  opinion;  and  probably 
most  of  our  readers  believe  in  a  personal  Creator  who 
created  all  things  and  adapted  them  to  each  other,  and  cre- 
ated the  human  mind  and  made  it  capable  of  discovering 
and  knowing  the  things  by  which  we  are  surrounded. 
Starting  with  the  opinion  that  mankind  are  capable  of 
knowing  material  things  through  their  senses,  and 
the  invisible  through  process  of  reasons,  we  would  inquire, 
What  is  science  ?  What  is  the  truth  in  reference  to  na- 
ture? What  explanations  of  natural  phenomena  are 
we  permitted  to  make,  can  we  make? 

This,  then,  is  a  humble  attempt  to  lay  the  foundation 
for  a  system  of  physical  philosophy  in  harmony  with  our 
system  of  metaphysics.  We  would  not  have  realists  re- 
main dependent  upon  phenominalists  for  their  physical 
philosophy.  I^et  them  have  their  physics  in  harmony  with 
their  metaphysics,  if  they  wish,  but  let  us  have  our  physics 
in  harmony  with  our  metaphysics.  No  one  has  in  recent 
years  favored  us  with  a  view  of  nature  from  the  stand- 
point of  realism.  It  may  be  very  imperfectly  done  here; 
but,  in  the  absence  of  any  other,  the  author  has  done  the 
best  he  could. 


PREFACE.  7 

Everyone  lives  in  contact  with  the  world,  daily  witness- 
ing its  phenomena,  employing  its  agents,  and  conforming 
to  their  modes.  From  this  experience  every  person  forms 
some  opinions  of  nature.  It  is  probable  that  the  deepest 
reach  of  philosophy  will  find  many  of  these  opinions  cor- 
rect, and  that  this  treatise  will  be  found  to  be  largely  an 
exposition  of  nature  as  it  is  seen  and  known  by  the  great 
mass  of  the  common  people  of  the  world,  as  far  as  nature 
may  be  known  by  direct  observation,  and  not  inconsistent 
with  these  views  in  reference  to  the  more  occult  processes 

of  nature. 

Then  let  us  go  forth  and  examine  nature  and  see  how 
things  appear  to  us.  Regarding  the  theories  of  science  as 
still  open  questions,  setting  aside  for  the  time  the  dicta  of 
authority,  let  us  examine  and  think  for  ourselves. 


Note  -This  work  was  originally  written  in  1870  and  1871.    Since  then  it 
has  been  re- written,  and  greatly  abridged;  but  the  original  manuscript  con- 
tained the  new  theory  of  the  physical  forces  here  presented;  and  that  theory 
was  announced  and  defended  in  a  series  of  scientific  articles  published  in  the 
Northwestern  Christian  Advocate,  of  Chicago,  in  1873  and  1874.   I  me;ition  this 
because  precisely  the  same  theory  was  set  forth  in  a  book  published  in  1877. 
It  is  not  certain  that  the  author  of  that  book  caught  the  hint  from  my  pub- 
lished articles  of  1874.    Often  when  public  opinion  has  reached  a  certain  stage 
of  progress,  a  new  thought  will  come  to  diflferent  minds  remote  from  each 
other  and  having  no  aependent  relation  to  each  other.    Whether  Mr.  Emer- 
son's doctrine  of  the  "Over-Soul"  explains  this  or  not,  we  know  that  such  is 
often  the  case.    But  it  is  very  certain  that  he  who  wrote  in  1871  and  published 
in  1874  is  not  indebted  for  his  thought  to  a  work  published  in  1877.    See  North- 
western Christian  Advocate  of  Sept.  9  and  Oct.  14, 1874,  first  page  in  both  cases. 


■>»  --r 


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;  / 


I. 
II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 


TITLES  OF  CHArTERS. 

*  <5XX5>  > 

RELATION  OF  Metaphysics  to  Sciknce,  ....       9 

Modes  of  Investigation, 21 

Absolute  Truths, 32 

Matter, 46 

Facts  and  their  Teaching, 74 

Motion, 33 

Inertia 102 

Energy, i  jq 

The  PH11.0SOPHY  OF  KV01.UT10N, 131 

The  Solution, 142 

Causes  in  Nature, 160 

Application  to  Organic  Phenomena, 175 

The  Process  of  Knowledge, 192 

Application  to  the  Human  Mind, 224 

The  Use  of  the  Intuitions  in  Science,  ...  248 
Nature  and  God, 282 


s: 


■  ■■'  '-Lt  .-: 


■M  .i!.': 


I 


CHAPTER  L 

REI.ATION  OF  Metaphysics  to  Science. 

Much  commendable  effort  has  been  made  during  the  past 
few  years  to  popularize  science.  Many  books  have  been 
written  to  make  known  to  the  reading  pubUc  especially 
the  theories  by  which  scientists  would  explain  natural 
phenomena.  Many  scientists  agree  that  certain  theories 
are  probably  true;  some  regard  them  as  open  questions, 
still  on  trial  before  the  world;  some  look  upon  them  as 
provisional  theories,  the  best  w^e  have  now,  which  are 
destined  in  time  to  give  place  to  others;  others  consider 
them  already  established  doctrines,  and  use  them  as 
evidence  in  other  departments  of  truth. 

Science  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  questions: 
(i)  What  are  the  facts  in  nature?  and  (2)  what  theories 
do  these  facts  indicate?  Observers  and  experimenters  are 
the  proper  persons  to  answer  the  first  question;  logicians 
and  philosophers  the  second.  The  opinions  which  we 
form  in  answer  to  the  second  question  depend  very  largely 
upon  the  logical  and  metaphysical  principles  which  we 
entertain  and  which  we  take  to  guide  us  in  our  processes 
of  thought. 

Scientists  sometimes  seem  to  regard  it  as  an  intrusion 
and  impertinence  when  metaphysicians  bring  forward  their 


? 


lO 


RELATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIENCE. 


DOCTRINES   RESPECTING   CAUSE. 


II 


principles  as  tests  of  scientific  theories.  They  do  not 
seem  to  reaUze  that  their  own  metaphysics  has  determined 
mainly  the  form  and  structure  of  their  theories.  They 
only  need  to  think  for  a  moment  of  the  importance  they 
attach  to  the  metaphysical  principle  which  has  been 
denominated  the  law  of  continuity,  or  the  unchangeable 
quantity  of  existence,  to  vSee  the  impropriety  of  forbidding 
the  use  of  metaphysics  in  scientific  theorizing.  Nearly 
all  that  is  peculiar  and  characteristic  in  modem  scientific 
theories  is  based  on  the  a  priori  assumption  of  endless 
continuity  of  being,  with  limitless  possibility  of  change. 
Descriptive  science  is  dependent  mainly  upon  observation; 
but  when  we  begin  to  construct  theories  and  systems,  we 
commence  to  arrange  facts  in  certain  relations,  and  the 
science  of  relations  is  metaphysics.  One  set  of  meta- 
physical principles  suggests  and  allows  one  arrangement 
of  facts  in  a  system,  and  another  set  of  principles  suggests 
and  allows  another  arrangement  of  the  same  facts. 

Popular  opinion  is  that  scientific  theories  depend  entirely 
upon  observed  facts,  and  that  the  new  theories  which  have 
appeared  in  late  years  are  the  results  of  newly  discovered 
facts.  Even  metaphysicians  who  do  not  adopt  the  systems 
of  metaphysics  which  they  discover  in  scientific  specula- 
tions, have  not  seemed  to  realize  to  what  extent  the  forms 
of  the  theories  are  consequent  upon  the  systems  of  meta- 
physics adopted  by  those  who  constructed  the  theories. 

These  questions  are  asked:  Do  not  scientists  know  the 
facts  which  support  cm  rent  theories?  and  are  they  not  as 
capable  as  any  of  judging  whether  the  facts  do  or  do  not 
prove  these  theories?  Do  they  not  know  all  the  facts 
which  may  be  brought  against  these  theories?  and  do  they 
not  know  as  well  as  any  whether  these  facts  do  or  do  not 
disprove  them?    To  these  questions  we  answer:    They 


know  all  the  facts;  but  with  one  set  of  metaphysical  prin- 
ciples, certain  facts  prove  anc  other  facts  do  not  disprove 
a  theory;  while  with  another  set  of  principles,  the  fomier 
facts  do  not  prove,  and  the  latter  facts  do  disprove  the 
theory.     The  question  respecting  scientific  theories  is  nol 
a  question  between  scientists  and  metaphysicians,  nor  be- 
tween facts  and  metaphysics,  but  between  one  system  of 
metaphysics  and   another  system  of  metaphysics,  while 
dealing  with  the  same  admitted   facts.     The  system  of 
metaphysics,  more  than  the  facts,  determines  the  theory. 
We  may  illustrate  this  by  presenting  a  specific  case. 

One  man  believes  that  it  is  folly  to  inquire  in  reference 
to  causes,  thinks  that  we  can  know  nothing  of  any  such 
things,  not  even  that  they  are.  What  is  called  the  causal 
relation  can  have  no  guiding  or  limiting  powers  upon  his 
speculations.  He  can  construct  theories  which  ignore  the 
existence  of  causes,  and  which  positively  and  constantly 
violate  the  causal  relation.  He  may  arrange  his  facts  in 
any  system  that  suits  his  convenience.  ^    . 

Another  man  admits  that  causes  are,  but  asserts  that 
they  are  to  us  "  unknowable. "  If  we  say  to  either  of 
these  men:  You  have  changes  without  causes,  he  well 
answers:  We  know  nothing  about  causes,  or  their  sup- 
posed relation  to  phenomena.  As  that  supposed  relation 
is  unknowable,  we  do  not  consider  ourselves  bound  to 
observe  your  view  of  it,  and  you  do  not  know  whether  we 
have  violated  it  or  not.  Such  a  "man  does  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  pay  any  heed  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect. 
He  can  construct  his  theories  without  any  reference  to  it. 
,To  say  that  his  theory  violates  the  law  of  cause  and  effect, 
is  to  him  no  proof  that  his  theory  is  false  or  incorrect. 

Another  man  admits  that  things  are  related  to  each 
other  as  causes  and  effects;  but  by  cause  he  means  that 
which  uniformly  precedes,  and  by  effect  that  which  uni- 


12 


RELATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIENCE. 


THE   TRUE   DOCTRINE. 


13 


formly  succeeds.  With  him  the  causal  relation  is  only  a 
time  relation — going  before  and  following  after.  The  day 
is  the  cause  of  the  night,  and  the  night  is  the  cause  of  the 
next  day,  and  so  on.  Spring  is  the  cause  of  summer, 
summer  the  cause  of  autumn,  and  autumn  the  cause  of 
winter.  Or,  speaking  of  effects,  we  may  say,  night  is  the 
effect  of  day,  day  the  effect  of  the  preceding  night,  and  so 
on.  All  that  is  necessary  For  this  man,  in  the  construction 
of  his  theories,  is  that  he  preserve  the  proper  order  of  suc- 
cession. If  any  one  should  attempt  to  test  his  theories  by 
the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  all  that  is  necessary  in  vind^'- 
cating  his  theory,  is  that  he  show  that  some  phenomena 
preceded,  and  other  phenomena  succeeded,  the  phenomena 
with  which  he  deals,  in  their  true  order  of  succession. 

Another  man  admits  that  things  are  related  to  each, 
other  as  causes  and  effects,  but  by  cause  and  effect  he 
means  the  same  existence  in  two  different  successive  forms. 
Thus  ice  is  the  cause  of  water,  and  water  is  the  cause  of 
steam.  Or  we  may  speak  of  the  effects,  and  say  water  is 
the  effect  of  ice,  and  steam  the  effect  of  water.  All  that 
is  necessary  in  the  construction  of  his  theories  is  that  the 
quantity  of  existence  be  preserved  unchanged  in  the  suc- 
cessive changes  in  form.  As  a  proof  that  his  theory  is 
properly  constructed,  he  shows  that  the  order  may  be 
reversed,  and  we  may  say  the  steam  is  the  cause  of  the 
water,  and  the  water  is  the  cause  of  the  ice.  If  it  be 
alleged  that  in  his  theory  he  has  effects  without  causes, 
he  has  only  to  show  in  reply  that  there  was  an  equal 
amount  of  existence  in  some  other  form  preceding  his 
effects. 

Another  man  believes  that  the  cause  energizes  to  pro- 
duce the  effect,  and  that  unless  it  does,  the  two  do  not 
stand  in  the  relation  to  each  other  of  cause  and  effect.  He 
believes  that  all  changes  are  the  results  of  the  energizing 


of  something.  With  him  the  causal  relation  includes  the 
energizing  of  the  cause  to  produce  the  effect.  He  cannot 
receive  as  true  any  theory  which  relates  things  in  a  way 
which  violates  this  opinion. 

Here  are  five  doctrines  respecting  cause  which  are  more 
or  less  current  in  the  world.  According  to  the  one  of 
these  which  a  man  adopts  will  be  the  form  of  his  scientific 
theories,  based  upon  the  same  admitted  facts.  When, 
then,  I  am  informed  that  certain  facts  prove  a  certain 
theory,  before  I  can  have  confidence  in  my  informant  as 
an  authority,  I  must  know  which  of  these  doctrines  of 
cause  he  adopts.  With  one  of  them  his  theory  may  be  in 
accordance  with  the  facts,  while  with  another  one,  in  view 
of  the  facts  his  theory  may  be  entirely  impossible.  Ac- 
cording to  the  first  four  of  these  doctrines,  theories  and 
explanations  of  natural  phenomena  are  allowable,  which 
according  to  the  last  are  impossible.  The  first  four  of 
them  can  co-operate,  because  they  all  agree  in  rejecting 
the  last.  The  last  can  have  no  fellowship  with  any  of  the 
others,  and  he  who  adopts  it  can  admit  no  theory  con- 
structed according  to  any  of  the  others,  and  in  violation  of 

this. 

The  last  of  these  doctrines  is  the  one  universally  held 
by  the  popular  common  sense  of  mankind.  Every  man 
considers  himself  a  cause  from  the  fact  that  he  energizes 
to  produce  results.  This  is  the  view  of  cause  universally 
entertained  by  the  common  people.  It  is  also  the  one 
that  is  entertained,  and  that  has  always  been  entertained, 
by  the  largest  and  best  class  of  metaphysicians.  But  cer- 
tain metaphysicians  declared  and  promulgated  the  other 
four  doctrines.  Scientists,  after  a  time,  adopted  them,  one 
or  another,  or  all  of  them,  and  began  to  construct  theories 
according  to  them,  and  in  disregard  of  the  last.  It  is  thus, 
and  thus  only,  that  some  of  the  most  important  theories  of 


14 


RKI.ATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIE;NCE;. 


REALISM. 


15 


modern  science  have  become  possible.  It  may  now  be 
said  that  the  first  four  of  these  doctrines  are  factors  in  the 
metaphysical  basis  of  all  modern  science.  Whoever  re- 
ceives and  believes  the  last  of  these  doctrines,  must,  while 
handling  the  same  facts,  arrive  at  very  different  conclu- 
sions from  those  reached  by  men  who  have  adopted  any 
other  of  these  doctrines  of  cause.  Theory-constructing 
and  system-building  are  arranging  and  relating  facts,  and 
depend  upon  the  principle  of  relation  which  the  builder 
entertains. 

Again,  our  opinions  of  scientific  theories  depend  very 
much  upon  whether  we  do  or  do  not  admit  the  existence 
of  fundamental,  absolute,  or  necessary  truths.  Upon  this 
question  metaphysicians  are  divided;  at  least  some  meta- 
physicians have  denied  that  there  are  any  such  truths.  If 
we  admit  that  there  are  certain  fundamental  truths  which 
we  must  not  violate  in  the  construction  of  our  theories,  we 
are  limited  and  restricted  in  our  work — w^e  must  construct 
our  theories  according  to  those  truths.  If  we  deny  that 
there  are  any  such  truths,  ignore  them,  and  construct  our 
theories  without  reference  to  them,  we  have  greater  liberty 
— we  may  construct  almost  any  theory  we  please.  Others 
may  say  that  one  part  of  our  theory  contradicts  another 
part.  We  may  answer:  That  is  nothing  to  us;  we  do 
not  admit  the  authority  of  what  is  called  the  law  of  con- 
tradictions, nor  of  any  other  alleged  absolute  truths.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  our  creed  embraces  such  truths,  they 
are  guides  to  us  in  the  construction  of  our  theories.  If  we 
do  not  recognize  them  at  all,  they  are  no  guides  to  us,  and 
they  impose  on  us  no  restrictions.  In  the  construction 
of  the  present  prevalent  system  of  physical  philosophy 
much  has  been  done  by  persons  who  have  adopted  the 
systems  of  metaphysics  which  deny  the  authority  of  any 
such  truths.     The  question  arises  in  the  minds  of  many : 


To  what  extent  are  the  wonderful  theories  which  so  dis- 
tinguish modem  science  dependent  upon  the  systems  of 
metaphysics  which  scientists  have  adopted?  What  mod- 
ifications  in  these  theories  would  some  other  system  of 
metaphysics  require?  What  must  be  our  opinion  respecting 
these  theories  from  the  standpoint  of  some  other  system  of 
metaphysics?  There  are  many  who  do  not  adopt  any  of 
the  systems  of  metaphysics  upon  which  modern  science  is 
built;   does  this  fact   require  them  to  modify  or  reject  its 

theories? 

We  may  be  a  little  more  specific  and  mention  th ,  bear- 
ing of  certain  specific  systems  of  metaphysics  upon  the 
structure  of  physical  philosophy.  Sensationalism,  denying 
any  innaLe  cnaracteristics  of  mind  or  necessary  modes  of 
mental  activity,  turns  man  out  upon  the  objective  world 
alone  for  his  evidence.  Its  antagonist,  intuitionalism,  finds 
in  mind  itself  certain  necessary  modes  of  action,  which  are 
thought  to  be  adaptations  to  and  intimations  of  objective 
facts,  and  these  necessary  modes  of  thought  are  supposed 
to  aid,  limit  and  direct  our  opinions  respecting  objective 
things.  Phenomenalism  limits  our  knowledge  to  appear- 
ances, idealism  to  our  own  mental  states  and  acts,  and  we 
know  not  that  there  is  any  real  thing  in  the  material 
world.  All  we  know  is  that  certain  appearances  are  pre- 
sented to  our  minds,  or  that  our  minds  perform  .ertain 
acts.  On  the  other  hand,  realism  of  various  shades  and 
kinds  includes  in  our  knowledge  not  only  appearances, 
but  things  as  they  really  are.  The  word  realism  has  had 
two  significations  in  philosophy.  Formerly  realism  was 
the  opposite  of  nominalism.  These  words  then  had  refer- 
ence only  to  the  content  of  general  terms,  such  as  man, 
horse,  brute  etc.  Nominalism  claimed  that  such  words 
were  only  names,  names  having  no  corresponding  things. 
Realism  claimed  that  they  were   names  of  real   things. 


ti 


i6 


RELATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIENCE. 


OUR   SYSTEM   OF   METAPHYSICS. 


17 


This  has  ceased  to  be  a  question  of  much  interest  in  philos- 
ophy. Nearly  everybody  has  concluded  that  these  terms 
are  not  names  of  things  but  only  of  groups  of  qualities. 

But  in  modem  philosophy  the  word  realist  has  come  to 
be  used  as  the  opposite  of  phenomenalist  and  idealist,  and 
means  a  believer  in  man's  knowledge  of  reality,  as  distin- 
guished from  mere  appearances  or  mental  activities.  Of 
course,  as  our  opinions  are  with  the  phenomenalist  or  with 
the  realist,  will  our  views  of  the  physical  world,  of  scien- 
tific theories,  and  our  system  of  physical  philosophy,  be 
difierent.  Sensationalists,  associationalists,  and  phenom- 
enalists,  generally  deny  the  existence  of  any  absolute 
truths;  many  idealists  do  not,  and  realists  generally  believe 
that  there  are  a  great  many  absolute,  immutable,  and 
eternal  truths,  which  are  and  must  be  true,  whatever  else 
may  be  said  or  thought. 

Now,  if  any  man  believes  that  these  alleged  absolute 
truths  are  merely  generalizations  from  obser\^ation  and 
experience;  or  that  they  are  merely  the  result  of  habit, 
custom  in  thus  associating  thoughts,  or  that  we  think 
them  true  merely  because  we  cannot  comprehend  their 
oppcsites — that  is,  that  they  are  grounded  only  in  otu- 
weakness — if  a  man  entertains  any  of  these  opinions  re- 
specting alleged  absolute  truths,  they  have  no  weight  of 
authority  with  him,  more  than  any  other  generalizations, 
cr  habits  of  thought,  or  limits  from  human  weakness.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  we  believe  that  they  are  really  absolute 
truths  which  cannot  be  refuted,  contradicted  or  even 
questioned,  we  know  that  our  opinions  in  physical  science, 
and  in  all  other  departments  of  thought,  must  be  con- 
formed to  them.  According,  then,  as  we  receive  or  reject 
these  must  cur  systems  of  physical  philosphy  be  very  dif- 
ferent. It  is  not  probable  that  any  one,  however  positively 
he  may  deny  the  validity  of  absolute  truths,  will  directly 


assert  that  two  contradictory  statements  can  both  be  true, 
or  that  it  is  not  always  true  that  a  thing  is  equal  to  itself; 
yet  by  fixing  it  as  a  general  rule  that  all  such  truths  must 
be  excluded,  and  that  they  must  not  be  allowed  to  have 
any  voice  in  determining  our  opinions  of  physical  nature, 
great  liberty  is  secured  in  the  construction  of  theories  and 
systems,  and  many  are  constructed  which  a  regard  for 
such  truths  would  forbid,  and  which  these  truths  utterly 

demolish. 

It  is  folly  to  exclude  metaphysics  from  all  voice  In  the 
construction  of  theories  and  systems  of  physical  philoso- 
phy.    As  I  have   already  said,  theory-constructing   and 
system-building   are   the   application   of  metaphysics   to 
physics.     Science  cannot  advance  a  single  step  beyond 
observation,  cannot  take  the  first  step  in  physical  icience 
—classification— without  using  the  metaphysical  principle 
of  likeness.     Likeness  has  no  corporeity,  no  body,  form 
or  size.     We  cannot  see  it,  or  hear  it,  or  handle  it.     It  is 
a  super-material,  meta-physical  abstraction.     Thus  we  see 
that  differences  of  opinion  in  reference  to  scientific  theories 
do  not  result  fi-om  the  fact  that  one  employs  metaphysics 
as  a  help  in  their  construction,  and  others  do  not — for  all 
employ  it — but  upon  the  kind  of  metaphysics  employed, 
upon  the  different  principles  used. 

A  large  majority  of  mankind,  both  the  learned  and  the 
unlearned,  hold  to  a  system  of  metaphysics  which  includes 
the  four  following  principles:  (i.)  Energizing  is  a  neces- 
sary factor  in  the  causal  relation.  (2.)  The  human  mind 
has  positive  characteristics  and  necessary  inborn  modes  of 
action.  (3.)  We  do  know  things,  and  not  merely  appear- 
ances. (4.)  There  are  absolute  truths  which  are  the 
ultimate  tests  of  truth  in  all  philosophy.  Among  those 
-  who  constitute  this  majority  I  class  myself.  The  meta- 
physical system  which  you  and  I  and  most  men  adopt, 


i8 


RELATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIENCE. 


WHAT  MUST  BE  OUR  VIEWS? 


19 


includes  these  four  propositions.  If  the  existing  theories 
and  systems  of  physical  philosophy  have  been  constructed 
by  those  who  did  not  include  these  principles  in  their 
system  of  metaphysics,  if  their  metaphysical  principles  are 
the  contrary  of  these,  their  system  of  physical  philosophy 
must  be  different  from  ours,  and  ours  different  from  theirs. 
If  we  are  satisfied  that  our  system  of  metaphysics  is  true, 
if  we  are  certain  that  we  have  the  truth  in  this,  we  cannot 
receive  as  true  any  physical  system  or  theory  of  natural 
phenomena  which  contradicts  the  truth  we  already  have. 
To  do  so  would  be  to  entertain  a  contradiction  in  our  own 
minds.  Two  contradictions  cannot  both  be  true.  Then 
we  must  either  give  up  our  metaphysics  or  our  contra- 
dictory system  of  physical  philosophy.  But  in  our  meta- 
physical system  we  have  this  principle  that  there  are  cer- 
tain absolute  truths  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  all 
truth,  which  are  the  ultimate  judicature  in  all  philosophy, 
metaphysical  and  physical.  Certainly  the  dependent  cannot 
require  that  the  fundamental,  upon  which  itself  depends, 
shall  get  out  of  the  way,  or  be  given  up.  One  of  these 
truths  we  have  just  employed — two  contradictories  cannot 
both  be  true.  We  hold  this  to  be  a  bottom  principle, 
applicable  to  all  thought  and  all  fact,  physical  and  meta- 
physical, in  all  periods  of  time  and  in  all  worlds.  Thus 
the  basal  principles  which  lie  beneath  all  facts,  and  which 
must  determine  our  opinions  of  all  facts,  and  must  deter- 
mine the  facts  themselves,  lie  in  our  metaphysics.  It  is 
thus  the  prime  authority  before  which  all  else  must  fall. 
It  is  only  the  absoluteness  of  its  own  authority  that  con- 
signs one  of  two  contradictory  philosophies  to  oblivion;  it 
is  its  own  authoritative  voice  that  commands  one  to  vacate 
the  arena,  and  it  is  not  self-annihilative;  it  does  not  com- 
mand itself  to  vacate. 

But  perhaps    some  one  says:       The  scientist  will  not 


admit  what  you  call  absolute  truths  as  evidence,  nor  allow 
them  to  be  applied  to  scientific  questions.     What  matter? 
I  do  not  care  whether  he  admits  them  or  not;   though  I 
know  that,  whatever  he  may  say  about  it,  he  will  admit 
them  practically,  even  the  one  that  we  have  just  been 
using,  and  if  one  of  his   experiments  contradicts  another 
of  his  experiments,  he  will  throw  away  one  of  them,  and 
say  they  cannot  both  be  true,  and  try  again.     But  I  am 
not  talking  with  scientists  who  forbid  the  use  of  meta- 
physics while  using  it  themselves,  nor  with   those  who 
have  a  different  system  of  metaphysics  from  that  which  I 
have  outlined  above.     I  do  not  propose  to  try  to  convince 
any  one  that  this  is  the  true  system  of  metaphysics,  nor  to 
discuss   further  the  propriety  of  applying  metaphysical 
principles  to  scientific  theories.     I  do  not  propose  to  try  to 
convince  any  one  who  has  built  his  physical  philosophy 
upon  a  different  metaphysical  foundation  that  he  is  in  error. 
I  suppose  myself  conversing  with  that  great  majority  of 
which  I  have  spoken,  who  agree  with  me  in  the  four  meta- 
physical principles  stated,  and  say  to  these  my  friends: 
According  to   these  fundamental  principles  of  philosophy 
which  we  all  hold  in  common,  what  must  be  onr  opinions 
of  the   physical  world?     What  views  must  we   have  of 
nature?     What  must  be  our  opinions  of  current  scientific 
theories?    What  in  general  must  be  our  conclusions  re- 
specting the  system  of  physical  philosophy  which  appears 
now  before  us  in  the  world?     It  has  been  very  ably  and 
laboriously  wrought  out  as  it  could  be  on  the  basis  of  other 
systems  of  metaphysics;   what  has  our  system  to  say  in 
reference  to  it?     What  modifications  would  our  system 
require  us  to  make  in  it?    We  enter  upon  an  examination 
of  the  physical  world  to  see  what  views  we  must  take  of  it 
in  the  light  of  our  system  of  metaphysics.     If  you  agree 
with  me  in  the  general  system  which  I  have  mentioned.,  I 


20 


REI.ATION  OF  METAPHYSICS  TO  SCIENCE. 


invite  you  to  accompany  me  in  an  excursion  among  the 
works  of  God,  for  the  purpose  of  endeavoring  to  obtain  a 
true  understanding  of  nature.  If  the  present  current  sys- 
tem of  physical  philosophy  is  possible  under  the  direction 
of  the  metaphysics  of  phenomenalism  and  the  exclusion  of 
absolute  truths,  how  is  it  under  the  direction  of  any  system 
of  realism  and  the  admission  of  such  absolute  truths? 


CHAPTER   II. 


ji 


Modes  of  Investigation. 

In  the  investigation  of  natural  phenomena  five  modes 
of  procedure  have  been  common  in  all  ages.  ( i . )  Observ- 
ing facts,  and  deducing  from  them  principles,  or  laws  of 
being  and  doing.  Many  facts,  because  of  their  resem- 
blances, admit  of  classification.  These  facts  are  all  accord- 
ing to  the  same  mode;  that  mode,  then,  is  a  law  or  prin- 
ciple in  nature.  Thus,  we  notice  that  bodies  left  unsup- 
ported in  the  air  fall  to  the  ground.  This  we  have  seen 
to  be  the  case  in  so  many  instances  that  we  say  it  is  a  law 
or  principle  in  nature  that  all  bodies  left  unsupported 
near  the  earth  fall  to  the  ground.  Other  facts,  unlike 
these,  but  like  each  other,  are  classed  together,  and  we 
say  that  their  mode  is  another  law  or  principle  in  nature. 
Thus  we  have  noticed  that  when  bits  of  wood,  cork,  and 
many  other  things,  are  put  down  in  water,  they  rise  up 
through  it  and  rest  on  its  surface.  Hence  we  say  it  is  a 
principle  or  law  in  nature  that  bodies  of  less  specific  grav- 
ity than  water,  rise  up  through  the  water  and  rest  upon 
its  surface.  Any  new  fact  is  thought  to  be  explained 
when  it  can  be  classed  with  or  placed  under  any  of  these 
already  deduced  modes  or  laws.  Thus,  if  we  put  bits  of 
iron  or  lead  in  a  dish  of  mercury,  these  bodies  rise  up 
through  the  mercury  and  rest  on  its  surface.  Explana- 
tion:    These  bodies   are   lighter  than   the  mercury,  and 


22 


MODKS   OF   INVESTIGATION. 


ABSOLUTE  TRUTHS. 


23 


If. 


hence  rise  up  through  it,  just  as  bits  of  wood  do  through 
water.  Sometimes  the  principle  thus  obtained  is  so  gen- 
eral that  it  is  decided  to  be  universal.  Thus  the  principle, 
all  bodies  left  unsupported  in  the  air  fall  to  the  ground,' 
is  thought  to  be  true  on  all  the  planets,  on  all  worlds,' 
universally.  Such  a  principle  is  called  a  generalized 
universal,  This  mode  of  procedure  has  in  later  times 
been  called  the  inductive  method.  It  is  also  called  gen- 
erahzing,  and  for  many  years  it  was  called  the  scientific 
method. 

(2.)     The  second  mode  of  procedure  is  this:     When  a 
principle  has  been   found   so  extensive   that   it  has  been 
generalized  into  a  universal,  that  principle   is  taken  as  a 
guide,  to  our  opinions.     Finding  so  many  things  accord- 
ing to  this  mode,  we  conclude  that  all  things  of  this  class 
are  according  to  it.     If,  then,  a  new  object  of  this  class  is 
presented  to  us,  we  say  that  it  is  according  to  this  princi- 
ple, before  we  have  ascertained  by  observation   or  experi- 
ment that  it  is  so,  and  even  when   the  circumstances  do 
not  admit  of  verification   by  observation  or  experiment. 
Thus,  if  a  new  planet  should  be    discovered,  we  would 
say  that  a  body   left  unsupported  a   little  distance   from 
that  planet  would  fall  to  it.     This   method  is  sometimes 
called   reasoning  from   analogy.     All  scientists   use  this 
method,  none  more  so  than  those  who  say,  "We  have  no 
right  whatever  to  ascertain  a  single  physical  truth  without 
seeking  for  it  physically." 

(3.)  The  third  mode  of  procedure  is  this:  Men  find 
themselves  under  the  necessity  of  thinking  after  certain 
forms  of  thought.  These  necessary  forms  or  modes  ot 
thought  have  been  denominated  intuitions,  or  subjective 
principles.  These  have  been  taken  as  indications  of  the 
modes  of  objective  things.  This  has  been  called  the  intu- 
itional method.     While  this  has  as  much  influence,  per- 


haps, as  any  other  method  in  determining  the  opinions  of 
mankind  in  general  respecting  external  things,  it  is  not 
admitted  as  valid  by  scientists,  and  there  is  so  much  of 
doubt  surrounding  it  in  scientific  minds  that  we  shall  not 
rely  upon  it  or  use  it  in  our  investigations  of  physical 
nature  till  we  have  ascertained  the  truth  by  other  mothods. 
(4.)  The  fourth  method  is  as  follows:  Men  see  by  the 
nature  of  things  that  certain  facts  must  be  true  of  them, 
and  cannot  be  otherwise — the  opposite  is  an  impossibility. 
They  formulate  one  of  these  necessary  facts,  express  it  in 
words,  and  call  it  an  absolute  truth.  From  this  absolute 
truth  they  form  opinions  of  how  things  must  be,  and  how 
otherwise  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  be.  From  these  we 
form  opinions  of  undiscovere  1  things,  and  of  facts  respect- 
ing discovered  things  which  cannot  be  otherwise  ascer- 
tained. This  may  be  properly  called  the  metaphysical 
method. 

The  second  and  fourth  of  these  principles  have  been  by 
some  indiscriminately  called  the  deductive  method;  and 
the  principles  obtained  by  both  of  these  processes  are 
sometimes  called  "a  priori"  principles.  They  ought  to 
be  carefully  distinguished.  They  are  alike  in  that  both 
take  principles  as  the  basis  of  opinions  respecting  objective 
things.  But  they  are  very  unlike  in  the  origin  and  au- 
thority of  the  principles.  A  generalized  principle  can 
only  prove  that  things  are  probably  so.  Take  the  prin- 
ciple, all  small  bodies  left  unsupported  near  a  large  body, 
fall  to  it.  We  suppose  that  this  principle  holds  true  of 
bodies  near  the  remotest  star.  But  we  have  no  evidence 
but  analogy  from  our  solar  system,  and  some  slight  indi  • 
cations  of  motion  in  some  other  heavenly  bodies,  that 
there  is  any  such  power  as  gravity  in  connection  with  that 
star.  It  is  possible  that  there  is  no  such  power  as  gravity 
there.     When,  then,  this  principle  is  applied  to  that  star, 


w 


24 


MODES  OF  INVESTIGATION. 


its  Opposite  is  possible,  and  the  fact  is  only  probable.  An 
absolute  truth  declares  that  things  must  be  so,  and  cannot 
possibly  be  otherwise.  A  generalized  principle  is  proof 
only  until  opposite  facts  are  discovered.  If  facts  which 
apppir  to  be  contrary  to  it  are  discovered,  we  cannot  say, 
we  know  they  are  not  contrary,  the  apparent  facts  must 
be  S'^t  aside,  the  principle  makes  it  necessary  that  facts  be 
according  to  it.  It  was  a  generalized  universal  only 
because  no  contrary  facts  were  known.  Now  that  con- 
trary facts  have  been  discovered,  it  ceases  to  be  a  univer- 
sal principle — it  is  true  of  some  things,  of  others  it  is  not 
true. 

All  four  of  these  modes  have  been  used  in   all  ages  of 
the  world.     They  are  distinguished  from   each  other  by 
their  premises.     In  the  first  mode  facts  are   the  premise, 
and  a  principle  is  the   deduction.     That  principle  is   the 
premise  in  the  second  mode.     In  the   third   mode  neces- 
sary forms  of  thought  are   the  premise.     In   the  fourth 
process  absolute   truths  are   the  premise.     In   the  early 
ages  of  the  world  comparatively   few  facts  were   known, 
but  men   could   not  wait   for  further   discoveries  before 
forming  systems.     Man's  impulse  to  system-building  has 
led  to  the  construction  of  systems  of  natural  philosophj^ 
by  every  generation  of  men.     Men  have  always  taken  as 
a  basis  of  their  systems  the  few  facts  known  to  them.     In 
the   absence  of  more   numerous  facts,    there  was   much 
reliance  upon  intuitive  or  subjective  principles  and   abso- 
lute truths.     Their  errors  generally   arose,  however,  not 
from  the  misguidance  of  subjective  principles  or  absolute 
truths,  but  from  mistake  in  reference   to   the  facts.     The 
Ptolemaic  system  of  astronomy,  for  instance,  was  based 
upon  mistaken  facts — the  whole  heavens  seemed  to  revolve 
around  the  earth.     These  were  the  supposed  facts  which 
constituted  the  basis  of  the  system. 


HYPOTHESES  AS  MEANS. 


25 


(5.)  The  fifth  process  is  as  follows:  From  the  intima- 
tion of  a  few  facts,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  these  and 
like  phenomena,  a  supposition  is  made,  or  an  hypothesis 
is  form^jd,  and  then  efforts  are  made  to  ascertain  how  well 
that  hypothesis  will  explain  these  phenomena.  On  the 
basis  of  this  supposition  can  we  account  for  and  explain 
these  phenomena  ?  Do  these  phenomena  accord  with  that 
supposition  ?  Do  they  sustain  that  hypothesis  ?  I  thus 
change  the  language  of  the  question  because  it  appears  to 
me  that  the  phrases,  does  it  explain  the  phenomena  ?  does 
it  account  for  the  phenomena  ?  do  the  phenomena  accord 
with  it  ?  and  do  they  sustain  or  prove  it  ?  are  practically 
the  same.  If  the  supposition  or  hypothesis  is  found  to 
accord  with  a  considerable  number  of  the  phenomena,  it 
is  called  a  theory.  A  theory  is  an  hypothesis  sustained 
by  some  gathered  evidence.  Efforts  are  still  made  to 
discover  its  accordance  with  other,  with  all  related  phe- 
nomena. If  there  are  found  some  phenomena  which  can- 
not be  explained  by  it,  with  which  it  does  not  accord,  the 
theor>'  is  somewhat  modified  to  adapt  it  to  these  new 
facts.  If,  on  further  examination,  there  are  found  some 
facts  which  it  will  not  yet  explain,  still  other  modifications 
are  made  in  it.  Thus  by  successive  modifications,  the 
endeavor  is  to  construct  a  theory  that  will  explain,  or 
accord  with,  all  related  facts,  all  facts  that  are  within  the 
field  of  that  theory. 

This  endeavor  is  prosecuted  by  different  persons,  in 
different  countries,  and  through  successive  generations. 
These  endeavors  constitute  a  very  large  portion  of  the 
work  of  scientists,  and  comprise  a  large  portion  of  scien- 
tific literature.  This  is  the  favorite  method  with  modem 
scientists.  It  is  not  true  that  the  Baconian  method  is  the 
scientific  method  of  the  age.  Men  do  not  go  forth  accu- 
mulating facts,  and  deducing  from  them  theories;  the 
theory  is  already  formed,  and   they  are  seeking  facts  to 


26 


MODES   OF   INVESTIGATION. 


test  it,  or  to  prove  it.  Men  do  not  go  forth  performing 
experiments  haphazard  to  see  what  their  teachings  are, 
without  any  opinions  of  the  results.  The  theor>^  is  already 
formed,  and  according  to  it  they  anticipate  the  results, 
and  now  they  perform  the  experiment  to  ascertain  if  the 
results  accord  with  their  anticipations,  and  thus  confirm 
their  theory.  It  is  not  true,  as  some  suppose,  that  Lord 
Bacon  discovered  or  invented  a  new  scientific  mode.  That 
mode  which  I  have  designated  as  number  one,  was  the 
method  which  he  recommended,  and  it  has  always  been 
the  first  method  of  mankind  in  all  ages  of  the  world.  He 
defined  it  more  clearly  than  it  had  ever  been  defined 
before,  and  analyzed  it  and  gave  names  to  certain  classi- 
fications within  It;  but  no  man  has  ever  followed  his  anal- 
ysis and  classifications,  but  all  men  have  gone  on  using  it, 
as  they  had  always  been  using  it. 

Nor  is  it  true  that  modern  science  is  the  fruit  of  the 
Baconian  method.  Because  the  extraordinary  burst  of 
progress  in  science  which  Newton  inaugurated  occurred 
soon  after  Bacon's  time,  many  have  attributed  it  to  his 
influence.  It  is  true  that  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  who  has 
been  styled  the  father  of  modern  science,  began  his  brill- 
iant career  of  investigation  soon  after  Bacon's  death;  but 
Professor  W.  S.  Jevons  says:  ' '  There  is  no  evidence,  from 
his  writing  or  from  any  other  source,  that  Newton  ever 
read  Bacon's  works. "  It  is  certain  that  he  did  not  follow 
his  mode.  From  the  intimations  of  a  few  facts — probably 
more  than  simply  the  fall  of  an  apple — he  conceived  the 
thought  of  the  force  of  gravity.  This  was  then  a  thought, 
a  supposition,  an  hypothesis,  in  his  mind.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded by  observation  and  experiment  to  test  and  verify 
this  hypothesis.  During  these  investigations  the  thought 
of  its  law  or  mode  of  increase  and  decrease  from  distance 
was  suggested  to  him.  This  was  another  hypothesis,  or 
addition  to  his  former  one.     He  then  proceeded  by  obser- 


POSSIBLE   MISTAKES. 


^7 


vation  to  test  and  prove  this.  He  has  now  the  hypothesis 
of  the  force  of  gravity  and  its  mode  or  law.  He  then 
asked  himself  the  question:  "Will  this  account  for  and 
explain  all  related  natural  phenomena,  including  the  mo- 
tions of  the  heavenly  bodies  ?  The  endeavor  to  show  that 
it  will,  constituted  the  largest  item  in  the  work  of  his 
life.  This  is  not  the  Baconian  method  at  all,  but  it  is  a 
good  example  of  the  one  which  we  now  have  under 
consideration.  This  process  of  first  forming  an  hypothe- 
sis, and  then  looking  for  the  corroborating  facts,  is  what 
Professor  Tyndall  calls  "the  use  of  imagination  in 
science. ' ' 

This  process,  when  used  in  connection  with  other  modes 
of  investigation,  is  often  very  serviceable,  and  can  often 
be  employed  in  the  ascertainment  of  truth.  When  certain 
facts  suggest  a  supposition,  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  that 
we  adopt  it  provisionally,  and  then  see  if  other  facts  cor- 
roborate it.  There  was  no  occasion  for  the  condemnation 
of  this  mode,  by  Bacon  or  any  one  else;  but  it  is  not 
proper,  while  using  it  to  condemn  it,  or  to  exclude  any 
other  legitimate  mode. 

In  using  this  method  we  are  liable  to  mistake  in  two 
ways:  (i)  in  our  earnest  desire  to  find  facts  which  accord 
with  the  hypothesis,  the  facts  themselves  may  be  distorted, 
or  certain  inimical  facts  may  be  excluded  or  covered  up; 
or  (2)  following  the  indications  of  the  hypothesis,  and  to 
answer  its  demands,  certain  facts  may  be  assumed  which 
are  known  to  be  facts  only  because  the  hypothesis  demands 
them.  Thus  many  opinions  respecting  the  nature  and 
doings  of  molecules  have  been  assumed  as  facts,  not  be- 
cause they  are  by  any  other  means  known  to  be  facts,  but 
because  certain  hypotheses  demand  that  they  should  be 
facts.  It  becomes  us  to  be  very  careful  in  admitting  as 
facts  opinions  projected  from  an  hypothesis  and  applied  to 
things.     They  are  of  the  natiure  of  prophecies,  and  may  or 


28 


MODES   OF   INVESTIGATION. 


may  not  be  true,  and  until  they  are  ascertained  by  other 
means  to  be  true,  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  facts. 

Suppose  we  proceed  after  this  manner:     An  hypothesis 
we  have  formed,  or  a  supposition  we  have  made,  indicates 
and  requires  certain  facts.    We  cannot  by  any  other  means 
ascertain  that  they  are  facts,  but  we  will  assume  them  to 
be  facts;  and  from  these  assumed  facts  we  will  construct 
another  hypothesis  respecting  certain  other  things.     This 
hypothesis  requires  certain  facts  respecting  those  things; 
we  cannot  by  any  other  means  discover  that  they  are  facts, 
but  we  will,  on  the  strength  of  our  hypothesis,  assume 
them  to  be  facts.     From  these  assumed  facts  we  will  pro- 
ject another  hypothesis  respecting  still  other  things;  and 
this  hypothesis  demands  other  facts,  and  we  will  assume 
them  to  be  facts;   and  from  these  assumed  facts  we  will 
construct  another  hypothesis,  and  so  on.     Thus  we  may 
proceed  according  to  this  process  until  we  have  constructed 
an  entire  system  of  the  universe.     That  would  be  a  system 
constructed  entirely  upon  imagination  and  faith;  but  these 
are  not  deemed  a  very  stable  foundation  for  a  system  of 
physical  philosophy.     If  we  follow  back  our  track  of  pro- 
gress, we  will  find  that  our  whole  system  rests  upon  the 
truthfulness  of  our  first  hypothesis.    If  our  first  hypothesis 
is  true,  then  such  are  facts;   if  these  are  facts,  our  second 
hypothesis  is  true;    if  this   hypothesis   is  true,  such  are 
other  facts,  and  so  on.    Thus  our  whole  system  rests  upon 
the  truth  of  our  first  supposition.     We  find  too  much  of 
this  in  modern  scientific  speculation;  and  to  this  the  words 
of  Professor   Tait   are   applicable  when   he   says:    "We 
have  no  right  whatever  to  ascertain  a  single  physical  truth 
without  seeking  for  it  physically." 

The  test  of  this  method  is  the  law  of  contradictions.  In 
the  successive  modifications  of  our  hypothesis  to  adapt  it 
to  other  facts,  we  may  render  it  entirely  inconsistent  with 
the  facts  which  first  suggested  it.    We  thus  introduce  into 


TEST  OF  THIS   METHOD. 


29 


■ 


it  a  contradiction,  and  an  absolute  truth  comes  in,  and, 
with  a  voice  as  decisive  as  the  voice  of  Omnipotence,  pro- 
nounces our  hypothesis  false.  It  is  thus  that  the  hypoth- 
esis of  an  universal  ether  has  suffered.  That  it  might  be 
competent  to  transmit  light  and  radiant  heat  at  their 
known  velocity,  it  was  necessary  to  give  it  such  properties 
that  it  became  impervious  to  the  moving  worlds.  If  we 
give  it  such  properties  that  it  becomes  no  obstruction  to 
the  passing  worlds,  it  becomes  entirely  incompetent  to 
transmit  light  and  heat  at  their  known  velocity. 

At  best  this  method  is  a  long  and  laborious  process, 
and  it  can  never  attain  unto  a  demonstration.  The  best 
we  can  do,  usually,  is  to  decide  according  to  what  appears 
to  be  the  balance  of  testimony.  Often  two  or  more  hy- 
potheses will  explain  the  phenomena  about  equally  well, 
then  each  person  will  be  disposed  to  accept  the  hypothe- 
sis which  appears  to  him  to  explain  the  fects  most  per- 
fectly. But  the  choice  of  men  is  not  always  thus  deter- 
mined. Every  man  knows  that  the  hypothesis  of  direct 
divine  agency  in  nature  will  perfectly  explain  all  natural 
phenomena;  but  there  are  many  who  do  not  receive  this 
hypothesis.  Nor  is  this  surprising.  It  seems  very  prob- 
able that  there  are  subordinate  natural  agencies  operating 
in  nature;  and  to  endeavor  to  discover  them,  and  trace 
out  their  working,  as  far  as  we  can  honestly  and  rever- 
ently, seems  entirely  legitimate.  In  the  prosecution  of 
this  endeavor  we  sometimes  meet  with  cases  where  no 
other  method  seems  so  serviceable  as  this,  to  from  a  few 
facts  construct  an  hypothesis,  and  then  test  it  by  an  appli- 
cation to  other  facts.  But  neither  this  nor  any  other 
should  be  our  exclusive  method.  We  have  need  of  all 
methods,  and  it  is  only  by  the  use  of  all  that  we  can  hope 
to  arrive  at  any  true  system  of  physical  philosophy. 

Here  are  five  methods  which  have  been  more  or  less 
employed  by  all  men  in  their  endeavors  to  solve  the  mys- 


11 


30 


MODES  OF   INVESTIGATION. 


teries  of  nature.  The  investigator  may  not  have  all,  or 
any,  of  these  distinctly  defined  in  his  own  mind,  distinct- 
ively premeditated  as  an  instrument  that  he  is  going  to 
use;  but  he  goes  forth  intuitively  using  them  as  means 
for  the  enlargement  of  the  bounds  of  his  knowledge. 
Scientists  of  the  present  day  employ  the  first,  second,  and 
especially  the  fifth,  and  often  repudiate  the  third  and 
fourth.  Metaphysicians  attach  more  importance  to  these; 
hence,  there  is  apt  to  be  some  antagonism  between  science 
and  metaphysics.  It  is  unfortunate  that  science  and  met- 
aphysics have  been  to  so  great  an  extent  separated.  It  is 
folly  to  construct  any  system  that  requires  for  its  main- 
tenance the  exclusion  of  metaphysics.  It  is  vain  to 
expect  that  metaphysics  is  to  be  exiled  and  shut  out  for- 
ever firom  its  influence  upon  human  thought.  Subjective 
principles  and  absolute  truths  will  in  all  future  ages,  as 
they  have  in  all  the  past,  lay  the  foundations  of  all  endur- 
ing systems,  and  ultimately  control  opinion  more  than  all 
other  influences,  and  determine  mainly  the  forms  of  human 
belief. 

The  two  modes  which  scientists  are  disposed  to  exclude 
are  necessary  for  the  construction  of  any  correct  and  com- 
plete system  of  physical  philosophy.  We  can  but  tak 
with  us  our  necessary  subjective  modes  of  thought.  Those 
who  theoretically  repudiate  them  as  guides  do  and  must, 
of  course,  constantly  use  them,  and  rely  upon  them  in  all 
their  mental  operations.  Absolute  truths  we  need  to  take 
with  us,  for  they  declare  beforehand  what  is  possible  and 
what  is  impossible,  and  save  us  the  time  and  labor  wasted 
in  the  construction  of  theories  which  may  be  easily  shown 
to  be  impossible.  They  are  infallible  guides  to  us  in  our 
investigations.  They  are  true,  whatever  else  may  appear. 
If  our  observations  seem  to  conflict  with  them,  we  must 
set  ourselves  immediately  at  work  to  correct  our  observa- 
itons.     If  our  supposed  facts   contradict  them,  we   may 


CERTAIN   GUIDES. 


31 


I 


I 


throw  our  supposed  facts   to  the   winds.     They  and  facts 
can  never  be  at  variance,  and  if  such  a  conflict  appears 
we  may  know  that  we  have  not  yet  obtained  the   facts. 
No  appearances  can  weaken  them;  no  number  of  apparent 
facts  can  impair  their  validity  or  stability.     I  do  not  pro- 
pose to  enter  the  field  of  controversy  respecting  them.     I 
do  not  propose  to  try  to  prove  that   there  are  such  truths. 
If  there  are  no  such  truths,    there  is   no  ultimate  test  of 
truth,  no  bed-rock  of  human  thought,   and  certainty  in 
anything  is  unattainable  to  man.     I  shall  therefore  freely 
use  them,  without  apologizing  to  any  one   for  their  use, 
and  if  the  reader  admits  them,  they  will  guide  him  to  the 
truth;  if  he  does  not  admit  them,  he  will  have   to  follow 
uncertain  guides,  or  grope  in  the  dark.     If  to  the  reader, 
as  they  are  presented  to  him,  they  are  absolute  truths,  he 
may  know  that  whatever  is  not  supported  by  them  is  un- 
certain, and  that  whatever  conflicts  with  them  is   false, 
I  do  not  say  that  all  opinions  expressed  in   the  following 
pages  will  be  supported  by  them,  but  I  would  not  enter- 
tain any  opinion  which  contravenes  one  of  them,  but  we 
shall  find  that  many   opinions   current  in   science  would 
never  have  been  promulgated  or  entertained  but  for  the 
previous  exclusion  of  their  testimony  from   the  halls  of 
science.     In   the   next  chapter  we   will  present  a  list  of 
such  of  them  as  we  may  have  occasion  to  use. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ABSOI.UTK  Truths. 

As  stated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  we  do  not  propose 
to  discuss  the  question,  are  there  absolute  truths?  but 
merely  present  some  that  I  regard  as  such,  and  leave  the 
reader  to  judge  for  himself  whether  he  so  regards  them. 
But  before  doing  so  we  must  define  what  we  mean  by  the 
words  substance,  property  and  doer. 

When  we  undertake  to  define  a  thing  we  would  state 
some  fact  or  facts  respecting  it  that  cannot  be  said  of  any- 
thing else,  that  distinguish  it  from  everything  else.    Now, 
what  can  be  said  of  substance  that  cannot  be  said  of  any- 
thing else  ?     This,  and  this   only,  that  it,  of  itself,  has 
being  in  space,  without  having  anything  else  below  it  or 
behind  it  upon  which   it  depends.     We  may  define   sub- 
stance, then,  as  existence  which  of  itself  occupies  space. 
We  may  add  by  way  of  explanation  of  the  word  itself  in 
this  definition,  that  is  not  dependent  upon  anything  else 
for  the  continuance  of  its  being.     We  would   not,  in  this 
sentence,  join  issue  with  those  who  believe  that  nothing 
finite  continues  in  being  except  as  it  is  sustained  by  divine 
power.     With  those  who  believe  that  nothing  can  subsist 
except  as  it  is  held  in  being  by   divine  power,  and   with 
those  who  believe  that  nothing  in  nature  moves  except  as 
God  moves  it,  and  those  who  believe  that  there  is  no  real 
being  but  God,  I  have  no  discussion.     But  most  people  do 


DEFINITIONS. 


33 


\ 


not  so  believe.  The  great  mass  of  mankind  think  that 
matter  is  itself  substantial  existence,  continuing  in  being 
by  virtue  of  its  own  nature  indestructibly,  and  that  some- 
thing that  is  not  God  moves  matter.  According  to  these 
views,  without  discussing  these  points,  we  frame  our  defi- 
nitions, and  endeavor  to  explain  natural  phenomena.  By 
this  definition  we  would  distinguish  substance  from  prop- 
erty or  attribute.  Of  course  a  property  extends  through 
space  as  much  as  its  substance.  Wherever  in  space  the 
substance  is,  its  property  is;  but  the  property  has  no  exist- 
ence apart  from  its  substance.  It  does  not,  of  itself,  occu- 
py space.  We  may  take  away  all  properties,  except  such 
as  are  inseparable  from  any  finite  existence  in  space — 
location,  extension,  form  and  size — and  yet  the  substance 
is  there.  But  take  the  substance  away  and  no  property 
remains,  nothing  remains.  Hence  we  say,  substance  is 
existence  which  of  itself  occupies  space.  The  relation  of 
this  definition  to  immaterial  substance  will  be  considered 
in  subsequent  chapters. 

A  property  is  an  inherent  characteristic  of  substance. 
This  definition  limits  the  word  to  one  class  of  properties, 
as  they  have  generally  been  treated^.  We  will  hereafter 
have  occasion  to  speak  of  the  different  classes  of  proper- 
ties. At  present  we  use  the  word  only  as  here  defined, — 
an  inherent  characteristic  of  substance,  a  fact  which  is 
not  now  dependent  upon  anything  for  its  existence  but 
its  substance.  Among  properties,  as  the  word  is  gener- 
ally used,  are  included  many  facts — such  as  color,  weight, 
and  so  forth — which  are  dependent  upon  something  out- 
side of  the  substance.  We  now  limit  the  W^rd  to  an  inhe- 
rent characteristic,  dependent  upon  nesting  external  to 
its  substance.  ,  t 

A  doer  is  that  which  producesmotion,  or  effects  change. 
We  sometimes  exert  energy  u|^  bodies,  and  yet  move 
nothing.     In  that  case  there  is  no   doing,  scientifically 


34 


ABSOI.UTK  TRUTHS, 


Speaking,  and  we  are  not  doers.  Energizing  and  doing, 
then,  are  not  synonymous  terms.  We  may  energize  and 
not  do.  Doing  is  energizing  which  effects  change,  or 
causes  motions;  and  a  doer  is  the  thing  which  energizes, 
and  thus  produces  the  motion,  or  effects  the  change. 

Absolute  truths  are  propositions  which  are  true  inde- 
pendent of  the  mind  that  thinks  them,  independent  of  any 
being  that  declares  them,  true  necessarily  in  the  nature 
of  things— their  opposite  is  not  possible.  There  are  many 
such  truths  in  mathematics  and  other  sciences,  but  we 
will  mention  only  such  as  we  may  have  occasion  to  use 
in  our  investigation  of  natural  phenomena.  They  may 
be  classified  in  kinds,  and  we  will  thus  classify  them 
under  the  terms  Absolute  Truths,  Included  Absolute 
Truths,  and  Derivative  Absolute  Truths.  I  do  not  say 
that  they  may  be  known  as  true  without  a  mental  process. 
There  is  no  knowledge  without  an  activity  of  mind.  But 
their  truthfulness  does  not  depend  upon  any  process,  or 
quality,  or  mode,  in  the  nature  of  the  mind  that  thinks 
them.  Those  of  the  first  class  are  known  as  true  by  sim- 
ply mentally  looking  at  them— they  are  self-evident. 
Those  of  the  second  class  are  known  as  true  by  perceiving 
that  they  are  included  in  some  one  of  the  first  class.  Those 
of  the  third  class  are  known  to  be  true  by  perceiving  that 
they  are  included  in  some  one  of  the  second  class. 

ABSOI.UTK   TRUTHS. 

1.  All  material  bodies  exist  in  space. 

2.  Every  body  is  at  a  distance  from  all  bodies  that  it 
does  not  touch. 

3.  Every  bo^  is  some  direction  from  all  other  bodies. 

4.  One  body  ca^pot  occupy   two  different  places  in 
space  at  the  same  time.i  - 

5.  All  events  occur  in  lime. 

6.  Each  event  is  simultaneous   with  other  events,  or 
before  or  after  them.  ^ 


TABLE  OF. 


35 


7.  All  things  in  the  universe  are  either  substance  or 
not  substance. 

8.  Where  no  substance  is,  nothing  is.  I  would  except 
time  and  space;  some  would  not  make  even  these  ex- 
ceptions. 

9.  Nothing  can  do  or  be  done  where  nothing  is. 

10.  Two  contradictories  cannot  both  be  true. 

11.  All  material  bodies  have  size,  or  dimensions. 

12.  Some  bodies  are  larger  or  smaller  than  some   other 
bodies. 

13.  If  one  body  is  larger  or  smaller  than  another,  it  is 
not  of  the  same  size. 

14.  There  are  more  or  less  of  some  things  than  of  others. 

15.  All  material  bodies  have  form. 

16.  All  bodies  have  not  the  same  form. 

17.  Things  are  like  and  unlike  other  things. 

These  I  hold  to  be  absolute  truths.  They  are  not  de- 
pendent upon  the  mind  that  thinks  them.  All  bodies 
exist  in  space.  It  is  not  merely  that  we  must  so  think. 
Bodies  could  not  exist  ouside  of  space,  for  there  is  no 
outside  of  space.  Then  if  they  exist  at  all,  they  must  be 
in  space.  That  is  not  a  fact  that  is  made  or  decreed.  It 
is  a  fact  the  opposite  of  which  is  impossible.  If  any  being 
in  any  world  thinks  contrary  to  any  of  these  propositions, 
he  thinks  a  falsehood.  There  may  be  beings  in  other 
worlds,  as  there  are  on  earth,  who  are  incapable  of  the 
concepts  expressed  in  these  propositions.  To  such  beings, 
of  course,  they  express  neither  truth  nor  falsehood;  but 
to  all  beings  who  can  comprehend  them,  they  declare  the 
truth. 

These   truths  are  independent  of   mind    to  make    or 
unmake  them.     No  being,  not  even   the  infinite  Creator, 
could  make  these  facts  to  be  otherwise  than   as  they  are. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  thirteenth.     If  a  body  is  larger  or 
smaller  than  another,  it  is  not  of  the  same  size.     If  upon 


i'l 


36 


ABSOI.UTE  TRUTHS. 


INCI.UDED  ABSOLUTE  TRUTHS. 


37 


a  two-foot  rule  you  place  a  rule  that  is  only  a  foot  and  a 
half  long,  no  being  in  any  world  could  make  it  true  that 
the  two  rules  are  of  equal  length.  No  being  could  make 
it  true  that  when  one  event  occurs  before  another,  they 
occur  at  the  same  time;  or  that  when  there  are  more  of 
some  things  than  of  others,  they  are  the  same  in  number; 
or  that  when  they  are  alike  in  form,  they  are  unlike;  or 
that  one  body  can  be  in  two  places  in  space  at  the  same 
time — or,  in  other  words,  make  one  equal  to  two. 

These  facts  would  have  been  as  they  are  if  there  had 
been  no  mind  connected  with  their  first  appearance  in 
reality,  and  no  mind  to  think  and  know  them.  When  a 
material  body  came  into  being  it  could  not  have  been 
otherwise  than  in  space;  and  its  advent  could  not  have 
been  otherwise  than  in  time,  and  it  could  not  have  been 
without  form  and  size.  If  the  material  elements  evolved 
themselves  into  shape,  or  even  into  being,  these  facts 
must  have  been  as  they  are.  If  there  had  been  no  mind  to 
think  them  there  would  have  been  no  truth  or  falsehood 
in  reference  to  them— that  is,  no  agreement  of  thought 
with  things;  but  the  facts  would  have  been  as  they  are. 

Here,  then,  we  have  a  list — it  might  have  been  ex- 
tended—of absolute  independent  truths.  These  form  an 
infaUible  basis  of  universal  knowledge,  and  every  intelli- 
gent being  in  all  worlds  must  think  according  to  them,  if 
he  thinks  the  truth;  and  if  he  does  not  think  according  to 
them.,  he  thinks  a  falsehood.  These  are  infallible  guides 
to  us  as  we  go.  forth  in  the  study  of  nature.  All  theories 
and  systems  must  conform  to  them,  or  be  torn  in  pieces  by 
them.  On  this  rock  must  all  foundations  be  laid,  or  ruin 
and  disaster  await  the  edifice. 

Each  of  these  propositions  contains  many  others  which 
might  be  made,  expressing  the  application  of  some  abso- 
lute truth  to  a  class  of  cases,  or  to  a  limited  number  of 
objects.     These  we  have  denominated  Included  Absolute 


Truths.  They  are  as  certainly  true  as  the  absolute  truths 
themselves,  because  they  are  included  in  the  absolute 
truths,  and  carry  with  them  all  the  authority  of  the  abso- 
lute truth  which  contains  them.  We  might  swell  the  list 
of  included  propositions  to  great  proportions,  but  we 
mention  only  a  few.  The  sixth  of  the  foregoing  absolute 
truths  includes  the  following: 

1 .  If  an  event  occurs  before  another,  it  does  not  occur 
after  it;  ^nd  if  we  say  it  occurs  after,  we  speak  a  falsehood. 

2.  If  it  occurs  after,  it  does  not  occur  before;  and  to 
assert  that  it  occurs  before,  is  to  assert  a  falsehood. 

8.  If  it  occurs  before  or  after,  it  does  not  occur  at  the 

same  time. 

4.  If  it  occurs  at  the  same  time,  it  does  not  occur  before 

or  after. 

The  tenth  of  the  foregoing  absolute  truths — two  con- 
tradictions cannot  both  be  true— includes  the  following: 

5.  A  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time;  be 
and  not  be  are  a  contradiction. 

6.  A  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  in  the  same  place  at 
the  same  time.  If  it  is  not  there,  to  say  that  it  is  there  is 
a  falsehood;   if  it  is  there,  to  say  that  it  is  not  there  is  a 

falsehood. 

7.  A  thing  which  is  not  cannot  do;  do  and  not  be  are  a 

contradiction. 

8.  A  thing  cannot  do  when  it  is  not. 

9.  A  thing  cannot  do  where  it  is  not;  doing  where  it  is 
not  is  doing  without  being — a  contradiction. 

10.  No  substance  can  do  outside  of  its  own  limits;  doing 
outside  of  its  own  limits  is  doing  where  it  is  not — a  con- 
tradiction. 

11.  If  a  thing  does,  we  know  that  it  is,  and  that  it  is 
where  it  does,  unless  it  uses  some  medium  to  effect  remote 

results. 

12.  All  doing  requires  a  doer.     This  is  another  way  of 


38 


ABSOI.UTE   TRUTHS. 


stating  number  7  above.  Doing  without  being  is  a  con- 
tradiction. Here  is  doing;  then  there  must  be  being  in 
the  doer,  something  which  is  and  does,  and  which  cannot 
do  unless  it  is.  Doing  without  being  in  the  doer  is  a 
contradiction.  Doing  without  a  doer  is  a  contradiction. 
If  there  is  doing,  there  must  be  being  in  the  doer;  the 
doer  must  be. 

13.  No  property  can  be  without  a  substance  of  which  it 
is  a  property.  Property  of  a  thing  which  is  not  contains  a 
contradiction — thing  and  no  thing. 

14.  Where  there  is  a  property  there  must  be  a  substance 
of  which  it  is  a  property. 

The  eighth  of  the  foregoing  absolute  truths — where  no 
substance  is  nothing  is — contains  the  following: 

15.  Nothing  but  substance  can  be  translated  in  space, 
or  moved  from  one  place  to  another.  Of  course,  this  ad- 
mits that  where  substance  is  moved,  it  carries  with  it  its 
properties.  Where  no  substance  is  nothing  is  to  be  moved. 
There  can  be  no  motion  without  substance.  When  sub- 
stance is  not  moved,  nothing  is  moved.  Nothing  but 
substance  can  be  translated  in  space.  Of  course,  that 
which  does  not  occupy  one  place  in  space  cannot  be  made 
to  occupy  successively  different  places  in  space.  The  ninth 
of  the  foregoing  absolute  truths — nothing  can  do  or  be 
done  where  nothing  is — includes  the  following: 

16.  Nothing  but  substance  can  do,  or  be  a  doer.  Where 
no  substance  is  nothing  is  to  do.  Where  substance  is 
nothing  else  is  but  properties  and  relations,  and  these  can 
never  be  doers.  Then  there  is  nothing  there  that  can  be 
a  doer  but  substance.  Nothing  can  move  or  be  moved  in 
space  but  substance.  Nothing  that  cannot  move  or  be 
moved  in  space  can  effect  changes  in  other  things,  or  cause 
motion  or  be  a  doer. 

17.  Then  all  doers  are  substance.  Then  whenever  or 
wherever  we  discover  doing  or  change,  we  know  that 


DERIVATIVE  ABSOI.UTE  TRUTHS. 


39 


there  is  a  doer,  and  that  there  is  substance  which  is  the 
doer. 

Now  if  what  we  have  here  called  included  absolute 
truths  are  really  included,  they  have  all  the  authority  and 
certainty  of  the  absolute  truths  themselves.  The  only 
question  that  can  arise  in  reference  to  them  is,  Are  they 
included?  Th'^  only  answer  ever  given  to  number  9,  by 
any  one,  including  Kant,  is  the  impossibility  of  explaining 
apparent  facts,  supposing  matter  to  be  the  doer.  ^  This  is 
a  poor  objection  for  a  metaphysician  to  offer.  Then  the 
apparent  facts  are  not  real  facts,  or  matter  is  not  the  doer. 
The  statement  in  number  9  is  true  anyhow,  and  we  must 
conform  our  physical  philosophy  to  it. 

Each  of  these  included  absolute  truths  contains  many 
others  which  are  applications  of  these  to  specific  cases. 
These  we  have  denominated 

DERIVATIVE   ABSOI.UTE  TRUTHS. 

The  twelfth  of  the  foregoing  included  absolute  truths — 
all  doing  requires  a  doer — includes  the  following: 

1.  Pushing  requires  a  doer. 

2.  Pulling  requires  a  doer. 

3.  Lifting  requires  a  doer. 

4.  Separating  requires  a  doer. 

5.  Uniting  requires  a  doer. 

6.  Change  requires  a  doer. 

7.  All  motion  requires  a  doer. 

And  as  many  more  as  there  are  kinds  of  doing. 

The  thirteenth  of  the  foregoing  included  absolute  truths 
— no  property  can  be  without  a  substance — includes  the 
following: 

8.  No  property  can  exist  apart  from  its  substance. 

9.  No  property  can  be  separated  fi-om  its  substance  and 
continue  to  be. 

10.  No  property  can  be  transferred  or  communicated 
from  one  substance  to  another. 


!! 


1 1 


40 


ABSOI.UTK  TRUTHS. 


11.  No  property  can  existrwhen  its  substance  is  not. 

12.  No  property  can  exist  where  its  substance  is  not. 

13.  No  property  -an  exist  beyond  the  limits  of  its  sub- 
stance; for  then  it  would  be  where  its  substance  is  not. 

14.  If  we  discover  a  property,  we  know  that  its  sub- 
stance is,  and  that  it  is  where  the  property  is. 

Thus  we  have  two  means  of  knowing  when  and  where 
substance  is:    (i)    If  we  discover   doing,  we  know  that 
there  is  a  doer — substance — which  does.     (2)  If  we  dis- 
cover a  property,  we  know  that  there  is  substance  there, 
of  which  it  is  a  property.     The  former  of  these  has  been 
called  the  law  of  cause  and  effect;    the  latter  has  been 
called  the  law  of  the  relation  of  property  and  substance. 
They  are  both  intuitive  or  subjective  principles-  that  is, 
the  mind  must  so  think;   but  we  do  not  here  base  their 
authority  upon  this  fact,  but  upon  the  fact  that  they  are 
included  in  absolute  truths. 

The  seventh  of  the   foregoing  absolute  truths   asserts 
that  all  things  in  the  universe  are  either  substance  or  not 
substance.     Whenever  anything  is  discovered  or  spoken 
of,  we  can  classify  it  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  terms; 
and  we  should  do  so  for  the  sake  of  clearness.     Immense 
confusion   has   crept  into   natural  philosophy  through  a 
neglect  to  do  so.    Substance  and  attribute  are  confounded, 
and  one  treated  as  the  other.    Properties  and  relations  are 
treated  as  though  they  were  real  space-filling,  independent 
existences      Indeed,  is  would  seem  that  some  men  have 
raised  a  cloud  of  dust  on  purpose  to  obscure  the  line  of 
distinction  between  substance  and  property.    I  very  much 
desire  to  know  of  some  men  who  treat  very  largely  of 
force  and  energy,  what  they  mean  by  them,  whether  they 
think  them  substances  or  properties;   and  whether  they 
consider  motion  a  substance  or  a  relation.  There  is  in  much 
of  modern  philosophy  a  painful  indefiniteness  and  obscura- 
tion of  the  idea  of  substance.     No  doubt  this  has  resulted 


GENKRA1.IZAT10NS. 


41 


largely  from  the  opinion  entertained  by  many  that  we  can 
know  nothing  of  substance,  that  we  can  know  only  prop- 
erties, or  only  appearances,  and  from  the  influence  of 
Comteanism  in  scientific  study.  By  these  we  are  cut  ofiF 
from  all  knowledge  of  reality,  and  shut  up  to  phenomenal- 
ism, appearances,  which  may  be  delusions. 

Besides  these  absolute  truths  there  are  some  generaliza- 
tions which  are  thought  to  be  universals.  They  are 
sometimes  classed  among,  and  treated  as  though  they 
were,  absolute  truths.  They  have  no  such  authority  as 
absolute  truths,  but  they  are  often  useful,  though  not 
infallible,  guides.     We  will  mention  two  or  three  of  these: 

An  exertion  of  energy  is  necessary  to  produce  motion. 
This  is  a  generalization  from  experience  and  observation. 
We  find  that  in  every  case  where  we  can  know  the  fact§, 
an  exertion  of  energy  is  necessarj^  to  produce  motion.  We 
know  that  when  we  start  matter  in  motion,  we  do  it  by  an 
exertion  of  energy.  We  know  that  the  motion  of  every 
moving  body  which  comes  against  us  is  attended  with  an 
exertion  of  energy.  From  these  facts  we  conclude  that  in 
every  case  of  motion,  there  is  an  exertion  of  energy  to 
produce  it.  We  have  b}-  an  absolute  truth  limited  the  class 
of  doers  to  substances.  By  this  generalization  we  limit  the 
class  doers  to  those  substances  which  are  capable  of  ener- 
gizing, or  which  possess  the  property  of  energy.  This 
generalization  is  proof  in  all  cases,  until  some  instances  of 
motion  where  there  is  no  exertion  of  energy  to  produce  it 
are  discovered.  No  such  instances  have  yet  been  found. 
Though  this  is  a  generalization,  it  is  parallel  with  an  in- 
cluded absolute  truth — all  doing  or  change  requires  a 
doer. 

Another  generalized  universal  is — All  things  in  the 
universe  are  included  in  three  denominations,  substances, 
attributes  and  relations.  This  generalization  is  proof  until 
something  is  discovered  which  is  not  included.     Those 


'I! 

II 


42 


ABSOI.UTE   TRUTHS. 


GENERALIZATIONS. 


43 


who  think  that  these  include  all,  count  time  and  space 
among  the  attributes;  some  say  attributes  of  the  human 
mind,  and  some  attributes  of  the  divine  mind.  This  class- 
ification cannot  be  used  to  prove  that  time  and  space  are 
attributes  of  God,  for  it  is  a  generalization  made  merely 
upon  the  supposition  that  it  includes  all;  and  if  there  are 
some  things  which  are  not  included,  some  other  denomi- 
nations must  be  added.  Make  the  classification,  substan- 
ces, attributes,  relations,  space,  and  time,  and  I  know  of 
nothing  that  is  not  included. 

Another  generalization  is — "Nothing  can  never  become 
something,  and  something  can  never  become  nothing."  I 
suppose  this  generalization  is  put  in  this  negative  form  for 
the  sake  of  disproving  something.  The  positive  form  of  it 
is  called  the  law  01  continuity,  wliich  asserts  that  the 
quantity  of  existence  is  unchangeable.  Great  use  is  made 
of  this  generalization  in  modern  physical  philosophy.  It 
has  been  deemed  sufficient  to  prove  any  po  nt  to  which  it 
can  be  applied.  It  is  the  basis  of  many  scientific  opinions, 
and  performs  a  large  part  in  the  construction  of  many 
scientific  theories.  It  reaches  out  into  the  invisible,  and 
is  deemed  sufficient  to  prove  existence  of  which  we  have 
no  other  evidence.  It  reaches  back,  and  narrates  the 
histor}'  oi  c  -^ation  in  the  eternal  past.  It  reaches  forward 
and  prophesies  of  the  destiny  of  the  universe  in  the  eternal 
future.  It  makes  matter  eternal,  or  else  a  part  of  God. 
Even  the  infinite  Creator  could  not  change  the  quantity  of 
existence;  if  he  brought  tliiags  into  being,  it  was  at  the 
expense  of  his  own  being,  f^r  no  change  in  the  quantity 
of  being  is  possible.  It  is  somewhat  amusing  to  see  with 
what  triumphant  assurance  some  men  use  this  generaliza- 
tion, while  peremptorily  forbidding  to  others  the  use  of 
any  a  priori  principles. 

Such  men  give  it  all  the  authority  of  an  absolute  trntli. 
The  quantity  of  existence  is  unchangeable.     Is  it?     Now 


how  do  you  know?  We  certainly  do  not  see  this  propo- 
sition to  be  true  by  merely  mentally  looking  at  it.  I  see 
nothing  impossible  in  the  increase  or  decrease  of  exist- 
ence. It  is  not  a  necessary  fact  in  the  nature  of  things, 
the  opposite  of  which  is  impossible.  It  is  not  included 
in  an  absolute  truth.  Being  and  not  being  at  the  same 
time  are  a  contradiction.  But  being  at  one  time  and  not 
bein£-  at  another  time  are  not  a  couiradiction. 

It  is  not  an  intuition,  or  a  necessary  process  of  mind. 
Comparatively  few  of  the  human  beings  who  have  lived 
upon  the  earth  have  thought  that  way.  True,  to  many  of 
them  the  propositio'i  has  not  been  stated,  but  its  opposite 
has  been  stated  to  them,  and  they  have  believed  that. 
Most  mankind  now^  believe  that  when  a  stick  of  wood  is 
burned,  something  goes  out  of  being;  and  they  have  no 
mental  difficulty  in  thus  believing.  When  the  indestructi- 
bility of  matter  was  first  stated  as  a  scientific  fact,  few 
believed  it.  It  reiiiained  the  opinion  of  the  few,  even 
among  philosophers,  until  Gay  lyussac  proved  it  by  ex- 
periment. 

Those  philosophers  who  derive  what  are  called  necessary 
truths  from  huinan  inability,  place  this  among  such  truths. 
We  cannot  see  how  existence  could  be  increased  or  dhnin- 
ished.  Well,  if  principles  based  upon  human  weakness 
are  the  only  tests  of  truth,  we  are  indeed  in  a  deplorable 
state. 

This  postulate  is  a  generalization  from  observed  facts. 
There  is  a  persistence  in  being  observed  in  nature,  observed 
long  before  the  indestructibility  of  matter  was  declared. 
In  many  cases  when  one  thing  was  seen  to  enlarge,  some- 
thing else  was  seen  to  decrease.  So  many  facts  of  this 
kind  were  discovered  that  men  generalized  that  these  cases 
were  not  a  going  out  of  being  and  coming  into  being,  but 
a  change  from  one  form  of  being  into  another,  and  that 
the  quanti  y  of  existence  in  these   cases  remained  un- 


44 


ABSOI.UTK  TRUTHS. 


changed.  From  these  facts  men  made  the  generalization 
— the  quantity  of  existence  always  remains  the  same. 
When  the  indestructibility  of  matter  was  demonstrated, 
that  confirmed  the  generalization.  When  the  idea  that 
force  or  energy  was  persistent  and  changeable  in  form, 
was  brought  forward  and  some  facts  seemed  to  favor  the 
idea,  this  strengthened  still  more  the  generalization.  Thus 
we  see  that  it  is  wholly  dependent  upon  obser\'ed  facts. 

There  is,  however,  in  our  mental  constitution,  an  intui- 
tion which  favors  and  helps  in  the  construction  of  this  and 
all  other  generalizations— that  is,  man's  natural  expecta- 
tion of  continuance,  sameness,  unity  of  being.     What  we 
see  now  to  be,  we  expect  has  been  and  will  be.     But  this 
expectation  is  a  hmited  intuition,  limited  by  the  intuition 
of  individuality,  or  the  expectation  of  limits  and  bounds 
in  space,  and  beginnings  and  endings  in  time,  which  we 
find  to  be  true  of  individual  things.     Hence  we  are  left  to 
observ-ed  facts,  after  all,  to  determine  what  things  con- 
tinue, and  what  begin  and  end.     Facts  prove  it  true  of 
material  substance  in  the  present  order  of  things;  whether 
it  is  true  of  anything  else  or  not,  we  must  ascertain  by 
research  and  experiment.     Attempts  have  been  made  to 
show  that  it  is  true  of  motion,  and  force,  and  energy. 
The  generalization  has  no  authority  to  decide  beforehand 
in  reference  to  these,  or  anything  else  that  is  within  the 
reach  of  observation.     We  must  ascertain  whether  it  is 
true  of  them  or  not  by  first  ascertaining  what  they  are, 
and  then  by  an  examination  of  facts.     The  generalization 
may,  of  course,  include  time  and  space,  for  they,  being 
illimitable,  are  absolutely  unchangeable  in  quantity.     The 
results  of  observation  and  experiment  justify  us  in  apply- 
ing it  to  matter,   and  we  may  say  that  the  quantity  of 
material  substance  is  at  present  unchangeable,    by  any 
finite  power.     It  is  probable  that  it  may  be  extended  to 
immaterial  substance,  and   that  we  may  say  in  general 


GENKRAI.IZATIONS. 


45 


terms,  substance  is  unchangeable  in  quantity  by  any 
finite  power.  Further  than  this  it  will  probably  never  be 
carried;  for,  besides  time,  space,  and  substance,  there  is 
nothing  more  but  attributes  and  relations ;  and  facts  teach 
us  that  these  are  subject  to  change,  and  may  begin  and 
€nd,  be  and  cease  to  be. 

Generalizations  never  render  contrary  facts  impossible. 
They  are  universals  only  so  long  as  all  discovered  facts 
accord  with  them.  The  discovery  of  one  contrary  fact 
destroys  at  once  a  generalized  universal.  A  generaliza- 
tion must  give  way  before  facts.  An  absolute  truth  will 
override  any  number  of  apparent  facts — of  course,  there 
can  be  no  conflict  between  an  absolute  truth  and  real  facts. 
A  generalization  declares  what  probably  is ;  an  absolute 
truth,  what  must  necessarily  be. 


^> 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Matter. 


We  are  now  to  enter  upon  the  study  of  the  material 
world.     We  must  first  explain  and  vindicate  our  definition 
of  substance.     We  have  defined  substance  as    existence 
which  of  itself  occupies  space.     It  is  the  reality  of  which 
all   appearances   and   properties    are   attributes.      Much 
pleasantry  and  even  ridicule  have  been  bestowed  upon 
the  substratum  which  lies  back  of  all  properties,    ''pure 
being,"  into  which  properties  are  ''stuck,  Hke  pins  in  a 
pincushion."     This  is  a  misrepresentation  of  the  opinions 
of  realists.     No  one  believes  in  pure  being  as  existence 
separated  from  all  properties.     Substance  and  properties 
may  be  logically,  in  thought,  separated ;  but  in  reality  no 
substance  exists  without  properties.     Here  we  have,  at 
the  beginning  of  our  investigation,  occasion  for  the  use 
of  some  of  our  absolute  truths  :  All  material  bodies  have 
location  in   space,  extension,  fonn,    aitd  size,     I^ocation, 
extension,  form,  and  size,  are  properties  without  which 
no  material  substance  can  be.     And  yet  the   substance 
does  not  exist  only  in  these  properties— it  is  not  true  that 
only  location,   extension,   form,   and  size  exist,   or  that 
these  properties  constitute  the  existence ;  but  somethmg 
exists  which  is  located  and  extended,  and  which  has  form 
and  size.     Nor  are  these  properties  external  to  the  sub- 
stance, added  to  being,  or  "stuck  into  it ;"  but  they  are 
facts  respecting  being,  and  inseparable  from  it.      These 
properties  are  not  attached  to  bodies  by  their  Creator,  but 
they  are  necessary  facts  respecting  existence.     They  are 
not  created  attributes ;  but  if  a  body  be  by  any  means 


SUBSTANCE. 


47 


,1 


created,  these  facts  necessarily  attach  to  it.  There  is  no 
"pure  being"  separable  in  reality  from  these  properties. 
When  we  have  gone  down  to  the  bottom  and  reached  the 
ultimate  finite  reality,  we  have  existence  located  and 
extended,  with  form  and  size.  This  is  to  us  the  ultimate 
reality,  and  there  is  no  finite  being  back  of  this,  or  purer 
than  this.  Such  an  ultimate  reality  is  neither  nonde- 
script nor  inconceivable.  We  do  in  thought,  for  logical 
and  scientific  purposes,  distinguish  between  the  located 
and  extended  reality,  and  location  and  extension,  and 
call   the   former  substance,   and  the   latter  attributes  or 

properties. 

It  has  been  said  that  "A  power  of  action  is  the  only 
assignable  difference  between  something  and  nothing." 
This  statement  assumes  the  whole  dynamic  theory  of 
matter.  Whether  the  molecules  of  matter  are  in  constant 
motion,  and  have  power  to  move  themselves  or  not,  is  a 
question  open  for  discussion,  and  the  affirmative  of  this 
question  is  not  proven  by  any  a  priori  assumption  of  it. 
Whether  matter  has  the  power  of  action  or  not  we  shall 
subsequently  consider,  but  before  that,  is  the  question  of 
the  existence  and  reality  of  matter.  Is  not  filled  space 
and  empty  space  an  "assignable  difference?"  I  can 
conceive  of  material  bodies  either  in  motion  or  at  rest,  but 
in  both  cases  they  occupy  space.  The  fact  of  their  occur 
pancy  of  space  is  more  primary,  then,  than  the  question 
of  their  activity.  Again  it  has  been  said,  "Being  has  its 
existence  only  in  its  action."  This  is  an  expression 
of  opinion,  or  it  may  be  considered  a  thesis  to  be 
proven;  but  it  cannot  be  advanced  as  proof.  No 
theor>^  of  the  nature  of  being  can  be  established  by 
inferences  derived  from  the  dynamic  theory  of  matter. 
If  that  theory  is  denied,  these  inferences  derived  from 
it  prove  nothing  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  being  or 
substance. 


1 

iii 


l» 


48 


MATTKR. 


I  have  defined  substance   by   a   fact   which   is   never 
absent  from  substance,  and  never  present  with  anything 
else,    and   which   therefore  clearly  distinguishes  it  from 
everything  else.     Substance,  having  location  and  exten- 
sion, occupies  space,  and  each  body  or  mass  of  substance 
fills  a  portion  of  space.      IV/iere  no  substance  is  not/mig  is. 
There  can  be  no  attributes,  properties,   or  relations  in 
space  where  there  is  no  substance.     Attributes,  properties, 
and  relations  never  do  of  themselves  occupy  space.     A 
property  occupies  the  same  space  that  its  substance  does, 
and   is   as    extended    as    its   substance — wherever   that 
substance  is,   that  property   is.     The  property  occupies 
that  space  only  because  its  subhtance  does,  and  in  the 
absence  of  its  substance  it  has  no  being,  and  hence  does 
not  of  itself  occupy  space.     All  space-filling  existence  is 
substance  ;  all  existence  which  does  not  of  itself  fill  or 
occupy  space  is  not  substance.     What  more  perfect  defi- 
nition   can    there   be   than  one  which  exactly  describes 
the  thing  defined,  and  distinguishes  it  from  everything 
else  ?     Of  every  mass  of  substance  which  occupies  space, 
and  has  extension,  form,  and  size,  every  person  can  have 
a  clear  and  satisfactory  conception. 

Having  obtained  a  clear  conception  of  substance,  we 
say  that  that  substance  which  has  weight,  inertia  and  im- 
penetrabiHty  we  call  matter.  We  may  define  matter,  then, 
as  substance  which  has  weight,  inertia,  and  impenetrabil- 
ity. There  may  be  substances  which  are  not  subject  to  the 
force  of  gravity,  and  which  have  no  inertia,  and  which 
are  penetrable  to  other  substances.  Such  substances  are 
not  matter,  but  immaterial  substances.  Weight,  inertia, 
and  impenetrability  distinguish  matter  from  immaterial 
substance.  Weight  is  also  taken  to  be  a  correct  measure 
of  the  quantity  of  matter. 

In  regard  to  the  ultimate  structure  of  matter  there  are 


THEORIES  OF, 


49 


a  variety  of  opinions.  I  will  mention  some  of  these 
theories  here,  not  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  them,  but 
that  we  may  have  them  before  our  minds,  and  that  others 
may  know  what  we  mean  when  we  refer  to  them. 

Boscovich  is  credited  with  a  theory  which  makes  each 
atom  of  matter  a  resisting  center  of  force.  According  to 
this  theory  the  material  universe  is  made  up  of  resisting 
centers  of  force.  There  is  nothing  in  the  universe  but 
force.  In  this  theory  there  is  the  same  indefiniteness  and 
vagueness  in  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  force,  or 
what  force  is,  which  pervades  so  much  of  modern  science  : 
we  are  not  told  whether  he  means  by  the  word  force  a 
substance  or  an  attribute. 

Dr.  Laurens  P.  Hickok,  in  "Creator  and  Creation," 
brings  forward  another  theory.  According  to  this,  in 
creation  the  divine  will  went  forth  in  action.  An  action 
necessitates  a  reaction.  Hence  two  divine  energizings 
went  forth  in  opposite  directions,  producing  a  revolvirg 
sphere  of  energizing.  Each  one  of  these  spheres  is  an 
atom  of  matter.  These  atoms,  or  revolving  spheres  of 
the  divine  energy,  become  in  a  sense  objective  to  God, 
and  persist  in  indestructible  existence,  and  perpetual 
activity.  The  material  universe  is  made  up  of  such 
atoms. 

Dr.  Herman  Lotze,  of  Germany,  suggested  a  theory  a 
little  different  from  this.  Like  Hickok  he  has  each  atom 
a  sphere  or  point  of  divine  energizing,  but  these  atoms 
never  become  in  any  sense  objective  to  God,  never  have  a 
separate  or  self-perpetuating  existence,  but  are  perpetual 
divine  energiznig.  Each  atom  of  the  material  world  is  a 
constant  divine  energizing. 

Sir  William  Thompson,  of  Scotland,  has  proposed  still 
another  theory  of  matter.  According  to  this  theory  each 
atom  of  matter  is  a  revolving  portion  of  the  supposed 
universal  ether.     When  the  ether  is  at  rest,  we  can  live 


■I  1  ■ 


<1 


50 


MATTER. 


and  move  around  in  it  and  not  be  conscious  of  its  pres- 
ence ;  but  when  certain  motions  are  started  in  it,  it 
becomes  impenetrable  and  tangible.  When  the  motion  is 
of  one  kind,  it  is  one  kind  of  matter  ;  when  the  motion  is 
different,  it  is  another  kind  of  matter,  and  so  on. 

All  these  theories  come  so  in  conflict  with  the  evidence 
of  our  senses,  and   are   so   contrary  to   the    conclusions 
reached   by  mankind  in  all  ages  from  observation,  that 
only  the  most  conclusive   and   indubitable   proofs   could 
render  any  one  of  them  rational  or  acceptable  to  the  mass 
of  mankind.     No  such  indubitable  proofs  have  been  pre- 
sented.    If  we  say  with  Lotze,  and  all  other  idealists,  that 
our  senses  can  give  us  no   knowledge  whatever   of  the 
material  world,  that  all  we  know  is  our  own  thoughts  and 
mental  states,  of  course,  we  may  form   any   opinion  or 
theory  we  please  respecting  the  nature  of  that  unknown 
something  which  we  call  the  material  universe.     Shut  up 
to   our   own    thoughts,    or,    as   phenomenalists,    to    the 
shadows  that  float  before  our  minds,  we  are  shut  away 
from  all  contact  with  matter  and  the  worlds,  and  we  can 
sit  and  dream  of  what  is  beyond  ourselves,  and  weave  our 
somnambulic  visions  into  any  /orm  we  please.     Remember 
that  the  first  step  in  the  formation  of  these  theories  is  to 
say,  We  know  nothing  of  the  material  world  through  our 
senses. 

But  if  we  take  our  senses  as  guides,  and  believe  that 
things  are  as  our  senses  give  them  to  us,  no  one  can 
believe  that  any  of  the  foregoing  theories  of  matter  are 
true.  We  know  that  in  some  instances  the  opinions  we 
form  immediately  through  our  senses  alone  are  not  true, 
and  we  have  to  correct  them  by  processes  of  reasoning,' 
but  those  processes  must  be  based  upon  facts,  and  not 
upon  some  theory  we  have  formed  respecting  that  un- 
known something  which  we  suppose  lo  be  outside  of  us. 
The  question  is :  What  opinions  or  theory  of  matter  best 


ATOMIC  THEORY. 


51 


accord  with  observed  facts,  with  what  we  know  of  matter 
through  our  senses  ?  Take  the  facts  as  we  discover  them 
to  be,  w^hat  must  be  our  opinions  of  matter  ?  When  this 
is  the  question  before  us,  and  w^e  take  observed  facts 
as  our  premise,  I  think  no  rational  being  will  take  any  of 
the  foregoing  theories  of  matter  in  preference  to  the  old 
atomic  theory. 

We  return  then  to  the  atomic  theory  of  matter.     This 
theory   supposes    that    matter   is   composed   of  ultimate 
particles   which   cannot   be   further   practically   divided. 
They  are  hard,  solid  bodies.      If  a  solid  or  liquid   ele- 
mentary substance  is  vaporized   by  heat,  its   atoms   are 
separated   from   each   other,    but   each   atom  retains   its 
structure   and   form,    as   solid   and   compact   as  ever,    a 
minute  solid  body.      The  atoms  of  an  element  are  not 
susceptible  of  any  change  in  properties   or  structure  or 
size  by  any  means  known  to  man.      The  atoms  of  the 
same  substance  are  always  of  the  same  size.     The  atoms 
of  different  substances  vary  in  size.     All  the  properties  of 
any  substance  inhere  in  each  of  its  atoms. 

If  two  or  more  atoms  of  the  same  substance  or  of 
unlike  substances  unite  together  chemically,  the  resulting 
body  is  called  a  molecule.  If  the  atoms  are  of  the  same 
substance,  there  is  no  change  in  their  chemical  properties 
— it  is  still  the  same  elementary  substance.  When  two 
or  more  atoms  of  different  substances  unite  chemically  and 
form  a  molecule,  many  of  the  properties  of  the  two  con- 
stituents are  lost,  and  a  new  substance  with  new  properties 
is  formed.  If  two  substances  chemically  unite,  they  unite 
atom  to  atom.  If  further  union  is  effected,  the  number 
of  atoms  of  one  or  both  the  constituents  is  doubled,  or 
trebled,  or  quadrupled.  When  two  atoms  unite,  one  of 
each  of  two  different  substances,  a  compound  with  one 
set  of  properties  is  formed.  When  one  atom  of  one 
constituent,  and|two  atoms  of  the  other  unite,  a  substance 


52 


MATTER. 


with  Other  properties  is  formed,  and  so  on.  The  smallest 
particle  of  a  compound  substance  is  a  molecule.  If  a 
molecule  is  divided,  it  is  chemically  decomposed,  resolved 
into  ultimate  atoms. 

All  modern   chemistry  is   based   upon   this   theory  of 
matter.     If  any  other  theory  should  be  adopted  an  entire 
reconstruction  of  chemistry  would  be  necessary.     This  is 
the  simplest,  and  to  common  observation  the  most  rational 
theory  of  matter.      But  it  alone  cannot  account  for  the 
actions   and  reactions  which   appear   to  be  going  on  in 
matter.      It  is   to   account    for   these   that   those   other 
theories  of  matter  have  been  proposed.      But   there  are 
ways   of  explaining   these   activities  which   allow  us   to 
retain   this   natural   view   of  matter.      Scientists,    while 
holding  to  the  atomic  theor>',  have  endeavored  to  account 
for  the  activities  in  matter  in  three  different  ways,  or  by 
three  different  theories.     We  see  that  matter  is  to  a  very 
large  extent    in    motion.      Atoms  appear   to   act   upon 
other  atoms,  molecules  upon  other  molecules,  and  masses 
upon  other  masses.     Now  the  question  is  :     How  can  we 
explain  these  activities?     What  is  the  mover  or  movers 
in   these   cases?      In   answer   to    these   questions   three 
theories  have  been  proposed  by  scientists. 

One  of  them  is  that  energy  is  a  persistent,  indestruc- 
tible something  which  is  forever  working  on  in  matter, 
an  unchangeable  quantity  of  energizing.  Its  advocates 
do  not  tell  us  how  it  came  to  be.  Many  of  them,  after 
the  teaching  of  Comte,  do  not  think  it  the  business  of 
philosophy  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  cause  of  things. 
On  coming  to  years  of  understanding  we  find  ourselves  in 
the  midst  of  a  universe  of  moving  matter.  We  are  not  to 
inquire  how  it  came  to  be,  but  only  what  is  the  mover? 
This  question  is  answered  by  saying  that  moving  matter 
coming  against  other  matter  moves  that,  and  that  moves 
other  matter,  and  so  on.     The  power  of  moving  matter  to 


DYNAMIC  THEORY. 


53 


move  other  matter,  is  called  energy,  or  sometimes  dyna- 
mic or  kinetic  energy.'  This  working  energy  is  inde- 
structible, and  remains  always  the  same  in  quantity  on 
earth,  except  as  it  is  dissipated  away  in  space  in  the 
form  of  heat  and  light.  When  bodies  of  sensible  size  are 
moving,  it  is  called  molar  motion.  When  bodies  of 
insensible  size — atoms  and  molecules — are  moving,  it  is- 
called  molecular  motion.  This  working  energy  may 
change  from  masses  to  molecules  and  from  molecules  to 
masses,  from  molecular  to  molar  motion,  and  back  again, 
remaining  unchanged  in  quantity.  This  working  energy 
may  change  from  one  to  another,  and  another,  and  another 
form  of  working  energy,  or  mode  of  motion  ;  its  quan- 
tity remaining  forever  the  same.  When  molecular  motion 
appears  in  one  form,  it  is  called  heat ;  when  it  appears  in 
another  form,  it  is  called  light ;  when  it  appears  in  another 
form,  it  is  called  electricity  ;  when  it  appears  in  another 
form,  it  is  called  magnetism,  and  so  on.  Thus  moving 
matter  is  the  worker,  doer,  in  all  natural  phenomena,  and 
is  supposed  to  account  for  all  the  motions,  changes  and 
doings  in  the  universe.  This  is  the  original  dynamic 
theory  of  matter. 

According  to  this  theory  moving  matter  is  the  mover. 
What  moves  the  matter?  Moving  matter.  What  moves 
that  matter  ?  Moving  matter.  Matter  moves  ;  therefore 
it  moves.  It  is  simply  a  declaration  of  the  fact  that 
matter  moves,  without  any  attempt  to  give  a  cause  of 
motion,  or  a  mover,  or  a  doer.  Those  who  elaborated 
this  theory  did  not  pretend  to  go  behind  appearances  for 
the  cause,  or  doers.  And  yet  a  great  many  who  were  not 
phenominalists  have  thought  that  this  was  an  explanation 
of  natural  phenemena.  Let  us  see.  No  motion  without  a 
mover.  No  doing  without  a  doer.  This  theory  assumes 
the  self-perpetuating  power  of  motion.  But  no  one  claims 
that  the  quantity  of  motion  always  remains  the  same  on 


"™ 


54 


MATTER. 


THEORIES   OF. 


I 


earth,    hence   the   introduction   of  potential   motion,    or 
motion    that    may   be.     Then    the   theory  assumes   that 
dynamic  energy  is  a  self-perpetuating  power   and   doer, 
transferable  and  communicable  from  one  body  to  another. 
Here  again  our  absolute  truths  come  in.     Dynamic  energy 
is  not  substance.     Nothino;  hut  substance  can  be  moved  hi 
spare,  or  transferred  from  one  place  to  another.     Nothing 
but  substance  can  be  a  doer.     Then,  as  dynamic  energy  is 
not  substance,  this  whole  system  of  dynamic  philosophy 
is   thrown   out   at   once.     As   we    find  that   this  theory 
violates   absolute   truths,  we  may  drop   it  and  throw  it 
away   as   worthless.     But   as     those    who    planned    this 
theory,  before    proceeding  to  their  work,  threw  out   all 
absolute  truths,   and  proposed  to  proceed   without  tlieir 
intermeddling,  and  will  not  admit  tliem  as  testimony,  w^e 
will  hereafter  consider  it  in  the  light  of  facts. 

The  palpable  weakness  and  insufficiency  of  tlie  forego- 
ing theory  led  to  the  construction  of  another  theory,  or  it 
may  be  considered  only  a  modification  of  this.  This  new 
theory,  like  the  former,  holds  that  moving  matter  is  the 
mover  and  doer  in  nature;  but  it  endowes  atoms  and 
molecules  wnth  a  self-moving  power,  power  to  start  them- 
selves in  motion.  They  do  not  move  merely  when  moved 
by  something,  but  they  move  of  themselves.  Their  nor- 
mal state  is  that  of  motion.  It  is  their  nature  to  be 
forever  moving.  Some  external  agent  is  necessar>^  to 
stop  them,  rather  than  to  start  them.  If  they  are  stopped 
by  something  external  to  themselves,  as  soon  as  the 
obstruction    is   removed,    they   commence   their   motion 


55 


agam. 


This  theory  supplies  a  mover,  which  was  lacking  in  the 
former  theory— that  is,  it  gives  to  molecules  the  power  to 
move  themselves.  But  it  fails  to  supply  changers.  What 
changes  the  mode  of  motion  from  gravity  to  heat,  and 
from  heat  to  electricity,  and  from  heat  to  life,  from  attrac- 


tion to  repulsion,  and  so  on  ?  "  Why,  physical  conditions, 
of  course."  But  when  we  undertake  to  find  those  physi- 
cal conditions,  and  trace  them  out  in  each  particular  case, 
all  we  have  to  sa}-  is  that  we  cannot  find  them.  In  a  few 
cases  men  have  found  something  which  might  possibly 
answer  as  reasons  for  the  change ;  but  if  they  were  satis- 
factory, they  were  so  only  because  they  wished  to  find 
them.  Some  men  are  still  holding  on  to  this  theory,  in 
hope  that  some  changers  ma}-  yet  be  iound  or  thought  of. 

Finding  it  impossible  to  discover  changers,  another 
theor}'  has  been  devised,  or  the  original  theory  has  under- 
gone another  modification,  returning  to  the  old  Lucretian 
doctrine  of  Atoms.  This  theory  endows  molecules,  not 
only  with  the  power  to  move  themselves,  but  also  with 
the  power  to  change  their  own  mode  of  motion  as  occa- 
sion may  require.  They  are  made  competent  to  do  all 
that  is  done  in  nature.  What  becomes  actual,  was  before 
potential  in  the  molecules.  Tae  plieiioai-Mi  of  the  uni- 
verse flow  on  as  a  necessary  succession,  a  necessary  order 
of  sequences.  The  antecedents  which  would  necessarily 
result  in  the  present,  existed  in  all  molecules  in  all  past 
time.  Thus  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are 
explained  by  assuming  that  the  molecules  are  competent 
to  do  the  work.  That  the  molecules  are  the  doers,  is 
assumed,  and  then  the  occurrence  of  the  phenomena  is 
supposed  to  show  their  competence.  Something  does 
these  things;  we  assume  that  molecules  are  competent  to 
do  these  things ;  therefore  these  phenomena  are  the  work 
of  molecules.  There  is  no  other  evidence  that  such  is  the 
nature  of  molecules,  but  we  will  put  into  their  nature  all 
that  is  necessary  to  enable  them  to  work  out  these  results. 

Of  course,  this  theor>^  is  theoretically  competent  to 
explain  all  natural  phenomena,  all  the  activities  found  in 
nature.  Whatever  doing  we  discover  we  can  assert  the 
competence    of   molecules    to    do.      If  so  iie   new   u.id 


II 


56 


MATTER. 


tl 


I 


It 


I 


wonderful    doings    are    discovered,    beyond    the    ability 
which  we   have   hitherto  assigned  to  the  molecules,  we 
only  have   to   load   up  our  molecules  with   new  powers 
to  make  them  competent.     If  we  would  account  for  the 
appearance   of  sensation  in  nature,    we   can   assert  the 
competence  of  molecules   to  produce  sensation,  or  even 
that    the   molecules    themselves    possess   sensation.       If 
we   see   the   manifestation  of  intelligence  in  nature,  we 
can  assert  that  molecules  possess  the   power  to  produce 
intelligence,  or  that  they  have  the  power  to  act  intelli- 
gently,   and   with   a   plan   and   purpose.      There   is   no 
power  that  we  may  not  theoretically  attribute  to  them. 
This   theory,    then,    can   be   tested   only  by  a   practical 
examination  of  natural  phenomena,  to  see  if  molecules 
do  really  possess  these  powers,  and  to  see  if  it  is  possible 
that  molecules  should  perfonn  all  these  doings.     Absolute 
truths  demolish  at  once  the  original  dynamic  theory  of 
matter,  and   also   that  modified   form  of  it  which  gives 
to  molecules   the   power   to   move   themselves.     But  in 
reference  to  the  bare  assertion  that  molecules   are  com- 
petent to  do  all  that  is  done  in  nature,  absolute  truths 
can  say  nothing. 

But  in  the  practical  application  of  the  theory-  to  actual 
phenomena,  we  find  that  most  natural  phenomena  are 
produced  across  intervals  of  space,  in  portions  of  space 
other  than  that  which  the  molecules  which  are  supposed 
to  be  the  doers  occupy  ;  .and  then  an  absolute  truth  comes 
in  to  limit  our  freedom  of  supposition — nothing  can  do 
where  it  is  not— and  we  are  com.manded  with  an  im- 
perative voice  to  halt;  and  we  find  that  our  theory 
is  utterly  impracticable  and  impossible  in  its  application 
to  actual  phenomena.  Whatever  powers  we  may  give 
to  molecules,  they  camiot  do  ivhere  they  are  Jiot. 

Well,  after  carefully  examinin?:-  ^H  ether  theories  of 
matter,  and   candidly  weighing  the  evidence  presented 


I 


in  their  support,  we  are  back  to  the  old  passive  *'  lump'* 
theory  of  matter,  as  it  is  sometimes  deridingly  called. 
The  explanation  of  the  activities  in  nature  according 
to  any  purely  physical  theory  are  entirely  unsatisfactory, 
even  impossible,  as  we  have  seen.  The  arguments  in 
favor  of  the  theory  of  I^otze  are  based  upon  the  suppo- 
sition that  all  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  dynamic,  and 
that  action  between  molecules  is  action  between  separated 
bodies ;  and  as  I  admit  neither  of  these  premises  of  the 
arguments,  they  have  little  weight  with  me.  Our  senses 
very  positively  declare  to  us  that  matter  is  hard,  solid  sub- 
stance. If  we  rely  at  all  upon  the  evidence  of  our  senses, 
this  is  the  fact.  It  needs  something  more  than  an 
hj^pothesis,  devised  to  account  for  the  activities  in  nature, 
to  overthrow  this  evidence  of  our  senses,  especially  as 
there  are  ways  of  explaining  these  activities  which  do  not 
conflict  with  sense  appearances. 

We  will  now  consider  some  further  suppositions  respect- 
ing matter. 

It  is  supposed  that  the  molecules  of  matter  are  always 
detatched  bodies,  and  are  never  in  contact,  not  even  in  the 
most  dense  liquids  and  solids.  It  is  admitted  by  all  that 
the  molecules  of  gases  are  separated  from  each  other  by 
intervals  of  space.  It  is  claimed  that  the  same  is  true  of 
the  molecules  of  liquids  and  solids,  only  that  the  spaces 
between  them  are  less. 

We  know  that  according  to  our  senses  the  molecules  of 
.  liquids  and  solids  appear  to  be  in  contact.  The  permanent 
form,  the  sharp  angles  and  polished  surfaces  of  solids 
indicate  that  these  appearances  are  true.  It  does  not 
seem  possible  that  sharp  angles  and  polished  surfaces 
should  remain  permanent  and  unchanged  through  many 
years,  resisting  so  strongly  influences  which  tend  to  dis- 
turb them,  if  the  molecules  are  detached  bodies  in 
constant  motion.     The   great  power  which  is  necessary 


^ 


58 


MATTER. 


1 


i 


to  move  tfcese  molecules,  and  with  which  they  resist 
efforts  to  separate  them,  seems  inconsistent  with  this 
supposition.  In  all  cases  where  the  molecules  are  known 
to  be  detached — in  gases  and  vapors— the}^  are  easily 
moved  among  each  other,  and  easily  separated.  We 
cannot  see  why  this  should  not  be  the  fact  in  all  cases 
of  detached  molecules.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  that  we 
might  say  that  it  must  be  so.  On  a  point  which  seems  so 
plain  and  certain,  only  the  most  positive  testimony  can 
set  aside  these  considerations  and  the  evidence  of  our 
senses.  What  proof  is  there  that  the  molecules  of  liquids 
and  solids  do  not  touch  each  other?  No  doubt  many  will 
be  surprised  when  they  see  the  meager  proof  by  which 
this  opinion  has  been  made  current  and  almost  universal 
among  scientific  men. 

First,  it  is  ascertained  by  experiment  that  all  Hquids 
and  solids  are  compressible.  This  proves  that  either  the 
molecules  are  separate,  or  that,  touching  at  points  or 
surfaces,  like  round  bodies,  they  have  interstices  of  unoc- 
cupied space  among  them.  Kither  of  these  facts  satisfac- 
toril}^  accounts  for  compressibility.  We  know  that  a  mass 
of  bodies — as  a  barrel  of  apples — is  compressible,  because, 
though  the  apples  may  touch  each  other,  there  are  inter- 
stices among  them.  This  seems  to  be  the  most  rational 
explanation  of  compressibility.  Water  is  so  little  com- 
pressible that  for  many  years  it  was  thought  to  be  entirely 
incompressible.  Yet  if  water  freezes  it  occupies  more 
space.  The  agent  which  is  supposed  mainly  to  keep  the 
molecules  apart,  heat,  has  been  greatly  diminished  in  it, 
yet  it  cannot  now  by  any  means  be  compressed  into  the 
same  space  that  the  same  matter  occupied  as  water. 
Have  the  molecules  been  moved  farther  apart,  or  have 
they  been  arranged  in  crystalline  forms  which  leave 
larger  interstices  among  them  ? 

Another  reason  for  supposing   that  molecules   do  not 


MOLECULES.  59 

touch  each  other  is  this :  Heat  is  supposed  to  be  molecu- 
lar motion,  and  there  is  some  heat  in  all  bodies,  and  the 
molecules  must  be  separated  to  allow  of  this  motion.  A 
theory  is  supposed,  and  facts  are  made  to  conform  to  it,  or 
are  deduced  from  it.  Is  that  the  inductive  method,  which 
scientists  declare  to  be  the  only  allowable  one  in  science  ? 
Pacts  must  determine  theories,  and  not  theories  facts. 

Again,  the  supposed  ether,  in  order  to  accommodate 
other  suppositions,  must  be  supposed  to  pass  through 
all  material  bodies ;  hence  there  must  be  supposed  to 
be  intervals  between  their  molecules.  If  there  were  a 
few  more  suppositions  in  this  argument,  it  might  possibly 
become  a  supposed  proof 

These  are  the  evidences  that  the  molecules  of  matter 
are  separated  by  intervals  of  space.  Is  it  not  strange 
that  an  opinion  so  meagerly  supported,  without  one 
discovered  fact  to  sustain  it,  should  be  regarded  as  a 
settled  doctrine  in  science  ?  These  proofs  are  entirely 
insufficient  to  set  aside  the  evidence  of  our  senses  and 
the  other  considerations  mentioned. 

Then  while  this  supposition  accommodates  some  theo- 
ries, it  greatly  increases  the  difficulties  of  others,  and 
renders  the  explanation  of  natural  phenomena  in  many 
respects  more  difficult.  Action  between  separated  bodies 
through  intervals  of  space,  has  always  been  the  most 
difficult  problem  in  nature  to  solve,  and  it  has  defied 
longest  the  ingenuity  of  man.  If  we  suppose  molecules 
to  be  separated  bodies,  we  greatly  increase  this  difficulty, 
we  make  all  the  doings  in  nature  action  between  sep- 
arated bodies.  If  it  was  before  impossible  for  scientists  to 
explain  how  the  earth  and  moon  could  act  upon  each 
other,  it  now  becomes  equally  impossible  for  them  to 
explain  how  one  atom  or  molecule  can  act  upon  another, 
and  over  all  natural  phenomena  we  have  spread  the 
shadow   of   an    impenetrable   mystery.      I   believe   that 


6o 


MATTER. 


I^UMINIFEROUS  ETHER. 


6l 


li' 


the  molecules  of  liquids  and  solids  are  in  actual  contact. 

There  are  one  or  two  other  forms  of  matter  that  we 
must  notice.  We  have  spoken  of  matter  in  a  liquid 
and  solid  state.  We  know  that  some  matter  exists  in 
the  forms  of  gas  and  vapor.  We  have  concluded  that 
the  molecules  of  liquids  and  solids  are  in  actual  contact. 
But  the  molecules  of  gases  and  vapors  we  know  to  be 
detached  and  separate.  The  question  now  is,  By  what 
means  are  they  kept  apart  ? 

A  theor}^  has  been  devised  by  which  the  molecules  of 
gases  and  vapors  are  said  to  keep  themselves  apart.  Their 
molecules  are  supposed  to  be  in  motion,  flying  about  and 
knocking  against  each  other,  and  this  knocking  tends  to 
drive  them  apart,  and  enlarge  the  volume  of  the  mass. 
This  is  a  part  of  the  dynamic  theory  of  matter,  which  has 
an  undiminishable  stream  of  dynamic  energy  running 
through  the  world,  passing  from  one  body  to  another,  etc. 

This  theory  of  expansion  is  contrary  to  all  appearances 
received  through  the  senses.  But  in  speculative  science, 
though  we  are  forbidden  to  use  any  other  evidence  than 
that  received  through  the  senses,  little  importance  is  at- 
tached to  that  here. 

But  this  theory  involves  some  impossibilities.  If  mole- 
cules are  little  bodies  of  matter,  they  are  subject  to  the 
laws  of  motion  as  found  true  of  other  bodies  of  matter. 
We  know  from  experiment  that  flying  bodies  of  matter 
can  be  stopped;  and  that  if  they  are  stopped,  when  the 
obstacle  is  removed  they  do  not  resume  their  motion  again. 
Reduce  a  gas  by  cold  and  pressure  to  a  liquid  or  solid. 
The  molecules  no  longer  move  as  flying  detached  bodies; 
they  have  no  velocity.  Remove  the  pressure,  keeping 
the  temperature  the  same.  Without  any  impact  from 
anything  outside  of  themselves,  they  immediately  rise  up 
and  commence  their  flying  again,  with  -  the  same  velocity 
they  had  before  they  were  stopped.    Bodies  of  matter  that 


have  been  stopped  do  not  start  themselves  in  motion  again. 
Matter  does  not  perform  such  doings  as  this.  Other  evi- 
dence will  be  given  in  the  chapter  on  motion. 

But  according  to  that  fonu  of  the  dynamic  theory  of 
matter  which  gives  to  molecules  the  power  to  move  them- 
selves, and,  if  they  are  stopped,  of  starting  themselves  in 
motion  again,  cannot  this  theory  of  expansion  be  main- 
tained? Certainly;  and  according  to  that  theory  there  is 
no  need  of  supposing  any  knocking  at  all,  or  any  motion. 
We  can  just  as  well  suppose  that  molecules  have  power  to 
hold  themselves  at  a  certain  distance  from  their  neighbors 
without  motion,  as  to  suppose  that  they  have  power  to 
start  themselves  in  motion  after  having  been  stopped. 
After  we  depart  from  all  basis  in  discovered  facts,  we  may 
suppose  anything  we  please,  anything  that  will  favor  our 
theory;  we  are  on  the  wing,  and  there  are  no  limits  to  our 
supposing,  except  our  power  of  flight.  This  theory  of 
expansion  by  molecular  knocking  is  of  no  use  at  all,  ex- 
cept in  the  original  dynamic  theory  of  matter. 

There  is  still  another  supposed  form  of  matter  to  which 
we  must  give  attention.  I  mean  what  is  called  the  lumin- 
iferous  or  universal  ether.  The  supposition  is  that  all 
siderial  space  is  filled  with  a  gas  made  up  of  particles  so 
fine  and  so  far  apart  that  it  presents  no  obstruction  to  the 
worlds  passing  through  it,  and  that  light  and  radiant  heat 
are  waves  or  vibrations  in  this  gas  or  ether. 

I  am  not  able  to  receive  this  hypothesis  as  true,  for  the 
following  reasons:  In  the  first  place,  it  seems  to  be  an 
awkward  and  laborious  way  of  transporting  light  through 
space.  It  is  an  attempt  to  conjoin  that  which  is  weight- 
less as  thought,  and  swift  as  thought,  with  slow  and  cum- 
brous matter.  It  is  like  harnessing  as  two  steeds  the 
lightning  and  the  glacier.  The  result  must  be  to  reduce 
light  to  the  conditions  of  matter,  or  to  exalt  matter  to  the 
conditions  of  light.     But  certain  facts  respecting  light 


II' 


-<i 


62 


MATTER. 


I 


have  been  determined,  and  certain  facts  respecting  matter 
have  been  determined;  and  these  two  classes  of  facts  are 
as  incompatible  as  light  and  darkness.  Either  we  must 
give  up  the  known  facts  of  light,  or  else  the  known  facts 
of  matter.  Scientists  have  elected  to  do  the  latter,  and 
have  supposed  a  form  of  matter  which  is  unlike  all  other 
matter,  and  which  cannot  be  held  to,  or  tested  by,  the 
known  laws  and  properties  of  other  matter.  A  theory 
which  carries  us  into  such  a  wide  departure  from  all 
basis  in  the  known,  and  which  is  obliged  to  supply  so- 
much  from  imagination  that  is  unlike  the  known,  has  a 
reasonable  presumption  against  it  to  start  with. 

Then,  after  we  have  supposed  such  a  medium  for  the 
transmission  of  light  we  have  provided  for  only  one  of 
the  many  mysterious  relations  existing  between  the  earth 
and  the  sun.     The  supposed  magnetic  and  electrical  in- 
fluences  of  the   sun   upon   the   earth,    and    the   known 
attraction  of  the  earth   by  the  sun,   remain  still  unex- 
plained.    Such  a  medium  could  not  be  used  by  the  sun 
as  a  line  with  which  to  draw  the  earth  from  a  straight  line 
into  an  orbit.     Certainly  some  medium  is  as  needful  for 
this  w^ork   as  for  the   transmission  of  light;    and   it  is 
equally  certain  that  a  rare  gas,  whose  particles  are  strug- 
gling  to  get  further  apart,   could  not   be  used   for  this 
purpose.     Nothing  can  do  where  it  is  not,  or  outside  of 
its  own  limits;  then  some  medium  must  fill  this  inter- 
vening space,  through  which  this  work  is  performed.  The 
sun  appears  to  perform  several  different  kinds  of  work 
upon  the  earth.     This  supposition  of  an  ether  attempts 
to  explain  one  of  them,  and  does  not  profess  to  explain 
the  others,  when  there  are  other  suppositions  that  will 
satisfactorily    explain    them     all.       Why    should    such 
strained    and    desperate    efforts    be    made   to   overcome 
obstacles  and  surmount  difficulties,  making  successively 
new   and  multiplied   suppositions,  imagining  something: 


LUMINIFEROUS   KTHER.  63 

which  is  unlike  everything  else  in  the  universe,  to  main- 
tain this  hypothesis,  when  other  suppositions  require  no 
such  labored  effort,  and  meet  with  no  such  difficulties, 
and  are  easily  satisfied  with  only  the  known  materials  of 

nature  ? 

When  the  thought  of  such  a  medium  was  first  suggested 
the  question  w^as  not,  is  such  a  medium  possible?  but, 
supposing  it  to  be,  can  optical  phenomena  be  explained  by 
it  ?  At  that  time  the  properties  which  the  medium  must 
possess  to  render  it  competent  for  its  w^ork  were  not  so 
well  understood  as  they  are  now.  It  was  easy  to  suppose 
that  the  inter-stellar  spaces  were  filled  with  a  gas  so  rare 
that  it  would  be  no  obstruction  to  the  planets  in  their 
orbits,  and  that  it  might  be  a  medium  for  the  transmission 
of  light;  but  when  m^n  came  to  inquire  what  its  proper- 
ties must  be  to  enable  it  to  convey  light  at  the  tremen- 
dous velocity  of  185,000  miles  in  a  second  of  time,  the  real 
difficulties  in  the  case  began  to  be  apparent. 

It  was  agreed  by  philosophers  that  the  velocity  of 
vibrations  in  any  medium  depends  upon  the  rarity  and 
elasticity  of  the  medium.  To  increase  the  velocity  there 
must  be  less  matter  in  a  given  space,  or  the  resistance  to 
pressure  must  be  greater.  Ascertaining  a  rule  by  experi- 
ments w4th  gases  of  different  densities,  it  was  decided  that 
in  order  to  attain  the  velocity  of  light,  the  elasticity  of  the 
ether  must  be  at  least  1,000,000,000,000  times  the  elas- 
ticity of  the  air  at  the  earth's  surface.  Now  let  us 
understand  what  this  means.  These  numerals  are  the 
measure  of  the  resistance  of  the  ether  to  pressure,  and 
the  measure  of  the  pressure  of  the  ether  upon  bodies  that 
are  in  it  and  upon  the  surface  of  the  earth.  Its  resistance 
to  pressure  is  greater,  then,  than  an  ordinary  solid.  If 
the  pressure  of  the  atmosphere  upon  the  earth  is  fifteen 
pounds  upon  every  square  inch,  the  pressure  of  this  ether 
is  15,000,000,000,000  pounds  upon  every  square  inch  of 


^4  MATTER. 

surface:  "Equal,"  says  Prof.  J.  P.  Cook,  Jr.,  in  New 
Chemistry,  "to  the  weight  of  a  cubic  mile  of  granite 
rock."  There  are  on  an  average  man's  body  at  least 
1,500  square  inches  of  surface  ;  then  each  of  us  is  living 
and  moving  about  under  the  weight  of  1,500  cubic  miles 
of  granite  rock. 

Then,  the  two  requisites  of  great  velocity— rarity  and 
great  resistance  to  pressure— when  carried  to  such  an 
extent,  seem  inconsistent  and  contradictory.  Reduce  the 
quantity  of  matter  in  the  ether  to  the  requisite  extent 
and  there  seems  to  be  practically  almost  nothing  left, 
and  yet  if  a  cubic  inch  of  it  could  be  confined  to  its  inch 
of  space,  and  a  cubic  mile  of  granite  rock  were  placed 
upon  it,  that  pressure  would  not  reduce  it  to  smaller 
dimensions. 

Then  the  question  arises,  if  its  particles  are  so  fine  and 
so  far  apart  that  there  is  only  this  amount  of  matter  in 
it,  what  keeps  its  particles  apart  with  such  tremendous 
power  that  a  cubic  mile  of  granite  rock  pressing  upon 
a  single  inch  of  it  cannot  drive  them  nearer  together  ? 
Shall  we  apply  to  it  the  dynamic   theory  of  gases,  and 
say  that  its  atoms  are  kept  apart  by  the  momentum  of 
their  own  motion   knocking  against  each  other?     Who 
can  believe  that  the  particles  of  matter  where  they  are 
so  fine   and  so  far  apart  that   there  is  no   more  than 
one   one-hundred-millionth    as   much    matter    there    as 
there  is  in  the  same  space  of  common  air,  could   have 
sufficient  momentum    to    lift  a  cubic    mile   of   granite 
rock?     (These  suppositions  of  science  make  prodigious 
demands  upon  our  marvelousness  and  credulity.)     If  its 
particles  have  this  tremendous  momentum,  they  would 
tear  in  pieces  the  hardest  steel  body  that   they  might 
come  in  contact  with,   and  a  wave  or  vibration  passing 
through   them  and  striking  upon   the  earth,  would  be 
equal  to  the  explosion  of  a  ton  of  nitro  glycerine.     If 


\ ; 


THE  ETHER.  65 

their  motion  be  supposed  to  be  the  motion  of  heat,  the 
temperature  ought  to  be  a  million  times  greater  than 
any  temperature  known  to  man.  If  we  suppose  that 
the  molecules  of  a  gas  are  held  apart  by  an  invisible 
force  called  molecular  repulsion  acting  between  them, 
and  apply  this  to  the  ether,  we  find  that  its  atoms  are 
held  apart  millions  of  times  more  strongly  than  the 
molecules  of  any  known  gas.  It  cannot  then  be  the 
same  force  as  that  which  operates  in  gases,  and  to  main- 
tain our  former  suppositions  we  must  make  still  another 
supposition,  and  suppose  another,  a  new  and  otherwise 
unknown  force,  of  far  greater  power  than  any  force 
known  on  earth. 

The  particles  of  this  immensely  rare  gas  are  held 
apart  so  strongly  that  the  space  occupied  by  it  is  really 
filled  with  a  solid.  Although  there  is  comparatively 
almost  no  matter  there,  yet  the  particles  that  are  there 
are  held  apart  with  as  much  power  as  they  would  be 
if  the  spaces  between  them  were  filled  with  ordinary 
matter.  Hence  the  ether  really  becomes  a  solid,  and 
it  is  so  described  and  named  by  scientists.  Sir  William 
Thompson  thus  speaks  of  it:  ''This  luminiferous  ether 
is  an  elastic  solid.  It  is  matter  millions  of  times  less 
dense  than  the  air,  but  possessing  the  most  prodigious 
rigidity  in  proportion  to  its*  density."  Professor  Tyn- 
dall,  more  cautiously,  perhaps  lest  he  should  too  vio- 
lently shock  the  prejudice  of  his  readers,  calls  it  a 
* 'jelly,"  or  "more  like  a  solid."  Dr.  Thomas  Young, 
who  is  credited  with  more  agency  in  making  the  un- 
dulatory  theory  of  light  acceptable  to  mankind  than  any 
other  man,  says:  "The  luminiferous  ether,  pervading 
all  space,  and  penetrating  almost  all  substances,  is  not 
only  highly  elastic,  but  absolutely  solid."  (Young's 
Works,  vol.  I,  p.  415,  quoted  by  Jevons  in  Principles 
of  Science,  second  edition,  page  515.)     Professor  Jevons 


66 


MATTER. 


If 

I 


himself,   says  on  the  same  page:     ''Herscliel  calculated 
the    force    which    may   be   supposed,    according    to    the 
undulator>^  theor}^  of  light,  to  be  constantly  exerted  at 
each  point  in  space,  and   finds  it  to  be  1,148,000,000,- 
000  times  the  elastic  force  of  ordinar>^  air  at  the  earth's 
surface,  so   that   the   pressure   of  the   ether  per  square 
inch  must  be  about  seventeen  billions  of  pounds.     Yet 
we  live  and  move  without  appreciable  resistance  through 
this    medium,  immensely  harder  and   more  elastic  than 
adamant." 

Here  are  four  or  five  men  of  the  ver>'  highest  authority 
in  physical   science,  who    declare    that   this   ether,  that 
it  be  capable  of  transmitting  light  at  its  known  velocity, 
must   press   upon    the    human   body  with    a    weight    of 
billions  of  pounds  to  every  square  inch  of  surface,  must 
be  an  ''absolute  soHd,"  "prodigiously  rigid,"  and  "harder 
than  adamant."     I,et  me  ask  you,  reader,  are  you  living 
and  moving  about  under  the  pressure  of  a  good  sized 
world,    and    through    a    medium    that    is    harder  than 
adamant?     You  may  not  have  obtained  membership  in 
the  guild  of  professional  scientists ;  but  have  you  there- 
fore  no    common    sense,    no    power   to   see  and    know? 
and  must  you  form  no  opinion  but  such  as  professional 
scientists  give  you  ?     Standing  upon  the  bare  surface  of 
^  a  granite  rock,   let  them    tell    you    that    the  rock  upon 
'  which  you  stand  is  softer  than  the  matter  which  invests 
your   body,  that  the  space   above   the   rock,    the   space 
through   which    you    move,  through   which   you    move 
your  legs  and  swing   your  arms,  is  filled  with  a  solid 
*' harder"  and  "more  rigid"  than  the  rock  upon  which 
you  stand,  and  believe  them  if  you  can  ! 

But  the  greatest  difficulty  of  all  remains  to  be  men- 
tioned. If  the  inter-stellar  spaces  are  filled  with  an 
absolute  solid,  harder  than  adamant  and  of  prodigious 
rigidity,    how   are    the  worids    to  pass  through  without 


THE  ETHER.  ^7 

obstruction?     To  obviate  this  difficulty  some  have  sup- 
posed that  the  ether  has  no  weight  nor  inertia.      Then 
it  is  not  matter,  it  lacks  two  of  the  three  essential  charac- 
teristics of  matter,  which  distinguish  it  from  immaterial 
substance,  and  it  belongs  to  the   class  immaterial  sub- 
stances,   rather    than    to    the    class    matter.      To    this 
supposition  other  scientists  answered   that  if  it  has   no 
weight    or    inertia,    no    vibrations    can    be    transmitted 
through  it.     Without  gravity  one  body  hitting  another 
would  have  no  momentum  to  move  the  hit  body.     With- 
out inertia  no  body  would  move  any  farther  than  the 
push  of  the  hitting  body.     Because  of  these  considerations 
these   suppositions   were   discarded.      The   attempt  was 
made  to  obviate  this  difficulty  by  supposing  great  mobility 
among  the  particles  of  ether.     But  the  properties  of  mo- 
bility and  rigidity  are  a  contradiction.     That  which  dis- 
tinguishes a  solid  is  its  rigidity,  or  absence  of  mobility. 
We  must  give  up  either  its  rigidity  or  its  mobility.     If  we 
give  up  its  rigidity,  it  cannot  answer  the  purpose  for  which 
we  supposed  it  to  be.     If  we  give  up  its  mobility,  the  worids 
cannot  move  in  it.     We  must  not  give  up  the  theory ; 
therefore  we  must  hold  on  to  its  rigidity.     Then  we  have 
the   planets  whirling  around   the   sun   at  the   rate  of  a 
thousand   and   more   miles   a   minute,   through   a  hard, 
rigid,  absolute  solid,  and  meeting  no  resistance  ? 

If  we  admit  that  the  ether  is  solid,  we  have  to  change 
our  views  of  the  form  of  the  waves  or  vibrations.  Waves 
in  an  aerial  substance  consist  of  successive  alternate  denser 
and  rarer  portions  of  the  medium.  Vibrations  in  a  solid 
are  transverse  deviations  from  a  straight  line,  as  vibra- 
tions run  along  a  taut  wire.  Vibrations  in  a  solid 
cannot  be  transmitted  through  it  unless  its  molecules 
touch  each  other  or  are  held  together  by  cohesion.  When 
one  atom  moves  to  the  right  or  left  of  a  line,  it  cannot 
move  any  other  atom  in  that  line,  unless  it  touches  or  is 


^S  MATTER. 

bound  to  it  by  cohesion ;  and  the  degree  of  elasticity 
depends  upon  the  firmness  with  which  the  atoms  are 
bound  together.  As  this  supposed  ether  transmits  vibra- 
tions milUons  of  times  more  rapidly  than  a  steel  wire,  the 
best  conductor  of  vibrations  known,  the  atoms  of  this 
ether  must  be  bound  together  with  millions  of  times  more 
strength  than  the  molecules  of  a  steel  wire  ;  and  yet  we 
have  the  worlds  passing  through  it  without  meeting  any 
resistance  or  obstruction. 

It  would  seem  that  by  this  time  we  ought  to  abandon 
this  hypothesis  altogether,  and  contrive  some  other  way 
for  getting  light  from  the  sun  to  the  earth.     But  no ;  we 
have  espoused  this  theory,  and  we  will  not  retreat,'  but 
will  go  on,  making  new  and  more  wonderful  and  wilder 
suppositions,  and  plunging  into  deeper  and  ever  deeper 
absurdities.     We  will  conclude  that,  after  all,  we  know 
nothing  about  matter,   and  can  therefore  project  from  it 
no  Hmitations  to   theorizing  or  possibilities;    it  is  only 
appearances  anyhow,  and  may  not  be  anything  like  what 
we  suppose  it  to  be ;  and  after  we  have  gone  so  far, 
we  have  run  ourselves  out  of  all  science  and  all  phi- 
losophy for  the  sake  of  maintaining  a  theory.      It  has 
been  suggested  that  this  supposed  ether  embraces  all 
there  is  of  science  and  philosophy,  and  that  it  is  all  there 
is  of  the  material  universe,  and  that  the  worlds  and  all 
things  therein  are  only  different  forms  of  this  ether,  and 
all  that  mankind  in  the  past  have  thought  to  be  knowl- 
edge was  only  delusions. 

Of  cou  rse ,  if  matter  is  only  resisting  centres  of  force, 
which  may  take  on  or  lay  off  their  resistance  according  to 
circumstances ;  or  if  matter  is  only  points  of  the  divine 
energizing,  which  may  resist  or  not  resist  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  energizer ;  or  if  we  suppose  matter  to  be  only 
different  forms  of  motion  in  the  universal  ether ;  if  we  set 
ourselves  in  any  way  to  construct  a  purely  imaginary 


THE  ETHER. 


69 


system  of  the  universe,  we  may  suppose  that  in  certain 
circumstances  matter  is  not  impenetrable,  and  that  worlds 
may  pass  through  the  hardest  and  most  rigid  matter  with- 
out encountering  any  resistance,  or  make  any  other 
supposition  we  please ;  but  if  we  are  to  erect  our  edifice 
upon  discovered  facts  and  the  known  properties  and  laws 
of  matter,  if  we  are  to  give  any  validity  to  any  knowledge  • 
obtained  through  the  senses-;  we  must  pronounce  the 
existence  of  any  material  medium,  filling  the  entire  space 
of  the  solar  system,  capable  of  transmitting  vibrations  at 
the  known  velocity  of  light,  and  at  the  same  time  offering 
no  resistance  to  the  revolving  planets,  a  direct  contradic- 
tion and  an  utter  impossibility. 

These    considerations   explain  why  some    great    and 
learned  men  hold  on  to  this  hypothesis  in  full  view  of 
all   these  apparent  absurdities  and  contradictions ;   for  I 
would  not  for  a  moment  intimate  that  these  difiiculties 
and  contradictions  have  not  presented  themselves  to  these 
men.     The  great  and  learned  are  subject  to  prejudices,  as 
well  as  any  others.  "I  When  such  a  man  has  championed  a 
theory,  and  devotedjall  his  energies  to  its  maintenance,  if 
some  great  obstacle^rises  up  before  him,  which  perempto- 
rily stops  him  and  defeats  him,  he  does  not  propose  to 
acknowledge  defeat  or  turn  back,  but  he  bends  all  his 
energies  in  effortjto  overcome  the  obstacle.     Thus  men 
have  adopted  the  hypothesis  that  light  is  conveyed  fi-om 
the  sun  to  the  earth  through  a  material  medium,  and  that 
light  is  vibrations  in  this  medium,  then  when  it  is  dis- 
covered   that,    according  to  all   known    properties  and 
laws  of  matter,  thisfis  an  impossibility,  instead  of  dis- 
carding the  hypothesis,  [as  would  seem  most  rational, 
they  begin  to  make  suppositionslrespecting  the  nature 
of  this  medium,  make  it  unlike  all  other  matter,    de- 
prive it  of  the  properties  essential  to  matter,  endow  it 
with  properties  found;^:in  no  other  matter,  assign  to  it 


70  MATTER, 

laws  which  are  a  contradiction  to  the  laws  of  all  other 
matter,  and  whicli  in  the  different  parts  of  the  theory 
contradict  each  other,  and  still  hold  on  to  the  h3^pothesis. 
Nor  is  this  all,  bit  reViniinj^  from  these  regions  of 
imagination,  they  tell  u  i  that  the  supposed  facts  of 
sensible  matter  are  all  wrong,  and  from  the  properties 
and  laws  w^ith  whicli  they  have  found  it  necessary  to 
endow  their  ether,  tliat  it  may  be  able  to  accomplish 
what  they  desire  of  it,  they  would  correct  our  concepts 
of  sensible  matter  and  require  us  to  receive  as  established 
science  the  visions  which  float  in  the  fields  of  imagination. 
It  appears  to  me  to  be  time  to  call  a  halt,  and  return  to 
terra  firma,  and  start  again  from  the  foundations  of  the 
known,  and  to  discard  a  theory  which  has  hard,  solid, 
prodigiously  rigid  matter  which  is  no  hindrance  to  our 
motion  in  it  and  no  obstruction  to  the  passing  worlds. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  all  these  wonders  and  difficulties 
and  contradictions,  scientists  tell  us  that  we  must  believe 
all  this,  and  receive  this  as.  the  true  theory  of  light. 
AVhy?  Because  many  optical  phenomena  can  be  ex- 
plained by  it ;  because  it  will  explain  optical  phenomena 
better  than  Newton's  corpuscular  theory.  If  we  were 
shut  up  to  the  alternative  of  believing  in  Newton's  theory 
or  this,  we  might  consider  which  of  the  tw^o  impossibil- 
ities w^e  would  try  to  endure  until  something  better 
should  be  presented.  But  we  are  not  thus  limited  to 
these  two  theories.  Facts  show  that  Newton's  theory 
is  false  and  impossible.  Facts,  even  the  facts  which 
have  been  mentioned  in  these  pages,  show  that  this 
theory-  is  false  and  impossible.  What  is  needful  for  us, 
then,  is  not  to  try  to  swallow  either  of  these  absurdities, 
but  to  look  for  some  other  theory  which  is  not  an  ab- 
surdity. We  shall  see  in  future  pages  that  another 
supposition  respecting  the  nature  of  light  is  possible, 
which   will  explain  optical   phenomena   more  perfectly 


PROPERTIES  OF.  7^ 

than  this,  and  which  meets  with  none  of  the  difficulties, 
contradictions,  and  impossibilities  which  overwhelm  this. 


PROPERTIES   OF   MATTER. 

We   defined   properties   as   inherent   characteristics  of 
substance.     Many  attributes  which  in  both  popular  and 
scientific  language  are  cilled  properties  are  not  included 
in  this  definition.     An  accurate  classification  requires  at 
least  three  terms  to  designate  the  different  things  which 
have   been    called    properties.       The    old   division   into 
primary   and  secondary   properties   is   not   enough.     In 
the  first  class   we   would   place    ceitain   necessary   facts 
respecting  bodies:    location,     extension,    form   and  size. 
These  are  absolute  facts   respecting  all   bodies.      These 
may   be    denominated     necessary   properties    of   bodies. 
In  our  second  class  we  would  place  those  characteristics 
of  material  substances  as  masses,  which  result  from  the 
action   of  the    natural    forces    in    them    and   on    them; 
such  as  weight,  color,  hardness,  softness,  elasticity,  duc- 
tility, solidity,  fluidity,  etc.     These  are  consequent  upon 
the   action   of    the    forces    of    gravity,    light,    cohesion, 
molecular  repulsion,  and  heat  in  and  on  the  substances. 
We  may,  according  to  popular  custom  call  these  properties, 
but  it  should  be  understood  in  what  sense  we  use  the 
word.      A  proper   term   to   designate    these   would    be 
contingent  properties.     In  our  third  class  we  would  place 
those  characteristics   which   permanently  inhere   in   the 
substances,  the  real  properties,  according  to  our  definition, 
such  as  impenetrability,  indestructibility,  sweetness,  sour- 
ness, bitterness,  and  a  thousand  others,  many  of  which 
have  never  been  named.     We  have,  then,  necessary  prop- 
erties of  bodies,  contingent  properties,  and  properties  of 

substances. 

Some  of  these  real  properties  of  substances  are  discov- 


72 


MATTER. 


ered  immediately  by  the  sense  of  touch,  taste,  and  smell. 
The  mind  in  immediate  contact  with  substances  perceives 
certain  of  their  properties.  There  is  a  certain  real  property 
in  some  substances  which  we  perceive  through  the  sense 
of  taste  and  call  it  sour.  The  statement  that  this  is  only 
a  name  of  a  sensation  is,  in  my  view,  not  correct.  This 
was  the  statement  of  the  case  according  to  the  theory  of 
mediate  perception.  But  if  we  immediately  perceive  any- 
thing, this  is  one  of  the  facts  in  that  substance  which  we 
immediately  perceive.  All  of  the  real  properties  of 
substances,  except  impenetrability  and  those  which  are 
perceived  by  the  senses  of  taste  and  smell,  are  discovered 
only  by  the  results  of  the  action  of  the  forces  in  and  on 
them.  They  are  not,  like  contingent  properties,  conse- 
quent upon  the  action  of  the  forces,  but  they  are  discov- 
ered by  this  means. 

Some  of  them  are  discovered  by  the  action  of  light  upon 
matter.  The  properties  of  one  subject  are  such  that  when 
light  falls  upon  it,  all  the  light  enters  it,  and  we  call  it  a 
black  body.  The  properties  of  another  substance  are 
such  that  when  light  falls  upon  it,  all  the  light  turns 
away  from  it,  and  we  call  it  a  white  body.  The  properties 
of  another  substance  are  such  that  when  light  falls  upon 
it,  all  the  light  enters  it,  except  the  red  rays;  they  turn  and 
fly  away  from  it,  and  we  call  it  a  red  body.  The  properties 
of  another  substance  are  such  that  when  light  falls  upon  it, 
all  the  light  enters  it,  except  the  blue  rays;  they  turn  and 
fly  away  from  it,  and  we  call  it  a  blue  body,  and  so 
on.  Thus  the  different  results  of  the  action  of  light  upon 
different  substances  are  consequent  upon  certain  prop- 
erties existing  in  those  substances,  which  properties  can 
be  discovered  by  no  other  means. 

We  discover  another  set  of  properties  by  the  action  of 
heat  upon  different  substances.  One  substance  is  said  to 
reflect  more  of  the  heat  which  comes  against  it.    Another 


PROPERTIES.  73 

is  said  to  absorb  more.  Another  is  said  to  radiate  heat 
more  rapidly.  Some  are  said  to  be  conductors.  Some 
are  said  to  transmit  radiant  heat,  and  others  not.  There 
must  be  some  different  properties  in  these  substances 
which  are  the  conditions  of  these  different  results  of  the 
action  of  heat  upon  them.  The  different  results  must  be 
consequent  upon  varying  properties  in  the  different 
substances.  What  those  properties  are,  and  that  they 
are,  we  can  know  only  by  the  results  of  the  action  of 
heat  in  contact  with  them. 

Another  set  of  properties  is  discovered  b)'  differences  m 
the  doings  of  the  vital  forces  in  their  presence.  One  sub- 
stance taken  into  the  stomach  results  in  perspiration, 
another  in  emesis,  another  in  catharsis,  another  in 
diuresis.  These  substances  must  all  have  different 
properties  which  condition  these  different  results,  or  in 
the  presence  of  which  the  vital  forces  act  thus  differently. 
These  have  been  called  medicinal  properties.  That  they 
are,  and  what  they  are,  we  can  ascertain  only  by  experi- 
ment and  the  results. 

We  present  these  cases  as  examples  of  the  manner  of 
the  discovery  of  properties  by  the  action  of  the  forces  on 
matter  In  none  of  these  cases  does  the  matter  act  to 
produce  the  results.  The  matter  does  not  act  upon  the 
licrht  to  cause  it,  in  one  case  to  enter  in,  and  m  another 
cie  to  fly  away.  The  light  is  the  only  doer  in  these 
cases  The  matter  does  not  act  upon  the  heat  to  produce 
the  diversities  in  the  results.  The  heat  is  the  only  doer 
in  these  cases.  So  likewise,  the  medicinal  substances 
do  not  act  upon  the  animal  system,  except  where  the 
chemical  force  in  them  decomposes  the  tissues.  The  vital 
forces  are  the  doers  in  these  cases.  Other  properties 
are  discovered  by  the  action  of  other  forces  on  matter, 
but  these  are  sufficient  to  show  the  manner  of  discovery. 


chapte:r  v. 

P'acts  and  thkir  teachings. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  examination  of  facts  we  must 
understand  the  signification  we  attach  to  certain  words. 
In  our  experience  we  find  that  bodies  at  rest  do  not  start 
themselves  in  motion,  and  that  an  exertion  of  energy  is 
necessary  to  start  them  in  motion.  We  find  also  that  an 
exertion  of  energy  is  necessarj^  to  stop  the  motion  of  a 
moving  body.  We  learn  from  this  that  motion  is  never 
practically  separated  from  energizing.  Wherever  there 
is  motion  there  is  energizing,  either  to  start  it  or  to  con- 
tinue it.  Energizing  is  necessary  to  start  the  body  in 
motion,  and  there  is  constant  energizing  in  it  to  continue 
its  motion.  Motion  is  always  dependent  upon  energizing 
for  its  existence.  There  is  no  motion  without  energizing 
to  produce  it ;  and  if  there  is  energizing,  there  must  be  an 
energizer. 

The  energizer  we  call  a  force.  By  the  word  force  we 
mean  something  which  energizes  to  produce  motion,  or  to 
prevent  motion,  to  produce  or  prevent  change.  To  pro- 
duce motion,  is  to  produce  change ;  and  to  produce 
change,  is  to  produce  motion,  stop  motion,  or  alter  the 
direction  of  motion.  We  have  designated  that  which 
produces  change  by  the  word  doer.  Force  and  doer, 
then,  are  synonymous  terms,  except  that  a  force  may 
energize   without  producing  motion,  and   even   to  pre- 


DOERS   ARE  SUBSTANCES.  75 

vent  motion ;  but  a  force  is  a  doer  only  when  it  causes 
motion  or  produces  change.  All  doers  are  forces  ;  and  as 
a  force  is  that  which  produces  motion  or  effects  change, 
and  as  a  doer  is  that  which  produces  motion  or  effects 
change,  and  as  the  word  forces  includes  everything  that 
does  produce  motion  or  effect  change,  the  word  forces 
includes  all  doers.  We  do  not  here  state  by  what  other 
names  some  of  the  forces  may  be  called,  whether  the 
specific  names  of  the  inorganic  forces,  or  matter,  man,  or 
God,  but  everything  which  produces  motion  or  effects 
change  is  a  doer  and  a  force,  and  there  are  no  doers  but 

the  forces. 

Now  we  advance  another  step.  All  doers  are  sub- 
stance ;  all  doers  are  forces ;  then  all  forces  are  substance. 
Nothing  is  a  doer  or  a  force  that  is  not  substance.  If  we 
talk  about  motion  without  a  mover,  or  about  doings  with- 
out a  doer,  or  about  movers,  doers,  or  forces  that  are  not 
substance,  we  are  talking  nonsense.  This  does  not 
determine  whether  the  forces  are  material  or  immaterial 
substances ;  but  they  are  and  must  be  substance. 

According  to  this  definition  of  force,  it  is  not  proper  to 
say  The  man  has  great  force,  but  rather,  The  man  has 
great  energy.     It  is  not  proper  to  say,  The  cannon  ball 
moves    with    great  force,    but  rather,   The  cannon  ball 
moves  with  great  power.     It  is  proper  to  say.  The  force 
of  gravity,  the  force  of  electricity,  the  force  of  inertia,  and 
so  forth ;  and  we  mean  by  such  expressions  the  substance 
which  is  called  gravity,  inertia,  etc.     We  do  not  mean  by 
the  force  of  gravity,  a  law,  or  a  mode,  or  a  class  of  phe- 
nomena, but  a  substance  which  is  and  does.     There   is 
something  which  energizes   to  pull  bodies  down  to  the 
earth,  and  that  something  is  substance,  and  to  that  sub- 
stance we  give  the  name  gravity.     There  is  something 
which  produces  the  motions  attributed  to  heat,  and  that 
something  is  substance,  and  to  that  substance  we  give 


ENERGY   DEFINED. 


77 


76  FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 

the  name  heat.  There  is  something  which  energizes  to 
hold  matter  at  rest  when  it  is  at  rest,  and  to  continue  its 
motion  after  it  has  been  started,  and  that  something  is 
substance,  and  to  that  substance  we  give  the  name 
inertia.  There  is  something  which  energizes  to  cause  the 
motions  attributed  to  electricity,  and  the  motions  attrib- 
uted to  magnetism,  and  the  motions  of  hght,  and  to  hold 
molecules  together  in  masses,  and  to  place  molecules 
together  in  the  form  of  crystals,  and  to  unite  atoms  and 
molecules  chemically,  and  to  push  molecules  apart ;  and 
in  each  case  that  something  is  substance,  and  to  the  sub- 
stance which  is  the  actor  or  doer  in  each  case  we  give  a 
specific  name.  These  are  what  are  called  the  inorganic 
forces.  There  are  ten  and,  it  is  thought,  only  ten  of 
them.  This  does  not  say  whether  they  are  material  or 
immaterial  substance,  but  they  are  substances.  If  they 
are  molecular  motions,  or  molecules  moving,  those 
molecules  are  substance,  and  to  molecules  in  a  particular 
form  of  motion  we  give  a  specific  name.  If  they  are  the  . 
divine  substance  energizing,  they  are  substance,  and  to  the 
divine  substance  in  a  particular  form  of  energizing  we 
give  a  specific  name.  Now  let  us  use  the  word  force  in 
this  sense,  and  in  no  other. 

Here  we  have  been  using  the  words  energize  and  ener- 
gizing. No  one  has  been  at  a  loss  to  know^  what  we 
meant  by  those  words.  We  all  know  that  we  energize, 
and  that  we  effect  changes  in  matter  by  energizing.  This 
thought  is  familiar  to  us,  both  in  our  language  and  our 
experience.  We  know  the  meaning  of  these  words,  and 
they  have  fixed  and  uniform  significations.  We  energize, 
we  exert  energy.  We  all  know  and  all  say  that  we  exert 
energy.  What  do  we  mean  when  we  so  speak  ?  We  mean 
that  we  exert  or  use  an  inherent  characteristic  of  our- 
selves, a  property  of  ourselves,  when  we  produce  motion. 
We  call  that  property  of  ourselves  energy.     All  men  call 


it  energy.     It  has  been  called  energy  during  the  ages. 
What  do  we  gain  now  by  departing  from  this  usage,  and 
constructing  a  definition  conformed  to,  or  derived  from,  a 
theory,  a  definition  which,  if  our  theory  turns  out  not  to 
be   true,  will  only  stand  as   a  monument  of  our  folly? 
That  which  we  are  conscious  of  using  or  exerting  to  pro- 
duce motion  or  to  prevent  motion  we  call  energy.     We 
know  it  in  our  consciousness  as  a  property  of  ourselves, 
an  inherent  characteristic  permanent  in  ourselves,  whether 
we  use  it  or  not,   which    we    may    use  or  not  use.     If 
from  sickness,    or   any   other   circumstance,   we   become 
incapable  of  exerting  energy,  we  find   that  we   can   do 
nothing,    move   nothing,— we  are  partially  or  wholly  de- 
prived of  that   property   which  we  did  possess  which  we 
call  energy.     Our  ability  to  effect  changes  in  matter  de- 
pends entirely  upon  the  amount  of  this  property  m  us 
available  for  use.     We  may,  then,  define  energy  as  tbat 
property  of  some  substances  which  enables  them  to  do  or 
to  effect  changes  in  matter.     Then  no  substance  can  be 
a  doer  or  a  force,  unless  it  possesses  the  property  of  energy. 
In  all  cases  of  physical  motion  the  matter  itself  must 
possess  the  property  of  energy,  and  be  able  to  start  itself 
in  motion,  and  to  perpetuate  its  own  motion :  or  else  there 
is  some  other  substance   in  it  which   does   possess   the 
property  of  energy  and  moves  it ;  or  else  somethmg  out- 
side of  it  is  acting  upon  it  and  moving  it.     It   requires 
the  exertion  of  the  same  amount  of  energy  to  continue 
the  motion  of  a  moving  body  as  was  required  to  start  it 
in  motion.     This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  it  requires 
precisely  the  same  amount  of  energizing  to  stop  it  as  was 
used  in  starting  it.     If  there  was  no  energy  exerted  to 
continue    the  motion,  no  exertion  of  energy  would   be 
required  to  stop  it.     In  all  flying  detached  bodies  there  is 
as  much  energy  exerted  to  continue  their  motion  as  was 
exerted  to  start  them  in  motion. 


1 


78  FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 

As  in  all  moving  bodies  there  must  have  been  an  exer- 
tion of  energy  to  start  them  in  motion ;  and  of  as  much 
to  continue  their  motion,  and  as  in  all  exertion  of  energy 
there  must  be  something  exerting  it,  some  substance  of 
which  this  energy  is  a  property  ;  as  all  motion  requires  a 
mover,  all  doing  a  doer,  and  as  all  doers  are  substance ; 
the  question  arises,  Is  the  matter  itself  the  doer?  or  is 
there  some  other  substance  outside  of  it  acting  upon  it  to 
move  it?  These  questions  involve  the  question,  Is 
energy  a  property  of  matter?  In  determining  whether 
matter  is  itself  the  doer  in  natural  phenomena  or  not,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  examine  a  number  of  cases  of  moving 
matter  to  see  whether  it  is  possible  that  matter  should  be 
the  doer.     This  we  now  proceed  to  do. 

We  see  bodies  falling  toward  the  earth.  The  matter  of 
the  earth  and  bodies  do  not  meet;  there  is  an  interval  of 
space  between  them.  Then  the  matter  of  the  earth  can 
not  draw  those  bodies.  This  is  not  merely  that  we  can 
not  see  how  it  could.  It  is  not  merely  that  the  phenom- 
ena of  gravity  are  yet  unexplained.  It  is  that  we  know 
that  it  is  not  possible  that  the  matter  of  the  earth  and 
body  should  be  the  doer  in  these  cases.  Nothing  can  do 
where  it  is  not.  No  substance  can  do  ontside  of  its  own 
limits.  The  atmosphere  which  fills  the  space  between 
those  bodies  is  made  up  of  detached  particles  which  are 
struggling  to  get  farther  apart,  hence  that  cannot  be  used 
to  draw  with.  If  there  was  any  other  matter  in  that 
space  that  could  be  used  to  draw  with,  we  could  by  its 
properties  of  weight,  inertia,  and  impenetrability  discover 
it.  We  have  found  abundant  reasons  for  discarding  en- 
tirely the  supposition  of  a  universal  ether ;  but  if  that 
space  be  filled  with  such  an  ether,  according  to  any  sup- 
position which  has  ever  been  made  respecting  it,  it  could 
not  be  used  to  draw  with.  It  is  impossible  that  the  mat- 
ter of  the  earth  should   do  anything  to  the  matter  of  the 


1 


ATTRACTIONS.  79 

bodies.  It  is  impossible  that  the  matter  of  the  bodies 
should  do  any  thing  to  the  matter  of  the  earth.  Nothing 
can  do  where  it  is  not,  or  outside  of  its  own  limits.  Then 
if  the  process  is  by  attraction,  if  there  is  any  such  thing 
as  the  attraction  of  gravitation,  as  has  always  been  sup- 
posed, matter  cannot  be  the  doer  in  this  case.  If  the 
process  is  by  attraction,  it  is  impossible  that  matter  should 
be  the  doer  in  any  case  of  motion  caused  by  gravity  ;  for 
unless  bodies  are  separated  by  intervals  of  space,  attrac- 
tion can  never  cause  motion.  Then  that  substance  which 
we  call  gravity  is  not  matter,  or  material  substance. 

The  same  is  true  of  all  other  attractions.     The  opposite 
poles  of  two  magnets  attract  each  other  through  intervals 
of  space.      Two  bodies,  one  charged  with  positive  and 
the   other   with   negative   electricity,  attract  each   other 
through  intervals  of  space.     Chemical  attraction  between 
atoms    and    molecules    acts    across    inten^als   of  space. 
Scientists  say  that  it  is  the  falling  together  of  the  atoms 
through  these  intervals  which  produces  the  heat  conse- 
quent  upon   chemical    action.      The  cr>'stallizing   force 
attracts  across  intervals  of  space,  drawing  together  mole- 
cules which  are  separated  by  solution.     Now,  if  the  pro- 
cess is  by  attraction,  if  these  are  attractions,  as  they  have 
always  been  called,  it  is  not  possible  that  matter  should 
be  the  doer  in  any  of  these  cases.     It  is  not  possible  in 
any  of  these  cases  that  one  body  should  act  upon  another 
across  an  interval  of  space.     Then  if  the  process  is  by 
attraction,  that  substance  which  we  call  magnetism  is  not 
matter,  or  material  substance ;  and  that  substance  which 
we  call  electricity,  and  that  substance  which  we  call  the 
chemical  force,  and  that  substance  which  we  call  the  crys- 
tallizing force,— none  of  these  can  possibly  be  matter. 

We  reach  similar  conclusions  in  cases  of  repulsion 
across  intervals  of  space.  The  north  poles  of  two  mag- 
nets,   and  the  south   poles  of  two  magnets,   repel  each 


So 


FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 


ACTION   THROUGH   SPACE. 


8l 


other  across  intervals  of  space.  Two  bodies  charged  with 
positive,  and  two  charged  with  negative,  electricity 
repel  each  other  across  intervals  of  space.  The  mole- 
cules of  all  the  permanent  gases  are  held  apart  across 
intervals  of  space.  If  the  process  in  these  cases  is  by 
repulsion,  if  in  any  of  these  cases  the  one  body  does  have 
any  influence  upon  the  other  body,  in  none  of  these  cases 
can  matter  be  the  doer;  and  it  is  not  possible  that  mag- 
netism, electricit}',  or  molecular  repulsion  should  be 
matter. 

There  are  many  other  cases  of  action  across  intervals 
of  space.  In  all  cases  of  electrical  induction,  in  all  cases 
of  magnetic  induction,  in  all  cases  of  the  action  of  mag- 
netism upon  electricity,  and  electricity  upon  magnetism, 
and  of  magnetism  upon  magnetism  in  separated  bodies, 
and  of  electricitv  upon  electricitv  in  separated  bodies, — in 
all  these  cases  there  is  action  across  intervals  of  space. 
All  of  these  cases  can  be  classed  under  attractions  and 
repulsions.  If  thej-  are  attractions  and  repulsions,  if  one 
body  does  in  these  cases  have  any  actional  relation  to  the 
other  body,  in  none  of  these  cases  can  matter  be  the 
doer,  and  none  of  the  forces  here  mentioned  can  be  matter. 

If  there  is  no  material  medium  between  the  earth  and 
the  sun,  as  we  have  abundant  reason  to  conclude,  heat 
and  light  exist  and  move  in  space  where  no  matter  is. 
There  is  no  greater  necessity  for  supposing  a  material 
medium  between  the  earth  and  the  sun  than  between 
bodies  drawn  together  by  gravity,  or  between  bodies  in 
which  electrical  or  magnetic  phenomena  are  manifested, 
or  between  bodies  drawn  together  by  chemical  or  crystal- 
lizing attraction,  or  between  bodies  that  are  kept  apart  by 
molecular  repulsions,  or,  if  the  supposition  of  scientists 
that  all  molecules  are  separated  bodies  be  true,  between 
all  molecules.  And  no  material  medium  can  lie  supposed 
with  properties  which  would  answer  all  these  purposes, 


and  yet  allow  of  these  motions.     And  if  there  was  any 
material  medium  in  all  these  places  which  would  answer 
these  purposes,  we  could  detect  it  by  our  senses.      The 
only  legitimate  conclusion  to  which  we  are  ultimately  led 
bv  the  supposition  that  the  natural  forces  are   physical 
processes,  is  that  which  Sir  Wm.  Thompson  has  suggested 
that  the  entire  universe  is  a  mass  of  continuous  matter;, 
and  then  all  our  knowledge  is  a  delusion,  and  the  science 
and  philosophy  of  the  past  are  fictions.     If  molecules  can 
act  upon  each  other  through  inter^'als  of  space  in  the 
phenomena  of  crystallization  and  chemical  action,  and  in 
electric  and  magnetic  phenomena,  and  in  the  work   of 
gravity,  without  using  a  material  medium,  I  see  no  rea,son 
why  masses,  worlds,  may  not  act  upon  each  other  through 
intervals  of  space  without  any  material  medium.     There 
is  no  more  necessity  for  supposing  a  material  medium  for 

light  than  for  gravity. 

We  have,  then,  gravity,  electricity,  magnetism,  the 
chemical  force,  the  crj-staUizing  force,  molecular  repulsion, 
light  and  heat,  eight  of  the  ten  inorganic  forces,  which 
are  plainly  shown  to  be  not  matter,  not  material  processes, 
and  we  see  that  what  have  been  called  the  physical  forces 
are  not  molecular  motions.  As  the  other  two  of  these 
forces  cohesion  and  inertia,  never  act  beyond  the  hmits 
of  their  bodies,  they  cannot  be  thus  shown  to  be   not 

matter. 

But  now,  it  may  be  supposed  that  these  processes  are 
not  attraction  and  repulsion,  and  that  there  is  no  such 
process  as  action  and  reaction  among  molecules  or  masses ; 
but  that  each  moves  itself  does  as  it  does  with  reference 
to  other  bodies,  by  its  own  inherent  power,  unacted  upon 
by  anything  outside  of  itself  This  is  an  old  supposition, 
and  has  been  often  answered,  but  we  give  it  place  here. 
This  <nves  to  masses  as  well  as  molecules,  a  self-moving 
and  self-directing  power.     They  must  also  be  capable  of 


82 


FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 


perception,  must  be  able  to  see  the  bodies  toward  which 
they  would  move.  They  must  also  resolve  that,  when 
they  move  toward  other  bodies,  they  will  increase  their 
velocity  according  to  a  fixed  law.  They  must  possess 
remarkable  power  to  form  judgments  of  distance,  or  they 
might  make  a  mistake  and  start  to  move  toward  a  body 
that  is  at  greater  distance  from  them.  They  must  pOvSsess 
great  ability  to  form  judgments  of  size,  of  the  quantity  of 
matter,  or  they  might  start  toward  a  body  that  contained 
a  less  quantity  of  matter.  After  forming  perfect  judg- 
ments of  distance  and  size,  they  must  possess  wonderful 
mathematical  power  to  calculate  the  resultant  of  many 
bodies  around  them  in  all  directions.  They  must  possess 
skill  in  execution,  in  marking  out  straight  lines,  curves, 
and  circles,  far  beyond  human  powers.  They  must  be 
capable  of  contemplating  purposes  and  ends  beforehand, 
and  great  wisdom  in  the  selections  of  means  and  ways  to 
accomplish  those  ends.  To  believe  that  molecules  and 
masses  of  matter  possess  such  wonderful  powers  requires 
a  degree  of  credulity  that  I  do  not  claim  to  possess. 

Unless  matter  does  possess  these  wonderful  powers, 
molecules  and  masses,  or  something  else  in  them,  must 
act  and  react  upon  each  other.  Then  matter  can  never  be 
the  doer  in  any  natural  phenomena,  except  where  one 
moving  body  comes  against  another  body  and  moves  that. 
In  all  motions  resulting  from  gravity,  electricity,  mag- 
netism, the  chemical  force,  the  crystallizing  force,  mole- 
cular repulsion,  light,  and  heat,  the  mover  and  doer  can- 
not be  matter. 

We  find,  then,  that  the  whole  of  what  is  called  the 
dynamic  theory  of  matter  is  included  in  the  doings  of  the 
force  of  inertia.  The  force  of  inertia  energizes  to  hold 
matter  at  rest  if  it  is  now  at  rest,  and  to  perpetuate  its 
motion  if  it  is  now  in  motion.  This  is  the  whole  basis  of 
the  dynamic  theory  of  matter,  this  includes   all  the  facts 


MATTER  NOT  THE   DOER. 


83 


which  support  it,  and  these  facts  are  all  there  is  of  it. 
The  other  nine  forces  have  their  modes  of  doing,  and  none 
of  them  can  be  brought  under  the  mode  of  inertia.  The 
attempt  to  extend  the  law  of  inertia  into  a  universal  prin- 
ciple, explaining  all  natural   phenomena,  is  one  of  the 

follies  of  this  age. 

The   fact  that  most  of  the   phenomena  of  nature   are 
effected  through  intervals  of  space,  where  the  supposed 
doer  is  not,  is  conclusive  proof  that  matter  is  not  the  doer, 
proof  that  is  equal  to  a  mathematical  demonstration,  pro- 
vided it  be  true  that  a  thing  cannot  do  where  it  is  not. 
But  the  reader  may  think,  has  not  the  difficulty  of  action 
between  remote   bodies  presented  itself  to  philosophers 
during  all  the  past,  and  yet  they  have  gone  on  admitting 
the  fact  of  such  action  ?     And  has  not  the  postulate,  which 
declares  that  a  thing  cannot  do  where  it  is  not,  been  known 
to  philosophers  during  the  centuries,  and  yet  they  have 
not  objected  to  the  physical  philosophy  which  assumes 
that  separated  bodies  do  act  upon  each  other  ?     To  these 
questions  we  answer,  yes.     "Then  why  do  you  say  that 
action  of  separate  bodies  upon  each  other  is  impossible, 
when  Aristotle  and  Kant  and  all  the  other  great  philoso- 
phers, in  full  view  of  this  postulate,  have  not  condemned 
the  physical  philosophy  which  has  separate  bodies  acting 
upon  each   other?     Have  you  discerned  what  these  men 
failed   to   discern?"      These  questions   are   natural;  but 
when  we  learn  how  those  philosophers  disposed  of  the 
difficulty,  these  questions  lose  much  of  their  importance. 
The   postulate  — nothing  can   do   where   it  is  not— was 
known  to  the  Greek  philosophers ;  but  when  they  looked 
out  upon  nature,  they  saw  a  world  of  facts  which  seemed 
to  contradict  it.     Bewildered,  dazed,  they  knew  not  what 
to  say.     Either  the  apparent  facts  or  the  postulate  must 
give  way.     The  facts,  they  said,  are  constantly  before  our 
eyes,  separate  bodies  are  drawn  together,  no  one  can  deny 


I  ' 


84  FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 

•  that.  The  apparent  facts  prevailed,  and  the  postulate 
was  laid  quietlj'  awa}',  and  the  mystery  was  frankly  ad- 
mitted to  be  beyond  human  comprehension.  Occasionalh' 
during  the  ages  a  philosopher  would  bring  the  postulate 
out  of  its  retirement  and  object  to  the  contrary  popular 
opinion,  but  he  had  nothing  but  matter  to  present  as  the 
doer,  and  the  apparent  facts  would  still  hold  their  suprem- 
acy. The  philosopher  said,  it  is  not  possible  for  separate 
bodies  to  act  upon  each  other,  yet  they  appear  to  do  so — 
it  is  a  mystery  we  cannot  explain.  They  held  on  to  the 
postulate,  but  made  little  use  of  it,  because  facts  seemed 
to  so  pOvSitively  contradict  it. 

Since  the  revival  of  philosophy  in  modem  times  the 
difficulty  has  been  generally  disposed  of  in  about  this 
manner:  *'It  is  true  we  cannot  explain  how  remote 
bodies  can  act  upon  each  other ;  neither  can  we  explain 
how  contiguous  bodies  can  act  upon  each  other — it  is  as 
great  a  myster}^  in  one  case  as  in  the  other."  Of  course, 
it  is  no  explanation  of  one  mystery  to  bring  another 
mystery  and  place  beside  it.  This  is  simply  an  admission 
that  both  are  inexplicable  mysteries,  considering  matter 
as  the  mover.  If  it  be  admitted  that  the  molecules  of  all 
matter  are  separated  bodies,  the  difficulty  is  as  great 
whether  we  consider  tlie  bodies  remote  or  near,  for  in 
both  cases  it  is  action  between  separated  bodies,  and  the 
postulate — nothing  can  do  where  it  is  not — applies  as  well 
to  bodies  that  are  near  and  appear  to  touch  as  to  those 
which  are  remote.  In  that  case  matter  cannot  be  the  actor 
or  doer  in  any  case,  even  within  solid  bodies,  and  we  have 
matter  as  a  doer  thrown  entirely  out  of  nature  and  phi- 
losophy. But  if  we  have  the  molecules  of  matter  in 
actual  contact,  the  two  cases  are  not  similar ;  in  one  case 
it  is  action  between  separated  bodies,  and  in  the  other 
case  it  is  action  between  bodies  which  touch,  and  we  do 
not  -have  matter  acting  where  it  is  not. 


KANT'S   ADMISSION.  '  85 

But  Kant,  acknowledged  to  be  the  most  profound  and 
penetrating   philosopher   that  has  appeared  among  men 
since  Aristotle,  while  he  does  as  others  have  done,  offsets 
one  of  these  mysteries   against   the  other,  and  declares 
them  both  impossible.      We  quote  from  Professor  John 
Watson's  "Kant and  his  English  Critics,"  p.  250 :     " To 
the  objection  of  attraction,  as  action  at  a  distance,  it  is  ■ 
commonly  objected  that  matter  cannot  act  where  it  is  not. 
How,  it  may  be  asked,  can  the  earth  immediately  attract 
the  moon,  which  is  thousands  of  miles  distant  from  it  ? 
To  this  Kant  replies  that  matter  cannot  act  where  it  is,  on 
any  hypothesis  that  we  may  adopt,  since  each  part  of  it  is 
necessarily  outside  of  every  other.     Even  if  the  earth  and 
moon   were   in  physical  contact,  their   point  of  contact 
would  lie  in  the  limit  between  the  two  parts  touching 
each  other,  and  therefore  each  part,  to  act  on  the  other 
must  act  where  it  is  not."     It  will  be  noticed  that  Kant 
here  admits  that  separate  bodies  cannot  act  on  each  other, 
and  also  declares  that  bodies  which  touch  each  other  can- 
not act  upon  each  other,  because,  though  they  may  touch 
at  one  point  or  surface,  all  the  rest  of  the  substance  mak- 
ing up  the  two  bodies  is  separated,  the  matter  of  one  body 
from  the  matter  of  the  other  body,  by  an  interval  of  space. 
Thus    he    fully    admits    the    validity  of  the  postulate- 
no  thing  can  do  where  it  is  not.     Kant,  so  far  from  deny- 
ing this  postulate,  positively  asserts  its  validity,  and  de- 
clares that  a  thing  cannot  do  where  it  is  not. 

The  difficulty  of  matter  acting  at  a  distance  is  not 
removed  by  saying,  neither  can  it  act  in  contact,— it  re- 
mains true  that  matter  cannot  act  at  a  distance.  I  believe 
that  matter  cannot  act  anywhere,  and  what  I  am  endeav- 
oring to  show  here  is  that  most  natural  phenomena  are 
effected  through  intervals  of  space  where  the  matter  which 
is  supposed  to  be  the  doer  is  not,  and  therefore  that  matter 
cannot  be  the  doer. 


86 


FACTS   AND   THEIR   TEACHING. 


Kant  knew,  and  every  other  philosopher  who  admits 
that  two  contradictories  cannot  both  be  true,  knows  that 
bodies  cannot  act  where  they  are  not.  But  apparent  facts 
seem  to  contradict  this,  and  the  apparent  facts  and  this 
cannot  be  reconciled;  so  scientists  disregard  the  contra- 
dictions, and  go  on  talking  about  separate  bodies  acting 
upon  each  other,  still  calling  matter  the  doer.  The 
apparent  facts  which  dispute  this  postulate  are  like  the 
apparent  facts  which  disputed  the  Copernican  system  of 
astronomy — the  heavenly  bodies  seemed  to  revolve  around 
the  earth.  The  fact  is,  separate  bodies  cannot  act  upon 
each  other — a  thing  cannot  do  where  it  is  not.  Then 
matter  cannot  be  the  actor  or  doer  in  anv  case  of  attrac- 
tion,  nor  in  any  case  of  repulsion,  except  where  one  body 
in  contact  pushes  another,  and  none  of  the  so-called  phy- 
sical forces  are  matter,  or  material  processes. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  answer  the  question.  Is  energy 
a  property  of  matter?  All  natural  phenomena  in  inor- 
ganic nature  are  produced  through  the  processes  of  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion.  We  have  found  that  in  all  cases  of 
attraction,  and  in  all  cases  of  repulsion,  except  where  one 
body  moves  against  another  and  moves  that,  matter  can- 
not possibly  be  the  doer.  We  have  found  that  five  of  the 
ten  inorganic  forces — gravitj-,  electricity,  magnetism,  the 
chemical  force,  and  the  crystallizing  force — do  attract 
bodies  through  intervals  of  space,  and  that  therefore  they 
cannot  be  matter  or  material  processes.  If  we  discard  the 
universal  ether,  which  this  writer  thinks  we  have  abun- 
dant reason  for  doing,  we  have  light  and  heat  moving 
through  empty  space,  then  the}^  are  not  matter  or  material 
processes.  We  have  found  that  electricity  and  magnetism 
do  repel  bodies  through  inter^'als  of  space ;  hence  there 
are  repulsions  in  nature  w^hich  are  not  material  processes, 
or  molecular  knocking.  I  think  w^e  have  abundant  rea- 
sons for  discarding  the   dj-namic  as  molecular  knocking 


ENERGY   NOT   MATTER.  87 

theory  of  gases  and  vapors ;  then  we  have  molecular  re- 
pulsion and  heat  acting  through  inter\^als  of  space,  then 
in  these  cases  matter  cannot  be  the  doer. 

We  have  now  left  only  the  two  forces— cohesion  and 
inertia— that  are  not  shown  to  be  not  matter.  These  two 
forces  never  act  beyond  the  limits  of  their  bodies,  so  they 
cannot  be  shown  by  this  test  to  be  not  matter.  They  do 
not  offer  any  proof  that  they  are  matter,  or  that  they  are 
not  not-matter ;  only  the  circumstances  do  not  admit  of 
their  being  shown  to  be  not  matter— they  cannot  be  posi- 
tively included  among  the  not-matter  forces. 

When  scientists  thought  they  had  shown  that  two  of 
the  inorganic  forces  were  material  processes,  they  did  not 
hesitate  to  generalize  that  all  of  them  are,  and  made  but 
little  effort  to  prove  that  the  others  were,  and  that  without 
success,  resting  their  generalization  upon  these  two  alone. 
We  have  shown  five  of  them  to  be  positively  not  matter, 
three  of  them  to  be  probably  not  matter,  and  two  of  them 
not  positively  included,  but  giving  no  evidence  to  the 
contrary.     Here,  then,  is  ample  foundation  for  the  gen- 
eralization that  none  of  these  are  physical  processes,  and 
that   matter  is  never  the  actor  or  doer  in  the  physical 
phenomena  of  nature.     In  all  the  motions  and  doings  in 
nature  there  is  a  manifestation  of  energy.     If  matter  is 
not  the  doer,  this  energy  is  a  property  of  something  not 
matter.     If  matter  is  not  the  doer,  this  energy  is  not  a 
property  of  matter.     Even  if  energy  were  a  property  of 
matter,  in  the  cases  cited  of  action  at  a  distance  its  energy 
could  not  be  the  effective  energy,  for  a  property   cannot 
extend  beyond  the  limits  of  its  substance.     Here,  then,  is 
ample  basis  for  the  generalization  that  energy  is  never  a 
property  of  matter.     There  are  few  scientific  generaliza- 
tions so  well  established  as  this. 


I 


\ 


CHAPTER  VI. 


Motion. 


Motion  is  a  fact  that  a  portion  of  substance  occupies 
different  places  in  space  in  successive  periods  of  time.  It 
is  not  substance  or  property,  but  a  relation.  It  is  a  space 
relation,  a  constantly  varying  space  relation.  It  differs 
from  location  in  the  fact  that  the  location  of  the  substance 
is  constantly  changing.  Location  is  a  fixed  space  relation, 
at  least  in  reference  to  other  bodies.  If  a  body  occupies 
constantly  the  same  space  relation  with  reference  to  other 
bodies,  we  call  it  a  fixed  or  located  body.  If  it  occupies 
constantly  the  same  portions  of  space— if  there  are  any 
such  cases — it  is  really  a  fixed  or  located  body.  If  it  is 
constantly  changing  its  place  in  space,  or  its  relative  dis- 
tance and  direction  from  other  bodies,  we  say  it  is  moving, 
and  we  call  the  fact  of  this  change  in  its  space  relations 
motion.  It  involves  also  a  time  relation— successive 
periods  of  time.  It  is,  then,  both  a  space  and  time  rela- 
tion. Being  only  a  relation,  it  is  improper  to  speak  of  it 
as  a  doer.  Nothing  but  substaiue  can  do  or  be  a  doer. 
Neither  can  motion  be  properly  spoken  of  as  a  correlative 
of  force  or  energy.  These  are  not  relations,  and  to  speak 
of  converting  motion  into  force  or  energy,  or  force  or 
energy  into  motion,  is  to  speak  of  converting  a  relation 
into  a  substance  or  property,  or  a  substance  or  property 
into  a  relation.  If  we  speak  of  the  equivalence  between 
motion  and  force  or  energy,  we  talk  nonsense.     There  can 


PERPETUAL   MOTION.  89 

'be  no  equivalence  between  things  so  unlike,  between  a 
relation  and  a  substance  or  property.  How  would  this 
sound?  above  ^  extension,  direction  =  matter,  motion 
^^  substance.  . 

Matter  has  no  power  to  start  itself  in  motion,  or  to 
move  itself  after  it  has  been  started  in  motion.  In  our 
previous  examinations  we  have  reached  the  following 
generalizations  :  Energy  is  never  a  property  of  matter, 
and  nothing  which  does  not  possess  the  property  of,energy 
•can  move  itself,  or  move  anything  else.  We  know  from 
experience  that  all  motion  in  matter  is  attended  with  an 
exertion  of  energy.  If  we  start  matter  in  motion,  we  do 
•so  by  the  exertion  of  energy.  If  moving  matter  comes 
against  us  we  have  to  exert  energy  to  resist  it.  By  this 
we  know  that  the  motion  of  a  detached  flying  body  is 
attended  with  a  constant  exertion  of  energy,  that  its 
motion  is  continued  by  a  constant  exertion  of  energy,  and 
by  experiment  we  learn  that  the  amount  of  energy 
exerted  to  continue  the  motion  is  just  equal  to  that  which 
started  the  motion.  Thus  we  conclude  that  there  is  no 
motion  in  matter  without  the  exertion  of  energy  to  move 
it,  that  the  energizing  continues  as  long  as  the  motion 
continues,  and  that  the  motion  would  cease  at  once  if  the 
energizing  should  cease,  that  there  is  no  continuance  of 
motion  after  the  energizing  ceases. 

PERPETUAL   MOTION. 

Motion,  then,  in  order  to  be  perpetual  must  be  con- 
tinued by  a  constant  exertion  of  energy.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  self-perpetuated  motion.  There  is  not  in 
motion  itself  any  tendency  to  perpetuity.  Motion  is  the 
result  of  the  energizing  of  something.  To  talk  about  a 
relation  being  self-perpetuating,  and  self-continuing,  is 
to  give  to  a  relation  causal  power,  and  make  it  capable 
•of  doing,  make  it  a  doer.  Nothing  but  substance  can  be  a 
doer.     If  there  is  any  decrease  in  the  energizing,  there  is 


I 


90  MOTION 

a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  motion,  or  in  the  velocity 
of  motion.  The  energy  of  amoving  body  is  not  conse- 
quent upon  its  n.otion,  but  its  motion  is  consequent  upon 
the  energizing  of  something  to  move  it.  The  motion  is- 
the  effect,  and  not  the  cause  in  this  case.  Motion — a 
relation — can  never  be  a  cause  or  doer. 

Again,  motion,  to  be  perpetual  must  be  without  obstruct 
tion;  that  is,  the  energizing  which  is  moving  the  body 
must  not  be  counteracted  by  other  energizing.  As  the- 
motion  of  a  moving  detached  body  is  continued  by  the 
continued  exertion  of  energy,  only  something  which  ener- 
gizes, something  which  possesses  and  exerts  energy,  can 
stop  or  retard  the  motion  of  the  body.  As  nothing  but  a 
force,  a  substance  possessing  the  property  of  energy,  can 
move  matter  or  cause  motion,  so  nothing  else  can  stop 
the  motion  of  a  flying  body.  All  flying  bodies  moving 
in  regions  adjacent  to  other  matter  are  acted  upon, 
retarded,  obstructed,  by  the  forces  iu  that  other  matter, 
and  hence  their  motion  is  brought  to  an  end.  All  visible 
motions,  except  those  of  the  planetary  worlds,  continue 
for  a  little  time,  and  then  end.  The  planets  are  the  only 
bodies  known  to  us  that  move  without  obstruction  ;  these 
meet  with  slight  obstruction  in  the  meteoric  ar^d  aerolite 
bodies,  but  not  enough  to  scarcely  sensibly  retard  their 
motion.  All  known  bodies  moving  in  space  adjacent  to- 
other bodies  are  obstructed  and  retarded.  This,  accord- 
ing to  all  rules  of  logic,  is  a  legitimate  basis  for  the  gen- 
eralization that  all  bodies  moving  in  like  circumstances, 
are  obstructed  and  retarded. 

But  some  are  disposed  to  limit  this  generalization  to. 
xnsible  or  molar  motion,  and  suppose  that  in  the  invisible 
or  molecular  realm  of  matter,  motions  may  be  perpetual. 
This  supposition  cannot  be  proven,  and  no   attempt  is 
made  to  prove  it.     It  is  merely  an  hypothesis  by  which 


IN  GASES.  gi 

they  would  remove  some  difficulties  out  of  the  way  of 
other  hypotheses.     All  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  of 
sensible  bodies.     In  all  our  examination  of  nature  we 
must  proceed  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.     What 
we  find  to  be  true  of  known  matter  we  legitimately  apply 
to  unknown  matter.     When  we  find  that  a  sensible  mass 
of  matter  possesses  the  properties  of  impenetrability,  in- 
ertia, and  gravity,  we  conclude  that  any  subdivision  of 
that  mass,  however  minute,  must  possess  those  properties. 
But  scientists  suppose  that  in  one  respect  matter  in  the 
form  of  molecules  difiers  from  matter  in  the  form  of  masses: 
masses  are  never  perfectly  elastic ;  molecules  are  supposed 
to  be  perfectly  elastic. 

We  will  consider  this  question  in  reference  to  the  mole- 
cules of  gases,  and  according  to  what  is  called  the 
dynamic  theory  of  gases.  In  this  theory  the  molecules 
are  supposed  to  fly  about  and  knock  against  each  other, 
and  to  be  kept  apart  by  this  knocking. 

Now,  what  ground  have  we  for  supposing  that  mole- 
cules are  perfectly  elastic  ?     It  is  well  known  that  sen- 
sible  bodies  of  matter  are  never  perfectly  elastic.     These 
are  the  facts  which  are  to  govern  our  opinions  respecting 
unknown  or  insensible  bodies  of  matter.     These  are  the 
facts  from  which  we  generalize  an  induction  in  reference 
to  all  matter.     In  all  known  cases,  in  all  instances  discov- 
ered  by  man,  bodies  of  matter  are  not  perfectly  elastic. 
From  these  facts  we  generalize  the  statement:     Matter  is 
never  perfectly  elastic ;  molecules  are  matter ;  therefore 
molecules  are  not  perfectly  elastic. 

No  reason  is  assigned  why  we  should  not  include  mole- 
cules in  this  generalization,  except  the  usefulness  of  the 
supposition  that  they  are  perfectly  elastic  in  the  support 
of  other  suppositions.  One  supposition  is  made,  and  to 
accommodate  that,  another,  and  so  on,  till  at  last  we  have 
a  system   of  physical   philosophy  resting  entirely  on  a 


92 


MOTION 


series  of  suppositions ;  and  in  this  case  in  direct  contra- 
diction to  all  known  and  discovered  facts  respecting  matter. ' 

This  is  not  an  hypothesis  devised  and  then  tested  by  an 
application  to  facts;  but  a  supposition  made  to  clear  the 
way  for  other  suppositions.  Heat  is  supposed  to  be  mole- 
cules in  motion;  all  molecules  are  supposed  to  be  in  con- 
stant motion,  moving  forever  of  themselves;  therefore  we 
must  not  admit  of  any  decrease  in  motion  or  kinetic 
energy,  else  we  would  not  have  an  eternally  self-moving 
universe;  therefore  we  will  suppose  that  molecules  are 
perfectly  elastic. 

Though  the  mass  is  a  gas,  each  molecule  is  a  solid,  so 
the  question  is  of  elasticity  in  solids.  I^et  us  consider  the 
process  of  motion  from  elasticity  in  solids.  When  a  marble 
ball  is  thrown  against  a  solid  block  of  marble  it  rebounds. 
This  is  explained  by  saying  that  the  two  bodies  by  col- 
lision are  indented,  the  matter  that  has  been  thus  indented 
springs  back  to  its  original  form,  and  thus,  like  a  spring, 
pushes  the  bodies  apart.  But  the  ball  never  leaves  the 
block  with  the  same  velocity  it  had  during  its  approach. 
This  loss  of  motion  is  sometimes  explained  by  saying  that 
a  quantity  of  heat  is  produced  by  the  collision,  and  some- 
times by  saying  that  some  of  the  matter  composing  the 
indentations  is  permanently  displaced,  and  the  indenta- 
tions are  not  entirely  restored. 

We  may  give  a»more  exact  explanation  of  rebounding 
motion.  The  force  of  cohesion  which  holds  the  particles 
of  matter  together  and  keeps  them  in  place,  in  its  efforts 
to  restore  the  indented  portions  to  their  former  places, 
pushes  the  two  bodies  apart.  The  agent  in  this  rebound- 
ing motion  is  cohesion.  All  rebounding  motion  from 
elasticity  in  solids  is  the  result  of  the  energizing  of  cohe- 
sion to  keep  the  body  in  its  original  shape.  Cohesion  in 
solids  is  the  agent  which  mainly  stops  the  forward  motion 
of  a  colliding  body  and  sends  it  back;  but  inertia  tends  to 


PERFECT   ELASTICITY 


93 


hold  at  rest  matter  w^hich  is  now  at  rest,  and  perpetuate 
the  motion  of  moving  matter  in  a  straight  line.  When 
the  colliding  ball  strikes  the  surface  of  the  block  it  meets 
with  the  resistance  of  cohesion  and  also  of  holding  inertia 
in  the  block.  It  overcomes  these  resistances  sufficiently 
to  move  a  portion  of  the  matter  of  the  block  so  as  to  form 
an  indentation  in  the  block,  and  also  so  as  to  indent  or 
flatten  the  ball,  so  that  it  is  not  perfectly  round.  A  portion 
of  the  matter  of  the  block  is  thus  started  in  motion  toward 
the  center  of  the  block.  Cohesion  soon  stops  the  motion 
of  that  portion  of  the  block  and  also  of  the  'ball  in  that 
direction,  and  starts  them  both  back  in  the  opposite 
direction.  Cohesion  thus  starts  back,  as  from  a  state  of 
rest,  the  matter  of  both  the  ball  and  the  indentation,  a 
quantity  of  matter  greater  than  the  ball  alone  contains. 
The  impact  that  started  the  ball  in  motion  at  first  had  to 
move  only  the  matter  in  the  ball;  the  agent  which  sends 
it  back  has  to  move  more  matter  and  can  consequently 
move  it  at  a  less  velocity. 

If  two  balls  moving  in  opposite  directions  collide,  both 
balls  are  flattened.  Cohesion  in  both  balls  pushes  the 
flattened  portions  so  as  to  restore  the  balls  to  their  former 
globular  form.  This  push  drives  the  balls  apart.  Thus 
a  portion  of  each  ball,  the  portion  forming  the  indentation, 
is  started  in  motion  in  the  opposite  direction  from  that 
in  which  the  ball  itself  is  moving.  This  backward  motion 
constitutes  a  jerk  or  pull  backward  upon  the  ball  which 
must  be  overcome  by  the  momentum  of  its  forward  motion, 
and  which  retards  and  lessens  its  forward  motion,  so  the 
two  balls  do  not  move  away  from  each  other  with  the 
same  velocity  that  they  had  in  their  approach. 

These  facts  fully  explain  the  loss  of  motion  in  all  col- 
lisions in  sensible  bodies,  where  the  bodies  are  not  per- 
manently changed  in  form,  and  they  are  just  as  applicable 
to  bodies  of  insensible  size,  and  they  show  the  impossi- 
bility of  what  is  called  perfect  elasticity. 


94  MOTION 

Of  course,  if  we  say  that  molecules  are  centers  of  force 
or  points  of  divine  energizing,  we  can  apply  to  them  no 
induction  drawn  from  sensible  bodies  of  matter,  and  we 
may  suppose  any  thing  we  please  respecting  them;  and  the 
convenient  dodge  of  the  idealist  is  always  available-he 
can  always  say  with  Professor  Huxley:     "After  all   what 
do  we  know  of  matter,  except  as  a  name  for  the  unknown 
and  hypothetical  cause  of  states  of  our  own  consciousness>- 
But  after  we  have  supposed  perfect  elasticity  in  mole- 
cules there  are  still  difficulties  in  the  way  of  perpetual 
molecular  motion  in  gases.     All  bodies  moving  near  the 
earth  are  obstructed  by  the  gravity  of  the  earth.     When 
the  molecules  of  a  mass  of  gas  move  away  from  the  earth 
they  UK  retarded;  when  they  move  toward  the  earth  they 
are  accelerated;  thus  the  motion  in  the  mass  away  from 
the  earth  must  be  less  than  toward  it.     When  the  mole- 
cules strike  the  earth  they  strike  a  body  that  we  know  is 
not  perfectly  elastic,  and  they  do  not  rebound  as  far  as 
they  have  fallen.     On  the  lower  surface  of  the  mass  of  gas 
there  is  a  layer  of  molecules  that  are  beyond  the  reach  of 
any  molecules  to  knock  them  back,  they  are  the  outside 
molecules,  and  there  are  no  molecules  outside  of  them  to 
knock  them  back,  and  they  must  fall  to  the  earth.     Other 
mo  ecules  are  then  the  outside  molecules,  and  there  are  no 
molecules  outside  of  them  to  knock  them  back.     Thus 

^a^^A  f  r/^'^"'^"  ^^'^'  ^"°"'^''  '""^t  escape  from  the 
mass  and  fall  to  the  earth,  until  they  have  all  fallen. 

Thus  admitting  the  perfect  elasticity  of  molecules,  per- 
petual motion  of  molecules  in  gases  under  this  theorTof 
gases,  seems  to  be  an  impossibility. 
But  some  believe  in  the  perpetual  motion  of  molecules 

Sfeve  thl/"^  '  '^^  ^^""'°'"  '^^'''y  «f  g««^«-  Such 
believe    that    the    molecules    of  a   gas    are   held   apart 

rL  S"^'  '°'''!^»'«'-  repulsion,  an  invisible,  undis- 
coverable  something,  which  holds  the  molecules  at  a 
distance  from  each  other.      Each  molecule  in  a  mass 


■I 


I 

BETWEEN  TWO   FORCES.  95 

, -is  pushed  on  every  side  from  all  its  neighbors.  It  is 
/  /known  by  experiment  that  this  push  increases  in  power 
<Kas  the  molecules  approach  each  other.  Then  there  is  a 
point  at  which  each  molecule  will  be  pressed  equally  on 
every  side,  where  the  repulsion  from  all  other  molecules 
^vill  be  in  equilibrium.  There  that  molecule  will  rest, 
and  any  attempt  to  move  it  from  that  point  will  meet  with 
the  resistance  of  this  push.  If  it  be  by  some  power  ex- 
ternal to  the  mass  knocked  from  that  position,  it  may 
vibrate  back  and  forth  for  a  little  time  ;  but  every  time  it 
passes  that  point,  it  will  be  pushed  upon  one  side  more 
than  on  the  other,  and  will  soon  be  forced  to  a  rest  at  that 
point. 

It  is  understood  that  gravity  acts  between  the  molQcules, 
:and  tends  to  draw  them  together.     Some  have  seemed  to 
suppose  that  the  molecules  might  vibrate  back  and  forth 
from  the  alternate  prevalence  of  gravity  acting  between 
the  molecules  and  the  molecular  repulsion.     But  there 
^can  be  no  such  alternate  prevalence.     Both  forces  increase 
Tin  the  same  proportion  as   the  molecules  approach,  and 
decrease    in   the    same  proportion  "vvhen   the   molecules 
-recede.     If,  then,  they  are  in  equilibrium  at  any  point, 
they  are  at  all  points  of  distance.     But  the  attraction  be- 
tween molecules  is  so  little  that  it  has  no  power  at  all 
against  the  powerful  repulsion.     It  is  so  little  that   Mr. 
Tyndall  throws  it  entirely  out  of  the  calculation. 

The  attraction  of  the  gravity  of  the  earth  tends  to 
■press  the  molecules  of  all  gases  together  at  the  surface  of 
the  earth.  This  is  as  an  outside  power  pressing  the 
molecules  together.  This  pressure  is  resisted  by  molecu- 
lar repulsion  acting  between  the  molecules.  The  outside 
-pressure  is  a  steady  and  uniform  pull,  and  when  it  presses 
the  molecules  together  until  the  resistance  of  repulsion 
"between  the  molecules  becomes  equal  to  it,  there  the 
miolecules  stop,  and   remain   at  rest.     This  is  the  case 


9^  MOTION ' 

first  considered  under  this  head ;  the  outside  pressure  of 
the  gravity  of  the  earth  upon  the  mass  of  gas  was  pre- 
sumed in  that  case.     I  see  no  chance,  then,  for  perpetual 
molecular  motion,  under  this  theory  of  gases. 

The  foregoing  discussion  applies  to  all  gaseous  sub-^ 
stances,  and  also  to  all  liquids  and  solids  if  their  molecules, 
are  detached  and  separate  from  each  other,  as  in  gases, 
only  separated  by  less  distances.  But  we  know  that  the 
molecules  of  liquids  and  solids  are  held  together  and  all 
motion  among  them  resisted  by  cohesion.  The  process 
of  vibrations  in  liquids  and  solids,  as  it  differs  from  that 
in  gases,  has  not  been  agreed  upon  and  definitely  described. 
It  does  not  seem  proper  to  call  these  vibrations  waves  ; 
they  certainly  cannot  be  inequalities  in  surface,  like  water 
waves,  nor  inequalities  in  density,  like  aerial  waves.  They 
have  sometimes  been  represented  by  the  communication 
of  an  impulse  through  a  row  of  detached  bodies.  In  such 
a  case  all  the  bodies  in  the  row  successively  move  forward,, 
and  hit  those  in  front  of  them.  Scratch  the  end  of  an 
iron  shaft  weighing  ten  tons  with  a  pin,  and  the  scratch, 
may  be  heard  at  the  other  end,  and  at  all  points  on  its. 
surface.  We  know  that  a  very  light  tap  with  an  iron 
instrument  at  one  end,  can  be  not  only  heard  but  felt,  at 
the  other  end,  and  at  every  point  on  the  surface  of  that 
end.  Now,  we  cannot  suppose  that  that  scratch  with  a- 
pin,  or  that  light  tap,  was  of  sufficient  power  to  move  the 
whole  of  those  ten  tons  of  matter  forward  a  little.  This 
explanation  of  the  process  does  not  seem  to  be  reasonable 
or  possible. 

These  vibrations  have  sometimes  been  represented  by 
the  motion  of  a  taut  cord  or  wire.  We  know  that  the- 
vibration  of  such  a  wire  consist  of  deviations  from  a 
straight  line.  It  may  be  a  mere  trembling,  but  that  even 
is  variation  from  a  straight  hne.  This  seems  to  more 
fitly  represent  vibrations  in  a  solid.     But  whatever  be  the- 


I 


f! 


.     IN  SOLIDS.  97 

form  of  the  motion,  we  know  that  cohesion  resists  motion 
of  any  kind  in  liquids  and  solids.  The  shortest  distance 
between  any  two  points  is  a  straight  line.  When  a  taut 
wire  is  made  to  vibrate,  every  time  it  moves  to  the  right 
or  left  of  a  straight  line,  it  becomes  more  taut,  and  cohe- 
sion in  it  resists  its  further  motion  in  that  direction,  and 
draws  it  back.  This  resistance  of  cohesion  to  any  devia- 
tion from  a  straight  line  soon  brings  the  motion  to  an  end. 
It  has  been  said  that  the  motion  of  the  wire  is  stopped  by 
the  resistance  of  the  air.  Admitting  that  the  air  is  some 
obstruction,  we  learn  by  experiment  that  the  motion  of 
the  wire  will  come  to  an  end  nearly  as  soon  in  a  vacuum^ 
But  the  motion  of  molecules  in  a  solid  body  is  resisted,. 
not  only  by  cohesion  acting  lengthwise  as  in  a  wire,  but 
also  by  cohesion  acting  laterally.  Every  molecule  in  the 
body  is  held  firmly  in  its  place,  bound  to  all  contiguous 
molecules,  by  cohesion,  and  their  motion  thereby  ob- 
structed, whether  the  molecules  toitch  each  other  or  not. 
Then  it  is  admitted  that  the  vibrations  of  a  taut  wire  are 
obstructed  by  the  molecules  of  air  around  it.  Suppose 
this  wire  to  be  surrounded  by  other  wires,  so  that  every 
time  it  moved  one  way  or  the  other  it  would  hit  against 
another  wire,  would  not  its  motion  be  obstructed  much 
more  than  by  the  air  ?  We  may  suppose  vibrations  in  a 
solid  body  to  be  like  vibrations  in  a  bundle  of  wires,  col- 
liding with  others  at  every  move.  This  seems  to  be  indi- 
cated  by  the  fact  that  sound  vibrations  move  more  rapidly 
and  further  when  they  mof e  lengthwise  of  the  fibers  of 
wood  than  when  they  move  across  them ;  and  when  the 
motion  is  parallel  with  the  lamina  of  crystalline  substan- 
ces, than  when  transverse  to  them. 

Now  it  is  very  easy  to  say  that  the  molecules  of  all' 
solids  are  in  constant  motion,  and  that  they  are  a  little 
way  apart  so  as  to  admit  of  that  motion ;  but  whether 
they  are  in  contact  or  not,  we  know  that  they  are  firmly 


'9^  MOTION 

lield  in  their  places,  and  that  their  motion  is  resisted,  by 
cohesion,  and  by  collision  with  other  matter.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  in  such  circumstances  perpetual  motion  is  not 
possible.  To  satisfy  the  demands  of  a  theory  we  cannot 
■do  such  violence  to  all  common  sense,  nor  so  contradict 
•all  the  facts  respecting  matter  known  by  observation  and 
experiment. 

We  have  still  to  consider  the  possibility  of  perpetual 

:motion  of  waves  in   an   ethereal  medium.      It   is   well 

known   that  all  sensible  waves  soon  come   to   an   end. 

Friction  and  imperfect  elasticity  are  alleged  as  reasons  for 

this.     But  we  know  that  these  do  not  include   all   the 

reasons.     Take   as   an   example  water   waves.     When  a 

wave  has  been  raised  by  wind,  or  any  other  means,  above 

the  common  level  of  the  surface,  it   is   drawn  down   by 

gravity,   and  a  portion  of  the  water  forming   the   w^ave 

flows  down  both  inclined  planes  of  the   wave.      If  the 

wave  is  moving  before  the  wind,  some  of  the  raised  water 

flows  down  the  back  side  of  the  wave,  and  reacts  as  an 

obstruction  against  the  next  oncoming  wave.     This  is  the 

main  reason  why  water  waves  flow  on  for  a  little  time, 

-continually  diminishing,  and  then  cease  to  be,  if  the  force 

which  raised  them  ceases  to  act. 

B}'  the  same  process  does  gravity  soon  destroy  all  waves 
in  an  aerial  medium.  All  such  waves  consist  of  alternate 
denser  and  rarer  portions  of  the  medium. '  Such  are  un- 
derstood to  be  the  waves  of  air  which  in  our  ears  produce 
the  sensation  of  sound.  Why  do  these  waves  so  soon 
•end  ?  What  ends  them  ?  It  is  well  known  that  gravity 
resists  inequalities  in  density  as  much  as  inequalities  in 
surface.  This  is  given  by  all  as  the  explanation  of  wind. 
The  molecules  of  the  atmosphere  are  pressed  together  on 
to  the  surface  of  the  earth  by  the  gravity  of  the  earth. 
They  are  held  apart  by  molecular  repulsion  acting  between 
the  molecules.     The  power  of  this  expanding  force  in- 


IN   ETHER.  99 

creases  as  they  are  pressed  nearer  together,  as  the  square 
of  the  distance  decreases.     The  pressure  of  gravity  is  a 
constant  quantity.     When  the  pressure  and  repulsion  are 
equal,  the  molecules  remain  at  rest ;  w^hen  they  are  driven 
nearer  together — condensed — repulsion  is   stronger   than 
the  pressures  and  they  are  driven  apart ;  w^hen  they  be- 
come rarer  than  the  equilibrium,  the  pressure  exceeds  the 
repulsion,   and  molecules    from  the  surrounding   denser 
portions  are  pressed  into  the  rarer  to  restore  the  equilib- 
rium.    As  the  wave  flows  along,  some  of  the  molecules  ' 
composing  the  denser  portion  are  driven  backward  to  fill 
up  the  rarer  portion  behind  it, — some  molecules  on  the 
border  of  that  denser  portion  are  pressed  by  repulsion  on 
one  side  more  than  on  the  other,  and  are  thus  pushed 
back  into  the  rarer  portion.     Thus  the  denser  portion  is 
constantly  depleted,  and  the  inequality  between  the  denser 
and  rarer  portions  is  constantly  diminished,  until  the  two 
portions    at  last  become  equally  dense,   and   the   wave 
ceases  to  be.     Thus  all  known  waves  in  all  serial  substan- 
ces are  known  to  be  ended.     In  proportion  to  the  strength 
of  the  two  forces  which  press   the  molecules  together  and 
repel  them  apart,  will  be  the  rapidity  of  this  destructive 
process.     If  the  pressure  of  gravity  upon  the  molecules 
of  our  atmosphere  were  a  thousand  times  greater  than  it 
is,  inequality  in  density  in  contiguous  portions  would  con- 
tinue only  one-thousandth  of  the  time  that  they  now  con- 
tinue ;  but  as  the  progress  of  the   wave  would  be  much 
more  rapid  than  it  is  now%  it  would  flow  more  than  one- 
thousandth  of  the  distance  that  it  now  flows.     Now,  in 
order  that  the  supposed  ether  may  be  capable  of  transmit- 
ting the  supposed  waves  of  light  and  radiant  heat  at  their 
known   velocity,  it  has  been  decided  that   the   pressure 
w^hich  pushes  the  atoms  of  the  ether  together,  correspond- 
ing to  the  pressure  of  gravity   which   pushes  the   mole- 
cules of  air  together,  must  be  a  million  million  times   as 


^°°  MOTION 

great  as  the  pressure  of  our  atmosphere.  How  lone 
would  contiguous  inequalities  in  density  continue  in  a 
gaseous  substance  under  such   a   tremendous  pressure  > 

that  this  e  her  ,s  a  "jelly,"  a  "solid,"  the  "  densest  of 
a  mat ter,"-that  is  to  say,  there  is  no  material  medium 
filling  the  interstellar  spaces,  and  the  undulatory  theor.^ 
of  light  IS  an  impossibility.  ,  ^ 

According  to  the  plan  of  this  work,  this  is  perhaps  a* 
much  as  It  IS  proper  for  me  to  say  here ;  but  I  will  add 
that  Sir  Isaac  Newton's  famous  argument  against   the 

He  irS:  ;  r7  "'  "^'*  ""''  "^^'^^  '''  been^nswer  d 
He  said  that  hght  cannot  be  waves  of  ether,  for  then  an 

ot,ect  would  form  no  shadow.      Waves  of  water  and  o 

•sound  flow  around   an  intervening  object,  and  leave  no 

unoccupied  space  corresponding  to  a  shadow,  behind  it 

This  argument  stood  as  an  insurmountable  rock  in   the 

luS  th/l!,"  Tr"-  ^""^  """^^  «^"^^*  do  flow 
around   the   body,  they  say,   but   they  are  cut  off  and 

quenched  by  the  process  of  interference.     Then  the  pro- 

Z„  TT""'"^  "^^'  ''^  "^'^^  ''''''  '^t^^^r  light  and  pro- 
ducing darkness  must  be  a  very  simple  process.  Every 
opaque  body  that  the  sun  or  moon  or  any  other  light  h^ 
shone  against  has  had  its  shadow,  with  clear  cut  edges  • 

be  difficult  to  contrive  some  apparatus  by  which  this  sim- 
ple process  can  be  effected.     Yet  all  the  ingenuity  of  man 

mTn  T"     ' V"'  ''  '^""^^™'^*  ^"'^'^  ^»  «tL.     N^ 

result  m  darkness.     "Why!  are  not  numerous  instances; 

ZZVk  7  f'"''°'^  ■  "     ^° '  *^>-  ^^y  h-e  led  you 
o  so  think  ;  but  you  have  been  deceived.     No  such  in- 
stance can  be  found  in  any  text-book  on  earth.     No  mat. 
has  ever  yet  been  able  to  make  one  ray  of  light  quench 


IN   ETHER. 


lOl 


T 


% 


:anotlier.     As  the  reader  may  not  have  time  or  opportunity 
to  search  through  all  the  books  on  light  to  see  for  himself 
that  the  foregoing  assertions  are  true,  I  will   quote  the 
language  of  a  very  high  authority  corroborating  them. 
In  Deschanel's  Natural  Philosophy,  translated    by  Pro- 
fessor J.  D.   Everett,  and  published  by  D.   Appleton  & 
Company,  on  page  1049,  we  find  the   following  words: 
**  Beams  of  light  from  different  sources,  even  from  differ- 
ent points  of  the  same  flame,  or  from  different  parts  of  the 
sun's  disc,  cannot,  by  any  treatment  whatever,  be  made 
to  exhibit  the  phenomena  of  mutual  interference. ' '     He 
gives  a  reason  why,  but  that  reason  applies  as  well  to 
light  in  the  case  of  shadows.     All  kinds  of  light,  from  all 
sources,  in  all  circumstances,  if  the  rays  are  intercepted 
by  an  opaque  body,  produce  a  shadow — they  say  because 
the  rays  behind  the  intervening  body  are  cut  off  by  inter- 
ference; that  is,  the  rays  which  flow  around   the   body 
on  different  sides  of  it  meet  and  cross  each  other,  and  in 
the   language  of  common  life,   put  out  each  other,  and 
result  in  "darkness ;  and  yet  man  has  never  been  able, 
*'  by  any  treatment  whatever,"  to  cause  one  beam  of  light 
to  cut  off  or  darken  another  beam  or  ray.     Until  men  can 
show  by  some  experimental   process  that  the  phenomena 
of  interference  is  possible,  it  is  vain  to  say  that  it  occurs 
constantly  in  every  case  of  a  shadow. 

Well,  if  the  teachings  of  this  chapter  are  true,  they  are 
very  iconoclastic.  We  have  shown  that  perpetual  motion 
in  gases,  liquids,  and  solids  is  impossible ;  then  the  dy- 
namic theory  of  heat  is  impossible.  We  have  shown  that 
perpetual  waves  in  a  supposed  ether  are  an  impossibility ; 
then  the  undulatory  theory  of  Hght  is  impossible. 


~* 


I.AWS  OF 


103; 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Ini-rtia. 

The  first  law  of  inertia  is :  Matter  has  no  power  to  start 
Itself  in  motion.  This  is  another  way  of  saying  that  an 
exertion  of  energy  is  necessary  to  stari  matter  in  motion. 
This  follows  fom  the  fact  that  energy  is  not  a  property  of 
matter ;  and  it  is  also  another  proof  that  enei-y  is  not  a 
property  of  matter.  Knergy  is  that  property  of  things 
by  which  they  cause  motion.  If  matter  possessed  this 
property,  it  could  start  itself  in  motion. 

We  state  as  a  second   law  of  inertia:     Matter  cannot 
move  itselj  after  it  has  been  started  hi  motion.     Energizing 
IS  as  necessary  to  continue  motion  as  to  start  it.     We  know 
that  the  motion  of  flying  bodies  is  continued  by  the  ex- 
ertion of  energy,  by  the  fict  that  an  exertion  of  ener-y  is 
necessary  to  stop  them.     Newton's  third  law  of  motion- 
Action  and  reaction  are  equal  and  in  opposite  directions- 
is  admitted  by  all  scientists.     If  this  be  true  the  reaction 
which  stops  a  body  i.  only  equal  to  the  action  in  the  body- 
there  must  be  something  theie  which  acts.     It  is  not  the 
force  which  gave  the  starting  impulse,  for  that  has  ceased 
to  act  upon  the  body.     It  is  not  the  matter  of  the  body 
for  energy  is  not  a  property  of  matter.      No   energiH^io; 
Without  an  energi-jer.     'i'hen  there  must  be  something  else 
there   which  is  the   energizer,  which  does   possesss   the 
property  of  energy.     We  have  found  that  in  four-fifths  of 
all  natural  phenomena,  the  forces  which  produce   them 


extend  and  work  beyond  the  limits  of  the  material  bodies,, 
and  know  thereby  that  they  are  not  matter.  In  the  case 
of  flying  bodies  there  is  something  which  energizes  ta 
cause  motion  which  does  not  extend  and'  do  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  bodies.  In  all  those  other  cases  we  know 
that  the  energizer  is  not  matter ;  hence  we  conclude  that 
in  this  case  the  energizer  is  not  matter. 

We  present  as  the  third  law  of  inertia  :  When  matter 
has  been  started  in  motion  something  tends  to  move  it  per- 
petually. We  see  bodies  every  day  moving  be3^ond  the 
reach  of  the  impulse  which  started  them.  In  all  such 
cases  motion  continues  for  a  time,  and  then  stops.  We 
can  see  why  it  stops.  In  the  case  of  detached  bodies 
flying  through  the  air,  the  motion  is  stopped  by  the  ob- 
struction of  the  air  and  bj^  gravit}^  As  we  can  discover 
the  stopping  agencies,  we  conclude  that  if  they  were 
absent,  the  motion  would  be  perpetual.  Then  in  the 
case  of  the  planets,  we  have  bodies  moving  without  ob- 
struction, and  their  motion  is  perpetual. 

Hence  w^e  present  as  the  fourth  law  of  inertia  :  Motion 
to  be  perpetual  rnust  be  without  obstruction.  The  condition 
of  perpetual  motion  is  the  absence  of  obstruction.  The 
obstruction  can  be  nothing  but  a  force.  Energizing  is 
necessary  to  stop  moving  matter ;  hence  nothing  can  be  a 
stopper,  or  an  obstruction,  that  does  not  possess  the  prop- 
erty of  energy.  The  obstruction  may  be  an  attractive 
force  acting  through  space  behind  the  moving  body,  or  a 
repellant  force  acting  through  space  in  front  of  it,  or  a  force 
which  energizes  to  hold  matter  at  rest.  A  body  stopped 
by  collision  with  other  matter  is  stopped  by  the  force  or 
forces  which  are  holding  that  matter  together  and  in  its 
present  place  in  space.  The  only  perpetually  moving 
bodies  3^et  discovered  by  man  are  the  planetary  bodies, 
and  these  are  the  only  moving  bodies  known  to  man  that 
move   without   obstruction.      By   bodies  here   we  mean 


I04 


INERTIA. 


LAWS   OF. 


105 


I'ti 


atoms  and  molecules,  as  well  as  masses.     See  preceding 
-chapter. 

We  present  as  tlie  fifth  law  of  inertia:     Moving  matter ^ 
if  7iot  acted  itpon  by  a7iy thing  outside  of  itself^  alivays  moves 

in  straight  lines.  The  force  which  moves  detached  bodies 
always  energizes  to  move  them  in  straight  lines.  Prac- 
tically the  motion  of  flying  bodies  is  never  in  straight 
lines;  but  we  know  what  agents  turn  them  from  right 
lines,  and  we  can  see  that  if  these  agents  did  not  operate 
upon  them,  their  motion  would  be  rectilinear.  All  inor- 
ganic bodies  moved  only  by  a  force  within  themselves 
move  in  right  lines,  and  no  other.  The  force  which 
moves  detached  bodies  persists  in  right-line  motion ;  it 
will  not  move  bodies  in  any  other  way.  If  the  body 
strikes  against  another  body  and  glances,  or  if  it  is  knocked 
by  another  body  out  of  its  course,  it  immediately  re- 
sumed straight-line  motion  in  another  direction.  Discov- 
ering thus  the  mode  of  this  force,  we  know  that  if  any 
bod}^  mass  or  molecule,  moves  according  to  any  other 
mode,  it  is  not  moved  by  the  force  which  perpetuates  the 
motion  of  flying  bodies, — we  know  that  some  other  force 
outside  of  the  body  is  acting  upon  it,  and  turning  it  out 
of  a  straight  line.  All  circular  and  zig  zag  motion  must 
be  the  result  of  two  or  more  forces.  No  one  can  argue  from 
the  fact  that  straight  line  motion  is  perpetual,  that  any 
other  mode  of  motion  is.  The  facts  and  phenomena 
which  occur  under  this  law  of  motion  can  never  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  any  other  mode  of  motion  is  per- 
sistent. All  motion  of  bodies  without  an  external  mover 
known  to  man  is  in  straight  lines,  except  as  some  other 
force  outside  of  the  body  turns  it  from  a  straight  line. 

This  force  resists  any  other  mode  of  motion.  An  exer- 
tion of  energy  is  necessary  to  turn  a  flying  body  out  of 
its  course.  It  is  strange  that  any  man  should  write, 
"*  *  No  power,  no  energy  is  required  to  deflect  a  bullet  from 


its  path,  provided  the  deflecting  force  acts  always  at  right 
-angles  to  that  path,"  (Unseen  Universe,  p.  180).  When 
it  was  said  that  no  work  was  done  by  turning  a  flying 
body  out  of  its  course,  we  could  understand  that  the  worcj 
ivork  could  be  so  defined  as  to  make  the  assertion  true  ; 
but  when  it  is  said  that  no  * '  power  or  energy ' '  is  re- 
quired, it  is  a  great  mystery.  The  degree  of  energy  wdth 
which  this  force  persists  in  tr>dng  to  keep  its  motion  in  a 
straight  line  may  be  seen  in  the  bursting  of  millstones, 
grindstones,  wheels,  and  threshing  machine  cylinders, 
when  revolving  with  great  velocity.  It  requires  as  much 
-energy  to  turn  a  flying  body  out  of  its  course  forty- five 
•degrees  as  was  required  to  start  it  in  motion  at  its  present 
velocity.  The  pull  of  this  force  in  the  earth  in  its  efforts 
to  make  the  motion  of  the  earth  a  straight  line  is  suffi- 
cient to  draw  the  sun  out  of  its  place  in  space,  and  move  it 
.around  in  an  orbit.  Thus  some  astronomers  also  suppose 
sthe  worlds  have  been  thrown  off  from  the  surface  of  the 
.skrinking  sun. 

If  circular  motion  is  produced  by  collision,  the  collision 
must  be  continuous.  One  collision  would  only  turn  the 
two  bodies  out  of  t^eir  course  in  straight  lines  in  different 
directions.  If  the  two  bodies  adhered  together,  the  mass 
made  up  of  the  two  would  continue  to  revolve  on  its  axis, 
if  unobstructed,  forever;  but  if  they  parted,  they  would 
fly  off"  from  each  other  in  straight  lines.  It  matters  not 
hy  what  force  a  flying  body  is  turned  out  of  its  course,  nor 
how  many  times  it  is  turned,  as  soon  as  the  force  which 
•turned  it  ceases  to  act  upon  it,  it  resumes  its  normal  straight 
-line  motion. 

As  it  requires  an  exertion  of  energy  to  turn  a  flying 
^body  out  of  a  straight  hue,  as  it  costs  a  flying  body  the 
loss  of  dynamic  energy  to  turn  another  flying  body  out  of 
.a  straight  line,  the  loss  of  dynamic  energy  in  circular 
motion  produced  by  collision  must  be  continuous.     Sup- 


I06  INERTIA, 

pose  that  two  currents  of  molecules,  moving  in  opposite 
directions,  meet  each  other.     We  will  designate  one  cur- 
rent by  the  letter  A,  and  the  other  by  the  letter  B.     The 
molecules  of  A  collide  against  the  molecules  of  B,  and 
whirl  them  around  in  a  revolving  motion.     The  molecules- 
of  B  do  the  same  to  the  molecules  of  A,  and  we  have  a. 
vortex  or  whirl  of  molecules.      The  molecules  of  both 
currents  lost  some  of  their  dynamic  energy  by  their  work 
of  turning  the  molecules  of  the  other  out  of  their  course. 
After  all  these  molecules  have  been  deflected  by  the  first 
collision,  they  would  of  themselves  resume  their  straight 
line  motion  in  a  multitude  of  tangents  from  the  periphery 
of  the   whirl   in  all   directions.      The   circular  mode   of 
motion  is  constantly  resisted  by  a  force  which  dwells  con- 
stantly in  matter.     The  collision  and  turning  of  A  by  B, 
and  of  B  by  A  must  be  constant  to  produce  vortex  motion, 
and  the  waste  of  dynamic    energy  must  be   continuous, 
without  any  possibility  of  replenishing  it,  and  the  two 
currents  must  soon  destroy  each  other.     The  struggle  for 
straight  line  motion  is  a  continuous  exertion,  and  must  be 
forever  counteracted  by  a  continuous  contrary  exertion, 
and   the  waste  of  dynamic  energy  must  be  continuous, 
until  it  is  all  used  up.     There  is  no  waste  in  the  energy 
that  persists  in  right-line  motion ;  there  is  waste  in  the 
dynamic  energy  which   turns  the   body  ;  the  wasteless 
must  survive  the  wasting  and  exist  alone.      Perpetual 
vortex  or  circular  motion  from  dynamic  energy  is  an  utter 
impossibility. 

We  present  the  following  as  the  sixth  law  of  inertia : 
This  force  has  two  modes  of  action,  holdi^ig  and  moving. 
Matter  at  rest  remains  at  rest  not  merely  because  some- 
thing is  not  moving  it,  but  because  something  is  holding 
it  at  rest  and  resisting  efforts  to  move  it.  There  is  as 
much  energy  exerted  in  the  matter  to  hold  it  at  rest  as 
there  is  exerted  afterward  to  move  it.     The  amount  of 


tAws  OF.  107 

energy  required  to  start  it  in  motion  is  just  equal  to  the 
dynamic  energj^  it  will  possess  after  it  is  started.  The 
matter  is  at  rest,  but  the  energy  is  constantly  exerted. 
On  the  condition  of  rest,  the  force  exerts  its  energy  to 
maintain  that  rest.  On  the  condition  of  motion,  it  exerts 
its  energy  to  perpetuate  that  motion.  On  the  condition  of 
motion  in  one  direction,  it  exerts  its  energy  to  continue 
that  direction,  and  to  resist  motion  in  any  other  direc- 
tion. Its  energy  is  always  exerted  to  keep  matter  in  its- 
present  state  of  rest,  motion,  and  direction.  It  is  a  con- 
stant resistance  to  change. 

When  a  body  is  started  in  motion  in  one  direction,  only 
its  holding  energy  which  corresponds  with  that  direction  is 
affected  by  the  change.  If  an  attempt  be  now  made  to 
move  it  at  right  angles  with  the  line  of  its  present  motion, 
it  resists  our  effort  just  as  much  as  it  would  if  it  was  at  rest. 
If  an  exertion  of  energy  is  necessary  to  start  a  body  in 
motion,  precisely  the  same  amount  of  energy  is  required 
to  turn  it  forty-five  degrees  from  its  present  line  of  motion. 

We  present  the  following  as  the  seventh  law  of  inertia : 
This  force  increases  or  decreases  its  energizing  in  propor- 
tion as  the  square  of  the  velocity  of  its  body  increases  or 
decreases.  If  a  body  is  at  rest,  and  we  undertake  to  move 
it  slowly,  its  resistance  to  our  effort  is  little.  If  we  un- 
dertake to  move  it  at  great  velocity,  its  resistance  to  our 
effort  is  great.  Its  resistance  to  our  effort  does  not 
increase  merely  as  the  velocity  at  which  we  attempt  to 
move  it  increases,  but  as  the  square  of  that  velocity  in- 
creases. If  we  start  a  body  in  motion  at  the  rate  of  one 
foot  in  a  second,  its  resistance  is  a ;  if  we  undertake  to 
move  it  at  the  rate  of  ten  feet  in  a  second,  its  resistance 
is  not  merely  ten  a,  but  the  square  of  ten,  one  hundred  a. 
If  a  body  is  now  in  motion  at  the  rate  of  one  foot  in  a 
second,  it  requires  a  energy  to  stop  it.     If  it  is  moving  at 


io8 


INERTIA. 


the  rate  of  ten  feet  in  a  second,  a  quantit)-  of  energy  equal 
to  one  hundred  a  will  be  required  to  stop  it. 

Thus  we  see  that  matter  is  held  at  rest  and  moved  by  a 
force  which  has  a  peculiar  mode  of  action,  a  force  which 
has  a  peculiar  mode  in  relation  to  velocity.  We  see  that 
the  force  which  holds  and  the  force  which  moves  has  the 
same  peculiar  mode  with  reference  to  velocity  ;  hence  we 
conclude  that  it  is  the  same  force. 

We  find,  then,  that  in  this  class  of  phenomena  there  is 
in  bodies  something  which  energizes,  something  which 
possesses  the  property  of  energy.     We  have  found  that 
in   almost   all   other  natural  phenomena  the   something 
which  energizes  can   not   be  matter ;  hence  we  conclude 
that  this  something  is  not  matter.     We  see  also  that  this 
something  has  peculiar  properties  and  modes,  (i)  energy, 
which  we  do  not  find  in  matter  anywhere  else ;  (2)  modes 
of  action  that  we  do  not  find  in  any  other  force ;  it  resists 
motion,  and  continues  motion,  it  resists  motion  after  a 
peculiar  manner  with  reference  to  velocity,  and  it  con- 
tinues motion  after  the  same  peculiar  manner.     These  are 
fixed  modes  and  permanent  properties  of  something.     No 
property  without  a  substance.     There  is  some  substance 
there  which  possesses  these  properties,  and  which  is  the 
doer.     That  substance  is  not  matter.     That  substance  is 
what  we  call  the  force  of  inertia. 

When  one  body  moves  against  another  and  starts  that 
in  motion,  v/hat  takes  place?  Is  energy  imparted  to  the 
moved  body?  A  property  imparted,  transferred  from  one 
body  to  another !  Is  motion  imparted  ?  A  relation  im- 
parted, transferred  !  W^e  will  have  to  use  language  more 
carefully  than  this,  or  we  deceive  ourselves.  The  ex- 
planation is  this :  the  static  mode  of  inertia  is  changed 
to  the  moving  mode— static  inertia  is  changed  to 
moving  inertia.  There  is  no  more  energ>'  in  the  body, 
but  the  energy  that  was  employed  holding,  is  now  em- 


LAWS  OF.  109 

ployed  moving.     The  energy  which  resisted  the  motion 
was  just  as  much  as  that  which  is  now  moving  it.   .  The 
dynamic  energy  of  a  flying  body  is  the  energizing  of  the 
force  of  inertia.     Here  is  a  true  case  of  conversion,  not  of 
one  force  into  another,  not  of  one   form  of  energy  into 
another,  but  of  one  mode  into  another  mode  of  the  same 
force.     This  is  the  only  conversion  in  nature.     Discover- 
ing cases  of  this,  and  not  understanding  them,  men  have 
been  led  into  all  this  talk  about  the  conversion  of  one 
force  into  another,  of  one  form  of  energy  into  another. 
This  is  all  there  is  of  it.     Out  of  the  modes  of  this  force 
also  grew  the  dynamic  theory  of  matter ;  and  this  is   all 
there  is  of  it.     When  men  have  talked  about  one  moving 
body  imparting  motion  to  another,  the  moving  body  did 
not  impart  anything  to  the  moved  body ;  the  energy  that 
was  energizing  to  move  the  body  used  its  body  with  which 
to  push  or  move  the  other  body.  •  When  they  have  talked 
of  one  body  imparting  energy  to  another  body,  the  ener- 
gizing in  one  body  has  changed  static  inertia  into  moving 
inertia  in  the  other  body, — changed  holding  energ>'  into 
moving  energy.     The  hitting  body  lost  nothing  ;  just  as 
much  energy  is  now  employed  holding  it,  as  was  before 
employed  moving  it.     The  hit  body  has  gained  nothing ; 
just  as  much  energy  was  before  employed  holding  it,  as  is 
now  employed  moving  it.     This  is   all  there   is  of  the 
dynamic  theory  of  matter.     It  was  a  great  undertaking  to 
show  that  all  natural  phenomena — even  gravity,  and  all 
the  other  forces — were  only  the  doings  of  the  force  of 
inertia.     It  is  not  the  first  time  that  men  have  found  a 
limited  and  local  principle,  and  have  endeavered  to  inflate 
it  into  a  universe. 


y 


WHAT  IS  ENERGY? 


Ill 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Energy. 

Without  reviewing  the  opinions  and  theories  of  others 
respecting  energy,  I  will  endeavor  to  present  what  appears 
to  me  to  be  its  true  exposition.      First  we  must  endeavor 
to  obtain  a  clear  conception  of  what  energy  is.     Is  it  sub- 
stance, or  an  attribute  or  property,  or  a  relation?     Does  it 
occupy  space  ?     Does  each   portion  of  energy  occupy  a 
certain  portion  of  space  ?     Has  each  mass  of  energy  ex- 
tension, form,  and  dimensions  ?     Is  it  capable  of  independ- 
ent existence  in  space,  without  being  attached  to,  or  held 
in  being  by  something  else  ?     Can  we  conceive  of  a  por- 
tion of  energy   existing  in   space,    occupying   a  certain 
portion  of  space,  existing  independently  and  alone,  having 
extension,  form  and  size?     If    this  be  a  description  of 
energy  it  is  substance.     Substance,  and   only  substance 
is  capable  of   self-existence  in    space.     Only   substance 
of    itself  occupies  space.       Only    that  which    of    itself 
occupies  space  can   be  moved,   or  made  to  occupy  suc- 
cessively different  places  in  space— that  which  does  not 
occupy  one  place  cannot  be  made  to  occupy  two  places 
successively.      All   that  is,    except  substance,    exists  in 
space  only  because  of  the  existence  of  substance  there, 
kept  in  dependent  being  by  the  presence  of  substance. 
Nothing  else  can  exist  in  space  disconnected  from  substance. 
If  energy  is  substance  it  may  exist  in  space  detached  from 
all  other  substance;  if  it  is  not  substance  it  cannot  thus 


^xist.  If  it  is  substance,  it  may  be  moved  through  space; 
if  it  is  not  substance  it  cannot  be  thus  moved,  nor  thus 
move  itself— it  is  utterly  incapable  of  motion.  If  it  is 
substance  it  may  be  transferred,  communicated,  translated 
irom  one  body  to  another;  if  it  is  not  substance  it  cannot 
be  thus  translated;  incapable  of  independent  being  in 
:space,  as  soon  as  it  is  detached  from  one  body  it  goes  out 
•of  being  and  in  the  space  between  the  two  bodies  it  has 
no  being,  and  that  is  the  end  of  it. 

Now,  what  do  we  know  of  energy  in  objective  nature 
-entirely  outside  of  our  experience  ?     Can  we  see  it  or  feel 
it — can  we  discover  it  through  any  of  our  senses?     We 
can  discover  through  our  senses  matter  and  motion,  noth- 
ing more.     Energy  is  not  matter,  and  motion  is  not  ener- 
gy.    We  have  already  mentioned  two  ways  by  which  we 
^can  discover  substance:  (i.)  where  we  discover  a  property 
we  know  there   is   substance;    (2)    where    we    discover 
doing  we  know  there  is  a  doer,  and  all  doers  are  substance. 
Neither   of    these   means  lead   us   to   the   discovery    of 
^energy.     The  existence  of  energy  in  objective  nature  is 
:an  inference  based  upon  our  subjective  conscious  exper- 
ience.    We  energize;  that  is  all  we  know  about  energy; 
all  else  that  we  may  think,  or  believe,  or  say  about  energy 
is  made  up  of  inferences  from  this  fact.     Then,  as  all  our 
[knowledge  of  energy  is  our  subjective  experience  of  ener- 
gy, and   as  all  the  philosophy  of  energy  is  made  up  of 
inferences  from  this  experience,  we  must  go  to  our  con- 
sciousness to  learn  what  energy  is,  and  all  our  philosophy 
•of  energy  must  be  determined  by  what  we  discover  re- 
specting energy  in  our  subjective  experience  of  energy. 
We  come  then  to   the   question:  what  is   energy?     We 
answer,  primarily  it  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  consciousness, 
of    which   no    definition   can    be  given,  except  to  point 
to    that    in    our    conscious    experience    to    which    this 
word  has  been  applied  as  a  name.     When  we  move  our 


112 


ENERGY. 


bodies  and  through  them  other  things,  we   are   said   to- 
energize,  or  to  exert  energy.     When  other  bodies  pull  or 
push  us  we  energize  to  resist  them,  and  prevent  motion 
and  maintain  our  place  in  space.     That  which  we  are  con- 
scious of  using  at  such  times,  for  these  purposes,  and  in 
this  work,  is  called  energy.     It  is  a  power  inherent  in  us^ 
a  property  of  ourselves.     These  are  the  facts  as  given  in 
consciousness.     We  start  our  bodies  in   motion   by  the 
exertion  of  energy.     We  start  other  bodies  in  motion  by 
the  exertion  of  energy.     We  resist  efforts  to   move  our 
bodies,  and   we  keep  them  in  the  same  place  in  space 
wdth  reference  to  other  bodies,  by  the  exertion  of  energy. 
We  hold  other  bodies  from  being  moved  by  the  exertion 
of  energy.     The  man  who  has  great  power  to  move  things- 
is  said  to  possess  a  great  amount  of  energy.     To   that 
which  we  use  in  all  these  activities,  the  common  usage  of 
mankind  has  applied  the  word  energy  as  a  name.     There 
is  nothing  in  the   discoveries  of  modern  science  which 
demands  any  change  in  this  usage.     Unproved  hypotheses, 
and  unestablished  theories  cannot  revolutionize  language. 
Webster's  definition  of  energy  is  as  good  for  science  and 
philosophy  as  for  common   life  and  literature.     He  de- 
fines it  as   * 'Internal   or  inherent  power;  the  power  of 
operating  whether  exerted  or  not."     Knowing  that  that 
which  we  use  in  our  activities  is  a  property  of  ourselves, 
we  may  define  energy  as  that  property  of  some  substances 
by  which  they  are  enabled  to  cause  motion,  and  continue 
jnotion,  and  prevent  motion,  and  maintain  rest. 

Objective  energy  is  not  directly  discoverable  by  us. 
According  to  a  necessary  mode  of  our  minds,  when  we 
see  motions  and  changes  we  believe  that  the  cause  of" 
those  changes  is.  But  we  know  the  process  of  causa- 
tion only  by  our  experience.  We  might  see  bodies 
moving,  we  might  see  one  body  move  against  another  and 
see  that  begin  to  move,  but  we  would  not  and  could  not 


t  ill 

'If 


OBJECTIVE  ENERGY.  II J 

know  that  there  is  any  energy  involved  in  the  phenome- 
non,   except  by   reference   to   the   knowledge  of  energy- 
obtained  in   our  conscious  experience.     We  know  from 
our  experience  that  there   must  be  an  exertion  of  ener- 
gy to    move   matter.     We   know  by  our  energizing   to 
resist  it,  that  when  a  moving  body   comes  against  us, 
it  energizes  upon  us.     When,  therefore,  a  moving  body  • 
strikes  against  another  body,  and  that  begins  to  move, 
we  understand  that  it  does  to  that  body   what  moving 
bodies    do   to   us,   exerts   energy   upon  it.     Thus  from 
our  experience   we  are  able  to  understand  the    fact    of 
energizing  in  phenomena  which  are  entirely  objective  to 
us.     We  have  no  knowledge  whatever  of  any  energy  in 
nature,  except  as  that  knowledge  is  based  upon  our  ex- 
perience of  energy.     We  discover  objective  energy  only 
by  the  fact  that  the  circumstances  and  results  are  the  same 
as  when  we  energize  and  effect  results.     The  connection 
between  subjective  and  objective  energy  is  the  subjective 
principles:  Like  doings  are  the  effect  of  like  doers.    Know- 
ing the  circumstances  and  results  when,  we  energize,  and 
seeing  the  same  circumstances  and  results   in   objective 
nature,  we  sav  there  is  energizing  there.     Thus  all  our 
knowledge  of  objective  energy  is  merely  the  transference 
of  facts  known  in  subjective  experience  to  objective  things. 
Then  the  energy  which  we  conclude  to  be   in   external 
things  is  not  and  cannot  be   anything  different  from  that 
known  in  experience.     We  cannot  transfer  from  our  ex- 
perience, and  locate  in  external  things,  something  unlike 
what  is   in  our  experience— we  cannot  transfer  from  us 
what  is  not  in  us.     Then  it  is  such  energy  as  we  find  in 
our  experience  that  we  suppose  to  be  in  external  things. 
When  we  speak  of  energy  in  external  nature,  we  mean 
just  the  same  that  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  energy  in 
ourselves.     Objective  energy  is  just  like  subjective  energy. 
We  know  in  our  consciousness  that  the  energy  we  exert 


114  ENERGY, 

to  move  our  bodies  and  to  move  other  things  is  something 
which  is  inherent  in  us.     It  is  not  something  communicat- 
•ed  to  us,  and  through  us  operating  on  other  things.     We 
have   power  in  ourselves  without  receiving  any  impact 
from  objects  outside  of  us,  to  move  our  bodies,  to  start 
them  from  a  state  of  rest  to  activity.     It  is  a  power  inher- 
ent in  our  bodies.     It  is  an  inherent  attribute,  character- 
istic, property  of  ourselves.     Subjective  energy,  then,  is 
a  property.     That  point  is  settled,  subjective  energy  is  a 
property.     Then,  as  all  our  knowledge  of  objective  ener- 
gy is  but  a  transference  of  this  subjective  knowledge  to 
-external  things,  all  objective  energy  is  a  property,,  and  if 
a  property  it  must  be  a  property  of  some  substance.     Not- 
withstanding the  involved  inconsistency,  the  latest  defi- 
nitions of  energy   given   by   scientists,    notwithstanding 
their  designedly  restricted  form,   make   energy   to   be   a 
property — "power  to   overcome  resistance,"   "power    of 
work."     Power  is   not  something   which   may   exist  in 
space  apart  from   substance.     Power  is   an   attribute   or 
propert}^  of  something.     Something  has  this  power.     It 
must  abide  in,  be  possessed  by,  something.     Energy  is 
always  a  property   of  some   substance,  and   there   is  no 
■energy  that  is  not  a  property. 

No  property  can  exist  without  its  substance.  Then 
wherever  energy  is  manifested,  wherever  there  is  energiz- 
ing, there  must  be  a  substance  of  which  the  energ>'  is  a 
property.  No  motion  without  energizing;  no  energizing 
without  an  energizer;  no  energizer  that  is  not  substance; 
no  substance  can  be  an  energizer  that  does  not  possess  the 
property  of  energy.  No  matter  ever  did  move,  or  ever 
will  move,  without  the  exertion  of  energy  upon  it  or  in  it. 
It  is  not  enough  that  something  did  energize  to  start  the 
motion.  No  matter  ever  continues  in  motion  after  the 
energizer  that  moves  it  ceases  to  energize.      The  energy 


A  PROPERTY.       '  115 

must  abide  in  some  substance,  and  that  abiding  energy  is 
the  property  of  that  substance  which  enables  it  to  move 

matter.  . 

If  energy  is  a  property,  it  can  have  no  existence  apart 
from  its  substance.  Then  it  is  not  something  which  has 
-real  objective  existence."  If  it  is  a  property,  it  can 
never  be  communicated  from  one  body  to  another.  A 
property  separated  from  its  substance  ceases  to  be.  Dur- 
ing its  transit  from  one  body  to  the  other  it  is  connected 
with  neither,  and  if  it  exist  at  all,  it  must  exist  in  space 
attached  to  nothing.  In  view  of  this  how  does  the  the- 
•ory  of  a  stream  of  energy  running  on  through  the  chang- 
ino-  phenomena  of  matter,  passing  from  one  body  to 
another  appear?  A  stream  of  elasticity  running  on 
through  the  world,  passing  from  one  body  to  another, 
dividing  up  into  a  thousand  little  streams  of  elasticity, 
leaping  here  and  there,  and  running  on  forever! 

There   are   not  several  kinds  of  energy;  there  is  only 
•one  kind,  only  that  kind  which  is  known  to  us  in  con- 
sciousness as  a  property  of  ourselves.     What  is  the  mean- 
ing  then,  of  kinetic,    dynamic    and    potential    energy? 
Kinetic  or  dynamic  energy  is  defined  as  the  power  a  mov- 
ing body  has  to  move  other  bodies.     What  is  it  really  ? 
Let  us  see.     Here  is  a  body  moving  toward  the  earth.     It 
is  said  to  possess  dynamic  energy.     What  makes  it  fall? 
What  is  the  mover  ?    We  answer,  gravity  in  the  earth  and 
in   the  body.      Gravity  is  pulling  the  body  toward   the 
•earth.     If  gravity  did  not  pull,  the  body  would  not  move. 
If  at  any  time  during  its  falling,  gravity  should  cease  to 
pull  upon  it  it  would  move  on   at   the    velocity   it  has 
already  acquired,  moved  by  the  force  of  inertia  in  it.     It 
is  the  pulling  of  gravity  that  accelerates  its  velocity  as  it 
approaches  the  earth.     The  movers  are  gravity  and  iner- 
tia.    The  dynamic  energy  possessed  by  it  in  consequence 
•of  its  motion  is  attributable  to  them.     It  is  their  energiz- 


Il 


Il6  ENERGY. 

ing  which  causes  and  continues  its  motion.  It  is  their 
energizing  that  we  would  encounter  if  we  should  try  to 
stop  it.  What,  then,  is  the  dynamic  energy  of  a  falling 
body  ?  It  is  the  energizing  of  gravity  and  inertia.  Some 
physicists  may  smile  as  I  speak  of  the  energizing  of  iner- 
tia. Some  others  smile  when  they  speak  of  inertia  as  a 
mere  passivity. 

Again,  there  are  some  molecules  of  air  driven  before 
the  lightning.     They  strike  against  other  molecules,  and 
their  dynamic  energy  is  such  that  they  produce  a  flame  of 
heat  and  light.     What  is  the  dynamic  energy   of  these 
moving  air  molecules?     It  is  the  energizing  of  electricity. 
Atoms  and  molecules  are  drawn  together  by  the  chemical 
force  with  so  much  power  that  they  make  sensible  a  large 
quantity  of  heat.     What  is  their  dynamic  energy  ?     It  is 
the  energizing  of  the  chemical  force.     Molecular  repul- 
sion moves  molecules   apart,    and   thus   moves    masses. 
What  is  their  dynamic  energy  ?     It  is  the  energizing  of 
the  force  of  molecular  repulsion.     Heat  moves  molecules 
apart,  and  thus  moves  masses.     What  is  their  dynamic 
energy?     It  is  the  energizing  of  heat..    If  a  man  pushes 
a  billiard  rod,  what  is  its  dynamic  energy  ?     It  is  the  ener- 
gizing of  the  muscular  force  in  the  man.     If  he  runs, 
what  is  the  dynamic  energy  of  his  body?     It  is  the  ener- 
gizing of  the  muscular  force  and  the  force  of  inertia  in  his. 
body.     If  he  strikes  downward  with  a  sledge,  what  is  the 
dynamic  energy  of  the  sledge?     It  is  the  energizing  of 
the  muscular  force  in  the  man,  and  of  the  force  of  gravity 
in  the  earth  and  sledge,  and  of  the  force  of  inertia  in  the 
sledge.     What  is  the  dynamic  energy  of  a  train  of  cars, 
or  of  a  steamboat,  or  a  steam  mill?     It  is  the  energizing 
of   heat  and    inertia.     What  is   the  dynamic  energy  of 
wind,  and  of  falling  water,  and  of  an  ascending  balloon  ? 
It  is  the  energizing  of  gravity.     What  is  the  dynamic 


DYNAMIC   ENERGY.  1 1? 

energy  of  detached  flying  bodies?     It  is  the  energizing  of 
the  force  of  inertia. 

I  care  not  what  question  you  ask  of  any  case  of  dynam- 
ic or  kinetic  energy  found  on  earth,  in  every  case  I  can. 
answer  that  it  is  the  energizing  of  one  or  more  of  the 
already  known  and  named  forces.  In  all  cases  of  moving 
matter  the  force  of  inertia  in  it  continues  the  motion  in 
straight  lines  after  the  force  that  started  the  motion  has 
ceased  to  energize  upon  it,  until  the  motion  is  stopped  by 

some  obstruction. 

The  answers  to  all  the  foregoing  questions  contain  one 
common  word— energizing.     However,  many  more  simi- 
lar questions   may  be  asked,  if  they  cover  all  possible 
cases  of  dynamic  energy,  all  the  answers,  if  true,  would 
contain  that  word.     In  general,   then,   what  is  dynamic 
energy?     It  is  energizing.     All  dynamic  energy  is  the 
energizing  of  some  force.    What  is  called  dynamic  energy 
is  not  energy  at  all,  but  energizing.     It  is  a  name  given 
to  a  certain  class  of  energizings.     All  moving  bodies  are 
moved  by  the  energizings  of  some  force,  and  the  powers 
of  the  moved  body— as  it  is  said— to  move  other  bodies 
is  not  the  bod3%  but  the  force  which  is  moving  the  body. 
Here,  then,  is  no  new  or  different  kind  of  energy  from 
that  which  we  subjectively  know.     Nor  are  the  facts  in 
this  case  any  different  from  the  facts  in  our  experience  of  en- 
ergy.     Some  substance  here,  possessing  the  property  of 
energy,  energizes  to  move  matter;  and  if  that  matter  moves 
other  bodies,  it  is  the  force  which  is  moving  it  that  moves 
them,  through  the  medium  of  that  matter;  just  as  a  man 
can  take  a  stick  and  move  by  it  another  body. 

Dynamic  energy  is  not  substance.  Then  it  has  no 
permanent  independent  existence.  It  is  not  a  property. 
It  is  not  a  permanent  inherent  characteristic  of  substance. 
A  body  may  possess  it— as  the  expression  is— one  minute, 
and  the  next  minute  not  possess  it.     It  ceases  to  be  as 


ill 


M 


Il8  ENERGY. 

soon  as  the  force  which  is  moving  the  body  ceases  to  en- 
ergize upon  it,  or  as  soon  as  the  circumstances  render  it 
impossible   that   the  energizing  should  produce  motion. 
Dynamic  energy  is  a  relation.     Energy  is  a  property,  but 
energizing  is  a  relation.     It  is  a  relation  existing  between 
the  energizer  and  the  work  done.     Energizer;  energizing; 
work  done.       Force;  energizing;    work   done.       Force; 
dynamic  energy;  work  done.     The  last  two  sentences  are 
identical  statements,  because  dynamic  energy  is  the  ener- 
gizing of  something.     What  do  you  think  of  the  proprie- 
ty of  talking  about  a  relation  doing  ?     We  might  as  well 
talk  about  distance,  or  direction,  or  above,  or  below,  or 
any  other  relation,  doing,  as  to  talk  about  dynamic  energy 
doing.     The  doer  lies  back  of  the  dynamic  energy.     The 
work  accomplished  is  the  work  of  the  doer,  and  not  of 
the  doing.     It  is  strange  that  men  will  say  that  gravity 
in  the  earth  draws  a  falling  body  down  to  it,  and  then 
say  that  the  dynamic  energy  of  the  falling  body  is  the 
doer  of  the  work  done  when  that  body  reaches  the  earth. 
If  the  fisherman  should  say,  The  spear  killed  the  fish,  or 
the  billiard  player  should  say,  the  rod  moved  the  ball, 
you  would  call  it  a  vulgar  misuse  of  language.     When  a 
a  boy  throws  a  stone  and  kills  a  bird,  you  do  not  say,  the 
dynamic  energy  of  the  stone  killed  the  bird.     The  im- 
mediate agent  in  this  case  is  the  force  of  inertia  in  the 
stone,   but  the  boy  started  that  into  active   energizing; 
hence  everybody  says,  the  boy  killed  the  bird  with  the 
stone.     In  all  cases  of  moving  bodies,  the  bodies  are  only 
the  instruments  which  some  of  the  forces  are  using  with 
which  to  do  work.     In  the  common  language  of  every- 
day life,  it  may  be  excusable  if  people  sometimes  speak 
of  the  instrument  as  the  agent,  but  in  science,  when  pro- 
fessing to  give  the  exact  explanation  of  phenomena,  to  do 
so,  and  to  carry  out  that  mode  of  speech  in  a  well  consid- 
ered and  voluminously  elaborated  system,  by  which  all 


POTENTIAL  ENERGY. 


119- 


natural  phenomena  are  to  be  explained,  what  must  we 
think  of  it?     The  whole  system  of  philosophy  which  rep- 
resents dynamic  or  kinetic  energy  as  the  doer  is  reduci- 
ble to,  the  spear  killed  the  fish,  the  stone  killed  the  bird. 
What  is  potential   energy?     Well,  it  is  not  much  of 
anything;  it  is  an  empty  name.     Scientists  mean  by  it  the  . 
kinetic  energy  which  may  at  some  future  time  be.     Let 
us  examine  the  meaning  of  that  sentence.     May  at  some 
future  time  be — ^then  it  is  not  anything  that  now  is.  Speak- 
ing of  a  future  possibility  as  a  thing  now  existing,  and 
quantifying  this  non-existence,  and  placing  it  in  an  equa- 
tion with  existence,  seems  to  be  very  loose  philosophy,  ta 
say  the  least.     But  when  we  consider  that  that  something 
which  may  be,  when  it  comes  to  be  will  be  no  thhig  at  all ^ 
but  only  a  relation,  the  energizing  of  some  force  in  cir- 
cumstances  which   admit   of  its  producing  motion,   the 
promise  of  that  future  existence  becomes  a  very  small 
matter — the  promise  of  an  agent,  which  when  it  comes  to 
be  is  not  an  agent.     Gravity  pulls  upon  a  body  when  it 
lies  motionless  upon  the  brink  of  a  precipice;  it  pulls  no 
more  upon  it  while  it  is  falling;  it  pulls  just  as  much 
upon  it  after  it  has  fallen.     The  only  difference  in  these 
cases  is  that  in  one  of  them  the  circumstances  are  such 
that  its  pulling  produces  motion.     These  circumstances 
are  only  a  condition  of  the  motion;  gravity  is  the  ener- 
gizer, the  doer.     In  the  first  case,  the  body  on  the  brink 
of  the  precipice  is  the  condition  in  the  presence  of  which 
gravity  may  do;  in  the  second  case,  the  condition  is  such 
that  gravity  is  doing;  in  the  third  ease,  the  condition  is 
such  that  gravity  cannot  do — it  energizes  the  same,  but 
its  energizing  cannot  cause  motion.     If  the  work  which 
in  the  first  case  gravity  can  do,  and  the  work  which  in  the 
second  case  gravity  does,  are  correctly  quantified,  of  course 
they  are  the  same,  for  it  is  the  same  work  which  is  quan- 
tified.    After  part  of  the  work  which  it  could  do  is  done„ 


I20  ENERGY, 

there  is  so  much  less  to  be  done.     As  the  body  descends, 
the  work  done  continually  increases,  and,  of  course,  the 
work  to  be  done  continually  decreases.     Is  it  not  strange 
that  any  man  should  have  called  this  a  conversion  of 
potential  into  dynamic  energy? 

"  Energy  of  position "  is  only  another  name  for  that 
non-existence  which  we  have  described  under  the  name 
of  potential  energy— the   body  is  in   a   position   which 

allows  some  force  to  move  it. 

And  now,  what  about  the  ''conservation  of  energ>'?*' 
I  once  said  to  a  very   distinguished  college  president, 
There  is  no  truth  in  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy.     He   replied,    "You  must  be  mistaken; 
you  know  that  it  has  always  been  held  that  the  quantity 
of  energy    is    unchangeable,    however   varied   the   ma- 
chiner3^  through  which  it  works. ' '     Thus  the  old  and  well 
established  doctrine  that  a  certain  amount  of  energy  will 
accomplish  a  certain  amount  of  work,  and  that  that  amount 
of  work  cannot  be  increased  by  any  mechanical  contrivances 
is  supposed  to  be  identical  with  the  modern  doctrine  of 
the  conservation  of  energ>'.     Suppose  you  push  upon  a 
lever,  that  push  cannot  be  made  to  do  more  work— esti- 
mating work   by   multiplying   the   weight  of  the  body 
moved  by  the  distance  moved  through— by  any  mechan- 
ical appliance.     That  push  extends  through  all  the  wheels, 
pulleys  and  bands,  unchanged  in  quantity,  except  as  it 
may  be  decreased  by  friction.     That  is  one  fact.     But 
suppose  you  stop  pushing,  will  that  push  continue  to  run 
on  in  the  machinery,  after  you  have  stopped  pushing,  on 
and  on  forever?    That  is  another  question.     The  two 
questions   are  not  at  all  identical.     This  latter  question 
answered  afiimatively  is  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  con- 
servation of  energy.     One  doctrine  is  that  a  push  cannot 
be  varied  in  quantity  while  the  pushing  continues.     The 
other  doctrine  is  that  a  push  once  started  will  never  stop. 


CONSERVATION   OF   ENERGY. 


121 


Suppose  you  try  it  and  see  if  the  push  you  make  with 
that  lever  will  continue  to  run  on  forever. 

When  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of 
forces,  as  it  was  then  called,  was  first  published  in  this 
country,  I  received  it  enthusiastically.  As  I  read  the 
proofs  of  the  doctrine,  and  saw  that  Mr.  Grove  and  others 
mixed  up  motion,  energy,  and  force,  and  counted  motion 
in  the  equation,  giving  it  a  dynamic  value,  I  was  set 
back  somewhat;  but  I  was  so  earnest  in  the  reception  of 
the  doctrine  that, I  passed  over  that.  Then  when  I  saw 
that  the  energizing  of  a  man  in  lifting  a  body  from  the 
earth  was  stated  as  the  antecedent  of  the  energy  mani- 
fested during  its  falling;  and  the  energizing  of  a  man  in 
mixing  together  an  acid  and  an  alkali  was  presented  as  the 
antecedent  of  the  energ}^  manifested  in  the  chemical 
action  which  followed,  I  again  paused  and  demurred.  But, 
notwithstanding  these  slips  in  its  advocacy,  I  thought  the 
doctrine  must  be  true,  it  is  so  nice,  so  rational  in  appear- 
ance, and  so  beautiful.  So  I  passed  over  these  and  other 
like  absurdities,  and  came  out  as  I  started,  a  firm  believer 
in  the  doctrine.  When  I  came  to  review  the  arguments, 
and  sift  out  all  such  absurdities,  I  found  that  the  doctrine 
had  rather  a  slender  foundation,  and  I  began  to  doubt.  Then 
I  thought,  this  is  a  new  doctrine,  these  men  are  exploring 
a  new  cavern,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  they  will  make 
some  mistakes;  it  seems  that  the  doctrine  ought  to  be  true, 
and  by  continued  investigation  it  may  j^et  be  adjusted 
to  the  facts. 

I  saw  that  the  theory  required  that  when  a  force  accomp- 
lishes any  results,  it  should  to  the  same  extent  itself 
decrease;  but  the  facts  seemed  to  be  that  the  forces  do 
energize  constantly  through  ages,  centuries,  and  aeons, 
without  any  waste  or  decrease  in  their  own  power.  If  grav- 
ity weakened  by  its  energizing  to  turn  the  worlds  into 
orbits,  they  would  begin  to  move  off  farther  from  the  sun. 


J  22  ENERGY. 

If  inertia  weakened  by  its  hurling,  the  worlds  would  begin 
to  approach  the  sun.     If  the  chemical  force  weakens  by 
its  energizing,  chemical  compounds  would  begin  to  fall  in 
pieces,  and  if  it  varied  in  strength,  no  calculations  could 
be    made    respecting    chemical    reactions.      Of    course, 
scientists  saw  this,   and  so  modified  the  doctrine  as  to 
make  it  demand  a  decrease  in  the  agent  only  when  work 
is  done,   change  effected.     But  it  appeared   to   me  that 
turning  flving  bodies  out  of  their  course  is  work,  change, 
and  we  know  that  it  costs  another  flying  body  the  loss  of 
energy  to  effect  this  change-see  page  92      Hurling  worlds 
through   space  must  certainly  be  work.     Gravity  draws 
bodies  to  the  earth,  yet  there  is  no  decrease  in  the  agent. 
The  chemical  force  draws  atoms  and  molecules  together, 
yet  it  suffers  no  decrease.     The  cr^'stalizing  force  works  in 
the  construction  of  cr>'stals,  but  loses  nothing  of  its  own 
power.     Electricity  works  on  and  on,  producing,  as  it  is 
said,  heat  and  magnetism,    but  suffers  no  decrease   in 
strength.      Magnetism  works,    producing  heat  and  elec- 
tricity, and  mechanical  work,  yet  growing  stronger  itself. 
Heat  is  the  only  force  that  ever  seems  to  suffer  loss  by 
work,  and  all  cases  where  this  appears  can  be  as  well  ex- 
plained, better  I  think,  by  the  old  method  of  supposing 
that  the  disappearing  heat  goes  into  a  state  of  latency. 

Then  the  theory  requires  that  the  forces  be  convertible, 
or  transmutable,  one  into  another;  but  facts  do  not  in  this 
accord  with  the  requirements  of  the  theory.  Gravity  is 
said  to  produce  heat,  but  there  is  no  decrease  m  gravity. 
Inertia  in  flying  bodies  is  said  to  produce  heat,  but  there 
is  no  decrease  in  inertia.  The  chemical  force  is  said  to  pro- 
duce neariv  all  our  artificial  heat,  but  there  is  no  decrease  in 
the  chemical  force.  Electricity  is  said  to  produce  heat 
and  magnetism,  but  there  is  no  corresponding  decrease  in 
electricity.  Magnetism  is  said  to  produce  heat  and  elec- 
tricity, but  there  is  no  decrease  in  the  magnetism.  Electric- 


CONSERVATION   OF   ENERGY. 


123 


ity  appears  to  produce  by  induction  other  electricity,  but 
there  is  no  decrease  in  the  producing  electricity.  Magne- 
tism appears  to  produce  by  induction  other  magnetism,  but 
there  is  no  decrease  in  the  producing  magnetism.  A  case 
of  the  conversion  of  one  force  into  another  has  never  yet 
been  discovered  by  man.  In  all  these  cases  of  what  is  called 
production,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  no  real  production. 
It  is  probable  that  what  is  called  production  of  heat  is  only 
bringing  heat  out  of  a  state  of  latency  into  a  sensible 
state,  and  that  what  is  called  the  producion  of  electricity 
and  magnetism  is  a  separation  of  the  two  kinds  of  each 
which  exist  in  a  state  of  quiescent  union  in  all  matter. 

It  is  admitted  by  all  that  practically,  experimentally, 
there  is  never  any  equivalence  between  the  different  forms 
of  energy.  A  certain  amount  of  heat  is  said  to  produce 
a  certain  amount  of  mechanical  energ3%  but  in  no  case 
can  that  mechanical  energy  be  made  to  produce  as  much 
heat  as  w^as  employed  to  produce  it.  Heat  is  said  to  pro- 
duce mechanical  energy  in  the  armature  of  the  electro- 
motor, and  this  mechanical  energy  is  said  to  be  converted 
into  electrical  energy,  which  is  carried  away  through  the 
conductors.  Now,  the  heat  energy  is  more  than  the  me- 
chanical energy,  and  the  mechanical  energy  is  more  than 
the  electrical  energy.  The  electricity  can  never  be  made 
to  produce  as  much  mechanical  energy  as  was  required  to 
produce  it,  and  the  mechanical  energy  can  never  be  made 
to  produce  as  much  heat  as  was  required  to  produce  it. 
In  every  series  of  successive  forms  of  energy,  ev^er>^  sub- 
sequent form  is  less  than  its  predecessor,  unless  some 
other  form  of  energy  comes  in  to  make  up  the  loss.  Thus 
all  experimental  tests  pronounce  their  verdict  against  the 
doctrine  of  constant  equivalence.  This  is  admitted  by  all, 
and  various  reasons  assigned  for  it — the  dissipation  of 
heat  into  surrounding  bodies,  the  loss  of  energy  in  over- 
coming friction,  the  production  of  heat  energy  through 


124  ENERGY. 

friction,  the  dissipation  of  electricity  into  the  surrounding 
air  and  of  heat  into  remote  space,  etc. 

Fully  admitting  all  these  facts,  and  to  avoid  the  admis- 
sion of  decrease,  Thompson  and  Tait  have  called  this  a 
degradation  of  energy,  instead  of  a  decrease  of  energy. 
They  talk  about  grades  of  energ>%  and  when  energy  drops 
from  a  higher  into  a  lower  grade  of  energy,   it  is  less 
effective    for    work.      Now,   all    energy  is  measured  by 
the  amount  of  work  it  is  capable  of  doing,  and  when  it 
becomes  less  capable  of  doing  work,  we  say  there  is  less 
energy,  and  we  do  not  evade  the  fact  by  calling  it  by  an- 
other name,  by  calling  it  a  degradation  of  energy.     If  we 
rep-esent  the  successive  forms  of  energy  by  the  letters  of 
the  alphabet,  and  estimate  the  amount  of  energy  by  the 
amount  of  work  it  is  capable  of  doing,  it  is  never  true  that 
A=B=C,  and  so  on,  but  each  successive  form  is  a  dimin- 
ished quantity.     It  is  never  possible  to  reverse  the  process 
and  work  back  through  C,  B,  A,  and  reach  the  same  quan- 
tity of  A  with  which  we  started.     Hence  the  conclusion  to 
which  scientists  have  reached,  that  the  quantity  of  energy 
upon  the  earth  has  been   continually   diminishing  ever 
since  it  was  a  world  of  fire,   and  that  it  will  continue  to 
diminish  in  quantity,  until  the  earth,  a  cold,  dead  world, 
will  at  last  revolve  around  a  cold,  dead  sun,  unless  the 
members  of  the  solar  system  shall  before  this  have  fallen 
together.     This  I  found  to  be  the  present  stage  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  whichisnot  a  con- 
servation at  all,  nor  a  constant  equivalence,  but  a  constant 
decrease,  and  ultimate  annihilation  of  energy. 

Now,  as  some  of  the  forces  continually  energize,  effect- 
ing changes  in  physical  things,  without  suffering  any  loss 
themselves,  and  as  one  of  the  forces  is  never  transformed 
into  another,  and  as  in  all  cases  of  successional  forms  of . 
energy  each  succeeding  form  is  demonstrably  shown  by 
experiment  to  be  less  than  its  predecessor,  what  is  there 


CONSERVATION   OF   ENERGY.  1 25 

Still  remaining  of  the  theory  of  the  conservation  of  energy  ? 
When  I  took  a  still  broader  view,   and  observed  the 
relation  of  this  doctrine  to   other  doctrines,  and   to  the 
whole  field  of  physics,  my  doubts  were  confirmed.     The 
theory  requires  that  the  molecules  of  all  solids  be  detached 
bodies  and  in   constant   motion,    and  that   I   could   not 
believe.     It  required  that  all  the  inorganic  forces  be  molec- 
ular motions,  or  moving  molecules.     When  I  first  learned 
of  this,  I  thought,  may  be  that  is  so;  I  will  see.     Then 
the  question  arose.     How   can   moving  molecules   draw 
other  moving  molecules  from  which  they  are  separated  by 
intervals  of  space?     No  one  could  answer  this  question; 
so  all  the  attractive  forces,  gravity,  electricity, "magnetism, 
chemical  attraction,  and  crystallizing,  attraction  remained 
unexplained.     I  will  wait  and  see;  perhaps  some  way  of 
explaining  them  may  be  discovered.     But  no;  years  and 
decades  passed,   and  no  explanation  appeared.     Neither 
was  it  explained  how  one  mass  of  moving  molecules  could 
repel  another  mass  of  moving  molecules  from  which  they 
were  separated  by  intervals  of  space.     Nor  was  it  possible 
to  explain  how  one  mass  of  molecules  acts  upon  a  remote 
mass  of  molecules  in  the  phenomena  of  electrical  and 
magnetic  induction.     Thus  the  theory  that  the  forces  are 
moving  molecules  was  found  capable  of  explaining  only  a 
very  few  of  the  natural  phenomena  involved  in  it.     On 
further  reflection  it  was  seen  that  the  action  of  one  mass 
of  moving  molecules  upon  another  mass  of  moving  mole- 
cules separated  from  it  by  an  inter\^al  of  space,  was,  not 
only  unexplained,  but  inexplicable,  impossible,  absurd. 
Then  he  who  would  receive  this  theory  of  the  forces  must 
do  so  without  evidence  in  its  support  in  face  of  its  known 
incompetence   to   explain   phenomena,  and  in  face  of  a 
positive  contradiction,  involving  in  itself  a  contradiction 
— having  a  thing  doing  where  it  is  not. 

Then  it  became   necessar}^   to  exclude   the   inorganic 


126 


ENERGY. 


i 


forces  from  the  problem.     The  original  proposition  was: 
All  molar  motion  (kinetic  energy),   plus  all   molecular 
motion  (the  forces),  plus  all  potential  energy,  are  a  constant 
quantity.     Throwing  out  the  forces  as  molecular  motions, 
the  proposition  is.  All  molar  motion  that  is,  plus  all  molar 
motion  that  may  be,— or  in   other  words,    All   dynamic 
energy  that  is  plus  all  dynamic  energy  that  may  be,  are  a 
constant  quantity.     Then,  when  we  consider  that  molar 
or  kinetic  energ>%  the  energy  of  moving  bodies  of  sensible 
size,  is  not  the  energ>^  of  those  bodies,  is  not  energy  at  all, 
but   the  energizing  of  some  one  or  more   of  the   forces 
moving  those  bodies,  we  see  that  our  proposition  has  van- 
ished into  nothing,  and  we  have  no  thesis  to  maintain. 
What  will  the  proposition  then  be?     The  question  will 
not  then  be,  Do  the  forces  always  energize  to   the  same 
extent,  for  we  know  that  some  of  them— as  gravity  and 
inertia— do  always  energize  with  precisely  the  same  power 
upon  all  matter,  admitting  the  variation  of  gravity  from 
distance,  and  of  inertia  from  velocity,  while  some  of  the 
forces— as  the  chemical  and  crystalizing  forces— often  do 
not  energize  upon  bodies,  because  they  are  beyond  their 
reach;  but  the  question  is.  Is  there  always  the  same  num- 
ber of  bodies,  or   the  same  amount  of  matter,  so  situated 
that  the  energizing  of  the  forces  can  move  it?     Thus  our 
original  proposition  has  vanished  out  of  our  hands,  and 
the  question  is  not  now  anything  respecting  energy,  but 
only  a  question  of  the  position  of  bodies.     Thus  in   any 
true  systemof  physical  philosophy,  the  question  of   the 
conservation  of  energy  becomes  a  vain  and  useless  ques- 
tion, which  no  one  can  answer,  and  which  no  one  has  any 
interest  in  if  it  could  be  answered. 

I  trust  now  we  have  some  clear  ideas  of  what  we  are 
talking  about.  Energy  is  a  property  of  some  substance. 
Dynamic  or  kinetic  energy  is  the  energizing  of  some  force 
in  circumstances  which  admit  of  motion.     Potential  ener- 


ENERGIZING  TO   MAINTAIN   REST.  1 27 

gy  or  energy  of  position  is  the  possible  future  occurrence 
of  conditions  which  allow  of  motion  by  the  energizing  of 

some  force. 

One  point  more  we  will  briefly  notice.  In  our  defini- 
tion of  energy  occurs  the  phrase,  to  prevent  motion  and 
maintain  rest.  The  energy  that  is  thus  employed  receives 
little  attention  in  the  dynamic  philosophy.  Indeed,  in 
its  very  nature  it  is  limited  to  the  study  of  moving  mat- 
ter. Moving  matter  is  the  only  agent  in  nature,  and  it 
cannot  go  outside  of  moving  matter  in  its  explanations. 
It  is  the  philosophy  of  moving  matter,  and  static  philos- 
ophy, or  the  philosophy  of  matter  at  rest,  is  left  unex- 
pounded.  The  effort  is  made,  even,  to  show  that  there  is 
no  such  fact  as  rest,  that  all  matter  is  moving,  and  there- 
fore the  philosophy  of  moving  matter  includes  all  there  is 
of  philosophy.  The  word  motion  has  no  significance, 
except  as  the  antithesis  of  rest;  and  we  know  that  much 
matter  is  in  that  state  which  has  been  called  rest,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  state  of  motion.  Of  course,  rest 
means  to  occupy  the  same  place  in  space  with  reference  to 
surrounding  bodies.  As  nearly  all  definitions  have  been 
conformed  to  current  theories,  rest  has  been  defined  as 
' '  the  equilibrium  of  opposing  forces. ' '  We  will  consider 
this  definition  hereafter. 

The  extent  of  the  omission  in  the  dynamic  philosophy, 
and  the  propriety  of  this  clause  in  our  definition,  will  be 
seen  by  a  little  consideration.  We  know  that  we  do  en- 
ergize to  hold  our  bodies  motionless  against  the  efforts  of 
other  forces  to  move  them.  All  reaction  is  some  force 
energizing  to  prevent  motion.  Cohesion  holds  the  mole- 
cules of  all  solids  together  to  prevent  motion.  That  it 
does  energize  to  do  this  we  know,  because  if  we  attempt 
to  pull  the  molecules  apart,  it  resists  our  pulling.  The 
chemical  force  energizes  to  hold  the  atoms  and  molecules 
of  all  compound  substances  together,  as  we  know  by  the 


128 


ENERGY. 


large  amount  of  energizing  necessary  to  separate  them. 
The  crystallizing   force   energizes   to   hold   together  the 
molecules  of  crystals.     Gravity  holds  all  loose  bodies  up- 
on the  surface  of  the  earth,  and  resists  attempts  to  move 
them.     The  force  of  inertia  constantly  energizes  to  hold 
all  matter  at  rest  that  is  now  at  rest,   and  to  resist   any 
other  motion  than  that  which  now  is.     Any  attempt  to 
move  matter  must  overcome  the  resistance  of  some  hold- 
ing force  or  forces.     In  the   present   age   of  the  earth's 
progress,  there  is  far  more  energy  employed  holding  mat- 
ter at  rest  and  resisting  motion,  than  is  employed  in  mov- 
ing matter.     I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be  said  that  this  is 
matter  resting  in  equilibrium  between  two  antagonistic 
forces.      Between  what  two  forces  are  the  molecules  of 
chemical   compounds  suspended?      We  might  say  that 
molecular   repulsion   would   push   them   apart,    and  the 
chemical  force  hold  them  together,  but  they  do  not  rest  in 
equilibrium  between  those  forces:  the  chemical  force  is 
greatly  the  stronger,  overcomes  repulsion,  and  holds  the 
molecules  in  actual  contact.     When  gravity  holds  loose 
bodies  on  the  earth,  between  what  two  forces  are  they 
suspended  ?     When  inertia  holds  bodies  in  their  present 
places  upon  the  earth,  between  what  two  forces  are  they 
suspended?     The   force   of  inertia  simply   holds   bodies 
where  they  are,  and  resists  any  attempt  to  move  them. 
That  definition  of  rest  seems,  then,  to  be  very  imperfect, 

at  least. 

Now,  all  these  energizings  are  left  entirely  out  of  the 
dynamic  philosophy,  and  the  definition  of  energy  is  so 
framed  as  to  purposely  include  only  the  energy  of  moving 
matter,  and  exclude  all  other  energy  and  energizing. 
What  about  this,  the  greater  part  of  energizing  now  on 
earth?  Are  we  to  have  no  account  of  this?  Does  phil- 
osophy take  no  cognizance  of  this  ?  When  we  take  into 
consideration  all  the  energy  that  is  employed  holding 


I 


1 


ENERGY.  1 29 

matter  at  rest,  it  is  evident  that  the  philosophy  which  has 
no  energy  but  moving  matter,  must  come  very  far  short 
of  a  complete  explanation  of  nature. 

I  am  sometimes  met  by  such  statements  as  this:  '  'These 
theories  which  you   discard  have   been  mathematically 
reasoned   out,  mathematically  demonstrated.     Can    your 
metaphysics  overthrow  mathematics  ? ' '     This  seems  to  be 
quite  an  extinguisher.     But  let  us  see.     Suppose  two  con- 
tradictory hypotheses  are  both  thus  mathematically  rea- 
soned out  to  certain  conclusions.     Does  this   prove  that 
both  of  these  contradictory  hypotheses  are  true?     In  this 
case  which  shall  hold  the  field,  mathematics  or  metaphy- 
sics?    It  is  well  known  that  all  mathematical  reasoning 
in  science  is  based  upon  some  hypothesis.     The  mathe- 
matical reasoning  based  upon  that  hypothesis  does  not 
demonstrate  that  that  hypothesis  is  true.     The  case  men- 
tioned above  often  occurs,  where  two  contradictory  hy- 
potheses may  both  be  reasoned  out  to  certain  harmonious 
results.     The  fact  that  an  hypothesis  can  be  thus  handled 
seems  to  give  it  a  shade  of  increased  probability;  and  if 
the  conclusions  reached  by  such  a  process  correspond  with 
facts  already  known  by  other  means,  it  is  quite  a  strong 
confirmation  of  the  hypothesis.     In  that  case  the  mathe- 
matician is  traveling  along  the  line  of  our  fifth  mode  of 
investigation,  ascertaining  if  the  hypothesis  will  explain 
known  facts.     But  usually  mathematical  reasoning  is  not 
toward  known  facts,  but  further  into  the  unknown.     As- 
suming that  the  basal  hypothesis  is  true,  we  may  by  a 
mathematical  process  of  reasoning  ascertain  facts  in  the 
otherwise  unknown.     For  instance,  assuming  as  an  hypo- 
thesis the  dynamic  theory  of  gases,  and  assuming  as  true 
Avogadro's  law  that  there  is  the  same  number  of  mole- 
cules in  the  same  measure,  under  the  same  pressure,  of 
all  gases,  and  knowing  the  relative  weight  of  the  mole- 
cules of  the  different  substances,  we  may  approximately 


I 


I30 


ENERGY. 


determine  by  mathematical  processes  the  velocity  of  the 
molecules  of  the  different  gases.  Mathematical  reasoning 
in  science  may  increase  the  probability  of  the  hypothesis, 
or  show  that  it  accords  with  known  facts,  or  ascertain 
otherwise  unknown  facts;  but  it  can  never  demonstrate 
the  truthfulness  of  the  hypothesis  upon  which  it  is  based. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Philosophy  of  Evolution. 

In  a  philosophical  discussion   with   an  evolutionist  I 
cannot  introduce  my  metaphysics.     He  does  not  admit 
the  authority  of  any  absolute  truths.     He  claims  to  re- 
ject all  metaphysics;  but  he  has  a  system  of  metaphysics 
of  his  own;  it  consists  very  largely  of  negations.     The 
fundamental  principle   of  his   metaphysics   is:    We   can 
know  nothing  of  causes  or  reality.     It  is  not  the  aim  and 
purpose  of  philosophy  to  look  for  causes.     It  is  not  phil- 
osophically proper  to  ask  for  them,  or  to  talk  about  them. 
They  are  entirely  and  forever  outside  of  the  limits  of  true 
philosophy.     We  are  not  to  take  them  into  our  thought, 
nor  allow  them  to  be  introduced  into  our  discussion,  nor 
allow  them  in  any  way  to  influence  our  opinions.     After 
this,  evolutionists  are  freed  from  the  necessity  of  assigning 
causes  for  the  doings  and  changes  which  they  describe; 
the  causal  relation  can   now   impose  no  restraints  upon 

them. 

We  can  know  appearances,  and  nothing  more.  Nature 
moves  before  us  as  a  pictured  panorama  moves  before  the 
audience.  We  can  see  the  pictures,  and  describe  them 
and  their  order  of  succession;  but  we  are  not  permitted  to 
inquire  respecting  the  artist  who  painted  them,  nor  look 
behind  the  curtain  for  the  man  who  turns  the  crank.  The 
train  of  clouds  floats  by,  the  clouds  perpetually  involving 


132 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   EVOLUTION. 


and  evolving,  floating  in  endless  succession,  forever  chang- 
ing; we  may  describe  each  successive  appearance  and  note 
the  order  of  succession,  and  possibly  the  laws  of  change; 
but  we  must  not  ask  what  there  is  behind  appearances, 
nor  why  appearances  move,  nor  why  they  change,  nor 
what  moves  and  changes  them.  The  evolutionist  does  not 
admit  that  he  is  under  any  obligations  to  try  to  answer 
these  questions;  he  says  they  ought  not  to  be  asked.  It 
is  no  matter  then  if  he  has  motions  without  movers,  doings 
without  doers,  changes  without  changers.  The  business 
of  philosophy  is  to  describe  what  can  be  known  through 
the  senses,  and  to  take  no  thought  of  what  cannot  be  thus 
known,  nor  allow  any  inquiry  or  discussion  respecting 
things  otherwise  supposed  to  be.  We  are  not  to  even 
presume  upon  the  existence  of  anything  else,  nor  admit 
that  anything  invisible  has  any  relation  to  or  influence 
upon  the  appearances  which  pass  before  us.  The  only 
relations  admitted  to  exist  are  space  relations,  like  and 
unlike,  and  succession  in  time. 

The  reader  recognizes  this  as  that  system  of  philosophy 
which  is  called  positivism.  That  this  is  the  metaphysi- 
cal basis  of  evolution  may  be  seen,  even  when  not  directly 
avowed,  by  the  definitions  given.  Take  as  an  example 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  definition  of  evolution:  ' '  Evolution 
is  a  change  from  an  indefinite,  inchoherent  homogeneity,  to 
a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,  through  continuous 
differentiations  and  integrations.*"  Here  is  change  in 
appearances  from  one  state  to  another  state,  but  no  speci- 
fication of  what  it  is  that  is  changed,  and  no  allusion  to 
anything  which  effects  these  changes.  It  is  a  description 
of  the  kind  of  changes  which  take  place  in  the  floating 
panorama  of  clouds,  as  before  stated.  He  would  be  under- 
stood as  telling  the  process  of  change,  by  "differentiations 
and  integrations,"  but  still  no  allusion  to  anything  that 

*Firs>t  Priuciples,  p.  'ilt'.. 


N'. 


MR.    spencer's   definition. 


133 


differentiates.  There  is  a  studied  purpose  in  this  definition, 
and  in  all  the  definitions  of  the  earlier  evolutionists  to 
ignore  and  shut  out  of  thought  all  doers  and  changers. 
The  word  differentiation  in  this  definition  is  a  superfluity 
and  a  tautology;  of  course,  if  anything  changes,  it  differ- 
entiates—defferentiation  is  only  another  word  for  change. 
This  definition  then  is.  Things  change  through  chang- 
ing; but  still  no  changer. 

Take  as  another  example  Mr.  Darwin's  definition  of 
nature:  ''The  aggregate  action  and  product  of  natural 
laws;  and  laws  are  the  sequence  of  events  as  ascertained 
by  us."*  The  action  and  product  of  laws;  and  laws  are 
the  sequence  of  events.  Nature  is  the  product  of  the 
sequence  of  events.  The  sequence  of  events  produces 
the  sequence  of  events.  The  sequence  of  events  is  some- 
thing which  acts  and  produces,  is  it?  He  meant  to  say, 
The  clouds  float,  therefore  they  float,  and  we  see  them 
floating.  He  cannot  have  meant  that  the  sequence  of 
events  is  a  producer. 

The  aim  of  evolutionists  is  to  describe  the  succession  of 
appearances  as  they  pass  before  us  in  nature,  and  to  ascer- 
tain the  laws  of  change  discoverable  in  this  series  of 
appearances.  We  all  notice  that  things  do  change.  They 
endeavor  to  discover  some  general  modes  according  to 
which  these  changes  occur.  Some  of  these  which  Mr. 
Spencer  thinks  he  has  discovered  he  mentions  in  his 
definition  of  evolution.  He  concludes  that  it  is  a  general 
law  that  things  change  from  the  homogeneous  to  the 
heterogeneous,  from  the  incoherent  to  the  coherent,  fronv 
the  indefinite  to  the  definite.  Such  he  concludes  from 
observation  and  history  to  be  the  general  modes  of  change, 
and  he  calls  these  modes  laws  of  evolution.  He  does  not 
attempt  to  give  any  account  of  what  it  is  which  effects 
these  changes;  this  inquiry  is   outside  of  the   limits   of 

♦Origin  of  Species,  Chap.  IV,  p.  85. 


>l 


I* 


134  PHILOSOPHY  OV  EVOLUTION. 

ohilosophy.  Mr.  Darwin,  giving  more  especial  attention 
?o  evXL  in  the  vegetable  and  animal  k„,gdoms  of 
nature,  emphasizes  a  mode  of  change  which  he  discovers 
there-  The  stronger  survive;  the  weaker  pensh.  This  he 
notices  as  a  common  fact  among  plants  and  ammals,  and 
he  calls  it  a  mode  or  law  of  evolution. 

According  to  the  system  of  philosophy  upon  which  evo- 
lution was  founded,  this  was  as  far  as  evolutionists  were 
required,  or  even  permitted,  to  go.     They  were  required 
to  describe  the  changes  which  take  place,  ^and  note  the 
general  laws  according   to  which  those  changes  occur, 
lerhaps  we  ought  to  have  been  content  to  let  evolution- 
ists pursue  their  way  in  their  path  of  cloud.     They  pro 
fess  to  know  nothing  of  doers,  and  intentionally  construct 
their  philosophy  without  reference  to  them   and  say  they 
do  not  propose  to  try  to  answer  the  demand  for  them      As 
they  profess  to  know  nothing  of  doers,  peope  might  ha^  e 
been  content  to  leave  them  in  their  -^nowledged  ignor- 
ance if  they  had  not  claimed  that  descnptions  of  the  pass- 
ing clouds  were  complete  explanations  of  phenomena. 
But  people  would  persist  in  demanding  doers  for  domg^ 
and  changers  for  changes,  and  would  not  admit  it  to  be 
a  complete  explanation  till  these  were  supplied 

It  became  necessary  to  yield  to  this  demand,  if  evolu- 
tion was  to  make  any  progress  among  the  V^^^^^^f 
first  move  was  to  supply  the  appearance  of  doers,  though 
in  fact  no  doer  was  supplied.     This  Mr.  Darwin  did  first 
in  the  name  which  he  gave  to  the  fact  of  the  survival  of 
the  stronger.     He  called  it  "natural  selection^      Selec- 
tion carries  with  it  the  thought  of  selecting  and  selector. 
Selection  implies  intelligent  action,  a  knowledge  of  two, 
and  choice  between  them.     Thus  there  was  produced  m 
the  mind  of  the  reader  the  illusion  that  he  had  supplied 
an  actor  and  a  doer,  and  men  could  read  of  the  doings  of 
natural  selection  without  any  painful  feeling  of  unsatisfac- 


DEMAND   FOR   DOERS.  135 

tion  because  of  the  demand  of  the  mind  for  a  doer— natural 
selection  is  the  doer.  Only  those  who  saw  clearly  enough 
to  see  that  this  was  only  a  name  for  a  mode  of  change, 
and  that  no  actor  or  changer  was  really  supplied,  felt  any 
deep  dissatisfaction  at  representations  of  the  doings  of  nat- 
ural selection. 

But  Mr.  Darwin  fostered  this  illusion,  not  merely  by 
giving  this  name  to  a  fact,  but  also  by  continually  using 
language  expressive  of  acting  and  doing  in  connection 
with  the  name.     Thus  in  his  description  of  how  an  eye 
may  be  formed^  he  has  natural  selection  ' '  always  intently 
watching,"  and    "carefully   preserving,"    and   "picking 
out  with  unerring  skill."     These  words,  watching,  pre- 
serving, picking  out,  and  skill,  can  be  used  only  in  refer- 
ence to   an   actor,    doer,  an  intelligent   doer.     He   thus 
deepens  the  impression  of  a  doer,  and  carries  the  reader 
along  in  the  illusion  that  he  has  met  the  demand  of  the 
human  mind  for  a  doer.     I  do  not  say  that  he  thus  inten- 
tionally tried  to  deceive  people.     It  seems  rather  probable 
that,  wishing  to  show  the  competence  of  natural  selection 
for  this  work,  and  feeling  in  his  own  mind  a  demand  for 
these  powers  to  make  it  competent,  he  created  this  illu- 
sion in  his  own  mind,  and  did  not  look   at  it   closely 
enough  to  see  that  he  had  endowed  it  with  powers  which 
it  came  far  short  of  possessing.     When  called  to  account 
for  such  use  of  language,  he  said  he  was  only  personifying 
the  fact  that  the  strongest  and  best  fitted  survive.     But  if 
we  take  out  of  the  explanation  these  personifying  words, 
it  ceases  to  be  any  explanation  at  all, — only  a  thing  really 
possessing  these  powers  could  accomplish  this  work,  while 
that  which  he  endows  with  these  powers  is  simply  a  fact, 
and   not  a  thing  at  all,  possessing  no   power  at  all.     It 
seems  that  Mr.  Darwin  did  not  have  clear  conceptions  of 
what  constitutes  a  doer;  through  all  his  writings  he  is 

Origin  ot  Species,  p.  ISl. 


'I   i. 


II 


I 


136  PHILOSOPHY  OF   EVOLUTION. 

constantly  treating  modes  or  laws  as  doers  and  ghing 
them  active,  productive,  creative  power.  Whether  this 
be  a  mistake  or  an  intention  to  deceive  the  unwary,  even' 
one  must  judge  for  himself.  He  and  other  evolutionists 
often  use  the  words  differentiate  and  differentiation  so  as 
to  produce  the  impression  that  they  are  agents  PO^^sing 
active  and  effective  power,  instead  of  the  mere  fact  that  a 
change  is  now  occurring,  or  that  a  change  has  been  efiect- 

ed  by  something.  .  , ,  j  ,     •     n,^ 

The  demand  for  changers  was  further  yielded  to  in  the 
introd,;ction  of  the  word  environments.     These,  physical 
surroundings,  dietetic  and  climatic  influences  etc     were 
introduced  as  changers,  causes  of  change.     Then  the  phi- 
losophy of  evolution  borrowed  many  of  the  doctnnes  of 
current  physics.     The  theory  that  the  inorganic  forces  are 
physical  motions,  the  theory  that  moving  matter  is  the 
only  doer  in  nature,  the  theory  of  the  conservation   of 
energy   and  the  convertibility  of  the  different  forms  of 
energy,  were  adopted  and  made  to  include  vegetable  and 
animal  life,  the  physiological  forces  and  instincts  of  brutes, 
and  the  mind  and  mental  activities  of  man.     The.se  were 
all  decided  to  be  physical  motions.     Then  the  way  was 
fully  open  for  the  introduction  of  causes  into  the  philos- 
ophv  of  evolution.     Causes  were  excluded  at  first  because 
they'  were  supposed  to  be  invisible.     The  rule  was  tha 
nothing  should  be  introduced  into  philosophy  or  sought 
for  that  is  not  discoverable  by  the  senses;  that  rule  was 
supposed  to  exclude  causes.     Now  that  all  causes  operat- 
ing on  earth  are  supposed  to  be  material,  and  matter  is 
discoverable  by  the  senses,  causes  may  be  freely  used  in 
philosophy.     It  is  no  matter  whether  causes  are  excluded 
from  or  included  in  philosophy,  if  only  the  divine  is  ex- 

''^  Evolutioni.sts  had  now  attained  to  a  position  where 
they  could  freely  use  causes,  and  talk,  as  other  philoso- 


CAUSE  AND  El^I^ECl'. 


^3l 


phers,  of  the  causal  relation.  The  causal  relation  which 
they  adopt  is  that  of  precedent  and  sequent — the  cause  is 
that  which  uniformly  precedes,  the  effect  that  which  un- 
iformly succeeds — or  else  the  law  of  continuity — the  cause 
and  the  effect  are  the  same  substance  in  precedent  and 
subsequent  states.  Either  of  these  will  answer,  and  one 
or  the  other  may  be  used  as  it  will  most  favor  the  case  in 
hand.  No  other  doctrine  of  cause  is  admissible,  for  all 
causes  are  physical,  and  all  that  is  and  all  that  occurs,  all 
agencies  and  all  influences,  even  those  which  we  have 
been  in  the  practice  of  denominating  mental  and  moral, 
are  all  reducible  to  the  laws  of  physics  and  mathematics* 

The  causal  relation  is  now  exalted  into  wonderful  inl' 
portance.  Everything  that  has  appeared  since  the  world 
of  fire  cooled  off,  is  the  effect  of  natural  causes,  and  nat- 
ural causes  are  matter  in  motion  and  at  rest^-or  in  motion, 
for  there  is  no  rest.  Matter  in  various  forms  of  motion 
is  all  there  was  at  the  beginning,  and  all  that  ever  has 
been,  and  all  that  ever  will  be.  The  various  forms  of' 
moving  matter,  interacting,  brought  forth  the  beginning  o^ 
life.  The  various  forms  of  moving  matter,  interworking, 
developed  from  that  successively  higher  and  higher  forms 
of  being.  The  various  forms  of  moving  matter  have 
wrought  out  the  history  of  earth,  and  the  history  of  the 
human  race,  and  they  will  continue  to  develop  these  to 
their  final  destiny. 

Everything  that  ever  has  been  was  a  necessary  effect  of 
natural  causes.  Everything  that  is,  is  a  necessary  effect 
of  natural  causes.  The  causes  existing  and  acting,  the 
effects  necessarily  follow.  Nothing  in  the  past  could 
have  been  otherwise  than  as  it  has  been,  nothing  in  the 
present  could  have  been  otherwise  than  as  it  is.  Nothing 
in  the  future  can  be  otherwise  than  as  the  causes  around 
it  make  it  to  be.  This  includes  the  bodies  and  minds  of 
men,    their  forms,    natures,    and   characteristics.     It  in- 


138  PHILOSOPHY   OF   EVOLUTION. 

eludes  also  the  activities  of  mind  and  body.  No  one 
can  think  otherwise  than  as  the  causesmake  hun  to  think. 
No  one  can  believe  otherwise  than  as  the  causes  make 
him  to  believe.  No  one  can  will  otherwise  than  as  the 
causes  make  him  to  will.  No  one  can  do  otherwise  than 
as  the  causes  make  him  to  do.  ,  ,     •     • 

The  peculiar  organization  of  each  individual  bram  is 
the  result  of  environments  in  the  midst  of  which  it  has 
come  to  be.     The  molecular  motions  which  we  call  heat 
outside  of  the  brain,  become  another  form  of  molecular 
motions  in  the  brain,  and  these  are  mind  and  these  are  our 
thoughts     If  diverse  environments  produce  different  bram 
motions,  we  have  different  thoughts  and  different  behefs 
Our  thoughts  and  our   opinions  are  necessary  effects  oi 
surrounding  causes.     One  man  is  made  by  his  environ- 
ments  to  think  and  believe  one  way,  and  another  man  is 
made  by  his  environments  to  think  and  beheve  directly 
the  opposite,  and  there  is  just  as  much  truth  and  certainty 
in  one  as  in  the  other.    One  set  of  causes  has  just  as  much 
authority  as  the  other,  or  any  other.    One  behef  is  just  as 
valid  as  the  other;   both  are  produced   by  their  causes; 
both  are  positively  necessary;  neither  could  possibly  have 
been  otherwise  than  as  it  is.     Each  man's  opinions  are  to 
him  true.     The  fact  that  the  opinions  of  two  men  are 
contradictor^^  is  no  disproof  of  either,  for  not  even  the  law 
of  contradictions  is  any  test  of  truth.     One  opinion  is  just 
as  true  as  any  other.     All  opinions  accord  with  the  causal 
facts  which  produced  them.     Then  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  truth  or  falsehood,  no  reasonable  and  no  unreasonable, 
no  rational  and  no  absurd. 

Then  according  to  all  principles  which  men  have 
agreed  upon  as  conditions  of  responsibility,  man  is  not  a 
responsible  being.  Every  man  thinks  and  believes  and 
does  as  the  surrounding  causes  compel  him  t<)  think  and 
believe  and  do.     Then  no  man  is  blamable  for  whatever 


NO   RESPONSIBILITY.  ^    139 

he  may  think  or  believe  or  do.     The  causes  made  the 
ihief  to   steal,  and  he  could  not  help  it.     The  murderer 
was  only  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  causes;  he  is  not 
.at  all  to  blame.     The  anarchist  can  truly  say,  It  is  utterly 
a  tyranny  and  a  wrong  to  hurt  a  man   for  whatever  he 
may  do.    You  call  stealing  a  crime.    We  call  accumulating 
•a  large  amount  of  property  a  crime.     One  is  as  great  an 
^vil  as  the  other.    We  have  the  same  right  to  punish  you 
for  being  rich  that  you  have  to  punish  us  for  stealing. 
There  is  no  right  or  wrong  about  it.     No  man  has  any 
more  right  to  govern  than  any  other  man.     The  judges 
are  the  criminals.     Jails  and  penitentiaries  are  engines  of 
crime.     The  criminals  are  those  who  put  men  there  for 
adts  which  they  could  not  avoid  doing.     Lawmakers  are 
tyrants.     Governments  are  hyenas  devouring   mankind. 
I  have  the  same  right  to  shoot  the  sheriff  for  his  acts  that 
lie  has  to  put  me  in  jail  for  stealing.     The  causes  make 
one  man  to  build  a  fine  house.     The  causes  make  me  to 
burn  it.    The  causes  make  one  man  to  accumulate  a  large 
amount  of  money.     The  causes  make  me  to  knock  him 
down  and  take  it  from  him.    He  was  as  much  to  blame  as 
I.    The  philosophers  of  evolution  have  given  us  the  prin- 
ciples upon  which  our  philosophy,  our  political  economy, 
and  our  sociology  are  founded.     You  will  please  reserve 
your  denunciations  of  us  while  you  teach  us  the  principles. 
Again,  as  all  opinions  are  necessary  effects  of  physical 
causes,  the  opinions  against  evolution  are  just  as  vaHd  and 
certain  as  opinions  in  its  favor.    Truth  is  only  to  the  man 
who  thinks  it.    The  opinions  of  one  man  are  to  him  truth; 
the  opposite  opinions  of  another  man  are  to  him  truth. 
The  evolutionist  cannot  ask  another  man  to  think  as  he 
does.     He   certainly  would  not  think  of  asking   me  to 
iDelieve  his  theor>%  w^hile  he  asserts  that  both  his  and  my 
opinions  are  necessar>^  effects  of  our  diverse  environments, 
:and  that  my  opinions  against  it  have  the  same  foundation 


I 


140  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOIvUTION. 

that  his  have  for  it,  and  that  mine  are  just  as  valid  as  his. 
This  doctrine  renders  all  truth  and  knowledge  unattain- 
able, and  all  science  impossible.     There  can  be  no  estab- 
lished principles  of  science,  for  each  one  thinks  as  the 
environments  make  him  to  think.    No  science  or  philoso- 
phy can  be  common  to  any,  except  those  who  happen  to 
be  subject  to  the  same  environments.     There  can  be  no 
system  of  truth  which  can  claim,  above  all  others,  to  be 
the  truth.     No  theory  or  system  is  any  more  valid  than 
any  other  theory  or  system.    Even  evolution  cannot  claim 
to  be  a  true  system;    it  rests  only  upon  the  fact  that  the 
peculiar  organization  or  peculiar  environments  have  made 
some  men  to  so  think,  while  the  mass  of  mankind  have 
been  made   by  their  environments  to  think   otherwise. 
Thus  the  system  buries  itself  at  last,  with  all  other  sci- 
ence, in  the  grave  of  nothingness. 

This  is  evolution.     It  is  built  upon  the  foundation  of 
the  exclusion  of  all  invisible  doers.     It  assumes  that  mat- 
ter, with  the  help  of  natural  causes,  can  evolve  itself  into 
new  forms,  into  all  the  forms  in  which  matter  appears,  and 
into  all  the  forms  of  being  and  life  which  are  found  on 
earth.     The  essential  feature  of  evolution  is  the  evolving 
of  matter  by  its  own  power  and  forces  into  new  forms  of 
being.      Evolution   means  self- unfolding,  self-producing. 
This  is  what  those  who  adopted  the  w^ord  and  constructed 
the  system  meant  by  it.    Any  system  of  belief  which  does 
not  embrace  this  thought,  which  does  not  have  matter 
self-evolving,  which  introduces  any  agent  from  outside  of 
nature,  is  not  evolution     What  is  called  theistic  evolution 
seems  to  me  to  be  clearly  a  misnomer.    It  is  not  evolution 
at  all,  but  a  theory  of  the  mode  of  divine  creation.     In 
evolution  nature   does  it  all;   in   theistic  evolution   the 
divine  Creator  does  it  all.     Why  the  same  word  should 
be  used  to  name  two  systems  so  directly  contrary  to  each 
other,  I  do  not  know,  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be  very  un- 


THEISTIC  KVOLUTION. 


141 


wise.  It  is  not  only  a  philosophic  impropriety  to  call 
things  so  unlike  by  the  same  name,  but  it  is  misleading, 
confusing  the  public  mind,  and  giving  to  the  word  evolu- 
tion a  respectability  which  does  not  belong  to  it. 

In  preceding  pages  we  have  seen  that  the  pillars  upon 
which  the  evolutional  system  of  philosophy  rests — that 
matter  is  a  doer,  that  the  inorganic  forces  are  moving 
molecules,  that  they  are  convertible  into  one  another — are 
not  found  in  nature,  and  if  these  supporting  pillars  are 
removed  how  can  the  edifice  stand  ? 


CHAPTER  X. 

The  Solution. 

We  have  found  in  our  investigations  that  in  all  processes 
of  doing  in  nature,  in  all  natural  phenomena,  except  where 
one  body  moves  against  another  body  and  starts  that  in 
motion,  the  doing  is  accomplished  across  intervals  of 
space,  where  the  matter  that  is  supposed  to  do  is  not,  and 
therefore  that  matter  cannot  be  the  doer  in  any  of  these 
cases.  From  these  facts  we  made  the  generalization  that 
matter  is  never  a  doer.  We  have  subsequently  found 
that  in  the  excepted  case — inertia — there  were  many  evi- 
dences that  there  was  a  mover  in  the  matter  that  is  not 
the  matter,  w^hich  has  its  own  peculiar  and  distinctive 
properties  and  modes,  which  indicate  a  sin  generis  sub- 
stance. In  all  the  other  cases  we  have  to  suppose  some 
immaterial  substance  w^hich  extends  and  reaches  across 
these  intervals  of  space,  which  is  the  doer.  If  we  extend 
this  supposition  to  the  excepted  case,  as  facts  seem  to 
indicate,  and  suppose  that  there  is  in  matter  an  immaterial 
substance  which  acts  according  to  the  modes  there  mani- 
fested, we  see  that  this  case  can  be  fully  and  perfectly 
explained  without  supposing  matter  to  be  the  doer.  In 
all  other  cases  matter  cannot  be  the  doer;  the  supposition 
which  we  are  compelled  to  make  in  the  other  cases  per- 
fectly explains  this. 

We  have  also  found  that  that  whole  system  of  physical 
philosophy  which  has  dynamic  energy  for  the  doer  in- 


ORIGIN   OF   THE    PHYSICAT,   THEORY. 


143 


volves  the  absurdity  of  counting  doing,  energizing,  a 
relation,  as  a  doer,  and  has  energizing  without  an  cner- 
gizer.  In  all  that  system  of  philosophy,  laws,  modes, 
motion,  and  energizing,  are  spoken  of  as  doers,  and  the 
whole  universe  is  an  eternal  pushing  without  any  pusher, 
and  an  eternal  pulling  without  any  puller. 

Some  of  the  sources  of  this  stream  of  philosophy  are 
found  in  the  remote  past,  but  its  largest  tributary  ap- 
peared when  it  was  asserted  that  heat  is  a  mode  of  motion — 
motion  without  any  mover.  When  the  public  and  scien- 
tific consciousness  became  adapted  to  the  thought  of  a 
perpetual  moving  without  any  mover,  in  case  of  heat,  the 
stream  soon  became  broad  enough  to  embrace  all  physical 
philosophy.  The  well  known  fact  that  matter  started  in 
motion,  if  unobstructed,  moves  perpetually  in  straight 
lines,  is  manipulated  and  expanded  into  a  universal  mode 
in  nature,  embracing  all  kinds  of  motions,  in  all  possible 
circumstances,  and  in  the  midst  of  constant  obstructions. 
Matter  does  not  move  perpetually,  even  in  straight  lines, 
and  in  the  absence  of  obstruction,  without  a  mover;  there 
is  a  mover  there,  and  that  mover  is  not  matter.  What 
folly  to  talk  about  bodies  of  matter  moving  perpetually  in 
the  midst  of  perpetual  obstruction!  Then  a  well  known 
law  in  mechanics — the  constant  quantity  of  work  which  a 
certain  amount  of  energizing  will  accomplish — passes 
through  the  same  transforming  process,  and  is  metamor- 
phosed into  an  eternally  flowing  current  of  energizing, 
and  by  their  belief  in  one  thing  men  are  made  to  believe 
in  an  entirely  different  thing. 

Heat  is  a  mode  of  motion.  What  is  the  mover?  The 
molecules  have  been  knocked,  and  now  they  go  on  moving 
forever,  in  the  midst  of  constant  obstruction,  and  con- 
stantly changing  their  directions.  Many  of  those  who 
elaborated  this  theory  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  look 
behind  motion  for  a  mover,  and  many  others  have  received 


144 


THE    SOLUTION. 


the  theory  on  the  authority  of  their  teachers  and  their 
text-books,  without  considering  its  a  priori  possibility. 
(See  page  97.)  Then,  as  there  is  some  heat  in  all  matter, 
the  molecules  of  all  matter  must  be  detached  bodies,  in 
perpetual  motion,  and  we  have  what  is  called  the  dynamic 
theory  of  matter.  Light  is  said  to  be  eternally  flowing 
waves  of  matter.  What  moves  the  matter?  Some  of  its 
atoms  have  been  knocked,  and  they  knock  others,  and 
they  others,  and  thus  the  waves  move  on  forever,  a  per- 
petual motion  in  the  midst  of  obstructions,  without  any 
mover.  Then  the  constant  energizings  which  are  going 
on  in  nature,  by  which  matter  is  constantly  moved,  were 
named  energy,  as  though  they  were  a  substantive  thing 
and  doer,  and  the  theoretical  framework  of  modem  physi- 
cal philosophy  was  erected. 

As  we  have  seen  in  preceding  pages,  this  system  meets 
with  many  difficulties — not  only  with  phenomena  which 
it  is  unable  to  explain,  but  also  with  what  appear  to  me 
to  be  impossibilities. 

Now  there  are  ways  of  obviating  all  these  difficulties. 
Doers  may  be  supplied  in  all  these  cases.  This  may  be 
done  by  supposing  that  God  is  the  universal  doer,  and 
that  all  motions  in  nature  are  the  effects  of  His  energizing, 
and  that  all  dynamic  energy  is  His  constant  energizing. 
This  is  the  opinion  of  many  theologians  and  some  scien- 
tists and  philosophers.  A  competent  doer  is  by  this 
supposition  supplied  for  every  doing  in  nature.  No  one 
questions  the  competence  of  this  supposition  to  explain 
all  natural  phenomena. 

It  is  surprising  to  hear  some  men  advocate  this  theory, 
and  at  the  same  time  adopt  and  maintain  the  current 
theories  of  science.  That  theory  and  these  seem  to  me  to 
directly  contradict  and  exclude  each  other.  The  dynamic 
theory  of  matter,  for  instance,  declares  that  the  molecules 
of  all  matter  are  in  constant  motion,  and  that  molecules 


' 


DIVINE   DOING. 


145 


, 


and  masses  once  started  in  motion,  no  matter  what  the 
form  of  motion,  nor  what  the  circumstances,  move  of  them- 
selves forever  afterwards,  unless  they  impart  their  motion 
to  other  bodies.  The  theory  of  divine  doing  declares  that 
matter  never  moves  of  itself,  never  moves  except  as  God 
moves  it.  One  theory  says,  matter  moves  itself  perpet- 
ually; the  other  says,  matter  never  moves  itself.  How 
can  ^ny  one  mind  embrace  and  support  both  of  these 
assertions?  The  dynamic  theory  of  heat  also  asserts  that 
molecules  of  matter  move  themselves  perpetually.  This 
theory  declares  that  matter  never  moves  itself.  Yet  many 
who  hold  to  this  theory  of  divine  doing,  embrace,  defend, 
and  teach  the  dynamic  theory  of  heat.  Thus  they  have  in 
their  creed  both  members  of  a  direct  contradiction.  The 
undulatory  theory  of  light  also  includes  the  endless  self- 
perpetuated  motion  of  matter,  and  involves  the  same  con- 
tradictions with  this  theory.  If  the  motion  of  light  is  the 
doing  of  God,  what  need  is  there  of  supposing  an  ether 
between  the  sun  and  the  earth.  God  can  move  through 
space  without  any  ether  to  move  in.  The  theory  of  the 
self-persistence  and  constant  equivalence  of  energy  also 
contradicts  the  theory  of  the  divine  doing.  Yet  many 
who  hold  to  this  theory,  hold  also  and  maintain  that 
theory.  If  we  have  in  our  creed  both  members  of  a  con- 
tradiction, we  would  be  wiser  if  we  threw  one  of  them 
away. 

The  theory  of  the  divine  doing  meets  all  the  require- 
ments of  the  case,  and  is  sufficient  for  all  demands  that 
may  be  put  upon  it.  But  it  is  not  to  the  human  mind  the 
most  satisfactory  way  of  explaining  nature.  It  seems  to 
be  almost  instinctive  to  look  for  natural  causes.  Men  of 
all  religious  creeds,  the  most  devout  as  well  as  the  most 
profane,  have  in  all  ages  been  trying  thus  to  account  for 
and  explain  natural  phenomena.  Perhaps  our  own  modes 
of  doing  incline  us  to  thus  think  of  God.     We  do  largely 


146  THE   SOLUTION. 

by  the  agency  of  others;  especially  is  this  true  of  sover- 
eigns and  those  in  authority.  It  seems  to  us  to  be  a 
derogation  of  His  dignity  as  sovereign  of  the  universe  to 
suppose  Him  constantly  engaged  in  the  details  and  minu- 
tiae of  doing  that  is  going  on  in  nature.  This  seems  to  be 
a  laborious  and  toilsome  way.  It  is  not  as  we  would  do 
if  we  possessed  all  power  and  authority.  Whatever  be  the 
reasons  for  it,  mankind  do  constantly  look  for  intermediate 
agents  and  finite  doers  in  nature;  and  the  most  of  mankind 
have  always  looked,  and  probably  always  will  continue  t© 
look,  for  them  and  believe  in  them. 

If  we  suppose  that  the  different  forms  of  energy  op- 
erative in  nature  are  emanations  from  God,  detached,  and 
objective  to  him,  now  running  on  of  themselves,  we  sup- 
pose an  absurdity;  for  energy  is  a  property,  and  nothing 
but  substance  can  be  detached,  and  exist  apart  and  inde- 
pendent. 

If  we  suppose  that  God  has  started  currents  of  dynamic 
energy,  and  then,  ceasing  to  energize  Himself,  allows  those 
currents  to  flow  on  of  themselves,  we  suppose  another 
absurdity;  for  dynamic  energy  is  only  the  energizing  of 
some  substance,  and  the  moment  that  that  substance 
ceases  t6  energize,  the  dynamic  energy  ceases  to  be. 

What  supposition  can  we  make  that  will  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  case,  and  still  allow  us  to  have  finite  agents 
as  doers  in  nature?  These  agents  must  be  immaterial  sub- 
stance: for  we  have  seen  that  their  work  is  such,  and  in 
such  circumstances,  that  matter  could  not  do  it;  or  if  they 
were  matter  extending  across  the  intervals  of  space  which 
separates  bodies,  we  could  detect  its  presence.  If  we  sup- 
pose that  God  has  created  some  finite  immaterial  substan- 
ces capable  of  performing  this  work,  we  could  meet  all 
the  demands  of  the  case.  They  must  be  substance  that 
they  be  capable  of  detached  and  independent  existence, 
and  that  they  be  doers.     They  must  possess  the  property 


IMMATERIAIv  DOERS. 


147 


' 


of  energy  that  they  be  capable  of  moving  themselves  and 
moving  matter.  They  must  possess  other  properties  or 
modes  of  action,  each  of  its  own  kind,  to  qualify  it  for  its 
specific  work.  By  such  a  supposition  we  obviate  all  the 
difficulties  we  have  met  with  in  any  physical  theory,  sup- 
ply doers  in  all  natural  phenomena,  and  yet  satisfy  our 
demand  for  second  or  natural  causes,  and  leave  an  oppor- 
tunity for  science. 

It  is  thought  that  all  phenomena  in  inorganic  nature 
can  be  attributed  to  ten  doers.  They  are  gravity,  inertia, 
cohesion,  chemical  attraction,  molecular  repulsion,  elec- 
tricity, magnetism,  the  crystallizing  force,  heat,  and  light. 
These  cannot  be  matter  in  any  state  or  form.  It  is  im- 
possible to  explain  a  hundredth  part  of  the  phenomena  of 
nature  on  this  supposition.  Then,  as  we  have  seen,  in  a 
very  large  proportion  of  natural  phenomena  it  is  utterly 
impossible  that  they  should  be  matter.  All  doers  are 
substance;  they  are  not  material  substance;  then  they  are 
immaterial  substance.  Each  one  of  these  ten  is  a  specific 
kind  of  immaterial  substance.  They  are  discovered  by 
their  doings,  and  distinguished  firom  each  other  by  differ- 
ences in  their  doings.  As  each  material  substance  has  its- 
own  distinctive  properties  which  characterize  it,  so  each 
immaterial  substance  has  its  own  modes  of  action  which 
characterize  it.  The  properties  of  matter  are  passive,  and 
are  discovered  through  various  processes.  The  properties 
of  immaterial  substances  are  active,  and  we  call  them 
modes  of  action.  Their  properties  are  inherent  in  them, 
and  are  never  imparted  to  them  by  any  finite  agency  or 
physical  circumstance.  Gravity  draws  matter  together 
because  that  is  its  nature,  its  increated  mode  of  action. 
Cohesion  holds  molecules  together  in  masses.  Chemical 
attraction  unites  molecules  and  atoms  together  chemically. 
The  cr5^stallizing  force  places  atoms  and  molecules  to- 
gether in  the  form  of  cr>^stals.    Each  does  work  of  its  own. 


: 


148  THE  SOLUTION. 

kind  with  matter,  because  of  its  own  increated  mode  of 
action. 

Material  substances  are  distinguished  from  immaterial 
substances  by  their  properties.     Matter  has  weight  and 
inertia,  and  is  impenetrable  to  other  matter.     Immaterial 
substance  has  not  weight  nor  inertia,  and  it  is  penetrable 
to  other  substance,  to  matter.    Material  substance  has  not, 
and  immaterial  substance   has,  the  property  of  energy. 
These  forces  are  not    fluids,   gases,   vapors,   or  moving 
molecules.     All  these  have  weight,  and  are  in  their  ulti- 
mate particles  impenetrable.      It  is  probable  that  each 
force  exists  in  connection  with  the  earth  in  unchangeable 
quantity,  except  as  heat  and  light  pass  away  into  space. 
We  cannot  create  one  of  them,  nor  add  to  the  quantity  of 
any  one  of  them,  nor  make  that  quantity  less.    But  many 
of  them   may  lie  in  a  quiescent,  latent  state  in  matter, 
when  they  are  not  discoverable  by  us.     Producing  them, 
as  it  is  generally  called,  is  only  bringing  them  out  from 
their  state  of  latency  into   activity,  when   they  become 
discoverable  by  us.     In  their  unchangeable  quantity  they 
are  like  the  material  elements.     The  quantity  of  iron, 
carbon,  oxygen,  and  so  forth,  is  unchangeable.     This  is 
equally  true  of  the  immaterial  substances.    One  of  them  is 
never  converted  or  transformed  into  another.     We  might 
as  well  try  to  change  iron  into  gold,  or  oxygen  into  hy- 
drogen, as  to  try  to  change  one  of  the  inorganic  forces 
into  another.    Bach  possesses  its  own  invariable  properties, 
and  exists  in  its  own  unchangeable  quantity. 

Some  persons  profess  to  be  unable  to  obtain  a  clear  con- 
ception of  immaterial  substance.  This  difficulty  has  been 
greatly  increased  by  the  philosophy  which  denies  exten- 
sion to  immaterial  substance.  We  can  have  no  conception, 
in  the  sense  of  image  in  the  mind,  of  anything  which  has 
not  extension  and  form.  In  giving  to  all  substance,  in 
our  definition,    space  relations,  we   allow  to  immaterial 


J 


IMMATERIAL   SUBSTANCES.  1 49 

substances  extension,  form,  and   size.     We   can  form  a 
conception  of  that  which  has  size  and  form. 

The  difficulty  of  obtaining  a  conception  of  immaterial 
substance  has  been  increased  also  by  the  philosophy  which 
denies  all  knowledge  of  even  material  substance.  I  think 
that  we  know  material  substance  immediately  through  the 
sense  of  touch.  We  discover  that  there  is  something 
which  fills  space  to  the  exclusion  of  other  matter.  That 
which  we  find  to  thus  fill  space  to  the  exclusion  of  other 
matter,  we  call  substance.  We  know  it  as  space-filling, 
other-matter-excluding  substance,  before  we  know  any  of 
its  properties,  or  anything  else  about  it.  We  susequently 
discover  its  form  and  size.  We  are  able  then  to  form  a 
conception  of  it  as  a  space-filling  thing  with  form  and  size. 

We  have  now  a  conception  of  material  substance.  We 
know  it  as  something  filling  space,  excluding  other  mat- 
ter, with  a  defijiite  form,  and  a  discoverable  size.  Let  us 
now  subtract  from  this  knowledge  one  of  these  four  facts — 
impenetrability — and  we  have  a  conception  of  it  as  space- 
filling substance,  with  size  and  form.  It  is  true  that 
property  which  enabled  us  to  first  discover  it  is  gone,  but 
we  can  conceive  it  there,  having  the  same  size  and  form, 
filling  the  same  space,  yet  allowing  other  substance  to 
enter  that  space.  What  is  it  that  we  now  have  a  concep- 
tion of?  It  is  substance  filling  space,  yet  not  excluding 
other  substance  from  the  same  space — that  is,  it  is  imma- 
terial substance. 

Here  is  a  block  of  crystalline  marble.  There  is,  first, 
the  material  substance  which  we  call  marble.  Dwelling 
in  it,  occupying  the  same  space,  of  precisely  the  same  form 
and  size,  is  another  substance,  an  immaterial  substance, 
which  we  call  cohesion.  This  substance  holds  the  mole- 
cules of  the  material  substance  strongly  together.  Within 
the  marble,  occupying  the  same  space,  of  precisely  the 
same  form  and  size,  is  another  immaterial  substance  which. 


»'  I 


I50 


THE   SOLUTION. 


unites  and  holds  the  atoms  of  calcium,  oxygen,  and  car- 
bon together  to  form  the  marble.  This  substance  we  call 
chemical  attraction.  Dwelling  in  that  marble,  occupying 
the  same  space,  of  the  same  form  and  size,  are  other  im- 
material substances— inertia,  the  crystallizing  force,  elec- 
tricity, magnetism  and  molecular  repulsion,  each  united  to 
the  marble  by  attraction.  Within  that  marble,  occupying 
the  same  space,  united  to  it  by  attraction,  but  extending 
indefinitely  beyond  its  bounds,  is  another  immaterial  sub- 
stance, which  we  call  the  force  of  gravity.  Within  that 
marble,  occupying  the  same  space,  much  of  it  remaining 
there,  undiscoverable  by  us,  but  some  of  it  letting  go  of 
the  marble  and  flying  away  from  it,  is  another  immaterial 
substance  which  we  call  heat,  and  another  which  we  call 
light. 

If  we  believe  in  mind  as  an  immaterial  substance,  we 
can  aid  our  conception  of  immaterial  substances  by  com- 
paring them  with  mind.     The  mind   occupies  the  same 
space  that  the  body  does.     Mind  and  the  inorganic  forces 
are  alike  in  that  they  both  are  imponderable  and  penetra- 
ble, both  possess  the  property  of  energy,  and  both  are- 
united  to  matter.     The  inorganic  forces  are  unlike  mind, 
in  that  they  do  not  possess  sensibility,  intelligence,  or  will. 
W^e  have  stated  that  these  forces  are  joined  to  matter 
by  attraction.     Of  course,  the  ultimate  how  of  this  attrac- 
tion no  one  can  explain.     Here  w^e  enter  the  department 
of  properties,  where  no  one  professes  to  give  any  explana- 
tion.    We  cannot  see  how  one  substance  can  be  made  to 
possess  one  property,  and  another  substance  another  prop- 
erty.    One  substance   possesses  a  property  by  which  it 
joins  itself  with  and  clings  to  another  substance.    We  call 
this  attraction.     Different  portions  of  the  same  immaterial 
substance  cling  together.     We  call  this  attraction.     We 
say  they  do  so  because  such  is  their  nature,  their  property, 
their  mode  of  action.     This  is  as  far  back  as  we  can  go  in 


IMMATERIAL   SUBSTANCES. 


151 


our  explanations.  I  can  see  no  explanation  back  of  that,/ 
or  reason  why  they  are  so,  or  do  so,  only  that  such  prop- 
erties or  modes  of  action  their  Creator  saw  fit  to  give  them. 
(In  the  original  manuscript  I  had  here  written  over  a 
liundred  pages  applying  this  theory  to  natural  phenomena 
in  all  their  details.  In  that  trial  of  the  theory  I  found  it 
competent  to  explain  natural  phenomena  more  perfectly 
and  more  completely  than  any  other  theory  which  has 
been  proposed,  except,  of  course,  the  theory  of  mimediate 
divine  doing.  But  I  have  thought  best,  in  this  abridge- 
ment, to  omit  all  this,  and  dismiss  this  branch  of  the  sub- 
ject wath  only  a  few  w^ords.) 

As  we  know  the  forces  by  their  doings,  as  we  deduce 
their  properties  and  powers  from  their  doings,  of  course 
we  can  give  to  each  force  properties  and  powers  which 
render  it  capable  of  performing   the  work  that  it  does. 
The  only  test  in  such  a  process  is  contradictions,  as  when, 
by  giving  it  properties  which  render  it  competent  for  one 
part  of  its  work,  we  destroy  its  competence  for  another 
part  of  its  work.     It  is  thus  that   the   hypothesis  of  a 
luminiferous  ether  is  shown  to  be  untenable.     When  it  is 
fitted  for  the  transmission  of  light,  it  becomes  impermea- 
ble to  the  worlds.     When  it  is  modified  so  as  not  to  be 
an   obstruction   to   the  worlds,  it  becomes   incapable   of 
transmitting  light  at  its  known  velocity.     When  a  true 
explanation  of  facts  is  hit  upon,  no  such  contradiction  can 
occur.     In  applying  and  testing  this  theory  in  all  the 
details  of  scientific  facts,  I  found  no  such  instance  of  con- 
tradiction.    On  the  other  hand,  I  was  often  surprised  to 
find  how  perfectly  an  inference  made  from  one  set  of  facts 
harmonized  with  all  the  other  facts.    I  will  mention  one  or 
two  instances  of  this  kind.     The  specific  heat  of  water  is 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  liquid  or  solid.     Inference 
from  this :     Heat  has  more  attraction  for  water  than  for 
any  other  liquid  or  solid.    Now  test  this  inference  in  other 


IS2 


THK   SOLUTION. 


phenomena  of  heat  in  relation  to  water.  It  absorbs  more 
transmitted  heat — heat  stops  in  it ;  it  is  a  poor  conductor — 
heat  moves  slowly  through  it ;  it  is  a  poor  radiator — heat 
clings  to  it ;  it  is  a  strong  refractor — heat  is  retarded  much 
in  its  passage  through  it.  Thus  we  find  that  all  the  other 
classes  of  facts  corroborate  the  inference.  Another  in- 
stance :  The  specific  heat  of  the  metals,  as  a  class,  is  low. 
The  inference  from  this  is :  Heat  has  little  attraction  for 
the  metals.  Test  this  inference  by  other  classes  of  facts. 
The  metals  are  good  conductors —heat  passes  rapidly 
through  them ;  they  are  good  radiators — heat  leaves  them 
readily  and  rapidly ;  they  are  good  reflectors — much  heat 
turns  away  from  them.  I  found  very  many  such  instances^ 
and  none  where  a  contradiction  appears. 

Under  the  guidance  of  this  theory  many  new  facts  are 
discovered,  and  many  old  ones  verified.  I  will  mention  a 
few  facts.  Gravity  and  inertia  have  an  equal  attraction 
for  all  kinds  of  matter.  All  the  other  forces  have  unequal 
degrees  of  attraction  for  different  substances.  Heat  and 
light  have  an  attraction  for  some  substances,  and  a  repul- 
sion for  others.  Some  portions  of  the  same  beam  of  light 
and  heat  have  an  attraction,  and  other  portions  a  repul- 
sion, for  the  same  substance.  The  chemical  force  is  an 
attractive  force  only.  The  diflerence  in  quantity  of  this 
force  in  different  substances  determines  their  relative  at- 
traction for  each  other; — those  two  substances  which  have 
most  of  this  force  in  them  are  attracted  together  most 
strongly.  (The  opinion  here  expressed  is  largely  h3'po- 
thetical,  it  not  having  been  fully  tested  by  experiment.) 
There  are,  however,  many  circumstances  which  modify 
this  rule  in  practical  u^^e;  such  as  electrical  state,  distance, 
solution,  chemical  bonds,  or  relative  position  of  the  atoms 
to  each  other,  and  so  forth. 

Some  of  the  forces  are  simple,  and  others  compound. 
There  are  two  kinds  of  electricity,  and  two  kinds  of  mng- 


KINDS   OF   LIGHT. 


153 


netism.  As  this  is  the  common  opinion  of  scientists  of 
the  present  day,  I  need  say  no  more  about  it.  There  are 
at  least  three  kinds  of  heat,  distiguished  from  each  other 
by  different  degrees  of  attraction  and  repulsion  for  differ- 
ent substances.  They  are  discovered  and  separated  from 
each  other  by  reflection,  absorption,  and  transmission  in 
the  same  substance.  I^et  a  beam  of  radiant  heat  fall  upon 
the  surface  of  water.  Part  of  it  is  reflec;ted  away  from  that 
surface;  that  is  one  kind  of  heat;  part  of  it  stops  in  the 
water  and  raises  its  temperature  ;  that  is  another  kind  of 
heat;  and  part  of  it  passes  through  the  water;  that  is 
another  kind  of  heat.  That  this  is  a  separation  of  par- 
ticular specific  kinds  of  heat  appears  from  the  following 
fact:  The  heat  which  has  passed  through  water  will  pass 
through  ice  without  melting  it  or  raising  its  temperature ; 
all  the  heat  which  has  an  attraction  for  water  in  any  form 
has  stopped  in  the  water,  so  that  none  of  it  stops  in  the 
ice  to  warm  it.  .^^ 

There  are  three  kinds  of  light  discovered  an3  separated 
in  the  same  manner.  Let  a  beam  of  light  fall  obliquely 
upon  a  plate  of  glass ;  part  is  reflected  from  the  surface  of 
the  glass ;  part  is  absorbed  in  it,  and  part  passes  through 
it.  The  first  is  a  kind  of  light  which  has  a  repulsion  for 
the  glass ;  hence  it  turns  and  flies  away.  The  second  is  a 
kind  of  light  which  has  so  strong  an  attraction  for  the 
glass  that  it  clings  to  it  and  remains  in  it;  the  third  is  a 
kind  of  light  which  has  not  sufficient  repulsion  for  the 
glass  to  turn  it  away,  nor  sufficient  attraction  for  the 
glass  to  stop  it,  so  it  goes  on  through.  If  the  light  strikes 
the  glass  at  a  very  acute  angle  with  its  surface,  more  of 
the  light  will  fly  away  from  it.  If  its  angle  with  the  sur- 
face is  obtuse,  more  of  it  will  be  by  its  velocity  and  tend- 
ency to  straight  forward  motion  driven  through,  even 
some  which  has  sufficient  repulsion  for  the  glass  to  at 
other  angles  turn  it  away.     If  the  light  strikes  the  surface 


154 


THE   SOLUTION. 


of  the  glass  at  a  certain  angle,  the  light  separated  from 
the  beam  by  reflection  is  what  is  called  polarized  light. 
The  same  portion  of  the  light  is  separated  from  the  common 
beam  by  refraction  in  plates  of  tourmaline,  Iceland  spar, 
and  some  other  substances.  I  see  no  necessity  for  suppos- 
ing that  any  change  is  effected  by  these  means  in  the  nature 
of  the  light.  I  think  all  the  facts  involved  can  be  ex- 
plained by  understanding  that  this  is  merely  a  separation 
from  the  common  beam  of  a  certain  kind  of  light.  Polar- 
ized light,  as  it  is  called,  is,  then,  only  a  certain  kind  of 
light  which  exists  in  the  common  ray,  but  which  is  sep- 
arated from  the  other  kinds  by  these  means. 

There  are  also  three  or  more  kinds  of  light  which  are 
distinguished  from  each  other  by  color.  Red  light  is 
one  kind  of  light,  blue  is  another  kind,  etc.  Color  in 
bodies  is  explained  by  different  degrees  of  attraction  and 
repulsion  which  the  different  color  kinds  of  light  have 
for  different  substances.  For  one  body  all  the  light  in 
the  beam  has  an  attraction,  except  the  red  rays;  all  the 
other  rays  pass  into  the  body  and  remain  there;  the  red 
rays,  having  a  repulsion  for  that  matter,  turn  and  fly  away 
from  it,  and  we  call  it  a  red  body.  The  same  facts  apply 
to  the  explanation  of  the  other  colors. 

This  theory  changes  our  concepts  respecting  many  nat- 
ural processes,  and  the  meaning  of  the  words  by  which 
they  are  designated.  Thus  the  words  conduction,  re- 
flection, refraction,  transmission  etc.,  imply  that  the  in- 
volved matter  is  the  doer,  whereas  matter  never  does  any- 
thing; the  forces  are  the  only  actors.  No  conductor  is 
necessar>^  for  heat  or  electricity.  Heat  passes  away  from 
a  hot  body  much  more  rapidly  in  a  vacuum  than  in  the 
air.  Radiated  heat  moves  much  more  rapidly  than  con- 
ducted heat.  Heat  and  light  have  a  natural  mode  of  mo- 
tion, which  is  in  straight  lines  through  space,  at  a  cer- 
tain definite  and  fixed  and  great  velocity.     All  forms  of 


NO  CONDUCTORS   NEEDED.  155 

:matter  are   more  or  less  obstruction  to  them,  and  retard 
ttheir  velocity  more  or  less.     They  are  retarded   by  their 
.attraction  for  that    matter.      For  some  substances  they 
have  a  stronger  attraction,  and  are  retarded  more;  and  for 
^some  substances  their  attraction  is  so  great  that  they  stop 
in  it,  attaching  themselves  to  it.     Bodies  are  opaque  to 
light',  not  because  the  light  cannot  pass  through  them,  but 
"because  the  light  has  so  strong  an  attraction  for  them  that 
it  stops  in  them  and  remains  attached  to  them.     It  is  not 
that  certain  substances  are  good  conductors  of  heat,  but 
ras  heat  has  less  attraction  for  them,  it  is  retarded  less  in 
its  passage  through  them.     Electricity  needs  no  conduc- 
tor; through   perfectly  empty   space   it   would  pass  more 
freely  and  rapidly  than  through  any  substance.  Through 
the  partial  vacuum  which  man  can  make  it  passes  much 
freer  and  farther  between  the  electrodes  than  through  the 
air.     The  purpose  of  conductors  is  to  make  an  opening 
through  the  air,  which  is  an  absolute  obstruction  to  elec- 
tricity.   The  combined  electricity  is  so  strongly  attached 
to  some  substances  that  it  cannot  be  decomposed  in  them 
nor  moved  from  them  by  the  process  of  induction;  hence 
there  can  be  no  transmission  through  them.     Such  sub- 
stances are  called  non-conductors.     The  combined  elec- 
tricity in  other  substances  is  more  loosley  joined  to  them 
—has   a   weaker  attraction   for  them— and   any   decom- 
posed  portion  of  electricity  near   them,  decomposes  the 
•electricity  in  them,  drawing  the  opposite  kind  toward  it, 
and  pushing  its  own  kind  away  from  it.     Then  there  are 
portions  of  decomposed  electricity  in  that  end  of  the  con- 
-ductor.     These  separated  portions  in  the  conductor  de- 
<compose  the  electricity  in  the  contiguous  part  of  the  con- 
ductor, or  wire,  and  that  decomposes  a  portion  further  on, 
iand  that  a  portion  still   further  on,  and  so  on  through  the 
whole  length  of  the  wire,  whatever  be  its  length.     If  the 
jstarting   electricity  is  positive,    the  negative   electricity 


156  THE  SOLUTION. 

throup:h  the  whole  length  of  the  wire  is  shifted  one  step 
toward  that  end  of  the  wire,  and  the  positive  electricity 
through  the  whole  length  of  the  wire  is  shifted  one  step 
toward  the  other  end  of  the  wire;  the  result  is  that  there 
is  some  free  positive  electridity  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire 
to  be  utilized.  If  the  circuit  is  completed,  and  the  pro- 
cess continued,  the  results  are  a  current  of  positive  elec- 
tricity flowing  in  one  direction,  and  a  current  of  negative 
electricity  flowing  in  the  opposite  direction.  These  are 
the  facts  as  demonstrated  by  experiment;  and  for  these 
facts,  these  two  currents  of  electricity  in  oppsite  direc- 
tions, the  physical  theory  of  electricity  has  no  explana- 
tion. 

There  are  many  other  natural  phenomena  for  which 
the  physical  theory  of  the  forces  can  give  no  explanation, 
which  are  perfectly  explained  by  this. 

Reflection  of  heat  and  light  is  explained  b}^  supposing 
that  the  portions  of  heat  and  light  which  are  reflected — 
as  it  is  called — have  a  repulsion  for  the  bodies  from 
which  they  fly  away.  For  the  substances  in  which  they 
are  absorbed,  they  have  an  attraction.  If  that  attrac- 
tion is  sufficiently  strong  to  overcome  their  disposition  to 
move  forward  in  straight  lines,  they  stop  there  perma- 
nently, and  remain  there  insensible  to  us,  become  latent. 
It  was  long  ago  thought  that  heat  did  thus  go  into  a 
state  of  latency;  it  appears  to  be  quite  as  common  a  fact 
with  light.  We  too  might  talk  about  storing  up  the  sun- 
beams of  the  geological  ages  in  the  coal  beds,  not  storing 
energy,  a  property,  which  is  nonsense;  but  storing  up  the 
substances  which  we  call  light  and  heat.  When  the  attrac- 
tion of  heat  and  light  for  the  material  substances  is  such 
as  to  hold  them  less  strongly,  they  slowly  move  away 
from  those  bodies, assume  their  natural  mode  of  motion,  and 
become  sensible  to  us.  Heat  is  sensible  to  us,  and  dis- 
coverable by  us,  only  when  it  leaves  other  bodies  and  en- 


REFRACTION.  1 57 

ters  our  bodies.  This  is  called  radiation.  When  the 
disposition  to  move  forward  in  straight  lines  overcomes 
its  attraction  to  the  bodies,  heat  moves  away  from  those 
bodies.  This  is  a  very  familiar  fact  in  reference  to  heat. 
Some  cases  of  it  in  light  are  known.  Phosphorus  is  of- 
ten luminous  without  combustion.  The  firefly,  the  glow 
worm,  some  kinds  of  fish,  and  sea  insects,  and  luminous 
paint,  are  instances  of  luminosity  without  combustion. 

These  are  cases  where  the  latent  light  in  bodies  passes 
away  frop  them  without  change  in  temperature.  When 
substances  are  heated  to  a  certain  temperature,  light 
ceases  to  be  bound  by  its  attraction  to  them,  and  it  bursts 
away  from  them  in  floods,  and  commences  its  nonnal 
flight. 

Refraction  is  the  result  of  an  attraction  for  the  sub- 
stance which  is  sufficient  to  retard,  but  not  stop,  the 
light  and  heat.  When  a  beam  of  light  strikes  obliquely 
upon  the  surface  of  a  plate  of  glass  which  has  parallel 
surfaces,  the  lower  edge  of  the  beam  touches  the  glass 
first  and  is  retarded  first,  and  the  other  portions  of  the 
beam  in  succession,  and  the  result  is  that  the  face  of  the 
beam  is  turned  downward.  When  it  emerges  from  the 
glass,  the  lower  side  of  the  beam  emerges  first,  and  re- 
sumes its  normal  velocity  first,  and  other  portions  of  the 
beam  in  succession,  and  the  result  is  that  the  direction  of 
the  beam  is  restored  to  its  original.  This  is  the  ex- 
planation given  in  the  physical  theory;  but  the  reason  of 
its  return  to  its  former  direction  here — its  normal  velocity 
— is  far  more  satisfactory  than  that  given  in  the  physical 
theory. 

As  I  have  declared  that  the  physical  theory  of  the  forces 
is  impossible  because  the  work  is  done  through  inter- 
vals of  space,  it  is  perhaps  incumbent  upon  me  to  explain 
how  this  difficulty  is  obviated  in  this  theory.  Gravity 
extends  in  unbroken  continuity  through  all  the  region  of 


1^8  THE   SOI.UTION. 

our  solar  system,  it  may  through  all  the  stellar  space.. 
But  we  do  not  know  that  the  different  solar  systems  have- 
any  attractive  power  upon  each  other,  although  it  is  sup- 
posed they  have. 

In  the  supposition  of  a  material  ether  it  was  necessary 
to  extend  it  to  all  suns  from  whence  light  comes  to  us. 
In  this  theory  the  immaterial  substance  which  we  calli 
gravity,  may  extend  to  only  the  limits  of  each  solar  sys- 
tem, binding  and  holding  all  its  members  together,  but. 
not  reaching  to  other  systems.     It  is  certainly  a  no  wilder 
supposition  to  suppose  that  an  immaterial  substance  fills, 
all  this  space,  than  to  suppose  that  a   material  substance 
does,  while   this  obviates  all  the  objections  of  its  imcom- 
petency,  and  its  obstruction  to  the  passing  worlds. 

Molecular  repulsion,  while  it  centers  in  the  molecule  as, 
a    nucleus   from    which    it   radiates,  extends    a    certain 
distance   beyond  the  limits  of  the   molecule  and  pushes, 
others  away  from  it.     Magnetism  and  electricity,  the  two 
kinds  united  together,  fill  all  bodies.     A  magnet  decom- 
poses the  magnetism  of  the  intervening  air,  and  it  prob- 
ably extends  to  a  limited  distance  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  magnet,  and  outside  of  the  limits  of  the  molecules  of 
air,  so  as  to  make  it  continuous  magnetic  substance  from 
one  magnet  to  another.     All  electrical  attractions  and  re- 
pulsions are  accomplished  through  nonconductors.     The 
electricity  of  the  air,  and  other  nonconductors  cannot  be 
decomposed  by  other  electricity;  but  it  appears  to  use  the 
electricity  of  the  intervening  nonconductor  to  push  and 
pull  the  electricity  of  a  body  from  which  it  is  separated 
by  that  nonconductor.     At   all   events,  in   the  cases    of 
both  magnetism  and  electricity,  they  fill  all  the  space  be- 
tween the  body  where  the  action  is,  and  the  body  where 
the  effect  appears,  and  we  are  not  guilty  of  the  absurdity 
of  having  substance  doing  where  it  is  not. 


INVESTIGATION   INVITED. 


159 


I  present  here  these  few  hints  merely  as  indications  of 
the  explanations  which  are    possible   under  this   theory. 
In  going  over  the  whole  field,  I  find  no  natural  phenome- 
na that  are  not  as  well  explained  as  by  the  physical  theory, 
hundreds  of  phenomena   that  are  better  explained  by  it, 
and  many  others  that  this  will  explain  which  that  cannot. 
Then  we  must  remember  that  the  effort  of  explanation  of 
phenomena    under  the  physical  theory  has  been  prose- 
cuted for  a  hundred  years,   by  all  the  most  learned  and 
able  scientists  of  the  age,  while  this  has  been  but  briefly 
considered  by  only  one,  and  that  one  claims  nothing  but 
an  ordinary  degree  of  common  sense.     I  invite  the  sever- 
est testing  by  practical  scientists;  but  if  they  commence 
their  investigations  by   ignoring  and  shutting  out  meta- 
physics—absolute truths— I   shall   claim   to   have   a  far 
higher  source   of  information  than  they,  and  a  far  more 

conclusive  test  of  truth.     Or  if  they  claim  to  know  only 

appearances,  I  shall  claim  to  have  a  much  more  intimate 

aquaintance  with  things  than  they  have. 

In  the  next  chapter  we  will,  from  the  standpoint  to 

which  we  have  now  attained,  consider  the  causal  relation 

as  it  exists  in  nature. 


II 


CHAPTER  XI. 
Causes  in  Nature. 

In  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  avoided  the  use  of  the 
word  cause.  I  have  done  so  because  the  word  lias  come 
to  have  so  many  significations  that  it  suggests  no  defi- 
nite thought  to  the  mind.  I  have  substituted  the  word 
doer  as  the  name  of  Aristotle's  efficient  cause.  If  we  use 
any  other  word  instead  of  cause  while  discussing  the 
causal  relation,  it  may  not  be  recognized  as  that  which 
others  mean  by  the  causal  relation.  We  use  the  word  as 
synonymous  with  doer,  and  define  it  as  follows:  A  cause 
is  that  which  energizes  to  produce  motion  or  effect 
change.  These  words  also  define  doer,  and  because  of 
the  uncertainty  in  the  meaning  of  the  word  cause,  I  think 
it  better  generally  to  use  the  former  word.  However 
many  meanings  we  may  attach  to  the  word  cause,  in  con- 
sidering the  causal  relation  we  can  mean  only  Aristotle's 
efficient  cause,  or  a  doer,  or  that  which  energizes  to  pro- 
duce the  effect. 

Mr.  Hume  said  respecting  causes:  "It  is  impossible  to 
point  to  any  one  quality  which  universally  belongs  to  all 
beings,  and  gives  them  a  title  to  that  denomination." 
This  is  true  if  we  take  the  word  cause  in  all  the  dozen 
meanings  which  have  been  attached  to  it.  But  if  we  lim- 
it it  as  above,  use  it  in  the  sense  of  doer,  that  which  en- 
ergizes, it  is  not  true.  We  can  say,  a  cause  possesses  the 
property  of  energy,  and  nothing  else  in  the  universe  does 


CAUSES   POSSESS   ENERGY. 


i6i 


ti  ' 


possess  that  property.  All  things  in  the  universe  are 
thus  at  once  classified  into  causes  and  not  causes.  All 
-existences  which  possess  the  property  of  energy  are 
causes;  and  all  things  in  the  universe  which  do  not 
possess  the  property  of  energ}^  are  not  causes.  There 
is  never  any  crossing  of  the  line  which  separates  causes 
from  non-causes.  Nothing  that  is  not  now  included  in 
the  class  causes  can  ever  be  made  to  become  a  cause.  No 
such  process  as  imparting  energy  to  a  body,  or  of  transfer- 
ing  energy  from  one  body  to  another,  is  possible.  Things 
that  were  created  causes  remain  such  through  all  the  ages. 
Things  that  were  not  created  causes  can  never  become 
such  by  any  agency  less  than  creative  power.  Man 
can  never  bestow  a  property,  or  create  a  property,  any 
more  than  he  can  create  a  substance. 

This  single  classification  clears  away  at  once  much  of 
the  fog  that  has  enveloped  this  subject.  Everything  that 
possesses  the  property  of  energy  is  a  cause.  Is  this  thing 
a  cause  ?  Does  it  possess  the  property  of  energy  ?  That 
question  may  be  determined  by  experiment,  or  by  an  ex- 
amination of  facts.  If  it  does  not  possess  the  property  of  en- 
ergy, it  is  not  a  cause,  and  never  can  become  a  cause.  In 
ascertaining  the  cause  or  causes  of  any  change  or  phe- 
nomenon, all  we  have  to  do  is  to  discover  what  things 
connected  with  the  phenomenon  possess  and  exert  energy 
in  that  case.  Nothing  can  produce  motion  or  effect  change 
but  by  the  exertion  of  energy.  Nothing  can  exert  energy 
that  does  not  possess  it.  Nothing  can  be  a  cause  of  mo- 
tion or  change  that  does  not  possess  the  property  of  en- 
<irgy. 

We  may  limit  our  classification  still  further.  Nothing 
but  substance  can  do.  Then  all  doers,  all  causes,  are 
substance.  If  the  property  of  energy  is  involved  in  all 
causation,  we  know  that  that  property  cannot  exist  ex- 
cept in  connection  with  substance.     The  substance  is  the 


ill 


162  CAUSES   IN   NATURE. 

doer  or  cause.  Every  cause  is  something  which  of  itself 
occupies  space.  Then  no  property,  or  attribute,  or  rela- 
tion, or  event,  or  phenomenon,  can  be  a  doer  or  cause. 

We  have  found  in  our  examination  of  phenomena  in 
preceding  pages  that  those  things  which  possess  the  prop- 
erty of  energy  do  not  possess  the  properties  of  weight, 
inertia,  and  impenetrability.  We  have  found  the  prop- 
erty of  energy  uniformly  associated  with  imponderability 
and  penetrability,  never  with  ponderability  and  impene- 
trability. From  these  facts  we  are  able  to  make  these  gen- 
eralizations: All  causes  are  immaterial  substance;  ma- 
terial substance  is  never  a  cause  or  doer.  These  are  gen- 
eralizations from  observed  facts;  and,  as  there  are  found 
no  exceptions  to  them,  they  are  generalized  universals. 

And  now,  is  this  definition  of  cause  the  true  expression 
of  the  causal  relation,  as  it  appears  in  our  consciousness  ? 
All  philosophers  of  every  school  admit  energizers  among 
the  causes,  but  some  of  them  admit  many  other  things. 
All  mankind  look  upon  things  as  causes  when  they  en- 
ergize to  produce  eiFects.  The  word  doer  is  by  all  limited 
to  such.  We  learn  the  process  of  doing  by  our  exper- 
ience as  doers.  Every  man  calls  himself  a  cause  when 
he  energizes  and  moves  something.  We  know  by  our 
experience  that  we  are  thus  related  to  the  effect.  We 
know  that  if  we  move  our  bodies,  or  move  any  matter 
outside  of  our  bodies,  or  effect  any  change  w^hatever  in 
things  around  us,  we  do  it  by  the  exertion  of  energy ,  and 
that  without  the  exertion  of  energy  we  do  nothing,  effect 
nothing,  cause  nothing.  The  essential,  always  present 
element  in  our  consciousness  of  ourselves  as  causes  is  en- 
ergizing. We  know  nothing  about  energy,  or  energizing, 
or  causation,  in  things  entirely  objective  to  us,  except  by 
transferring  this  subjective  knowledge  to  objeclive  things. 
We  know  that  objective  things  which  move  us,  exert 
energy   upon   us.     We  can  have  no   conception  of  our- 


OBJECTIVE   CAUSES.  1 65 

selves  as  causes,  nor  of  objective  things  as  doers,  causes, 
without  including  energizing  as   one   of  the  elements  of 
that  conception. 

From  our  experience  of  ourselves  as  causes,   and  from 
our  experience  when  external  things  move  us,  we  con- 
clude that  energizing  is  always  present,  and  is  always 'the 
nexus  between  cause  and  effect  in  objective  natural  phe- 
nomena, when  both  the  cause  and  the  effect  are  abjective 
to  us.     But  this  correspondence  between  the  subjective 
and  objective  causative  process  need  not  here  be  admitted 
as  an  a  priori  fact.     We  have  learned,  by  the  action  of 
objective  things  upon  as,  and  by  our  action  upon  them, 
when,  and    in  what  circumstances,  motion,    effects    are 
produced.     We  have  thus  the  mode  of  the  causative  pro- 
cess in  our  minds.     Now  we  can  go  out  among  objective 
phenomena  with  this  subjective  mode  fixed  in  our  minds, 
and  what  we  find  in  objective  nature  which  corresponds 
with  this  mode  we  will  classify  under  it.     As  we  energize 
when  we  are  causes,  as  things  energize   upon  us  w^hen 
they  move  us,  we  will  classify  all  things  we  find  in  ob- 
jective nature  which   energize,  or  possess  the  property  of 
energy,  under  the  name  causes.      We  will  not  here  argue 
from  the  subjective  mode  that  such  are  the  facts  in  ob- 
jective nature;  but  what  w^e  find  by  observation  to  actually 
correspond  with  this  subjective  mode,  w^e  wdll  classify  un- 
der it.     Then  if  we  will  go  to  work  and  ascertain  what 
does  and  what  does  not  possess  and  exert  energy,  we  can 
make  our  classification  complete. 

This  is  what  we  have  been  endeavoring  to  do  in  pre- 
ceding pages;  and  w^e  think  we  have  found  it  a  plain  and 
evident  fact  that  nothing  on  earth  possesses  the  property  of 
energy  but  immaterial  substance,  and  that  therefore  im- 
material substances  are  the  only  doers,  causes,  in  nature. 
If  others  are  not  prepared  to  admit  this,  if  they  think  that 
some  material  substances  possess  and  exert  energy,   they 


i 


164 


CAUSES   IN  NATURE. 


would  place  such  in  the  class  causes.  Whatever  we  find 
that  possesses  and  exerts  energy  belongs  to  the  class 
causes,  and  everything  else  is  excluded.  I  am  confident, 
however,  that  nothing  on  earth  does  possess  and  exert 
energy  but  immaterial  substances.  The  definition  of  cause 
which  we  have  given  agrees  with  our  intuition  of  cause, 
and  our  experience  of  causation,  and  as  we  know  nothing 
of  any  other  causal  process,  these  should  regulate  and 
determine  our  classification  of  causes,  and  nothing  in  ob- 
jective nature  should  be  called  a  cause  that  does  not  agree 
with  our  experience  of  causation. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  formulate  the  causal  relation,  and 
express  it  in  an  invariable,  universal,  and  infallible  for- 
mula, applicable  to  all  things,  in  all  space,  and  in  all  time. 
That  formula  is  this; 

Cause;  Energizing;  Effect. 

The  necessary  connecting  link  between  cause  and  efiect, 
so  often  demanded,  is  here  supplied,  and  the  chasm  which 
was  the  central  point  of  Hume's  destructive  criticism  is 
bridged.  He  said  that  if  the  "necessary  connection"  be- 
tween cause  and  effect  can  be  shown,  "I  shall  frankly  give 
up  the  entire  controversy."  The  necessary  connection  is 
the  energizing  of  the  cause  to  produce  the  effect.  It  is  a 
necessary  connection.  The  energizing  must  be  there,  or 
else  the  causal  relation  is  not  there,  and  the  two  do  not 
stand  in  the  relation  to  each  other  of  cause  and  efiect. 

We  will  test  this  by  a  table  of  examples  in  which  the 
causal  relation  is  absent. 

Water; ;  ice. 

Morning; :  noon. 

Day; ;  night. 


Spring  ;- 
Clouds  ;- 
Motion  ;- 


•;  summer. 

-;  rain. 

-;  another  motion. 


Law;- 


FAI.SE   SYSTEMS. 

;  phenomena. 


165 


;  development. 


Natural  selection; 

Homogeneous; ;  heterogeneous. 

Incoherent; ;  coherent. 

Indefinite; ;  definite. 

Differentiation; ;  a  new  being. 

Sequence  of  events; ;  other  events. 

Survival  of  the  fittest; ;  improvement. 

Course  of  nature  yesterday; ;  course  of 

nature  to-day. 

Matter; ;  another  form  of  matter. 

In  this  table  the  entire  system  of  the  physical  philoso- 
phy of  positivism  is  represented.  Each  one  of  many  of 
these  is  the  basis  and  material  out  of  which  theories  have 
been  constructed.  Here  is  the  entire  philosophy  of  evo- 
lution. They  are  science  constructed  according  lo  the 
Comtean  philosophy.  The  causal  relation  is  wanting  in 
all  these  cases.  The  word  energizing  cannot  be  placed 
in  the  blank  between  the  other  two  members  in  any  one  of 
these  statements.  The  doers  are  left  entirely  out  of  all 
these  statements,  and  out  of  all  such  philosophy,  and  we 
have  only  a  succession  of  existences.  In  these  there  is 
no  attempt  to  supply  doers.  It  is  an  ignoring  of 
the  demand  for  doers.  Perhaps  some  men  are  satisfied 
with  it.  There  is  a  desperate  effort  made  in  these  days  to 
keep  people  from  looking  beneath  the  surface  of  things,  as 
is  seen  in  the  oft  repeated  sneer  at  metaphysics. 

In  another  system  of  physical  philosophy  feints  are 
made  at  supplying  doers,  but  they  only  reach  to  doing;, 
and  to  certain  classes  of  doings  substantive  names  are 
given,  and  the  demand  for  doers  is  cheated  by  an  illusion. 
In  this  philosophy  there  is  energizing  and  effects,  but 
no  energizer,  no  thing  which  energizes.  The  formulas 
which  express  such  philosophy  are: 
;  doing  ;  effects. 


i'! 


a 66  CAUSES   IN    NATURE. 

;  momentum  ;  motion. 

;  vis  viva  ;  change. 

;  dynamic  energy;  phenomena;  and  all  of 

these  are  simply ;energizing;  effects. 

Men  have  imposed  upon  themselves  and  others  by  sup- 
posing that  dynamic  energy-  was  something  that  can  pass 
from  one  body  to  another,  an  endless  stream  flowing  on 
and  on,  an  endless  stream  of  doing  without  any  doer. 
There  is  no  doing  without  a  doer,  no  energizing  without 
an  energizer;  and  as  soon  as  the  doer  ceases  to  energize, 
the  doing  ends. 

The  illusion  which  has  made  this  system  of  philosophy 
to  appear  satisfactory  to  many  persons  results  from  the 
practice  of  using  words  in  the  substantive,  instead  of  the 
participial  form — energy,  dynamic  energy,  kinetic  energ>', 
momentum,  instead  of  energizing.  Thus  the  demand  for 
a  substantive  cause  seemed  to  be  satisfied.  This  was  an 
illusion.  Motion,  energ>^  dynamic  energy,  and  momen- 
tum, are  not  substances.  Energy-  is  a  property.  Dynamic 
energy  and  momentum  are  the  energizing  of  some  sub- 
stance. Motion  is  an  effect  of  energizing.  These  are  never 
doers  or  causes.  They  can  never  be  placed  as  the  first  term 
in  the  formula.  D3'namic  energy  and  momentum  must  be 
placed  in  the  middle  term;  and  any  doctrine,  or  theory,  or 
system  of  philosophy,  which  is  built  upon  them  as  causes, 
omits  the  cause  altogether,  and  has  the  first  term  of  the 
formula  blank,  as  in  the  last  foregoing  table.  The  phil- 
osophy represented  by  this  table  includes  the  dynamic 
theory  of  matter,  all  explanations  of  phenomena  where  en- 
ergy and  dynamic  energy  are  represented  as  the  doers,  the 
dynamic  theory  of  heat,  and  the  undulatory  theory  of  light. 
Heat  is  molecular  motion.  What  moves  the  molecules? 
Molecules  never  move  themselves.  Molecules  never 
move  except  as  they  are  moved  by  something.  Self-per- 
petual motion  of  molecules  in  any  case  or  in  any  circuni- 


. 


INCORRECT   VIEWS.  1 67 

stances  is  an  impossibility.  The  condition  of  perpetual 
motion  from  the  force  of  inertia  is  without  obstruction, 
and  in  straight  lines,  and  no  matter  moves  in  the  vicinity 
of  other  matter  without  being  obstructed  by  some  of  the 
forces  in  that  other  matter. 

The  first  term  in  the  formula  must  always  be  a  doer. 
Nothing  but  substance  can  do.  Then  the  first  term  must 
always  be  the  name  of  some  substance.  If  then  we  ar- 
range the  formula,  and  place  in  the  first  term  the  name  of 
something  which  we  have  supposed  to  be  the  cause,  and 
find  it  to  be  a  property,  or  an  attribute,  or  a  relation,  we 
may  know  that  we  have  not  specified  the  cause.  The  ab- 
.surdity  of  the  following  statements  is  seen  at  a  glance. 

Transparency;  energizing;  transmission  of  light. 

Weight;    energizing;    breaking  down  of  a  house. 

A  fall;  energizing;  heat. 

Neither  transparency,  weight,  or  a  fall  can  energize. 
"Yet  there  is  just  as  much  propriety  in  saying  that  weight 
ibreaks  down  a  house,  or  that  a  fall  produces  heat,  as  in 
saying  that  dynamic  energy  does  anything.  Weight, 
.falling,  and  the  dynamic  energy  of  a  falling  body,  are 
ithe  energizing  of  gravity,  and  one  is  just  as  much  a 
•cause  as  the  other. 

The  first  term  must  always  be  the  name  of  some  sub- 
:Stance  which  possess  the  property  of  energy.  We  have 
.reached  the  conclusion  that  material  substance,  matter, 
mever  possesses  the  property  of  energy.  Then  the  first 
.term  must  always  be  the  name  of  some  immaterial  sub- 
.stance.  Then  the  work  of  separating  out  and  ascertain- 
ing the  causes  in  natural  phenomena  is  simple  and  easy. 
'The  one  of  the  class  of  causes  which  energizes  in  the 
production  of  a  certain  phenomenon  is  the  cause  in  that 
<case;  or  if  more  than  one  energizes  to  produce  it,  they  are 
its  causes.  All  other  things  and  circumstances  involved 
in  Ihat  phenomenon,  even  though  without  them  it  could 


1 68 


CAUSES   IN   NATURE. 


not  be,  are  only  conditions  of  its  occurence.  We  suppose 
that  all  the  doers  in  inorganic  nature  have  been  discov- 
ered and  named.  They  are  the  only  causes  in  inorganic 
nature.  Then  in  *ny  statement  respecting  any  inorganic 
natural  pheonmenon,  one  or  more  of  those  known 
doers  must  be  the  first  term.  All  phenomena  occurring  in 
inorganic  nature  can  be  thus  expressed,  and  the  first 
term  will  in  every  case  be  one  or  more  of  the  inorganic 
forces.  Thus  the  philosophy  of  causes  becomes  the  sim- 
plest department  of  the  philosophy  of  science. 

The  middle  term  of  the  formula  must  always  be  en- 
ergizing, or  some  word  which  is  the  name  of  some  form  of 
energizing.  No  motion,  no  change,  no  effect  whatever,  in 
matter  can  be  produced   without   energizing.      Momen- 
tum is  the  name  given  to  the  energizing  of  inertia  in  mov- 
ing matter.      Dynamic  energy  is  the  energizing  of  any 
force  in  or  on  a  moving  body.     These  words,  then,  are 
names  of  certain  classes  of  energizings.     If  either  of  these 
words    is   used    in   the    formula,    it    must  be  placed  in 
the  middle  term,  and  it  may  be  there  placed  with  or  with- 
out the  word  energizing.     Momentum  is  not  an  effect  of 
the  energizing  of  inertia,  it  is  the  energizing  of  inertia. 
Dynamic  energy  is  not  an  effect  of  the  energizing  of  some 
force;  it  is  the  energizing  of  some  force. 

If  gravity  and  inertia  should  both  cease  at  once  to  ener- 
gize in  a  falling  body,  all  its  dynamic  energy  would  be 
gone. 

In  the  third  term  of  the  formula  any  effect  may  be 
placed.  While,  according  to  this  exposition,  the  first  and 
second  term— the  cause  and  the  nexus— are  so  simple  and 
easily  ascertained,  the  effects  are  more  complicated.. 
Without  attempting  any  classification  of  effects,  there  are 
some  differences  which  we  must  notice.  Some  effects  are 
done,  finished,  and  the  force  which  produced  them  has- 
ceased  to  energize  in  their  production.    Such  are  a  broken. 


KINDS   OF   EFFECTS.  1 69 

dish,  a  tree  shattered  by  lightning,  an  exploded  boiler,  a 
hole  in  a  ship  made  by  a  cannon  ball, — any  change 
effected  by  any  force  in  the  shape,  size,  or  structure  of 
bodies,  or  in  their  direction  or  distance  from  each  other 
which  remains  permanent  after  the  force  which  effected 
the  change  has  ceased  to  operate  upon  the  matter, — these 
constitute  one  class  of  effects. 

Other  effects  are  continued  by  the  continued  energizing 
of  their  cause  or  causes.  Such  is  motion,  all  motion  in 
material  bodies — matter  never  continues  in  motion  an 
instant  after  the  force  that  is  moving  it  ceases  to  energize 
to  move  it.  Such  are  molecules,  held  together  by  the 
continued  energizing  of  the  chemical  force.  Such  are 
masses,  held  together  by  the  constant  energizing  of  cohe- 
sion. Then  there  are  other  effects  which  are  the  con- 
ditions of  the  activity  of  other  forces;  such  as,  friction, 
concussion,  and  condensation,  as  conditions  of  the  activity 
of  heat;  high  temperature,  as  the  condition  of  the  activity  of 
light,  and  so  forth.  When  heat  is  made  apparent  by 
friction,  etc.,  it  is  not  produced;  the  heat  that  was  lying 
latent  in  the  matter,  is  made  to  become  sensible  and  mov- 
ing heat.  When  a  heated  body  is  made  to  become 
luminous,  the  Hght  is  not  produced,  but  the  hght  that  did 
lie  latent  in  the  matter,  is  made  to  become  sensible  or 
moving  light.  And  when  one  force  acts  upon  another 
force,  the  effect  may  be  the  activity  of  the  affected  force, 
or  its  action  in  a  particular  manner.  Electricity  acts  upon 
magnetism,  decomposes  it,  and  places  it  at  right  angles 
to  the  line  of  its  own  action.  Magnetism  does  the  same 
to  electricity.  Thus  the  effect  of  one  is  the  activity  of 
the  other,  and  its  action  in  a  particular  manner.  It  has 
always  been  customary  to  classify  causes  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  effects;  hence  the  general  classification  into 
inorganic  forces,  vegetable  forces,  animal  forces,  mental 
forces,  and  so  forth.     Mankind  have  already  found,  it  is 


lyo 


CAUSES    IN   NATURE. 


thought,  all  the  forces,  or  causes,  operating  in  inorganic 
nature,  and  named  them  individually.  There  are  ten, 
and  no  more,  in  the  present  state  of  science. 

We  here  introduce  a  table  containing  all  the  causes, 
operating  in  inorganic  nature,  with  some  effects  and  the 
nexus: 

Gravity;  energizing;  spheres,  falling  bodies,  etc. 
Inertia;  energizing;  persistent  rest,  perpetual  motion. 
Cohesion;  energizing;  masses,  elasticit}^  in  solids. 
Chemical  force;  energizing;  molecules,  compounds. 
Molecular  repulsion;  energizing;  gases,  vapors. 

Electricity;  energizing;  lightning,    thunder,  a  shat- 
tered tree. 
Magnetism;    energizing;  bodies  moved  and  held. 
Heat;  energizing;  steam  power,   expansion,  comfort, 

pain. 
I^ight;  energizing;  luminousness,  color,  conditions  of 
vision. 
Crystallizing  force;  energizing;  crystals,  crystalline  forms. 
We  see  that  the  word  energizing  as  the  necessar>^  con- 
nection between  the  cause  and  its  effect  can  be  introduced 
in  all  these  cases.     Of  course,  we  could  place  in  the  col- 
umn of  effects  any  effect  of  the  cause  we  pleased.     Oppo- 
site ever}^  one  of  these  causes  might  be  placed  as  an  effect 
some  form  of  motion.     All  rebounding  motion  from  elas- 
ticity in  solids  is  the  effect  of  cohesion;  and  the  energizing 
of  light  moves  itself. 

If  two  or  more  forces  cooperate  in  producing  an  effect, 
the  names  of  both  or  all  should  be  placed  in  the  first  term. 
Examples: — Gravity  and   inertia;    energizing;    orbital 
motion  of  the  planets. 

Heat  and  molecular  repulsion;  energizing;  bursting  of 
a  cannon. 

We  ])efore  stated  that  the   word  energizing,  and  any 
other  word  which  we  may  use  which  is  the  name  of  a  par- 


NO   COMPLICATION. 


171 


ticular  form  of  energizing,  should  be  placed  in  the  second 
term. 

Examples: — Inertia;  energizing,  momentum  of  a  can- 
aaon  ball;   demolished  house. 

Gravity;  energizing,  dynamic  energy  of  falling  water; 
sawed  lumber. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  complication  of  causes 
in  the  production  of  effects.  It  has  been  said  that  every 
effect  is  the  product  of  many  causes,  etc.  If  we  say  as  Sir 
Wm.  Hamilton  did:  "Everything  is  a  cause  without 
which  the  effect  could  not  be,"  of  course,  we  have  a  great 
complication  of  causes.  But  limit  the  word  cause  to  doers, 
energizers,  as  we  have  here  and  as  it  should  be,  and  all 
these  complications  disappear. 

Take  the  last  of  the  foregoing  examples.  The  proper- 
ties of  the  water  are  not  a  cause  of  its  falling.  The  fluid- 
ity of  the  water,  the  mobility  of  its  molecules  is  a  condi- 
tion of  its  falling.  If  it  w^as  a  solid,  gravity  could  not 
make  it  run  down  hill  and  fall.  The  construction  of  the 
mill,  the  form  of  the  machinery,  the  properties  of  the  saw, 
the  placing  of  the  log,  etc.,  are  all  conditions  in  the  pres- 
ence of  which  the  energizing  of  gravity  could  effect  these 
results.  Without  these  the  effect  would  not  be  produced, 
they  are  therefore  necessary  conditions,  but  only  that 
which  energizes  to  produce  the  effect  is  the  cause.  Nor 
does  the  energizing  of  the  man  in  building  the  mill  and 
placing  the  log  connect  the  man  with  the  sawed  lumber 
as  a  cause.  The  man  was  the  cause  of  the  mill,  and  of 
ihe  position  of  the  log,  but  not  of  the  lumber.  He  thus 
supplies  the  necessary  conditions  upon  which  gravity 
•could  effect  the  result. 

The  three  terms  in  our  formula  express  the  entire 
causal  relation,  in  all  its  extent  and  limits  in  every  possi- 
ble case.  In  no  case  is  that  which  is  expressed  in  the 
ifirst  term  produced  or  cau.sed.     In  no  case  is  that  which 


172 


CAUSES    IN   NATURE. 


is  expressed  by  the  third  term  a  cause.  Each  statement 
expresses  the  complete,  isolated  phenomonon,  with  no 
connecting  link  before  or  after  it.  No  finite  power  can 
produce  a  cause.  No  effect  can  become  a  cause,  or  pro- 
duce another  effect.  It  is  not  possible  to  place  the  name 
of  any  natural  agent  before  the  first  term  in  any  of  the 
statements  in  the  foregoing  table,  as  its  cause?  What 
can  be  placed  before  gravity  as  its  cause?  Nothing  below 
omnipotence  can  produce  or  create  gravity.  What  can  be 
placed  before  inertia  as  its  cause  ?  What  pan  produce  or 
create  inertia  ?  Nothing  can  create  or  add  to  the  quantity 
of  any  of  the  inorganic  forces.  Their  existence  is  uncaused, 
and,  their  quantity  unalterable  by  any  natural  agency. 
Their  properties  and  modes  are  uncaused  and  unalterable  by 
any  finite  power.  Nor  in  any  case  can  the  effect  of  one  of 
them  become  a  cause.  The  word  energizing  can  never  be 
written  after  the  third  term  in  any  statement  that  can  be 
made.  Place  the  word  energizing  after  any  statement  in 
any  of  the  foregoing  tables,  and  see  if  it  speaks  the  truth. 
How  would  energizing  go  after  sawed  lumber,  a  demol- 
ished house,  and  so  forth  ? 

There  are  cases  where  the  action  of  one  force  supplies 
the   condition   of  the   action  of  another  force;  as   when 
gravity  draws  a  body  to  the  earth  occasioning  the  action 
of  heat.     Let  us  state  this  in  a  formula. 
Gravity;  energizing;  a  falling  body. 
Heat;  energizing;  effects. 

The  word  energizing  cannot  be  placed  between  those 
two  statements.  A  falling  body  does  not  energize.  It  is 
the  energizing  of  gravity  which  moves  the  body  down- 
ward. Bodies  of  matter  never  energize.  The  energizing 
of  gravity  supplies  the  condition  of  the  activity  of  the 
heat  which  lies  latent  in  the  matter. 

.     As  I  said,  there  are  two  cases  where  forces  appear  to 
act  upon  each  other,  electricity  and  magnetism.     There 


EFFECTS   NEVER  CAUSES. 


173 


are  two  kinds  of  electricity,  and  two  kinds  of  magnetism. 
When  the  kinds  are  united  together,  they  appear  to  lie 
latent  in  matter,  and  we  cannot  even  discover  their  exis- 
tence. When  they  are  separated  they  begin  to  manifest 
phenomena.  Electricity  is  one  of  the  means  by  which 
the  two  kinds  of  magnetism  are  separated;  and  magnetism 
is  one  of  the  means  by  which  the  two  kinds  of  electricity 
are  separated.  These  two  forces,  not  only  decompose 
each  other,  but  each  places  the  other  at  right  angles  with 
itself.  Here,  if  anywhere,  the  effect  might  be  supposed  to 
be  a  cause.  Let  us  state  these  changes  in  a  formula: 
Electricity;  energizing;  decomposition  of  magnetism. 
Magnetism;  energizing;  effects. 

These  two  statements  cannot  be  connected  by  the  word 
•energizing.  Decomposition  of  magnetism  is  not  a  thing 
that  can  energize.  Or  if  we  should  make  the  third  term 
in  the  first  of  these  statements  action  of  magnetism,  in- 
stead of  decomposition  of  magnetism,  still  energizing 
could  not  be  placed  after  it — actio7i  of  anything  is  not  a 
thing  that  can  energize.  Electricity  may  cause  the  action 
of  magnetism,  but  it  cannot  cause  or  produce  magnetism. 

A  force  may  change  static  inertia  into  moving  inertia, 
it  may  cause  this  change  in  the  mode  of  inertia,  but  it 
cannot  cause  inertia.  Take  the  following  example.  Heat; 
energizing;  change  from  static  to  moving  inertia.  Iner- 
tia; energizing;  perpetual  motion. 

These  two  statements  cannot  be  connected  by  the  word 
energizing.  Change  from  static  to  moving  inertia  is  not  a 
substance  that  can  energize — change  energizing  would  be 
nonsense.  In  this  case  the  heat  does  not  produce  the 
inertia.  Inertia  is  not  the  effect  of  the  heat.  The  effect 
of  one  force  is  never  another  force.  No  new  force  nor 
new  portions  of  an  already  existing  force,  is  ever  pro- 
duced in  nature.  No  natural  cause  has  ever  yet  produced 
another  cause.     No  effect  is  ever  a  cause.     There  is  no 


174 


CAUSES   IN   NATURE. 


such  thing  as  a  chain  of  causes  and  effects  in  nature.  No 
cause  can  be  traced  to  anything  else  on  earth  as  its 
cause.  No  effect  can  ever  energize  to  produce  other  effects. 
Every  phenomenon  in  nature  can  be  expressed  in  these 
three  terms.  There  is  no  series  of  phenomena  that  will 
admit  of  more  than  these  three  terms — cause;  energizing; 
effect.  No  natural  cause  can  be  placed  before  the  first 
term.  The  word  energizing  can  never  be  placed  after 
the  third  term. 

Any  series  of  events,  how^ever  long  and  complicated, 
can  be  expressed  in  separate  statements  containing  the 
causal  relation,  and  no  two  of  those  statements  will  be 
connected  as  one  the  cause  of  the  other.  It  matters  not 
how  long  or  how  complicated  the  series  of  concatenated 
events,  the  doers  can  be  separated  out,  and  the  doings  of 
each  one  expressed  in  a  single  formula — cause;  energizing; 
effect — and  in  no  case  can  any  two  of  those  statements  be 
connected  together  by  the  word  energizing.  Thus,  when 
we  come  to  have  a  clear  and  correct  idea  of  the  causal 
relation,  and  the  word  cause  is  properly  limited,  all  this 
talk  about  endless  chains  of  causes  and  effects  vanishes 
into  nothing.  All  this  confusion,  running  through  the 
ages,  and  often  making  a  chaos  of  philosophy,  has  result- 
ed from  using  the  word  cause  in  so.  many  different  senses. 
If  we  will  use  it  in  the  single  sense  here  indicated,  or  if 
we  use  it  in  an}^  other  sense  use  also  a  qualifying  word 
with  it,  or  substitute  in  its  place  the  word  doer,  we  may 
avoid  all  this  confusion. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


Application  to  Organic  Phenomena. 

We  have  concluded  (i)  that  matter  is  never  an  actor  or 
doer.  (2)  That  the  inorganic  forces  are  immaterial  sub- 
stances. (3)  That  they  are  indestructible  and  unchange- 
able in  quantity.  (4)  That  one  of  them  is  never  trans- 
formed into  another.  (5)  That  they  are  not  created  or 
produced  by  any  natural  agency.  (6)  That  each  one  has 
its  own  naturally  uncaused  modes  of  action,  which  cannot 
be  to  any  great  extent  changed.  (7)  That  each  possesses 
in  itself  a  store  of  energy  which  it  can  use.  (8)  That 
energy  is  never  imparted  to  them,  nor  from  them  to  other 
things.  (9)  That  they  spontaneously  act  when  the  con- 
ditions of  their  action  are  present,  without  being  acted 
upon  by  any  thing  outside  of  themselves.  (10)  That  the 
forces  are  the  only  actors  and  doers,  and  hence  the  only 
causes  in  inorganic  natural  phenomena. 

These  principles  apply,  no  doubt,  with  little  modification, 
to  organic  phenomena.  We  know  that  while  resemblances 
run  through  all  departments  of  nature,  there  are  also 
differences.  If  I  say  that  life  is  an  immaterial  substance, 
I  only  repeat  what  others  have  said.  I  am  not  aware  that 
any  one  has  before  said  that  the  inorganic  forces  are  im- 
material substance,  ''^  but  many  have  said  so  of  life.  The 
appearances  so  plainly  indicate  that  life  is  not  the  matter 

*After  this  was  written  and  my  theory  imblislied  in  a  periodical  Dr. 
A  Wilford  Hall,  of  New  York,  proposed  the  same  theory  in  his  "Problem  of 
Human  Life,"  and  expounded  and  defended  it  in  the  Periodicals  which  he  has 
published,    r^ee  note  at  the  end  of  Preface. 


176 


ORGANIC    EORCEvS. 


of  the  body,  but  an  invisible,   imponderable  something 
dwelling  in  the  body  and  moving  it,  that  this  is  the  spon- 
taneous first  thought  of  all  mankind,  in  all  ages  of  the 
world.     Men  see  the  tree  or  animal  body  full  of  life  and 
activity;    they  see  it  again  motionless,  dead.     The  mat- 
ter of  the  body  is  there  apparently  the  same,  but  some- 
thing appears  to  have  been  in  it  that  is  not  now  in  it,  that 
appears  to  have  gone  out  of  it.     These  appearances  are 
sufficient  for  the  common  consciousness  of  the  world  to 
conclude  that  life  is  something  else   than  matter.     That 
something  is   intangible,   imponderable,  and  penetrable. 
This  is  a  description  of  immaterial  substance.     No  evi- 
dence has  been  adduced  which  disproves  this  seeming,  or 
proves   that   these  facts  are  not   as  they  appear  to  be. 
Other  suppositions  have  been  made,  and  attempts  made  to 
explain  the  phenomena  of   life  according   to   them,    but 
with  very  little  success.     I  see  no  reason  w^hy  we  should 
discard  this  natural  and  spontaneous  deduction  for  any 
less  satisfactory  supposition.     Finding  the  inorganic  forces 
to  be  immaterial  substances,  our  natural  conclusion   re- 
specting life  is  confimied  by  analogy. 

Our  third  generalization  respecting  the  inorganic  forces 
— that  they  are  indestructible  and  unchangeable  in  quan- 
tity— is  this  true  of  the  organic  forces  ?  The  generaliza- 
tion, that  substance  is  indestructible  and  unchangeable  in 
quantity  by  any  finite  power,  is  now,  since  the  indestructi- 
bility of  matter  has  been  experimentally  demonstrated, 
generally  admitted.  Finding,  as  w^e  have,  that  this  is 
true  also  of  those  substances  w^hich  are  called  the  inor- 
ganic forces,  we  have  an  additional  basis  for  this  generali- 
zation, and  w^e  conclude  that  it  is  true  of  life,  of  the 
immaterial  substances  called  the  organic  forces.  Do  we 
then  make  vegetable  an4  brute  life  immortal?  There 
are  several  suppositions  which  may  be  made  respecting 
this  question.     We  may  suppose  that  each  vegetable  and 


INCREASE   IN   QUANTITY.  1 77 

brute  life  is  an  organic  entity  w^hich  retains  its  identity  in 
unchanged  being  after  it  separates  from  the  body;  or  we 
may  suppose  that  there  is  a  common  mass  or  atmosphere 
of  these  organic  immaterial  substances  surrounding  the 
earth,  or  in  certain  localities,  existing  in  heterogeneous 
mixture,  like  the  material  substances  of  the  earth.  In  this 
case  we  would  not  suppose  each  one  to  exist  in  a  sensitive 
or  active  state,  but  in  such  state  as  the  dormant  or  latent 
inorganic  forces  are  at  times.  Immense  quantities  of 
light,  heat,  electricity,  and  magnetism  lie  latent  in  matter, 
and  are  brought  forth  to  activity  by  some  change  in  sur- 
rounding conditions.  In  such  a  state  we  may  suppose 
the  vegetable  and  brute  forces  to  be  when  separated  from 
their  bodies. 

In  regard  to  unchangeable  quantity,  w^e  know  that  a 
vegetable  or  animal  life  force  in  any  particular  body  does 
increase  in  quantity.  It  commences  in  the  germ  as  min- 
ute in  quantity  as  the  matter  of  the  germ;  it  increases  in 
quantity  as  the  body  increases,  until  it  becomes  an  adult 
being.  We  know  that  the  body  increases  by  the  forces  in 
it  taking  of  other  matter,  assimilating  it,  and  adding  it  to 
their  own  body.  In  this  process  the  forces  select  certain 
matter  that  they  can  assimilate,  or  that  is  already  assimi- 
lated. If  the  supposition  that  unattached  vital  forces 
exist  in  a  heterogeneous  mass  around  the  earth  be  true, 
the  forces  in  the  body  may  select  from  this  mass  their  own 
kind,  and,  adding  it  to  themselves,  increase  their  own 
quantity.  This  would  make  the  process  of  grow^th  alike 
in  both  the  material  and  immetarial  substances  w^hich 
compose  the  being.  This  may  explain  why  certain  local- 
ities are  more  favorable  for  the  growth  of  certain  veget- 
ables and  animals— there  may  be  more  of  their  kinds  of 
immaterial  substance  in  one  place  than  in  another.  This 
may  also  account  for  the  spontaneous  appearance  of  cer- 
tain vegetables  in  soil  w^here  no  seeds  of  that  particular 


178  ORGANIC   FORCES. 

vegetable  can  be  discovered.  Even  if  there  should  be 
found  some  instances  of  spontaneous  germination,  it 
would  not  prove  that  life  could  be  produced  by  the  opera- 
tion of  the  inorganic  forces  upon  matter;  in  such  cases 
some  of  these  unattached  vital  forces  might,  finding  mole- 
cules in  a  state  just  adapted  to  their  use,  re-attach  them- 
selves to  matter. 

But  we  might  suppose  that  the  vital  forces  have  power 
to  take  of  the  inorganic  immaterial  substances  around 
them,  and  transform  them  into  their  own  kind,  without 
violating  any  of  the  principles  deduced  from  inorganic 
phenomena.  This  would  not  be  the  transformation  of 
one  force  into  another  by  an  agency  external  to  the  forces 
themselves,  nor  one  force  transforming  itself  into  another, 
but  one  force  taking  of  others  and  assimilating  them  into 
its  own  kind;  a  process  analogous  to  their  assimilation  of 
matter  into  their  own  kind  of  matter.  Either  of  these 
suppositions  will  explain  the  growth  and  increase  in  quan- 
tity of  the  vital  forces  in  any  vegetable  or  animal  body. 

According  to  our  fourth  generalization  the  inorganic 
forces  acting  upon  matter  can  never  produce  a  new  force, 
or  new  portions  of  an  already  existing  force.  None  of 
the  facts  of  variation  brought  forward  by  Mr.  Darwin  and 
others  forbid  the  extension  of  this  generalization  to  vital 
phenomena;  in  all  these  gathered  facts  there  is  not  one 
instance  of  the  production  of  a  new  vital  force,  nor  the 
transformation  by  any  external  agency  of  one  into  another, 
nor  the  production  by  any  external  agent  of  new  portions 
of  an  already  existing  force.  As  no  facts  contrary  to  it 
are  found  among  vital  phenomena,  we  are  authorized  to 
extend  this  generalization  to  organic  phenomea;  and  say 
that  no  natural  agency  can  transform  an  inorganic  force 
into  a  vital  force,  nor  one  vital  force  into  another. 

Hence  also  we  may  extend  the  fifth  of  the  foregoing 
generalizations — They  are  not  produced  or  created  by  any 


DEPENDENT  ON   CONDITIONS.  1 79 

natural  agency — to  organic  forces.  No  one  thinks  of 
looking  among  natural  agencies  for  a  cause  or  producer 
of  gravity,  or  inertia,  or  any  other  one  of  the  inorganic 
forces.  Those  who  do  not  admit  a  divine  Creator  begin 
with  matter  and  all  the  natural  forces  existing  and  act- 
ing in  matter.  But  under  the  supposition  that  the  inor- 
ganic forces  are  moving  molecules,  one  is  said  to  be 
changed  into  another,  and  that  portion  of  that  other  is 
said  to  be  produced,  or  caused  to  be.  But  we  have  found 
that  the  forces  are  not  molecules  in  motion,  and  that 
one  is  never  transformed  into  another,  and  that  new  por- 
tions of  them  are  never  produced  or  caused  to  be.  Among 
the  vital  forces  there  are  found  no  facts  which  contradict 
this  generalization,  hence  we  may  extend  it  to  them. 

Our  sixth  generalization  is  that  each  one  has  its  own 
naturally  uncaused  modes  of  action,  which  cannot  be  to- 
any  great  extent  changed.  The  mode  of  action  of  grav- 
ity is  to  draw  matter  together;  of  inertia,  to  hold  matter  at 
rest  and  move  it  at  its  present  velocity.  Nothing  causes 
gravity  to  do  this,  or  imparts  to  it  this  mode  of  doing. 

Nothing  causes  inertia  to  do  as  it  does.  Nothing  causes 
heat  to  do  as  it  does.  Nothing  causes  any  one  of  the  in- 
organic forces  to  do  as  it  does  with  matter.  No  cause,  no 
natural  reason  why  they  do  as  they  do,  has  ever  been 
stated  by  any  man.  Even  supposing  them  to  be  moving 
molecules,  no  reason  has  ever  been  assigned  for  their  par- 
ticular mode  of  motion.  As  no  natural  reason  can  be 
assigned  for  any  of  the  inherent  characteristics  of  any  of 
the  material  elements,  so  are  the  modes  of  action  of  the 
inorganic  forces  entirely  inexplicable,  and  cannot  be  attrib- 
uted to  any  natural  agency.  So  likewise  no  natural  or 
physical  reason  can  be  assigned  for  the  modes  of  action, 
of  any  organic  force,  nor  any  natural  agent  discovered 
which  causes  them  to  act  according  to  their  known  modes. 
We  find  that  the  modes  of  the  inorganic  forces  are  en- 


! 


i8o 


ORGANIC   FORCES. 


CLASSIFICATION   OF   FORCES. 


l8l 


i| 


tirely  invariable.      This   is  equally  true  of  the  organic 
forces  by  an}^  power  outside  of  themselves.     We  discover 
in  them,  what  we  do  not  find  in  the  inorganic  forces,  that 
they  have  a  limited  power  to  modify  their  own  modes  of 
action.     This  comes  under  the  general  law  of  conditions. 
We  thus  distinguish  between  -cause  and  a  condition;  a 
cause  is  that  which  energizes  to  produce  the  results,  a 
condition  is  that  which  has  some  relation  to  the  result, 
but  does  not  energize  to  produce  it.     Gravity  and  inertia 
act  constantly   independent   of  conditions.     But  inertia 
has  two  modes,  and  its  action  is  according  to  one  or  the 
other  of  these,  as  different  conditions  exist;  on  the  con- 
dition of  rest,  it  energizes  to  maintain  rest;  on  the  condi- 
tion motion,  it  energizes  to  perpetuate  that  motion.     In 
the  presence  of  certain   conditions,    heat   and   light   are 
active;  in  the  presence  of  other  conditions  they  are  latent. 
The  chemical  force  is  often  dependent  upon  conditions  of 
nearness,  solution,  vaporization,  ignious  fusion,  etc.,  for 
its  opportunit)^  to  work.     Other  forces  are  dependent  up- 
on other  conditions  for  opportunity  to  work. 

Then  the  results  of  the  action  of  the  forces  are  often 
dependent  upon  conditions.  On  condition  that  a  body  is 
elevated  from  the  earth,  and  unsupported,  gravit}^  can 
move  it  down.  Gravity  acted  upon  it  just  as  strongly  be- 
fore it  was  raised,  and  after  it  had  fallen,  but  in  those 
conditions  it  could  not  move  the  body.  If  the  body  drawn 
down  by  gravity  is  iron,  it  is  not  altered  in  shape  by  the 
fall;  if  it  is  putty,  it  is  flattened;  if  it  is  glass,  it  is  broken 
in  pieces.  Thus  the  results  are  dependent  upon  condi- 
tions in  the  nature  of  the  substance  acted  upon.  So  the 
vital  forces  are  often  dependent  upon  conditions  in  the 
nature  of  the  substance  acted  upon,  and  for  their  opportun- 
ity to  act,  and  also  for  the  results  of  their  action.  In  the 
absence  of  food,  the  digestive  forces  cannot  act;  in  the 
absence  of  the  right  kinds  of  food,  they  cannot  build  up 


a  healthy  body,— the  results  of  their  action  may  var}^  be- 
cause of  conditions  in  the  nature  of  the  substances  digest- 
ed and  assimilated. 

Besides  all  this,  the  vital  forces  seem  to  have  the  power 
to  in  a  slight  degree  modify  their  own  modes,  to  adapt 
themselves  to  changed  physical  conditions.  If  the  changes 
in  physical  circumstances  are  not  too  great,  they  can  mod- 
ify their  own  modes  so  as  to  adapt  themselves  to  these 
different  circumstances,  and  still  in  a  manner  perform  their 
w^ork.  If  the  changes  are  too  great,  they  cease  Iheir 
work  and  die.  This  is  all  there  is  in  changes  said  to  be 
effected  in  the  nature  of  plants  and  animals  by  their  en- 
vironments. External  physical  things  never  effect  any 
changes  in  them,  but  they  can,  in  a  limited  degree,  change 
their  own  modes  to  adapt  themselves  to  their  changed 
environments. 

'  The  relation  of  the  vital  forces  to  temperature  and  to 
time  are  determined  by  their  own  inherent  characteristics, 
and  not  by  their  environments.  Among  indigenous  plants 
in  the  same  latitude,  one  seed  germinates  at  one  tempera- 
ture, and  another  at  another.  One  dies  at  the  slightest 
touch  of  frost,  and  another,,  more  fragile,  endures  the  freez- 
ing of  a  whole  winter.  One  plant  reaches  maturity  and 
dies  in  a  few  weeks;  another,  with  the  same  environments, 
has  a  period  of  a  few  months,  another  a  few  years,  an- 
other a  hundred,  another  a  thousand  years.  One  plant 
bears  fruit  in  a  few  weeks;  another  waits  years  before  it 
puts  forth  a  blossom.  One  animal  reaches  puberty  in  a 
few  hours,  another  in  a  few  months,  another  in  a  few 
years.  The  periodicity  of  the  sexual  desire  in  female 
brutes,  and  of  the  instinct  of  incubation  in  fowls,  and  the 
changes  which  mark  decrepitude,  have  no  relation  to 
environments.  These  and  a  thousand  other  facts  show 
that  each  plant  and  animal  has  a  nature  of  its  own  which 


I82 


ORGANIC    FORCES. 


determines  its  modes  of  action,  and  that  its  modes  are  not 
determined  by  its  environments. 

Each  one  is  a  specific  tiling,  with  a  specific  nature,  and 
specific  modes  of  action.     This  is  true  of  the  inorganic 
forces,  and  it  is  equally  true  of  the  animal  and  vegetable 
forces.     The  vegetable  forces  in  all  vegetables,  and  the 
animal  forces  in  all  animals,  have  some  modes  in  common, 
and  some  differences.     We  decide  that  among  forces  it  is 
another  force  when  it  does  another  kind  of  work.     The 
question  of  classification  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  and 
unsettled   in  science.      When  shall  we  call  a  thing  the 
same,  and  when  another  thing?     The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion depends  upon  the  degree  of  intention  and  extension 
that  we  employ  in  our  classification.     If  we  require  few 
common   properties,  and  allow  of  many  differences,  we 
may  say  that  many  things  are  the  same.     If  w^e  require 
many  likenesses,  and  allow  of  few  differences,  few  things 
are  the  same.     If  we  mean  by  the  word  same,  identity, 
there  must  be  no  difference  in  properties  or  modes  or  time 
or  space,— it  must  not  only  have  the  same  properties  and 
modes,  but  must  also  be  at  the  same  time  and  occupy  the 
same  space.     But  that  is  not  what  men  mean  when  they 
say,  the  same  force.     They  mean  that  it  is  a  force  with  the 
same  modes,  although  it  may  be  at  another  time,  and  in 
another  place.     Thus  we  say  that  the  same  force  holds  the 
sun  and  also  the  moon  in  their  orbits;  though  in  one  case 
most  of  it  is  in  the  sun,  and  in  the  other  case  most  of  it  is 
in  the  earth.     When  a  force  has  the  same  modes,  we  say 
it  is  the  same  force,  no  matter  when  or  where  we  find  it; 
and  we  ascertain  its  modes  by  w^hat  it  does.     Hence  we 
say  it  is  the  same  force  when  it  does  the  same  kind  of 
work. 

But  here  arises  another  difficulty:  When  shall  it  be 
called  the  same,  and  when  another  kind  of  work?  This 
depends  again  upon  our  classification.     Animals  have  been 


IN   DISEASE   AND   DEATH. 


183 


classified  on  the  ground  of  the  ahmentary  appetite,  as  car- 
nivorous, herbivorous,  graminivorous,  and  omnivorous, 
animals.  The  question  arises.  Is  eating  animal  food  and 
vegetable  food  doing  the  same  kind  of  work  ?  To  this 
some  would  answer,  yes,  and  some,  no.  We  see  thus  the 
difficulty  of  establishing  any  dogmatic  rules  of  classifica- 
tion, and  why  differences  of  opinion  will  continue  to  exist 
among  men  on  this  point.  I  have  admitted  that  the  vital 
forces  can  modify  their  own  modes  in  a  slight  degree;  but 
of  course,  I  do  not  admit  that  any  modification  they  can 
effect,  makes  them  to  become  another  force.  In  reference 
to  many  things  there  is  already  a  common  agreement 
among  mankind.  All  agree  that  vegetables  are  not  ani- 
mals, and  that  brutes  are  not  men,  and  that  the  ten  inor- 
ganic forces  are  each  a  different  thing.  Even  those  who 
have  believed  them  to  be  convertible,  have  regarded  them 
as  different  things. 

I  know  of  no  better  rule  than  the  one  already  given: 
That  which  does  another  kind  of  work  is  another  force; 
and  then  we  must  agree  when  to  call  it  the  same,  or  an- 
other kind  of  work.  Gravity  and  the  chemical  force  both 
draw  matter  together;  but  the  chemical  force  results  in  a 
change  of  the  properties  of  the  matter  drawn  together, 
and  gravity  does  not;  hence  they  do  not  both  do  the  same 
work.  Molecular  repulsion  and  heat  both  push  matter 
apart;  but  heat  gives  us  the  sensations  of  warmth  and 
burning,  and,  leaving  the  matter  which  it  pushes  apart, 
passes  on  without  it,  and  molecular  repulsion  does  not  these; 
hence  they  do  not  the  same  kind  of  work.  According  to 
this  rule,  I  should  regard  all  the  doers  in  all  the  individ- 
uals of  the  same  species  as  different  portions  of  the  same 
force  or  forces,  as  different  portions  of  gravity  are  in 
different  bodies.  The  differences  in  the  results  of  their 
doing  are  explained  by  different  physical  conditions,  and 
the  slight  modifications  which  they  can  themselves  effect 


^^4  ORGANIC   FORCES. 

in  themselves.  The  self-effected-  variations  in  the  modes 
of  the  forces  of  an  animal  are  transmissible  to  their  pos- 
terity. 

Our  seventh  generalization  is  that  each  force  has  in 
itself  a  quantity  of  energy  which  it  can  use.     The  word 
quantity  cannot  be  properly  applied  to  a  passive  property 
of  matter.     But  it  is  customary  to  apply  terms  expressive 
of  quantity  to  the  active  property  of  energy.     One  man 
has  much  energy,  another  has  little;  in  vigorous  health 
the  man  has  much,  in  sickness  Httle.     I   have   claimed 
that  each  vital  force  can  increase  its  own  quantity  in  growth 
by  accretions  from  other  forces.     Decrease  in  sickness,  in 
paralysis,  and  in  old  age,  may  be  explained  by  supposing 
that  the  forces  in  these  conditions  of  body  become  latent 
and  their  energy  unusable;  or  the  forces  may  be  partially, 
some  of  it  perhaps  wholly,  separated  from  the  body;  or 
the  physical  organs  through  which  they  act  may  have  be- 
come less  suitable  for  their  use.     All  of  these  supposi- 
tions have  their  parallels   in  inorganic  nature.     It  is  a 
common  occurrence  for  portions  of  the  inorganic   forces 
to  become  latent  in  matter;  and  a  body  cools  by  portions 
of  the  heat  separating  from  it;  and  the  chemical  force  can- 
not act  through  or  upon  matter  in  one  state  as  well   as 
when  the  matter  is  in  another  state.     In  death  the  vital 
forces  separate  entirely  from  the  body,  and  the  inorganic 
forces  assume  control. 

In  our  experience  the  quantity  of  energy  in  us  available 
for  use  seems  to  waste  by  work.  As  this  is  never  the  case 
among  the  inorganic  forces,  it  is  questionable  whether  it  is 
the  fact  here.  Grayity,  inertia,  cohesion,  the  chemical 
force,  and  the  crj-stallizing  force  energize  perpetually 
without  any  decrease.  In  no  case  does  electricity  or  mag- 
netism appear  to  decrease,  except  by  dissipation  and  when 
the  two  kinds  of  each  unite  in  a  state  of  satisfied  inactivity. 
When  heat  appears  to  decrease  by  work  it  goes  into  a 


FORCES   DO   NOT   WASTE. 


185 


state  of  latency.  No  one  thought  of  explaining  the  dis- 
appearance of  heat  in  these  cases  in  any  other  way,  till  it 
was  thought  that  these  facts  could  be  used  to  maintain  the 
theory  of  transmutation.  In  all  cases  of  expansion,  as 
when  a  liquid  becomes  a  vapor,  there  is  a  great  decrease 
in  sensible  heat;  but  that  the  heat  is  not  destroyed,  trans- 
muted into  something  else,  or  diminished  in  quantity,  is 
known  by  the  fact  that  when  the  matter  is  restored  to  its 
former  state  the  lost  heat  appears  again.  As  far  as  the 
inorganic  forces  can  teach  by  analogy ;  when  the  vital  forces 
appear  to  diminish  by  work,  they  go  into  a  state  of 
latency.  No  doubt  it  is  the  body  that  is  tired,  and  not 
the  forces.  In  violent  exercise  the  absorptive  process  in 
the  body  goes  on  more  rapidly,  and  the  secretive  process 
less  rapidly;  this  inequality  continued  long  would  result 
in  the  destruction  of  the  body.  At  a  certain  stage  in  this 
process,  the  forces  refuse  longer  to  work,  that  they  may 
have  an  opportunity  to  replenish  the  waste  of  the  body. 
Whatever  energy  any  force  ever  exerts,  it  is  all  contained 
within  itself,  for. 

According  to  our  eighth  generalization,  energy  is  never 
imparted  to  a  force,  nor  communicated  from  it.  This,  of 
course,  is  unquestionable  if  we  admit  that  energy  is  a 
property.  But  without  this  admission,  we  have  found  it 
to  be  a  well  established  generalization.  When  gravity 
energizes  to  pull  a  body  down  nothing  imparts  to  it  the 
energy  it  uses.  When  cohesion  energizes  to  join  molecular 
together  in  masses,  when  the  chemical  force  energizes  to 
join  atoms  together  in  molecules,  when  the  crystallizing 
force  energizes  to  arrange  molecules  in  the  form  of  crys- 
tals, when  molecular  repulsion  energizes  to  hold  mole- 
cules apart  in  gases, — in  none  of  these  cases  does  any- 
thing impart  to  the  force  the  energy  it  employs.  In  the 
cases  of  heat,  light,  electricity,  and  magnetism,  some  ex- 
ertion of  energy  often  precedes  their  activity,  but  only  to 


i86 


ORGANIC   FORCES. 


supply  the  conditions  of  their  activit}-,  never  to  impart  to 
them  the  energy  they  exert.  Facts  show  this  to  be 
equally  true  of  the  organic  forces.  When  the  forces  in  a 
vegetable  seed  begin  their  activity,  nothing  imparts  to 
them  their  energy.  Heat  and  moisture  are  conditions  of 
their  activity,  but  the  heat  does  not  supply  their  energy. 
If  the  heat  imparted  to  the  seed  the  energy  that  appears 
there,  it  could  impart  it  to  a  dead  seed,  whose  physical 
structure  is  precisely  the  same,  as  far  as  man  can  discover. 
The  forces  must  be  already  there,  then  the  heat  supplies 
the  condition  of  their  activity. 

This  is  but  one  of  the  many  instances  of  the  relation  of 
life  to  temperature.  During  all  the  stages  of  the  veget- 
able growth,  certain  conditions  of  temperature  are  neces- 
sary. One  seed  will  germinate  at  a  low  temperature,  and 
send  up  its  shoot  through  a  coating  of  snow;  another 
lies  dormant  till  a  tropical  temperature  supervenes;  thus 
showing  that  a  low  temperature  is  the  condition  of  activ- 
ity in  one  case,  and  a  high  temperature  in  the  other  case. 
When  the  animal  begins  to  move,  nothing  imparts  to  him 
the  energy  which  moves  his  body.  When  I  arise  from 
my  chair,  and  leave  the  room,  nothing  outside  of  my  body 
imparts  to  me  the  energy  that  moves  my  body.  In  no 
case  in  any  department  of  nature  does  one  force  impart  to 
another  force  the  energy  which  it  uses.  All  the  energy 
which  any  force  ever  employs  is  inherent  in  that  force, 
and  there  is  never  a  transferrence  of  energy  from  one 
thing  to  another.  All  that  one  force  ever  does  to  another 
is  to  present  before  it,  or  to  effect  in  it,  the  conditions  of 
its  activity,  or  the  conditions  of  its  activity  after  a  certain 
mode. 

The  ninth  generalization — they  spontaneously  act  when 
the  conditions  of  their  action  are  present— follows  as  a 
necessary  carollar>^  from  the  foregoing. 

The  first  of  the  foregoing  generalizations  asserts  that 


MATTER  NOT  THE   DOER 


187 


matter  is  never  an  actor  or  doer.     This  generalization  is 
based  upon  the  fact  that  in  four-fifths  of  all  inorganic 
phenomena  the  doing  is  accomplished  where  the  matter 
which  is  supposed  to  be  the  doer  is  not,  and  hence,  it  is 
not  possible  that  matter  should  be  the  doer;  and  in  the 
other  one-fifth,  none  of  the  phenomena  contradict  this 
generalization,  but  all  favor  it,  and,  without  the  others, 
render  it  probable.     We  now  extend  this  generalization 
to  vital  phenomena.     We  have  already  supplied  actors  and 
doers  in  vital  phenomena  which  are  entirely  competent  to 
do  all  that  we  see  done;  hence  there  is  no  necessity  for 
supposing  that  in  this  respect  vital  phenomena  are  any 
different  from  inorganic  phenomena.     Indeed,  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  actors  are  immaterial  doers,  and  that  matter 
is  not  the  actor,  is  far  more  evident  to  common  observa- 
tion here  than  among  inorganic  phenomena.     Still  in  the 
<:ommon  language  of  the  world  material  things  here  are 
often  spoken  of  as  though  they  were  actors  and  doers.    Soil 
is  said  to  produce,  climate  to  effect  changes,  food  to  do, 
medicines  to  effect  results,  etc.     It  is  the  common  custom 
■to  adapt  the  language  of  common  life  to  appearances, 
without  any  strict  conformity  to  even  known  philosophi- 
cal facts  and  principles.     The  sun  is  said  to  rise,  the  earth 
and  sun  to  attract  each  other,  molecules  and  atoms   to 
attract  other  molecules  and  atoms,  the  body  to  grow,  etc. 
If  we  conform  our  language  to  facts,  soil  does  not  pro- 
duce.    A  rich  soil  contains  an  abundance  of  the  material 
which  the  vegetable  forces  use  to  build  up  rapidly  and 
vigorously  their  physical  bodies.     The  sun  and  earth  do 
not  attract  each  other,  but  gravity  in  them  both  and  ex- 
tending the  whole  distance  between  them  tends  to  draw 
them  together.     The  chemical  force  in  atoms,  and  extend- 
ing across  the  space  between  them,  draws  them  together. 
The  body  does  not  grow,  but  the  contained  forces  take  of 
other  matter  and  build  up  the  body.     Food  does  not  do; 


i88 


ORGANIC   FORCES. 


but  taken  into  the  stomach,  the  digestive  forces  act  upon 
it,  assimilate  it,  and  use  it  to  supply  the  waste  of  the 
body.     Medicines  are  not  causes,  they  are  the  conditions 
of  the  acticn  of  the  vital  forces  after  a  certain  manner. 
In  pungent,  caustic,  acrid,  and  corrosive  medicines  the 
chemical  force  in  them  acts  upon  the  tissues  of  the  body, 
disintegrating  them.     The  result  is  that  the  vital  forces 
arouse  themselves  to  expel  them  from   the   body,  or  to 
resist  their  action,  and  prevent  and  repair  the  hurt.     If 
the  action  of  the  chemical  force  in  them  is  not  so  great  as 
to  immediately  destroy  the  tissue,  the  vital  forces  energize 
with  inordinate  activity  to  protect  the  body  and  repair  the 
hurt.     This  explains  the  results  in  the  administration  of 
all  stimulants.     Yet  it  is  convenient  to  sometimes  say, 
the  medicine  does,  just  as  we  say,  the  sun  rises.     The 
chemical  force  in  all  corrosive  poisons  so  destroys  the  tis- 
sues of  the  body  as  to  render  them  unfit  for  the  use  of 
the  vital  forces.     In  the  presence  of  the  narcotic  poisons 
the  vital  forces  go  into  a  state  of  inactivity,  or  separate 
locally,  partially,  or  wholly  from  their  bodies. 

Thus  we  find  it  possible  to  explain  all  vital  phenomena 
without  supposing  that  matter  has  power  to  act  and  do; 
and  we  find  no  facts  here  which  forbid  the  extension  of 
this  generalization  to  vital  phenomena.  Our  tenth  gen- 
eralization— the  forces  are  the  only  actors  and  doers  in 
nature — follows  necessarily  on  the  establishment  of  the 
first,— if  matter  does  not  do,  the  forces  are  the  only  doers. 

Here  we  might  go  into  a  full  detail  of  particulars,  and 
show  the  incompetence  of  any  physical  theory  to  explain 
vital  phenomena,  and  the  entire  competence  of  the  theory 
we  advocate;  but  we  content  ourselves  with  a  few  observa- 
tions. According  to  any  physical  theory  it  is  impossible 
to  explain  why  homogeneous  bioplasm  becomes  in  one 
case  an  oak  and  in  another  a  cabbage.  Bioplasm  in  all 
seeds  is  precisely  the  same,  as  far  as  man  can  discover, 


REPRODUCTION,  HEREDITY.  1 89 

and  the  environments  are  in  many  cases  the  same;  why 
these  different  results  ?  The  physical  theory  can  give  no 
answer.  Our  theory  answers,  There  is  in  each  seed  a 
portion  of  immaterial  substance  whose  inherent  modes 
determine  and  constitute  the  nature  and  form  of  the  plant 
which  it  constructs.  Why  does  homogeneous  bioplasm 
or  albumen  become  in  one  part  of  the  animal  body  bone, 
in  another  part  flesh,  in  another  part  bloodvessels,  and  so 
on?  For  these  facts  the  physical  theory  can  afford  no  ex- 
planation. Our  theory  answers.  There  is  in  the  bioplasm, 
and  in  the  embryo,  and  in  the  adult  being,  a  portion  of 
immaterial  substance,  whose  modes  of  action  accomplish 
just  these  results. 

Reproduction,  heredity,  and  personal  identity  are  also 
inexplicable  by  any  physical  theory.     No  magician  ever 
deceived  people  by  any  trick  of  jugglery  more  than  evo- 
lutionists  have   by  the  flourish  of  heredity.     Of  course 
everything  is  explained  by  the  law  of  continuity.      But 
there  is  no  continuity  of  being,  either  in  motion  or  matter, 
between  the  parent  and  offspring.  The  motions  in  the  bio- 
plast are  not  the  same  that  they  are  in  the  parent.     The 
motions  in  the  embryo  are  not  the  same  as  those  in  the 
bioplast.     The  motions  in  the  adult  are  not  the  same  as 
those  in  the  embryo.     The  matter  is  not  the  same  in  these 
successive  bodies^  it  is  in  every  living  body  a  perpetual 
flux,    old   matter  going  and  new  matter  coming.     The 
molecules  in  the  body  of  the  child  are  not  the  molecules 
which  composed  the  body  of  the  adult  parent,  nor  those 
which  are  in  the  body  when  the  child  becomes  a  man. 
Thus  there  is  no  continuity  of  matter— it  is  not  the  same 
matter  acting  in  the  parent,  in  the  bioplast,  in  the  child, 
in  the  adult  offspring.     The  molecular  motions  going  on 
in  these  several  bodies  have  not  been  the  same  in  any  two 
of  them.     Yet  perhaps  some  peculiar  trait  discovered  in 
the  nature  of  the  parent  does  not  appear  in  the  child  un- 


I 


'  I 


u 


190 


ORGANIC   FORCES. 


til  it  has  become  an  adult,  and  perhaps  not  in  the  first 
offspring  at  all,  and  yet  does  appear  in  the  offspring  of 
the  second,  or  third,  or  fourth  generation.  Over  all  these 
breaks  in  the  continuity  of  matter,  through  all  these 
changes  in  the  molecular  arrangements  of  the  matter 
composing  these  successive  bodies,  over  all  these  breaks 
in  the  continuity  of  motion — the  motions  in  the  parent 
body  ceasing  to  be,  and  other  motions  taking  their  place 
in  the  body  of  the  infant,  and  those  motions  ceasing  to  be 
and  others  taking  their  place  when  the  infant  has  become  a 
man,  and  all  the  motions  in  that  body  ceasing  to  be  and 
others  taking  their  places  through  successive  generations 
of  beings, — through  and  over  all  these  changes  in  matter 
and  motion,  certain  molecules — not  those  which  have 
been  in  any  of  the  preceding  bodies — certain  molecules 
rise  up  and  begin  to  perform  such  motions  as  other  mole- 
cules did  perform  in  other  bodies,  perhaps  half  a  century 
ago,  begin  to  do  as  those  other  molecules  did,  and  because 
those  other  molecules  did  so,  to  preserve  the  line  of  her- 
edity. 

The  evolutionist  replies:  "The  trait  lay  dormant 
through  all  these  years."  What  lay  dormant,  the  trait? 
What  is  the  trait  ?  What  is  it  made  of?  Is  it  substance, 
or  what?  The  matter  did  not  lie  dormant;  none  of  the 
matter  in  this  body  was  in  the  former  bodies.  Motion 
cannot  lie  dormant;  when  motion  ceases  to  move  it  ceases 
to  be.  What  has  the  evolutionist  here  but  matter  and 
motion  to  lie  dormant? 

According  to  our  theory  heredity  is  explained  by  saying: 
Portions  of  the  immaterial  substance  which  fills  the  bod- 
ies of  the  parents  separate  off  and,  uniting,  form  a  new 
being  which  begins  independent  action  apart  from  the 
parent  life.  Of  course  it  carries  with  it  the  nature  and 
characteristics  of  the  immaterial  substance  from  which 
it  parted,  each  of  the  two  parts  of  which  it  is  composed 


PERSON AIv   IDENTITY.  19  ^ 

possessing  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  parent  from 
which  it  parted,  and  the  two  natures,  more  or  less  modi- 
fied by  their  differences  in  union,  appear  in  the  nature  of 
the  offspring.  According  to  this  explanation  there  is  a 
continuity  of  substance,  immaterial  substance,  running 
through  successive  generations,  and,  in  consequence  of 
differences  in  circumstances  and  conditions,  some  peculiar 
trait  may  not  be  manifest  in  every  individual  of  the  series, 
but  may  appear  at  intervals. 

Again,  supposing  matter  and  motion  to  be  all,  how  can 
we  explain  oiu*  consciousness  of  personal  identity  in  this 
ever-flowing,  ever-changing  stream  of  matter  and  motion  ? 
Our  bodies  are  never  entirely  the  same  in  matter  and  mo- 
tion on  any  two  successive  days,  much  less  on  any  two 
widely  separated  days;  why,  then,  do  we  feel  ourselves  to 
be  the  same  being  through  all  these  changes,  all  the  days 
of  our  lives?  It  appears  to  me  that  personal  identity  is 
based  in  the  perpetually  identical  and  changeless  imma- 
terial substance  which  dwells  in  each  of  our  bodies,  and 
which  constitutes  ourselves;  which  maintains  its  unchanged 
identity  while  the  stream  of  matter  composing  our  bodies 
flows  on  in  perpetual  change. 


190 


ORGANIC   FORCES. 


til  it  has  become  an  adult,  and  perhaps  not  in  the  first 
offspring  at  all,  and  yet  does  appear  in  the  offspring  of 
the  second,  or  third,  or  fourth  generation.  Over  all  these 
breaks  in  the  continuity  of  matter,  through  all  these 
changes  in  the  molecular  arrangements  of  the  matter 
composing  these  successive  bodies,  over  all  these  breaks 
in  the  continuity  of  motion — the  motions  in  the  parent 
body  ceasing  to  be,  and  other  motions  taking  their  place 
in  the  body  of  the  infant,  and  those  motions  ceasing  to  be 
and  others  taking  their  place  when  the  infant  has  become  a 
man,  and  all  the  motions  in  that  body  ceasing  to  be  and 
others  taking  their  places  through  successive  generations 
of  beings,— through  and  over  all  these  changes  in  matter 
and  motion,  certain  molecules — not  those  which  have 
been  in  any  of  the  preceding  bodies— certain  molecules 
rise  up  and  begin  to  perform  such  motions  as  other  mole- 
cules did  perform  in  other  bodies,  perhaps  half  a  century 
ago,  begin  to  do  as  those  other  molecules  did,  and  because 
those  other  molecules  did  so,  to  preserve  the  line  of  her- 
edity. 

The  evolutionist  replies:  *'The  trait  lay  dormant 
through  all  these  years."  What  lay  dormant,  the  trait? 
What  is  the  trait?  What  is  it  made  of?  Is  it  substance, 
or  what?  The  matter  did  not  lie  dormant;  none  of  the 
matter  in  this  body  was  in  the  former  bodies.  Motion 
cannot  lie  dormant;  when  motion  ceases  to  move  it  ceases 
to  be.  What  has  the  evolutionist  here  but  matter  and 
motion  to  lie  dormant? 

According  to  our  theory  heredity  is  explained  by  saying: 
Portions  of  the  immaterial  substance  which  fills  the  bod- 
ies of  the  parents  separate  off  and,  uniting,  form  a  new 
being  which  begins  independent  action  apart  from  the 
parent  life.  Of  course  it  carries  with  it  the  nature  and 
characteristics  of  the  immaterial  substance  from  which 
it  parted,  each  of  the  two  parts  of  which  it  is  composed 


PERSONAI.   IDENTITY. 


191 


possessing  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  parent  from 
which  it  parted,  and  the  two  natures,  more  or  less  modi- 
fied by  their  differences  in  union,  appear  in  the  nature  of 
the  offspring.  According  to  this  explanation  there  is  a 
continuity  of  substance,  immaterial  substance,  running 
through  successive  generations,  and,  in  consequence  of 
differences  in  circumstances  and  conditions,  some  peculiar 
trait  may  not  be  manifest  in  every  individual  of  the  series, 
but  may  appear  at  intervals. 

Again,  supposing  matter  and  motion  to  be  all,  how  can 
we  explain  our  consciousness  of  personal  identity  in  this 
ever-flowing,  ever-changing  stream  of  matter  and  motion  ? 
Our  bodies  are  never  entirely  the  same  in  matter  and  mo- 
tion on  any  two  successive  days,  much  less  on  any  two 
widely  separated  days;  why,  then,  do  we  feel  ourselves  to 
be  the  same  being  through  all  these  changes,  all  the  days 
of  our  lives?  It  appears  to  me  that  personal  identity  is 
based  in  the  perpetually  identical  and  changeless  imma- 
terial substance  which  dwells  in  each  of  our  bodies,  and 
which  constitutes  ourselves;  which  maintains  its  unchanged 
identity  while  the  stream  of  matter  composing  our  bodies 
flows  on  in  perpetual  change. 


1     5 

i 


ll 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
The  Process  of  Knowledge. 

The  conditions  of  knowledge  are  said  to  be  (i)  a  thing  to 
be  known  and  a  mind  knowing,   and  (2)   that  the  two 
come  in  such  relations  to  each  other  that  the  existence  and 
properties  of  one  shall  become  knowledge  to  the  other. 
Assuming  that  these  two— mind  and  thing— are,  the  diffi- 
culty arises  when  we  undertake   to  get   them   into   the 
necessary  relation   to  each    other.      This  difficulty  has 
always  been  realized,  and  effi^rts  have  in  all  ages  been 
made  to  solve  the  problem.    Supposing  mind  to  be  located 
in  the  brain,  how  do  facts  respecting  external  things  get 
to  it?     Various  suppositions  have  been  made  respecting 
the  medium  which  conveys  the  information,  and  respect- 
ing what  is  conveyed.     It  has  been  generally  agreed  that 
the  nerves  must  be  the  channel  through  which  something 
is  conveyed.     Then  what  is  conveyed  ?     Images  of  things, 
electrical  currents,  nerve  currents,  ner\^e  vibrations,  etc.[ 
have  been  supposed.     It  was  finally  agreed  that  images  of 
things  could  not  be  conveyed.     Then  how  could  electric- 
ity or  nerve  currents,  or  vibrations,  or  anything  else  of 
the  kind,  give  us  any  correct  idea  of  external  things?     It 
was  alleged  that  there  could  be  no  resemblance  between 
these  currents  or  vibrations  and  objective  things.     Then 
the  assertion  was  that  we  do  not  know  the  objective,  that 
we  know   only   our   sensations,   or  only  our  subjective 
states,  our  thoughts  and  feeling.     Things  outside  of  us 


<msm 


THEORIES  OF   PERCEPTION. 


193 


may  not  be  anything  like  what  we  suppose  them  to  be. 
There  is  no  certainty  in  our  knowledge  of  external  things, 
knowledge  of  external  things  is  not  possible.  All  our 
supposed  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  a  delusion. 

Finally  in  answer  to  this,  a  new  departure  was  taken, 
originating  with  Kant,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the 
somethings  conveyed  to  the  mind  need  not  bear  any  re- 
semblance to  external  things,  in  fact  do  not, — it  is  not 
possible  for  them  to  have  any  likeness  to  things;  but  on 
their  reception  by  the  mind,  certain  thoughts  arise,  the 
mind  performs  certain  acts,  not  at  all  resembling  the  com- 
munications received,  but  like  the  things  from  which 
those  communications  came.  The  mind  has  within  itself 
certain  norms,  or  forms  of  activity,  natural  and  spontan- 
eous to  it,  and  on  the  receipt  of  these  communications, 
certain  of  these  native  forms  of  thought  arise  in  the  mind. 
The  communication  from  the  external  serves  as  a  spark 
to  discharge  the  already  loaded  mind.  The  act  of  mind 
which  we  call  knowledge  is  mainly  determined  by  the 
nature  or  inherent  modes  of  action  already  fixed  in  the 
mind.  The  mind  itself  thus  supplies  a  large  element  in 
our  knowledge  of  the  objective.  The  vibrations  of  air, 
or  the  consequent  vibrations  of  the  tympanum  and  the 
auditory  nerve,  have  no  resemblance  to  the  sound  which 
we  are  said  to  hear,  but  on  the  reception  of  these  vibra- 
tions, the  mind  performs  certain  acts,  and  to  those  acts 
we  have  given  the  name  sound. 

But  the  question  still  remained,  how  do  we  know  that 
the  acts  of  mind  consequent  upon  the  communications 
resemble  the  objects  from  which  the  communications 
come?  Kant  admitted  the  resemblance  could  not  be 
proven.  We  must  so  think  and  believe,  but  we  do  not 
kno7iJ  that  our  thoughts  are  like  the  things.  He  had 
maintained  as  against  Locke  and  Hume  the  subjective 
origin  of  many  of  our  ideas,  and  that  the  mind  has  posi- 


1 


!  i 

!  * 

\  I 


194 


PROCESS   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


tive  qualities  and  necessary  modes  of  action,  but  He  had 
not  vindicated  the  validity  of  objective  knowledge.  He 
finally  concluded  that  all  our  real  knowledge  is  of  the 
subjective. 

From  Kant  two  streams  of  thought  diverged,  one  tak- 
ing the  assertion  that  we  must  think  and  believe  that  the 
thoughts  which  arise  in  our  minds  in  consequence  of  the 
external  world,  are  true  representations  of  the  real,  the 
other  taking  the  assertion  that  our  only  real  knowledge  is 
of  the  subjective.  The  latter  stream,  led  by  Fichte  and 
Shelling,  ran  into  pure  idealism — we  know  not  that  there 
is  any  objective  world;  we  live  in  a  purely  ideal  world. 
Those  who  followed  the  former  stream  asserted  the  exist- 
ence and  reality  of  the  external  world,  and  endeavored 
to  vindicate  the  reliability  of  our  knowledge  of  it.  They 
endeavored  to  show  that  the  thoughts  which  arise  in  the 
mind  on  the  reception  of  communications  from  external 
things  do  correspond  with  the  objects  from  which  the 
communications  come.  This  illustration  has  been  used: 
One  man  sends  a  written  epistle  to  another  man.  The 
letters  written  on  the  paper  have  no  likeness  to  the 
thoughts  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  nor  to  the  thoughts 
which  arise  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  but  on  the  recep- 
tion of  those  characters  on  the  paper,  the  same  thoughts 
arise  in  the  mind  of  the  reader  that  were  in  the  mind  of 
the  writer. 

This  illustrates  the  supposed  process,  but  it  does  not 
correspond  entirely  with  the  facts  in  the  case.  Between 
the  two  men  there  was  an  agreement  and  understanding 
as  to  what  signs  should  represent  certain  ideas.  The  one 
used  those  signs,  and  the  other  man  knew  what  ideas  the 
writer  represented  by  those  signs,  and  those  thoughts  arose 
in  his  mind.  We  can  hardly  suppose  that  there  is  a  mu- 
tual understanding  between  the  object  and  mind  as  to 
what  signs,  what  vibrations,  shall  represent  certain  facts. 


MEDIATE   KNOWI^EDGE. 


195 


But  the  advocate  says  we  do  know  external  things,  we    _ 
know  them   as  they  are, — everybody  practically  acts  as 
though  he  did  know  them;  therefore  these  mental   acts 
which  arise  on   the   reception  of  these   communications 
must  be  true  likenesses  of  external  things.     The  fact  of 
knowledge  every   one  practically  admits;  but  this  does 
not  prove  that  one  or  another  theory  of  perception  is  the 
true  one.      Admitting  that  this  correspondence  between 
the  mental  forms  and  the  objective  qualities  does  exist,  the 
validity  of  objective  knowledge  may  be  thus  established r 
but  this  can  hardly  silence  the  skeptic  who  may  deny  the 
correspondence,  and  demand  proof.     Other  suppositions 
besides  this  may  bring  to  their  support  the  admitted  fact 
of  knowledge. 

But  it  is  claimed  that  the  Creator  so  made  the  human 
mind  that  it  does  know  the  meaning  of  the  characters  on 
this  epistle  received  from   the   object.     The   question  is 
still  asked,  How  do  we  know  that?    This  explanation 
assumes  that  God  created  the  external  world,  and  that  He 
so  created  the  human  mind  that  it  does  understand  the 
meaning  of  the  hieroglyphics  which  come  to  it  in  the 
form  of  nerve  vibrations.     His  integrity  and  truthfulness 
are  a  guaranty  to  us  that  He  does  not  deceive  us,  that  the 
thoughts  which  He  has  caused  to  arise  in  our  minds  on 
the  reception  of  these  vibrations  are  true  thoughts  of  the 
external  world.      Thus   the   certainty   of   our  objective 
knowledge   depends   upon   our  belief  in  the  veracity  of 
God.     This  may  be  a  sufficient  basis  of  certainty  for  a 
devout  believer  in  God,  and  in  His  immediate  agency  in 
creation,  but  how  is  it  with  those  who  doubt  His  exist- 
ence, or  deny  His  agency  in  creation?     How  is  it  with 
those  who  have  never  heard  of  Him  ?     Can  they  have  no 
confidence  in  their  apparent  knowledge  of  the  external 

world  ? 

Others  have  endeavored  to  meet  this  difficulty  by  de- 


11 

II 


196  PROCESS  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

daring  that  perception  is  not  mediate,  but  immediate.  It 
is  asserted  that  the  mind  spontaneously  cognizes  in  its 
first  activity  the  self  and  the  not-self,  the  subjective  and 
the  objective,  in  a  single  primitive  act.  We  do  not  first 
know  ourselves,  and  then  subsequently  by  any  process 
whatever  come  to  know  the  external  worid,  bnt  we  know 
them  both  in  a  primitive  single  act  of  mind.  This  is 
called  immediate  perception. 

This  is  certainly  an  assertion  that  we  do  know  both  our- 
selves and  the  external  worid,  but  I  do  not  see  that  it  is  a 
very  clear  exposition  of  the  process  of  it.  I  do  not  see 
that  it  explains  how  things  external  to  our  bodies  become 
present  in  consciousness  to  be  known. 

With  all  due  deference  to  the  many  great  men   who 
during  the   ages   have   grappled   with  this   problem,    it 
appears    to    me  that  a  more  radical  departure  from  the 
current  of  philosophy  than  has  yet  been  taken  is  neces- 
sary in  order  that  we  attain  to  a  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  process  of  knowledge.     I  cannot  see  how  immediate 
perception  is  possible  if  mind  is  an  unextended  something 
limited  to  the  brain.     It  appears  to  me  that  if  we  declare 
immediate  perception,   we  must  go  further  and  declare 
that  mind  is  extended.     And  why  not?   When  the  Greek 
philosophers  said  ''Mind  has  no  extension,"   they  placed 
a  mountain  across  the  path  of  any  explanation  of  percep- 
tion.    Ever  since  that  men  have  been  trying  to  find  out 
how  we  can  see  things  on  the  other  side  of  the  mountain. 
That  we  do  see  them  every  one  believes,  but  how  ?     I 
suppose  the  simple  fact  is  there  is  no  mountain  there,  and 
that  mind  is  extended.     The  objector  seems  to  think  that 
he  shows  this  supposition  false  by  saying,  "Have  thought, 
feeling,  and  volition  extension?"     We  answer,  certainly 
not,  for  they  are  acts,   and  acts  can  have  no  extension. 
But  this  does  not  prove  that  the  actor,  the  substance  act- 
ing, has  no  extension.     In  our  definition  of  substance— 


MIND   HAS   EXTENSION. 


197 


that  which  of  itself  occupies  space— we  assumed  that  all 
substances,  immaterial  as  well  as  material,  occupy  a  cer- 
tain portion  of  space. 

Some  will  be  alarmed  by  this  supposition,  and  think  that 
by  giving  mind  extension  we  make  it  to  be  matter.  Not 
at  all.     I  do  not  know  why  substance  that  has  no  weight, 
or  inertia,  or  impenetrability  cannot  be  extended,  as  well 
as  substances  which  have  these  properties.     Does  the  fact 
of  extension  make  it  necessary  that  the  substances  have 
these  other  properties  ?     If  the  Lotzean  theory  of  matter  be 
true,  it  does  not  deprive  matter  of  extension,  although  it 
makes  it  to  be  spirit  energizing.     If  an  immaterial  sub- 
stance has  no  space  relations,  it  can  have  no  relations  ta 
that  which  has  space  relations,  for  to  become  related  to  that 
is  to  become  related  to  space.     An  unextended  substance 
can  never  act  simultaneously  over  the  surface  of  an  ex- 
tended body  without   being   itself  equally   extended.     I 
cannot  labor  to  explain  how  an  unextended  thing  can  act 
upon,  or  cognize,  an  extended  thing;  for  to  me  the  propo- 
sition contains  a    contradiction — extension    and   not-ex- 
tension.     I  see  no  reason  why  the  mind  may  not  be  as 
extended  as  the  body.     All  the  facts  of  sensation  indicate 
that  the  sensitive  and  cognizing  mind  is  in  every  part  of 
the  body;  and  these  facts,  and  not  any  a  ^r/<7n  judgment, 
should  determine  our  opinions  upon  this  subject. 

I  believe  that  the  mind  is  as  extended  as  the  nervous 
system.  It  is  a  common  saying  of  physiologists  that  there 
is  more  of  sensation  in  the  ends  of  the  fingers  than  in  any 
part  of  the  brain.  There  are  some  motions  going  on  in 
the  body  which  are  disconnected  from  consciousness; 
these  may  not  be  classed  among  the  ^cts  of  mind.  All 
that  constitutes  the  conscious  mind  is  connected  with  the 
brain  as  its  head  and  center;  but  the  conscious  mind  ex- 
tends through  the  nerves  of  sensation  and  the  mandatory 
nerves,  and  at  the   outer  extremities  of   the  nerves  of 


198  PROCESS  OF   KNOWI.EDGK. 

sensation  it  comes  into  immediate  contact  with  the  exter- 
nal world.  We  then  have  the  thing  knowing  and  the 
thing  known  brought  into  such  relations  to  each  other 
that  knowledge  is  possible— the  necessary  condition  of 
knowledge  is  supplied. 

Now,  according  to  this  view  of  the  relation  existing  be- 
tween mind  and  body,  let  us  endeavor  to  discover  the  pro- 
cess of  knowledge.  What  method  shall  we  employ  in  our 
search  ?  I  think  we  will  not  best  find  it  by  a  study  of  adult 
consciousness,  nor  by  any  process  of  deductive  reasoning. 
The  work  of  first  obtaining  a  knowledge  of  the  objective 
world  is  long  past  with  us,  and  our  memory  cannot  aid  us  in 
ascertaining  the  steps  by  which  we  obtained  it.  It  appears 
to  me  that  this  is  a  question  to  be  settled  by  observation, 
rather  than  by  introspection.  I^t  us  then  adopt  the  in- 
ductive method,  leave  the  study  of  consciousness,  go  out 
in  the  observation  of  facts,  and  seek  aid  even  from  com- 
parative psychology. 

Here  is  a  chicken  that  has  been  hatched  by  artificial 
means,  and  has  never  seen  one  of  its  kind.  It  has  re- 
mained in  its  nest  till  the  supply  of  food  provided  for  him 
at  that  period— the  yolk  of  the  egg— is  nearly  gone. 
You  take  it  out  and  place  its  feet  upon  the  floor.  He 
stands  erect,  but  does  not  move  his  feet  from  where  you  have 
placed  them.  He  maintains  his  erect  position— he  has 
already  adjusted  himself  to  the  pull  of  gravity,  one  of 
his  environments.  Soon  he  looks  around,  looks  before 
him,  as  if  surveying  the  floor.  He  then  takes  two  or 
three  steps  forward.  He  has  seen  the  floor  before  him, 
he  moves  his  foot  forward  in  certain  expectation  of  some- 
thing upon  which  to  place  his  foot.  He  has  in  his  mental 
constitution  a  disposition  to  walk;  that  something  which 
he  sees  before  him  seems  to  be  an  external  adaptation  to 
the  internal  disposition,  and  he  moves  his  foot  forward 
confidently  upon  it.     It  turns  out  to  be  as  he  expected,  and 


EXAMPLES  OF.  1 99 

his  thought  cf  it  is  verified  by  experience,  and  the  floor 
has  now  become  to  him  an  item  of  knowledge. 

He  sees  an  insect  moving  on  the  floor  before  him.     He 
looks  at  it,  watches  it  carefully  for  a  little  time,  and  then, 
with  a  quick  and  sudden  motion,  as  if  expecting  that  it 
might  make  an  effort  to  escape,  seizes  it  with  his  bill. 
Now,  what  is  implied  in  this?     In  the  first  place,  he  saw 
it,  knew  of  its  existence,  or  he  would  not  have  made  mo- 
tions toward  it.     In  the  second  place,  he  cognized  it  as 
something  adapted  to  him  as  food.     He  has  in  his  mental 
constitution  an  appetite,  a  want,  which  causes  him  to  de- 
sire food,  and  which  has  in  its  mode  of  action  intimations 
of  that  which  is  adapted  to  the  supply  of  that  want.     If 
it  had  been  a  mouse,  or  a  toad,  or  a  kitten,  he  would  not 
have  moved  his  head  toward  it.     This  implies  compari- 
son,   discrimination,    and  judgments  of  form,  size,  and 
general  appearance.     If  it  happens  to  be  a  disabled  house- 
fly, after  he  has  taken  it  in  his  bill  the  odor  of  it  meets 
his  mind  in  the  gustatory   and  olfactory  nerves,  and  by 
other  senses  than  that  of  sight  he  cognizes  it  as  something 
adapted  to  his  subjective  want,  and  he  swallows  it.     If 
it  happened   to   be   a  young  potato  bug,  he  would  not 
through  the  sense  of  sight  discover  its  inadaptablity  to  his 
want,  and  perhaps  he  moves  his  head  toward  it,  but  if 
before  he  actually  seizes  it  its  odor  strikes  his  olfactory 
nerves,  he  quickly  withdraws  and  shakes  his  head  as  if 
to  get  rid  of  it.     If  he  does  not  discover  its  odor  till  he 
has  seized  it,  he  quickly  drops  it,  and  shakes  his  head  in 

disgust. 

From  this  example  it  appears  that  the  process  of  ob- 
taining a  knowledge  of  objective  things  is  not  a  difficult 
or  complicated  process.  It  seems  not  to  correspond  with 
any  of  the  explanations  which  philosophers  have  given  of 
the  process.  It  is  not  the  deduction  of  an  existence  from 
the  discovery  of  properties,  or  from  the  fact  of  resistance, 


200 


PROCESS   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


for  the  chicken  experiences  no  resistance  from  the  fly,  or 
the  mouse,  or  the  potato  bug.  It  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
perception  in  consciousness  of  the  self  and  the  not-self. 
It  seems  that  the  sense  of  sight  is  so  adjusted  and  adapted 
to  the  objective  that  through  the  image  of  light  from  the 
external  object,  met  by  the  mind  in  the  optic  nerve,  the 
object  is  known  as  an  existence,  and  its  form,  size,  and 
general  appearance  are  cognized,  and  by  its  odor  the 
chicken  cognized  in  the  olfactory  nerves  the  edible  quali- 
ties of  the  object. 

Take  this  chicken  now  and  place  him  near  a  hen  which 
is  caring  for  some  others  of  about  the  same  age.  This 
chicken  hears  the  cluck  of  the  hen,  and  immediately  runs 
toward  her.  He  cognizes  in  his  sense  of  hearing  that 
sound  as  the  call  of  the  mother  hen  for  her  young.  The 
subjective  preparation  and  adaptation  are  such  that  he 
knows  the  meaning  of  that  sound,  without  instruction 
and  without  experience,  the  first  time  he  hears  it. 

In  a  little  time  the  hen  sees  a  hawk  flying  overhead, 
and  she  screams  out  the  sound  of  alarm.  None  of  her 
chickens  have  ever  heard  that  sound  before,  but  they  cog- 
nize it  at  once,  and  know  its  meaning,  and  run  and  hide 
under  her  or  under  some  weeds  near  by.  The  subjective 
preparation  in  this  case  is  such  that  cognition  of  the 
meaning  of  the  objective  is  immediate  and  perfect. 

Take  another  case.  A  duck  has  been  hatched  among 
chickens  under  a  hen.  She  goes  about  with  the  others, 
eats  and  drinks  from  a  dish,  but  has  never  seen  water 
except  in  a  small  basin.  Some  weeks  pass,  during  which 
she  has  felt  a  longing  for  something  that  she  has  not 
found,  and  has  never  seen.  She  roams  about  in  search  of 
it.  She  believes  that  it  exists,  she  has  no  doubt  of  it, 
she  goes  forth  confident  in  her  search,  expecting  to  find 
it.  If  she  had  human  powers  of  deduction,  she  could 
from  her  subjective  desire  for  it  form  some  opinion  of  the 


AMONG   BRUTES. 


201 


nature  and  form  and  purpose  of  the  object  of  her  search. 
There  is  in  her  mind  an  intellectual  image,  type  of  that 
object.  She  certainly  knows  what  she  desires  to  do  with 
it;  if  too  long  a  time  passes  before  she  finds  it,  she  per- 
forms without  it  the  motions  she  desires  to  perform  in  it — 
she  goes  through  the  motions  of  swimming,  diving,  and 
flapping  her  wings  as  if  in  water,  when  she  is  still  on 
land.  At  last  she  meets  a  pond  of  water.  She  cognizes 
it  at  once  as  the  object  of  her  search.  It  corresponds 
with  the  thoughts  which  she  had  respecting  it  before  she 
met  it.  It  is  the  thing  she  was  looking  for.  She  had 
sufficiently  definite  ideas  of  it  before  she  met  it  to  enable 
her  to  cognize  it  at  once,  as  soon  as  the  image  of  light 
reflected  from  it  met  her  mind  in  the  retina  of  her  eye. 
She  does  not  hesitate  in  uncertainty  upon  the  brink;  she 
does  not  wait  to  verify  her  sight  perception  of  it  with  her 
other  senses;  she  does  not  stop  at  the  edge  of  the  water 
and  feel  of  it  with  her  foot  to  see  if  it  really  is  what  she 
has  conceived  it  to  be;  she  rushes  without  a  pause  into  it, 
as  confidently  as  an  old  sailor.  The  knowledge  of  this 
water  does  not  seem  to  be  an  inference  from  discovered 
properties,  nor  from  resistance,  nor  a  simultaneous  percep- 
tion in  consciousness  of  the  self  and  the  not-self.  I  do 
not  know  that  she  has  ever  thought  of  herself  as  existing, 
or  had  any  self  consciousness;  but  she  thought  of  water 
to  swim  and  bathe  and  play  in,  thought  of  it  before  she 
met  it  in  reality;  and,  on  meeting-it  she  immediately  cog- 
nized it  as  the  thing  she  had  been  thinking  about,  believ- 
ing in,  and  longing  for. 

One  more  example.  A  calf  that  is  a  few  hours  old  will 
^get  upon  his  feet  and  walk.  Here  he  is  in  relations  to 
the  objective  world.  The  motions  that  he  makes  in  get- 
ting upon  his  feet  are  determined  by  subjective  mental 
modes  born  in  him.  A  colt  in  first  getting  upon  his  feet 
does  not  make  the  same  motions,  nor  proceed  in  the  same 


202  PROCESS  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

way;  but  the  motions  this  calf  makes  are  common  to  all 
of  his  kind.     The  subjective  modes  which  direct  his  mo- 
tions imply  the   existence  of  the  ground  beneath  him. 
It  is  not  a  logical  deduction  from  his  instinct  to  walk, 
but  a  declaration  of  that  instinct,  a  declaration  of  the 
truthfulness  of  which  he  has  no  doubt.     It  is  no  compli- 
cated or  difficult  process  by  which  he  comes  to  know  the 
ground.     It  is  not  a  deduction  from    properties  or  from 
resistance.     It  is  simply  a  cognition  through  the  sense 
of  sight  and  touch  of  the  external  object  which  his  instinct 
implied,  anticipated,  foretold.     It  is  therefore  no  mystery, 
or  surprise  to  himself.     If  he   could  explain  his  mental 
act  at  this  time  he  would  say,  Of  course,  I  knew  from  my 
instinct  to  walk  that  there  was  ground  upon  which  I  could 
walk— my  instinct  declared  the  existence  of  the  ground. 
If  I  should  say  that  he  cognized  his  instinct,  and  cognized 
in  his  instinct  the  declaration  of  the  existence  of  its  object, 
I  supposed  I  would  be  stating  the  modern  theory  of  im- 
mediate perception,  but  I  do  not  suppose  that  he  reflects 
upon  his  instinct,  and  the  theory  seems  to  me  incomplete 
till  some  provision  be  made  by  which  this  subjective  declara- 
tion can  be  verified  by  actual  discovery.     I  do  not  sup- 
pose that  the  calf  has  any  conscious  thoughts  of  himself, 
or  that  his  instinct  is  to  him  an  object  of  reflection,  but  he 
instinctively  acts  out  his  impulse  in  its  relation  to  the  ex- 
ternal world,  and  as  soon  as  he  sees  or  touches  the  ground 
he  has  knowledge  of  it. 

The  calf  has  to  exert  himself  to  maintain  his  erect  posi- 
tion. He  extends  his  feet  laterally  to  widen  his  base,  and 
if  he  is  liable  to  fall,  hethrows  out  his  feet  in  that  direction. 
In  this  he  does  what  the  philosopher  would  do,  and  the 
philosopher  would  do  it  as  instinctively  as  he.  He  has 
not  discovered  gravity,  it  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge  to 
him,  because  none  of  his  senses  can  cognize  it,  but  he  has 
discovered  a  mode  of  energizing  upon  him  for  which  he 


AMONG   BRUTES. 


203 


is  mentally  prepared  beforehand  so  perfectly  that  he  acts 
in  reference  to  it  as  the  wisest  philosopher.  Only  an  in- 
tellectual being  who  can  deduce  a  doer  from  effects,  or 
from  energizing,  can  know  gravity,  and  some  will  not 
admit  that  this  is  knowledge. 

He  staggers  up  by  the  side  of  the  cow  in  search  of 
something.  He  has  not  much  trouble  in  finding  it.  He 
seems  to  have  in  his  mind  some  already  formed  ideas  of 
where  it  is  to  be  found,  on  what  part  of  the  cow's  body,  and 
its  position.  If  he  never  received  food  from  the  cow,  but 
is  fed  by  the  hand  of  man,  he  instinctively  places  his  head 
and  neck  in  the  position  and  shape  that  are  necessarj^  for 
obtaining  food  from  the  cow,  and  if  it  were  a  lamb  instead 
of  a  calf,  he  might  drop  on  to  his  knees  for  that  purpose. 
Here  again  we  see  the  subjective  preparation  for  and 
adaptation  to  the  objective  relative. 

As  soon  as  his  nose  touches  the  teat  he  cognizes  it  at 
once  as  the  object  of  his  search.  He  does  not  then  cog- 
nize it  through  its  properties  or  through  its  resistance,  but 
he  knows  it  as  the  thing  he  is  seeking.  In  order  to  cog- 
nize it  thus,  he  must  have  had  a  premonition  of  its  form 
and  feel,  a  subjective  anticipating  conception  of  it.  How 
did  he  know  it  when  he  touched  it  ?  How  did  his  antici- 
pating conception  of  it  become  knowledge?  He  found  it 
-where  his  premonition  located  it.  When  he  touched  it,  the 
reality  given  to  him  in  the  sense  of  touch  corresponded  per- 
fectly with  his  subjectively  anticipating  notion  of  it.  His  cog- 
nition of  it  is  very  much  like  our  re-cognition  of  something 
which  we  have  before  seen.  We  have  an  image  or  notion 
of  it  preserved  in  our  memory,  and  when  it  comes  again 
before  us  we  cognize  it  as  the  same  thing  because  of  its 
agreement  with  the  notion  of  it  preserved  in  our  memory. 
The  notion  which  the  calf  had  of  it  was  not  the  result  of 
fortner  discovery,  but  it  was  born  in  him,  created  in  the 


!f' 


204  PROCESS   OF   KNOWI.EDGE. 

first  of  his  kind,  and  transmitted  to  all  of  his  posterity 
according  to  the  laws  of  heredity. 

These  are  but  examples  of  the  general  process  by  which 
brutes  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  external  world.  These 
are  not  isolated  or  extraordinary  cases,  but  all  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  that  meets  the  mental  being  of  the  brute  in 
any  of 'his  senses,  meets  there  a  mental  likeness  or  correl- 
ative, and  the  object  is  known,  or  becomes  knowledge, 
by  its  agreement  with  the  already  existing  mental  notion 
of  it.  We  may  say,  then,  that  knowledge  is  the  dis- 
covered agreement  of  objective  things  with  already  exist- 
ing mental  modes  or  types: 

Our  inductions  thus  far  have  been  from  facts  discovered 
among  brutes.     Is  the  process  of  knowledge  in  man  any 
different?     The  human  young  are  not  provided  with  so 
many  strong  instincts  to  direct  their  actions.     They  are 
more  helpless,  and  are  left  more  dependent  upon  parental 
care.     Then  the  human  being  is  lifted  somewhat  out  of 
the  region  of  instinct  and  left  more  to  the  guidance  of 
reason.     But  in  all  our  observations  of  infants  we  can 
discover  no  difference  in  the  process  of  knowledge  betwen 
them  and  brutes.     Nor  can  we  at  the  time  that  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  world  is  obtained  claim  any  superior- 
ity or  greater  capability  in  the  human  young.     Indeed, 
during  the  first  few  days  or  even  weeks  of  life  some  brute 
young  seem  to  be  quite  superior  to  the  human  in  intellec- 
tual, as  well  as  in  physical  ability.     Nor  are  there  any 
differences  in  the  media  through  which  knowledge  is  ob- 
tained which  would  suggest  any  diflference  in  the  mental 
process.     The  organs  of  sight,  hearing,  taste  and  smell 
are  constructed  after  the  same  general  type. 

From  our  observed  facts  we  have  concluded  that  brutes 
have  certain  premonitions,  notions,  mental  forms,  corres- 
ponding with  objective  things,  which  prepare  them  for  the 
cognition  of  the  objective.     Are  there  any  evidences  that 


INBORN   MODES   OF  MIND.  205 

this  is  true  of  the  human  mind?  We  know,  that  we  have 
in  our  natures  such  as  those  which  we  have  been  observ- 
ing in  brutes,  and  some  of  these  are  manifested  in  infants 
before  experience.  From  both  our  observation  and  the 
study  of  consciousness  we  are  certain  that  our  generic  de- 
sires are  bom  in  us. 

Then  philosophers  have  in  all  ages  assigned  to  the  human 
mind  certain  inborn  characteristics,  native  modes  of  action, 
which  identify  it,  define  it,  and  distinguish  it  from  inani- 
mate things.  These  have  been  called  variously  inherent 
Tnodes  of  action,  desires,  propensities,  propensions,  incli- 
nations, dispositions,  laws  of  thought,  sentiments,  powers, 
faculties,  etc.  It  is  evident  that  these  are  more  than 
power  to  do,  they  are  inclinations  to  perform  some  specific 
acts.  They  all,  except  will,  have  external  objects.  Their 
<3)bjects  include  physical  things,  persons,  tangible  and  also 
intangible  qualities,  physical  and  also  logical  relations, 
time,  space,  and  spiritual  beings.  They  all  desire  to  act, 
desire  to  find  and  meet  their  objects.  In  this  sense  they 
are  all  desires. 

We  are  conscious  now  that  those  of  our  faculties,  or 
generic  desires  which  have  not  yet  met  their  objects  do 
desire  to  do  so.  We  know  also  from  our  consciousness 
that,  in  the  absence  of  their  objects,  we  do  form,  from  the 
nature  of  the  faculty  itself,  notions,  ideas  of  their  objects. 
Take  an  example:  Man  has  a  natural  desire  to  worship. 
The  real  object  of  worship  is  not  discoverable  by  our 
senses,  but  from  the  desire  itself  men  form  notions  of  its 
object.  In  the  first  place,  men  know  from  the  faculty  it- 
self what  feelings  should  enter  into  the  acts  of  worship — 
reverence,  fear,  love,  self-depreciation,  submission,  sup- 
plication— these  have  entered  into  the  worship  of  all 
nations,  under  all  religious  systems.  In  the  second  place, 
men  form  opinions  from  the  faculty  itself  respecting  the 
physical  acts  which  properly  express  the  sentiment  of  wor- 


2o6 


PROCESS  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


ship      The  bowed  head,   kneeling,  and  prostration,  are 
common  to  all  religions  in  all  ages.     In  the  third  place, 
men  do,  from  the  faculty  itself,  form  ideas,  notions  of  the 
being  to  be  worshiped.     He  must  be  a  being  worthy  of 
worship;  he  must  be  great,  powerful,  superhuman,  good, 
just,  kind  to  the  obedient,  and  severe  toward  the  disobe- 
dient.    As  all  men  are  conscious  of  disobedience  and  de- 
merit,   and  as  the  unaided  mind  discovers  no  accepted 
intercessor  and  divine  Redeemer,  all  religions  outside  of 
Christianity  consist  more  of  fear  than  of  love.     If  the  ob- 
ject of  this  faculty  is  not  revealed  to  any  people  they  fix 
their  minds  upon  the  greatest  and  most  worthy  object 
known  to  them,  and  pour  out  their  devotions  to  it.     But 
after  all,  the  object  thus  fixed  upon  does  not  fill  out  the 
measure  of  the  ideal  fonned  from  the  faculty  itself— they 
are  conscious  of  its  incompleteness  and  incongruities,  it  is 
not  entirely  satisfactory  to  them.     The  ideals  formed  firom 
the  faculty  prepare  mankind  for  the  reception  of  the  real 
God  when  He  is  brought  before  them  in  a  divine  revela- 
tion     The  object  of  worship  there  presented  to  mankind 
agrees  with  the  notions  and  ideals  of  Him,  and  perfectly 

satisfies  this  want.  ,  •  t.  t. 

Such  is  the  nature  of  many  of  our  faculties  which  have 
already  met  their  objects  that  we  are  certain  that  if  they 
had  not  met  their  objects,  we  would  long  for  them,  seek 
for  them,  and  form  ideals  of  them.     If  an  infant  could 
grow  up  on  an  island  without  ever  meeting  a  human  being, 
he  would  long  for  the  object  of  his  social  sentiments,— he 
would  roam  over  the  hills  and  valleys  of  his  island  home 
in  search  of  their  object,  he  would  form  ideals  of  it  from 
the  nature  of  the  faculties  themselves,  and  if  he  should  at 
last  meet  it,  he  would  cognize  it  at  once  as  the  object  of 
his  search.     He  would  cognize  it  because  of  its  correspond- 
ence with  his  ideals  of  it,  because  of  its  agreement  with 


SUBJECTIVE  TYPES.  207 

the  inborn  modes  of  action  of  these  faculties,  with  the  sub- 
jective type  of  being  which  these  faculties  declare. 

These  subjective  thought- forms  growing  out  of  the 
modes  of  the  faculties,  which  I  have  called  ideals  of  ex- 
ternal things,  are  sometimes  called  norms.  I  have  called 
them  ideals  only  because  that  is  a  more  familiar  and  gen- 
erally better  understood  word.  The  subjective  forms  may 
be  called  types,  and  the  objective  things  antitypes.  Kant 
so  far  prepared  the  way  for  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the 
correct  explanation  of  the  process  of  knowledge.  But  as 
he  denied  extension  to  the  mind,  and  had  it  locked  up  in 
some  deep  recess  of  the  brain,  he  could  not  contrive  any 
way  by  which  the  subjective  norms  and  their  objective 
antitypes  could  be  brought  into  the  necessary  relation  to 
constitute  knowledge. 

It  has  been  often  said  that  man  can  know  only  such 
things  as  he  has  faculties  for  knowing.  There  may  be 
many  things  and  properties  and  relations  outside  of  mind 
of  which  there  are  no  types  within  mind  ;  of  these  man 
can  never  have  knowledge,  nor  even  thoughts  respecting 
them.  They  are  to  him  as  God  and  worship  are  to  the 
brute  who  has  no  worshiping  faculty.  Man  has  in  his 
own  nature  the  subjective  norms  which  prepare  him  to 
know  every  external  thing  which  it  is  possible  for  him  to 
know,  or  if  not  of  that  precise  thing,  of  the  class  of  things 
with  which  this  can  be  associated. 

I  will  specify  some  of  the  faculties  which  subjectively 
prepare  man  for  the  perception  of  the  objective.  Among 
these  is  form.  Man  has  inborn  in  his  nature  a  faculty 
which  gives  him  ideas  of  form,  which  enables  him  to  cog- 
nize form  in  things,  which  leads  him  to  anticipate  and  look 
for  form  in  things,  which  declares  the  existence  of  form  in 
objective  things.  The  infant  mind  anticipates  a  world  of 
forms  around  him.  If  a  man  thinks  of  a  thing  he  has 
never  seen,  or  of  an  imaginary  being,  he  involuntarily 


i 


208 


PROCESS   OP   KNOWLEDGE. 


gives  it  some  form.  He  does  not  feel  that  he  has  a  satis- 
factory conception  of  a  thing  till  he  has  ascertained  its 
form,  and  been  able  to  construct  an  image  of  it  in  his 

mind. 

He  has  another  faculty  by  which  he  cognizes  size,  di- 
mension, extension,  and  which  enables  him  to  form  judg- 
ments of  relative  size.  In  consequence  of  this  he  is  dis- 
posed to  give  some  specific  dimensions  to  things  and  per- 
sons of  which  he  has  only  heard. 

Another  faculty  enables  him  to  cognize  color,  light,  the 
various  forms  of  light,  and  the  diversities  of  color. 

By  another  faculty  he  cognizes  number, — it  enables  him 
to  count,  makes  a  mathematical  being  of  him. 

Another  faculty,  which  has  been  by  some  denominated 
** weight,"  and  by  others  "the  sense  of  force,"  enables 
him  to  cognize  resistance,  energy,  force,  and  enables  him 
to  form  judgments  of  the  relative  strength  of  different  man- 
ifestations of  energy. 

Another  faculty,  which  has  been  denominated  "indi- 
viduality, ' '  views  things  as  concrete  individuals,  without 
any  thought  of  their  relations, — regards  each  as  an  indi- 
vidual without  reference  to  any  other  thing,  with  its 
boundaries  in  space,  and,  if  appearances  seem  to  so  indi- 
cate, its  limits  in  time.  The  relativity  of  knowledge  is 
the  knowledge  of  mature  and  learned  philosophers,  and 
not  of  infant  minds  in  perception ;  and  the  impossibility 
of  conceiving  of  a  beginning  is  an  impossibility  discov- 
ered in  the  reflections  of  the  philosopher,  and  not  in  the 
unreflective  perceptions  of  immaturity.  Things  as  indi- 
viduals do  have  their  boundaries  in  space  and  their  limits 
in  time,  and  when  man  conceives  them  in  the  exercise  of 
this  faculty  he  so  conceives  them,  without  any  inquiry-  of 
the  before  or  after.  This  faculty  also  implies,  foretells, 
and  declares  the  existence  of  substance. 

It  is  probably  in  the  exercise  of  this  faculty  that  man's 


OBJECTIVE   RELATIVES.  20g 

first  perceptions  of  the  objective  world  are  formed.  Things, 
and  not  relations  or  properties,  are  first  conceived.  The 
thing  is  discovered  before  its  form,  size,  and  color  are 
thought  of.  The  first  thought  is  of  thing,  and  form;  size, 
and  color  are  after  thoughts,  especially  when  two  or  more 
things  are  discovered,  and  the  process  of  discrimination 
through  comparison  commences. 

The  foregoing  faculties  connect  man  with  the  physical 
world,  and  enable  him  to  perceive  physical  things.  But 
things  do  exist  in  relations,  and  man  himself  exists  in  re- 
lations to  other  beings.  For  th€  perception  and  regula- 
tion of  these  relations  man  has  other  faculties.  These 
faculties,  like  the  former,  imply,  suggest,  and  foretell  the 
objective  existence  of  certain  relations.  Things  may  be 
related  to  each  other  in  waj^s  that  we  can  not  discover,  of 
which  we  can  form  no  conceptions, — we  can  discover  only 
such  relations  as  have  a  corresponding  subjective  mode  in 
our  minds. 

One  of  these  subjective  modes,  or  faculties,  is  called 
comparison.  It  suggests,  foretells,  and  enables  man  to 
conceive  likeness,  difference,  and  identity.  It  does  not, 
as  some  have  said,  impose  these  relations  upon  things,  but 
these  relations  really  existing  in  external  things,  this  fac- 
ulty cognizes  them,  causes  man  to  desire  to  discover  them, 
leads  him  to  anticipate  them, — they  are  antitypes  of  which 
the  types  exist  in  the  mind.  This  faculty,  employing  the 
faculties  of  form,  size,  and  color,  enables  man  to  distin- 
guish one  thing  from  another. 

Another  faculty  cognizes  the  dual  relations — cause  and 
effect,  doer  and  doing,  motion  and  mover,  substance  and 
property,  and  all  other  relations  where  one  thing  is  de- 
pendent upon  another  for  its  existence. 

Another  faculty  cognizes  time,  enables  man  to  form 
judgments  of  the  lapse  of  time,  measure  time  into  equal 
periods,  as  in  music,  to  know  the  relations  of  before  and 


2IO 


PROCESS   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


\i 


after,  and  all  other  time  relations,  and  to  cognize  limited 
and  measured  periods  of  time. 

Another  faculty  takes  cognizance  of  space,  and  enables 
man  to  form  judgments  of  direction  and  distance,  and  all 
other  space  relations,  and  to  know  limited  and  measured 
portions  of  space. 

There  are  other  faculties  which  cognize  other  objective 
relations — love  of  beauty,  which  requires  things  and  parts 
of  things  to  be  so  related  as  to  constitute  beauty ;  love  of 
order,  which  requires  that  things  be  related  in  an  orderly 
manner,  love  of  music,  which  requires  sound  in  musical 
relations,  etc. ,  but  as  I  am  not  writing  a  psychology,  only 
bringing  examples  to  illustrate  the  process  we  are  consid- 
ering, I  need  not  mention  more. 

The  faculties  all  have  within  them,  in  their  mode  of  ac- 
tion, types  of  which  the  antitypes  exist  in  the  outer  world. 
When  the  outer  world  meets  the  mind  in  the  organs  of 
sense,  the  type  and  antitype  become  one  in  knowledge,  or 
the  result  is  knowledge. 

I  have  already  mentioned  one  other  fact  respecting  these 
mental  modes  or  faculties,  viz. ,  that  each  faculty  declares 
beforehand  the  existence  of  its  objective  relative.  Whether 
the  object  be  substance,  properties,  or  relations,  the  faculty 
itself  declares  before  the  object  is  met  that  it  does  exist  in 
the  objective  world.  This  declaration  is  to  the  being  in 
whose  mind  the  declaration  exists  sufficient  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  the  object  to  give  him  a  confident  and 
undoubting  belief;  just  as  the  appetite  of  the  calf  declared 
the  existence  of  food  before  he  had  found  it,  and  sent  him 
forth  in  confident  search  of  it,  just  as  the  subjective  want 
of  the  duck  declared  the  existence  of  water  to  swim  in 
before  she  found  it ;  just  as  the  social  sentiments  of  our 
supposed  lone  man  declared  the  existence  of  other  beings 
like  him.  Every  man  instinctively  believes  in  and  trusts 
these  subjective  declarations.     The  man  has  no  doubt  of 


SUBJECTIVE  DECLARATIONS.  211 

the  existence  of  the  things  thus  subjectively  declared,  un- 
less after  long  search  he  fails  to  find  them,  and  even  then 
he  does  not  give  up  belief,  unless  doubt  coincides  with  his 
wishes.  Even  then,  though  he  may  intellectually  doubt, 
he  instinctively  acts  when  off  his  guard  according  to  that 

belief. 

These  subjective  declarations  of  the  existence  of  object- 
ive things  are  what  have  been  called  intuitions.     An  in- 
tuition is  a  belief  arising  in  the  mind  itself,— the  declara- 
tions of  the  inborn  modes  of  action  that  some  objective 
thing  or  attribute  or  relation  exists  in  the  objective  world. 
Knowledge  is  verified  intuitions,  or  intuitions  proven  by 
the  actual  discovery  of  their  objects.     The  intuitions  which, 
spring  from  the  faculties  which  relate  man  directly  to  the 
physical  world  are  verified  so  early  that  we  are  not  gen- 
erally conscious  of  their  existence  before  their  objects  are 
met,  or  we  have  no  memory  of  their  action  before  they 
were  merged  into  knowledge.     An  intuition  alone  is  a 
sufficient  basis  for  belief,  an  intuition  verified  by  discovery 
through  the  senses,  or  by  some  other  means,  becomes- 

knowledge. 

But  there  are  intuitions  whose  objects  cannot  be  discov- 
ered by  the  senses,  (i)  because  the  object  is  not  within 
reach,    (2)  because  the  object  has  no  attributes  cognizable 
by  the  senses.     Of  this  latter  class  are  the  intuitions  of 
time  and  space.     We  have  faculties  which  declare  their 
existence,— that  is,  we  have  intuitions  of  them,  but  time 
and  space  have  no  form,  size,  color,  or  other  properties 
cognizable  by  our  senses,  and  no  substance,  hence  our  in- 
tuitions of  them  can  be  only  partially  verified.     The  intu- 
ition  of  space  is  partially  verified  by  the   discovery  of 
limited  and  bounded  portions  of  space.     These  bounded 
portions  of  space  are  a  verified  intuition— knowledge— and 
they  are  just  as  real  existence  to  us  as  the  matter  that 
bounds  them.     The  walls  of  this  room  are  no  more  ob- 


212 


PROCESS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


If 


jectively  real  to  me  than  the  portion  of  space  which  they 
inclose,  ^he  intuition  of  time  is  partially  verified  by  the 
discovery  of  marked  and  measured  off  periods.  We  know 
a  year,  a  day,  an  hour,  just  as  well  as  we  do  a  mountain, 
a  tree,  a  house.  Though  our  intuitions  of  space  and  time 
as  wholes  cannot  be  verified  nor  their  objects  perfectly 
comprehended,  yet  every  one  knows  the  meaning  of  these 
words,  and  there  are  no  thoughts  more  familiar  or  more 
easily  understood,  even  in  childhood,  than  thoughts  of 
time  and  space. 

We  have  other  unverifiable  intuitions — of  right  and 
wrong  in  conduct,  of  duty  and  obligation,  growing  out  of 
conscience ;  of  spirit  beings,  immortality,  and  God.  Though 
these  intuitions  are  not  verifiable  by  the  senses,  yet  all 
men  have  thoughts  of  their  objects,  and  they  are  partially 
verifiable  by  the  testimony  of  other  intuitions,  by  the  ex- 
perience of  mankind  in  society,  and  by  some  objective 
probabilities.  Men  do  not  doubt  the  existence  of  their 
objects  till  they  turn  away  from  these  subjective  witnesses, 
refuse  to  admit  their  testimony,  and  look  for  objective  evi- 
dence, and  refuse  to  consider  this  satisfactory,  and  end  at 
last  in  a  morass  of  eternal  darkness.  The  want  for  food 
is  scarcelj^  a  more  imperaitive  want  to  man  than  the  want 
for  a  divine  object  of  worship  and  trust.  The  fact  is  the 
subjective  declarations  of  the  faculties,  the  intuitions,  have 
in  all  ages  determined,  and  will  in  all  future  ages  mainlj'- 
determine  human  opinions  and  belief 

The  upverifiable  intuitions  growing  out  of  the  faculties 
of  comparison  and  causality  are  in  philosophy  of  great 
importance.  They  are  the  processes  and  highways  of 
nearly  all  philosophy.  We  have  already  mentioned  the 
verifiable  intuitions  of  comparison — likeness,  difference, 
and  identity — but  besides  these  there  are  the  intuitions  of 
•classification  and  unity,  and  unity  applied  to  being  is  the 
law  of  continuity,  applied  to  space  it  is  infinity,  and  ap- 


INTUITIOUS. 


213 


plied  to  time  it  is  eternity.  The  philosophy  of  the  condi- 
tioned is  thought  traveling  in  the  paths  marked  out  by  the 
intuitions  of  comparison,  and  Sir  William  Hamilton  says 
there  is  no  other  philosophy.  This  is  why  his  philosophy, 
notwithstanding  his  acuteness  and  erudition,  is  so  unsatis- 
factory— it  is  like  a  man  trying  to  walk  with  only  one  leg. 
He  is  able  to  give  us  no  satisfactory  account  of  the  causal 
relation,  it  is  frittered  away,  and  made  to  mean  only  our 
inability  to  conceive  of  a  beginning. 

We  have  already  stated  that  the  intuitions  of  causality 
include  all  dual  relations,  all  cases  where  one  is  dependent 
upon  another  for  its  existence.  This  faculty  declares  that 
its  objective  relative  does  exist,  that  the  relation  of  neces- 
sary dependence  does  exist  among  objective  things,  that 
both  the  dependent  and  that  upon  which  it  depends  do 
exist.  When,  therefore,  we  discover  only  one  of  these 
thus  related  objects,  this  intuition  declares  the  existence 
of  the  other.  On  the  discovery  of  the  dependent,  it  de- 
clares the  existence  of  that  upon  which  it  depends,  even 
when  it  cannot  be  discovered  by  any  other  means.  Hence 
it  is  said  by  all  philosophers  who  use  this  intuition  that  an 
effect  declares  the  existence  of  a  cause. 

This  is  an  intuition  quite  as  important  in  philosophy  as 
the  intuition  of  unity;  they  must  both  go  hand  in  hand. 
Both  thrust  us  out  where  our  senses  cannot  go,  into  the 
regions  of  the  super-sensuous,  into  the  undiscovered  realms, 
of  the  infinite.     We  must  take  both  these  intuitions  as. 
declarations  of  the  truth,  though  but  partially  verifiable.. 
The  intuition  of  unity  is  partially  verified  by  the  discovery 
of  universal  likeness,  pointing  to  one.     The  intuition  of 
causality  is  partially  verified  by  our  consciousness  of  our- 
selves as  causes  and  the  effects  of  other  causes  upon  us. 

In  confirmation  of  the  truthfulness  of  our  intuitions- 
there  is  opportunity  here  for  a  generalization,  after  the- 
manner  of  scientists.    All  our  intuitions  which  relate  us. 


214 


PROCESS   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


to  the  physical  world  are  found  by  discovery  to  be  declara- 
tions of  the  truth  ;  only  those  which  relate  us  to  the  super- 
sensuous  are  left  unverified  by  discovery.  If  so  many  of 
our  intuitions  are  proven  to  be  declarations  of  the  truth, 
we  have  good  logical  ground  for  the  generalization  that 
all  of  them  are  declarations  of  truth. 

The  question,  What  of  the  physical  world  does  man 
know?  has  engaged  the  attention  of  philosophers  through 
the  ages.  We  have  anticipated  this  question  to  some  ex- 
tent in  the  foregoing  discussions.  The  two  opinions — that 
mind  is  not  extended  and  that  man  does  not  know  sub- 
stance— have  gone  hand  in  hand  through  the  centuries. 
It  seems  presumptuous  for  any  ordinary  man  to  question 
opinions  so  venerable  and  supported  by  so  great  authority  ; 
but  we  know  that  grave  mistakes  have  been  made,  and 
that  opinions  have  been  long  entertained  that  have  at  last 
been  found  to  be  errors.  In  science  opinions  are  valued 
most  for  their  newness,  in  metaphysics,  for  their  antiquity. 
But  other  opinions  have  changed,  and  I  think  some  hoary 
psychological  opinions  must  give  way  before  there  can  be 
any  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  process  of  knowledge. 
There  is  a  tendency  in  the  latter  physiologies  to  locate 
mind  in  all  parts  of  the  body.  Ufe  is  certainly  limited 
only  by  the  limits  of  the  body,  and  certain  physiological 
processes  are  going  on  in  all  parts,  some  of  them  con- 
nected with  consciousness  in  the  brain,  and  some  of  them 
without  such  connection.  I  have,  in  common  with  many 
physiologists,  assumed  that  the  mind  occupies  the  whole 
body,  and  it  follows  of  course  that  the  mind  is  extended. 

I  now  take  the  further  step  that  man  does  know  sub- 
stance. In  chapter  third  I  mentioned  two  modes  by  which 
we  arrive  at  the  existence  of  substance — deducing  it  from 
properties  and  from  doing— but  this  is  only  inferential 
knowledge,  and,  however  satisfactory  it  may  be  to  the  in- 
dividual, it  is  not  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  actual  dis- 


THROUGH   RESISTANCE. 


215 


covery.     I  now  express  the  opinion  that  man  discovers 
material  substance  immediately  by  the  sense  of  touch. 

Formerly  it  was  declared  that  we  know  only  properties 
and  relations.  Our  knowledge  consisted  of  bundles  of 
properties,  and  the  relations  of  those  bundles  to  each  other. 
It  was  claimed  that  we  do  not  know  any  reality  under- 
lying properties.  If  any  such  exists,  it  was  thought  to  be 
entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  discovery,  to  us  unknown. 
To  this  it  was  answered  that  a  necessary  mode  of  our 
minds  compels  us  to  place  substance  beneath  every  prop- 
erty ;  hence  we  know,  not  merely  properties,  but  sub- 
stances through  their  properties.  But  still  this  was  only 
inferential  knowledge. 

More  recently  resistance  is  said  to  be  that  which  we  dis- 
cover through  our  senses.     Every  thing  is  '  *  dynamic ' '  in 
these  days.     All  we  discover  of  the  objective  world  is  re- 
sistance.    We  do  not  know  whether  there  is  any  thing 
back  of  resistance  or  not ;  if  there  is  any  thing,  it  is  to  us 
unknowable,  and  we  cannot  say  whether  it  is  matter  or 
spirit  or  force,  or  what  it  is.     To  this  it  was  answered,  as 
before,  that  a  necessary  mode  of  our  minds  compels  us  to 
place  behind  resistance  a  resister,— we  cannot  separate  re- 
sistance from  thing  resisting.     What  we  know,  then,  is 
not  resistance,  but  thing  resisting.     This  is  no  doubt  true, 
but  still  it  is  only  deductive  or  inferential  knowledge.  We 
meet  with  resistance,  and  deduce  from  this  a  thing  re- 
sisting. 

Notwithstanding  I  have  the  utmost  confidence  in  the 
process  of  deducing  substance  from  properties,  and  a  thing 
resisting  from  resistance,  I  do  not  believe  that  this  is  the 
only  way  we  obtain  a  knowledge  of  matter.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  such  a  generalization  as  resistance  is  first  formed 
in  the  infant  mind.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  infant  mind 
commences  its  activities  with  deductions.  Deductions  and 
generalizations  are  the  work  of  mature  years.    Thing  is 


2i6  PROCESS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

the  subject,  the  primary  thought,  and  the  beginning  of 
knowledge.     As  we  begin  our  instruction  to  our  children 
with  names  of  things,  so  nature  begins  her  culture  with 
things.     We  do  not  first  teach  our  children  words  express- 
ing motion  or  comparison,  but  names.     Much  more,  we 
do  not  first  teach  them  predicates,  abstractions,  deductions, 
generalizations,  conjunctions,  or  any  other  relations.  These 
are  the  last  that  we  find  them  capable  of  comprehending. 
If  we  should  undertake  to  reverse  the  order  of  our  teach- 
ing, we  would  come  in  conflict  with  nature,  and  fail. 
Nature   is  too  wise  to  undertake  such  an  unreasonable 
course,  and  if  she  should  undertake  it,  she  too  would  fail. 
If  mental  action  commences  with  the  use  of  the  intui- 
tion of  the  dual  relations,  by  deducing  from  properties  or 
from  resistance  tangible  things,  the  process  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  matter  is  the  same  as  that  by  which  we  know 
invisible  causes,  intangible  doers,  and  spirit  beings.     Why 
then  have  we  any  clearer  knowledge  of  material  bodies 
than  we  have  of  immaterial  causes  and  spirit  beings.     Do 
we  not  feel  that  we  have  a  more  real  and  positive  knowl- 
edge of  material  bodies  than  we  have  of  immaterial  causes  ? 
Why,  if  we  know  them  by  precisely  the  same  process  ? 

But  let  us  return  to  our  observations.     How  did  the 
chicken  know  the  disabled  housefly  which  crawled  on  the 
floor  before  him?     Did  he  feel  resistance,  and  infer  from 
that  a  thing  resisting  ?     How  did  the  duck  know  the  pond 
of  water  before  she  had  touched  it  ?     Did  she  feel  resist- 
ance, and  infer  from  that  a  thing  resisting?    When  the 
calf's  nose  touched  the  cow's  teat,  did  he  formulate  in  his 
mind  the  idea  of  resistance,  and  infer  from  that  a  thing 
resisting  ?    Take  another  case,  a  new-born  infant.     After 
suitable  preparation,  he  is  laid  quietly  and  comfortably  to 
rest.     He  sleeps  a  few  hours.     He  has  not  been  fed.     He 
is  stirred,  awakened,  but  he  does  not  open  his  eyes.     A 
wet-nurses  nipple  is  made  to  lightly  touch  his  lips.     He 


NOT  THROUGH   RESISTANCE. 


217 


opens  his  mouth  and  perhaps  turns  his  head  from  side  to 
side,  as  if  in  search  of  something.  He  knows  something 
has  touched  him ;  he  has  discovered  something.  He  knows 
nothing  about  its  properties  ;  he  has  not  thought  whether 
it  is  round  or  square,  white  or  black,  hard  or  soft ;  his 
only  idea  is  thing.  He  has  not  thought  of  resistance,  or 
thing  resisting.  It  has  touched  his  lips  so  lightly  as  not 
to  indent  them.  Then  resistance  can  be  conceived  only 
as  reaction  against  conscious  muscular  exertion.  He  has 
discovered,  not  properties  or  resistance,  but  thing.  What 
of  the  thing  has  he  discovered  ?  Not  attributes,  not  rela- 
tions, what  else  is  there  of  thing  but  substance  ?  He  has 
discovered  a  space-filling  thing,  substance,  and  nothing  else. 

Then  what  do  we  now  think  of  in  contact  with  the  ma- 
terial world?  If  I  run  against  a  post  in  a  dark  night, 
what  do  I  think  of,  properties  ?  resistance  ? — it  resists  me 
certainly,  but  is  that  what  I  think  of?  My  thought  is  of 
post,  hard,  solid  post.  What  does  the  farmer  plow,  prop- 
erties, resistance,  thing  resisting?  or  earth,  space-filling 
existence,  substance?  What  does  the  woodsman  chop 
with  his  axe,  properties,  resistance  ?  or  tree,  a  space-filling 
thing,  substance  ?  What  does  the  well-digger  throw  up 
out  of  the  earth,  properties,  resistance,  thing  resisting  ?  or 
earth,  space-filling  matter,  substance?  If  a  grain  of  sand 
gets  into  a  man's  eye,  he  does  not  think  of  properties,  or 
resistance,  or  thing  resisting,  but  he  is  pretty  sure  that 
there  is  a  hard,  solid  "lump"  there.  May  be  that  there 
is  no  space  filling  thing  there ;  may  be  he  does  not  know 
that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  matter ;  may  be  there  is 
only  an  ideal  world  surrounding  us,  may  be  it  is  only  re- 
sisting centers  of  force ;  may  be  it  is  only  God  energizing, 
— that  is,  that  it  is  God  hurting  him ;  but  he  is  pretty 
sure  that  there  is  a  hard,  solid  lump  there,  a  space-filling 
thing,  substance,  and  he  knows  it  as  such. 

The  ideal  philosophers  have  led  us  quite  away  from  our 


2i8  PROCESS  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

real  experience,  into  an  imaginary  world,  into  a  state  of 
being  quite  transcending  the  state  of  mortals.     Let  us  get 
back  onto  terra  firma.     Mankind  do  know  matter,  know 
matter  as  hard,  solid,  space-filling  existence— that  is,  sub- 
stance, know  its  substance  by  actual  contact,  mind  in  con- 
tact with  matter,  mind  in  immediate  contact  with  substance, 
know  it  first,  know  it  better  than  they  know  any  thing 
else,  before  and  better  even  than  they  know  themselves- 
Because  of  the  certainty  of  our  knowledge  of  matter,  be- 
cause we  do  constantly  touch  and  handle  and  know  the 
hard,  solid  substance  of  matter,  all  idealizing  and  spirit- 
ualizing of  matter,  all  theories  of  it  which  make  it  to  be 
any  thing  different  from  what  we  know  it  by  our  experi- 
ence to  be,  are  most  incongruous  nonsense  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind.     I  think  those  philosophers  who  really 
desire  to  vindicate  the  attainability  of  truth  and  the  valid- 
ity of  our  knowledge,  have  conceded  quite  too  much  to, 
and  prepared  the  way  too  well  for,  the  agnosticism  of  this 

afife. 

If  the  two  new  doctrines  here  presented— that  mind  is 

extended  and  fills  the  whole  body,  and  that  we  do  know 
substance— are  true,  what  becomes  of  all  the  mist  and 
mystery  and  uncertainty  respecting  our  knowledge  of  the 
material  world,  and  what  becomes  of  all  those  complicated 
contrivances  devised  to  explain  the  how  of  knowledge  ? 
The  process  of  knowledge  becomes  plain  and  simple  and 
easy,  just  as  it  must  be  to  be  within  the  competence  of 
brutes  and  infants  and  children,  and  the  material  worid 
and  our  knowledge  of  it  become  in  philosophy,  just  what 
they  are  in  practical  life  to  every  person,  real  and  certain. 
I  am  not  disposed  to  weaken  or  invalidate  our  knowledge 
obtained  by  the  process  of  deducing  doers  from  doings. 
The  adult  may  do  this,  but  not  infants.     Our  knowledge 
of  the  material  worid  is  certainly  obtained  through  a  pro- 
cess which  is  easier,  more  direct,  and  more  simple  than 


WHAT   DO  WE   KNOW? 


219 


that.  In  science  the  test  of  a  theory  is  its  competence  to 
explain  the  related  phenomena.  According  to  that  test 
no  other  theory  of  perception  yet  divised  can  stand  in  the 
same  neighborhood  with  this. 

Through  the  sense  of  touch  we  know  material  substance 
first.  By  this  sense  man  subsequently  knows  certain  con- 
tingent properties  of  substances ;  such  as  hardness,  soft- 
ness, roughness,  smoothness,  etc.  There  are  real  facts 
concerning  material  substances,  facts  which  are  immedi- 
ately perceived  by  mind  in  contact  with  matter. 

The  sense  of  taste  is  the  mind  residing  and  acting  in  the 
gustatory  nerves  through  their  whole  length,  especially 
concentrated  in  the  tongue,  palate,  and  fauces.  If  we  take 
into  the  mouth  a  lump  of  sugar,  we  perceive  its  presence 
by  the  sense  of  touch.  The  mind  in  the  sense  of  taste 
does  not  cognize  it  at  all  until  some  of  it  is  dissolved. 
When  it  is  dissolved,  some  of  it  enters  into  the  minute 
cells  in  the  organs  of  taste,  and  there  comes  into  imme- 
diate contact  with  mind  in  the  gustatory  nerves,  and  some 
of  its  properties  are  there  immediately  cognized.  The 
sugar  is  then  a  liquid  not  distinguishable  by  sight  or  touch 
from  the  saliva  with  which  it  is  mingled,  but  taste  now 
perceives  certain  of  its  properties.  No  representative  of 
the  sugar,  or  of  any  of  its  properties,  is  conveyed  by  any 
means  to  the  brain.  The  mind,  as  the  sense  of  taste,  in 
the  mouth  perceives  a  property  of  the  sugar  which  we  have 
named  sweet.  The  sweet  is  not  a  thrill,  or  a  vibration,  or 
any  thing  else  in  the  nerve  conveyed  to  the  brain.  The 
word  is  not  the  name  of  a  certain  act  of  mind  which  en- 
sues after  certain  vibrations  have  reached  it.  It  is  the 
name  of  a  property  of  the  substance,  a  property  which  the 
mind  then  immediately  perceives.  All  the  properties  that 
are  known  through  the  sense  of  taste  are  real  properties 
of  the  substances  placed  in  the  mouth,  and  they  are  im- 
mediately perceived  by  the  mind  there. 


220  PROCESS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

The  sense  of  smell  is  the  mind  acting  in  and  through 
the  nerves  which  terminate  in  the  membranesof  the  nose. 
J  fntensest  seat  is  there,  but  it  extends  through    he 
whole  length  of  the  nerves  to  the  brain.     The  odors  which 
this  sense^r  the  mind-there  perceives,  are  real  proper- 
ties of  substances.     Particles  of  some  vapors  are  suffi- 
cientlv  fine  to  enter  into  the  cells  in  those  membranes, 
and  there  are  in  direct  contact  with  mind  in  those  nerves, 
and  Ihe  mind  there  perceives  certain  of  the.r  properties 
The  particles  of  other  vapors  enter  into  these  cells,  but 
this  sense  perceives  none  of  their  properties,  because  they 
have  no  properties  which  correspond  with  the  m^es  of 
action  of  miid  in  this  sense,  and  we  call  them  inodorous 
substances.   Taste  and  smell  often  perceive  the  same  prop- 

"in  the  process  of  seeing  the  immediate  perception  is  of 
forms  of  that  immaterial  substance  which  we  call  light. 
This  substance  moves  by  its  own  energy  away  from  bodies 
in  the  outline  forms  of  those  bodies,  and  those  forms  of 
visible  immaterial  substance  picture  those  forms  on  the 
retina  of  the  eye,  and  there  come  in  immediate  contact 
^ith  mind  in  the  optic  nerve.     The  mind  there  perceives 
the  forms  of  light  which  enter  the  eye    perceives  the^r 
forms,  their  color  kinds  if  they  are  made  up  of  decom- 
posed light,  and  the  shading,  or  different  degrees  of  in- 
tensity of  light  in  different  parts  of  those  images.     These 
Serent  degrees  of  intensity  of  the  light  in  different  parts 
ithe  imag'e  furnish  materials  by  which  the  child  learns 
to  form  judgments  of  form  other  than  outhnes.     Convex- 
ity, concavity,  irregularities  in  surface  distance  both  of 
different  objects  and  of  different  parts  of  the  same  object, 
-the  whole  art  of  perspective  is  probably  learned  by  ex- 
perience.   As  far  as  the  external  object  is  concerned,  this 
I  a  case  of  mediate  perception.    The  image  of  the  object 
enters  the  eye,  and  is  there  perceived.    The  immediate 


THE  SENSES. 


221 


perception  is  of  forms  of  light.  The  child  soon  learns,  by 
the  help  of  the  other  senses,  that  these  images  represent 
material  bodies,  or  such  may  be  the  adapted  preparation 
of  mind  that  the  thought  of  corresponding  objective  phy- 
sical bodies  arises  from  the  simple  perception  of  these 
images.  Such  would  seem  to  be  the  case  in  the  examples 
of  the  chicken  and  the  fly,  and  the  duck  and  the  water, 
mentioned  in  preceding  pages.  In  the  course  of  time  the 
child  acquires  skill  in  forming  from  these  images  judg- 
ments of  the  relative  size,  and  distance,  and  structural 
peculiarities  of  bodies  which  the  immaterial  images  rep- 
resent. 

In  the  sense  of  hearing  the  immediate  perception  is  of 
vibrations.  Here  is  one  case  where  what  the  mind  per- 
ceives is  vibrations.  Hence  this  is  always  taken  as  the 
illustration  of  the  vibration  theory  of  perception.  When 
it  was  thought  that  images  of  things  were  conveyed  to 
the  mind,  the  sense  of  sight  was  taken  as  the  illustration. 
I  do  not  see  the  propriety  of  taking  any  one  sense  as  an 
illustration  of  a  process  that  cannot  be  true  of  any  of  the 
others.  In  hearing  the  communication  of  objective  infor- 
mation to  the  mind  in  the  brain  though  vibrations  is 
possible;  it  is  not  possible  in  any  other  of  the  senses.  I 
prefer  to  explain  this  by  the  others,  instead  of  others  by 
this,  as  I  see  that  the  others  cannot  be  explained  according 
to  the  supposition  which  is  possible  here.  In  the  other  four 
cases  the  mind  must  act  at  the  place  of  sensation;  hence 
we  conclude  that  it  does  in  this  case.  In  hearing  the 
vibrations  are  perceived  by  the  mind  in  the  ear.  The  air 
vibrations  produce  vibrations  in  the  tympanum,  and  the 
mind  in  the  auditory  nerve  there  perceives  them. 

But  we  soon  learn  by  the  help  of  the  other  senses  to 
attribute  these  vibrations  to  some  remote  object;  or  such 
may  be  the  subjective  preparation  for  obtaining  knowl- 
edge through  this  medium  that  the  mind  instinctively 


222  PROCESS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

understands  them  to  be  representatives  of  objective  facts. 
Certain  it  is  that  the  mind  instinctively  understands  the 
meaning  of  certain  vibrations  of  the  tympanum.  The 
young  babe  that  has  never  been  hurt  will  be  frightened 
by  the  mother's  cry  of  alarm,  and  by  other  frightful  and 
threatening  sounds.  We  certainly  soon  come  to  attnbute 
these  vibrations  to  some  remote  objects,  first  to  some 
moving  physical  body,  then  to  air  as  a  medium,  and 
finally  to  some  immaterial  doer  in  the  physical  body. 
These  vibrations  vary  in  length,  altitude,  frequency, 
order  of  succession,  and  in  innumerable  other  character- 
istics which  have  never  been  named.  By  these  quahties 
we  learn  something  of  the  nature  of  remote  movers,  and 
by  agreeing  upon  certain  sounds  to  represent  thoughts  a 
language  is  formed  for  communication  among  men. 

The  word  sound  is  not,  like  the  word  sweet,  the  name 
of  a  property  of  some  external  thing.  It  is  a  general 
name  given  to  all  the  acts  or  understandings  of  the  mind 
fi-om  these  vibrations  of  the  tympanum.  We  talk  about 
sound  coming,  the  vibrations  come;  but  they  are  sounds 
only  when  the  mind  acts  upon  them  in  the  tympanum  of 

the  ear 

The  foregoing  is  the  explanation  which  we  give  of  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  through  the  senses.     According 
to  this  view,  sensation  and  perception  are  not  so  positively 
distinguishable  as  has  been  supposed.     When  mind  was 
thought  to  be  an  unextended  something  somewhere  in 
the  brain,  and  sensations  were  thought  to  be  impressions 
produced  by  external  bodies,  and  conveyed  in  some  un- 
known way  to  the  mind  in  the  brain,  sensation  was  mani- 
festly something  different  from  the  action  of  mind  which 
ensued  when  the  sensation  reached  it.     But  with  the  view 
here  presented,  sensation  and  perception  are  one.     The 
mind  at  the  outer  extremity  of  the  nerve  perceives  and 
knows.     Sensation  is  not  an  impression  produced  upon 


IV 


4 


SENSATION.  223 

the  body  by  matter.  Matter  never  produces  anything. 
It  is  true,  when  we  press  against  matter  we  meet  with 
resistance,  but  it  is  not  the  matter  which  resists,  it  is  the 
force  of  cohesion  holding  the  molecules  of  matter  together, 
and  perhaps  in  solid  attachment  to  the  earth  or  other 
great  bodies,  and  the  force  of  inertia  that  is  holding  mat- 
ter at  rest.  The  mind  is  the  actor  and  doer,  and  in 
immediate  contact  with  matter  perceives  it,  its  substance 
first,  and  then  its  properties,  and  then  its  relations. 

I  have  thus  given  my  opinion  of  the  process  of  knowl- 
edge. It  will  probably  be  called  by  philosophers  ' '  vulgar 
realism."  No  matter  what  it  is  called  if  it  is  only  the 
truth.  It  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  this  treatise.  The 
criticisms  and  opinions  of  physical  philosophy  expressed 
elsewhere  are  not  dependent  upon  this.  The  process  by 
which  we  know  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the  discussions 
upon  other  points.  Yet  it  has  a  bearing  upon  the  general 
philosophy  of  agnosticism  which  is  associated  with  the 
current  physical  philosophy. 


MODES  OF   MIND. 


225 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Application  To  The  Human  Mind. 

That  the  human  mind  is  an  immaterial  substance  has 
been  largely  the  opinion  of  mankind.  This  opinion  is 
now  strengthened  and  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  we  find 
all  the  doers  in  nature  to  be  immaterial  substance.  The 
opinion  that  the  matter  of  the  body  is  not  the  actor  and 
doer,  but  that  something  not  matter  dwells  in  the  body 
and  moves  it,  and  thinks,  and  feels,  has  spontaneously 
arisen  in  the  minds  of  men  from  their  consciousness,  their 
experience  and  observation.  There  have  always  been 
some  men  who  dissented  from  this  view;  but  in  their 
attempts  to  explain  vital  and  mental  phenomena  upon  the 
supposition  that  the  matter  of  the  body  is  the  doer,  they 
have  not  met  with  great  success.  Our  consciousness  of 
ourselves  as  doers  has  enabled  us  to  understand  objective 
doing  in  nature.  Men  have  projected  from  their  experi- 
ence facts  and  principles  which  enabled  them  to  under- 
stand how  the  doers  in  nature  accompHsh  their  work.  In 
the  primitive  ages  of  the  world  men  did  thus,  to  a  large 
extent,  form  their  opinions  of  natural  phenomena,  and 
explained  them  as  passive  matter  acted  upon  by  invisible 
doers.  We  are  now  able  to  come  from  the  field  of  the 
inorganic  with  facts  and  principles  which  help  us  to  an 
understanding  of  mind. 

In  the  first  place,  if  matter  is  never  a  doer  in  organic 
nature  where  some  appearances  seem  to  indicate  that  it  is, 
it  certainly  is  not  in  mental  phenomena,  where  all  facts 


seem  to  be  against  such  a  supposition.  Again,  if  the 
doers  in  inorganic  phenomena  are  not  created  or  produced 
by  any  natural  agency,  where  some  appearances  seem  to 
favor  such  a  supposition,  it  is  quite  certain  that  the,  mind 
is  not  produced  or  created  by  any  natural  agency,  for 
here  there  are  no  appearances  which  favor  such  a  supposi- 
tion. 

Our  sixth  generalization — each  force  has  its  own  natur- 
ally uncaused  modes  of  action — throws  some  light  upon 
some  questions  in  psychology  over  which  there  has  been 
much  contention.  Nothing  causes  gravity  to  draw  mat- 
ter together,  it  does  so  only  because  that  is  its  own  inher- 
ent mode  of  action.  Nothing  causes  molecular  repulsion 
to  push  matter  apart,  it  does  so  only  because  it  is  its 
nature  thus  to  do.  It  is  so  with  all  the  inorganic  forces. 
There  is  nothing  in  nature  outside  of  them,  or  back  of 
them,  or  anterior  to  them,  which  causes  them  to  be  and 
do  as  they  are  and  do,  or  determines  their  modes  of  action. 
We  now  extend  this  generalization  to  mind,  and  say  that 
nothing  in  nature  causes  mind  to  be  what  it  is,  or  to  do 
what  it  does,  or  gives  it  its  modes  of  action.  We  find  no 
facts  in  mental  phenomena  which  conflicts  with  this  gen- 
eralization. No  cause  of  the  modes  of  mind  has  ever 
been  mentioned,  or  can  be  discovered.  No  reason  can  be 
given  why  mind  acts  as  it  does.  Why  does  light  act  as  it 
does?  Why  does  heat  act  as  it  does ?  Why  does  gravity 
act  as  it  does?  Why  does  mind  act  as  it  do^s?  One  of 
these  questions  is  just  as  unanswerable  as  any  other  one 
of  them.  To  all  of  them  precisely  the  same  answer  must 
be  given,  because  it  is  its  nature  thus  to  act,  because  of 
its  own  inherent  modes  of  action. 

If  modes  of  the  human  mind  were  products  of  natural 
causes  or  environments,  difierent  sets  of  causes,  different 
environments  would  result  in  different  modes,  and  some 
people  on  some  portions  of  the  earth  would  come  to  have 


^^ 


226 


THE  HUMAN   MIND. 


mental  modes  differing  from  those  of  other  portions  of  the 
earth.     The  fact  that  all  human  beings  now  found  on  the 
earth  have  precisely  the  same  mental  modes,  is  proof  that 
they   are  not  caused  by  environments.       *'A11  human 
beings  on  earth  have  precisely   the  same  mental  facul- 
ties.'*     But  there  are  differences,  and  the  question  arises, 
What  are  faculties,  or  primitive  mental  modes  ?    We  can- 
not here  enter  into  a  full  discussion  of  this  question.     We 
will  only  say  that  men  have  agreed  to  call  all  mental 
modes  which  are  common  to  all  human  beings,  human 
faculties.     Then,  of  course,  all  human  beings  have  pre- 
cisely the  same  faculties.     Take  our  position  here,  then, 
all  mental  modes  common  to  all  living  human  beings  are 
the  primitive  mental  modes,  or  faculties  of  man.     Now 
look  back  through  the  history  of  the  human  race.     Has 
any  one  of  these  mental   modes   been   added   to   human 
nature  during  the  historic  period  of  the  human  race  ? 
Some  tribes  have  been  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  race 
one  thousand,  two  thousand,  and  perhaps  three  or  four 
thousand  years;  during  that  time  has  a  mental  faculty,  or 
mental  mode,  been  added  to  or  taken  from  human  nature 
by  its  environments?    What  the  human  mind  now  is,  in 
reference  to  its  mental  modes,  in  this  city,  it  is  in  every 
city  and  nation  and  tribe  of  the  earth.     What  it  now  is  it 
always  has  been  in  every  nation  and  tribe  as  far  back  in 
the  history  of  the  world  as  we  have  any  information. 
Surely  this  is  time  and  space  enough  for  environments  to 
create  a  new  one  or  destroy  an  old  one,  if  they  have  the 
power.      Whether  the  positive  proofs  are  satisfactory  or 
not,  there  are  no  negatives,  no  facts  found  in  the  history 
of  human  nature  which  forbid  the  extension  of  this  gen- 
eralization to  the  human  mind. 

Now  let  us  get  a  clear  understanding  of  these  mental 
modes.  They  are  the  natural  and  necessary  modes  of  our 
minds,  and  consequently  our  natural  and  necessary  modes 


MKNTAI.  MODES.  227 

of  thinking.  We  can  compare  and  classify  them  with  the 
modes  of  the  inorganic  forces.  It  is  a  mode  of  action  of 
one  inorganic  force  to  draw  matter  together.  We  name 
that  mode  of  action  attraction.  It  is  a  mode  of  action  of 
another  inorganic  force  to  push  matter  apart.  This  mode 
of  action  we  name  repulsion.  So  it  is  a  mode  of  mind  to 
compare  things;  and  we  name  that  mental  mode  compari- 
son. It  is  another  mental  mode  to  love;  and  we  name 
that  mental  mode  love,  and  its  acts  we  call  loving.  It  is 
another  mental  mode  to  hate;  and  we  name  that  mode 
hate,  and  its  acts  we  call  hating.  It  is  another  mental 
mode  to  make  deductions  from  premises,  to  deduce  a  cause 
from  an  effect,  a  substance  from  a  property,  etc. ;  and  this 
mode  we  name  causality,  or  the  deductive  faculty.  All 
our  mental  processes  are  of  certain  kinds,  and  must  be  of 
those  kinds,  and  can  be  of  no  other  kinds.  The  mind  can 
do  nothing  different  from  its  modes,  or  outside  of  its 
modes,  or  that  is  not  included  in  its  modes,  more  than 
gravity  can  do  something  besides  draw  matter  together, 
or  than  molecular  repulsion  can  do  something  with  mat- 
ter other  than  to  push  it  apart.  These  mental  modes, 
then,  determine  what  we  must  necessarily  think,  and  how 
we  must  think.  They  lay  down  railways  on  which  our 
thoughts  can  run,  must  run,  and  they  can  run  nowhere 
else.  They  therefore  mark  the  limits  of  all  possible 
knowledge.  The  mind  can  think  of  nothing,  perceive  no 
thing,  no  property,  and  no  relation,  that  has  not  its  cor- 
responding mode  in  the  mind. 

These  mental  modes  are  also  impulses;  they  urge,  im- 
pel, and  push  us  out  into  the  performance  of  these  par- 
ticular kinds  of  mental  acts.  Each  one  is  a  desire,  at 
least  so  far  as  it  desires  to  act,  and,  of  course,  it  desires  to 
perform  that  particular  class  of  acts  which  are  included  in 
its  nature,  its  mode  of  action.  All  of  them,  except  will, 
have  external  objects,  and  they  desire  to  meet  and  obtin 


228 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


their  objects.  They  are  generic  desires,  desires  for  a  class 
or  kind  of  things,  each  its  own  kind,  its  corresponding 
things.  Desire  for  property  is  a  mental  mode,  a  faculty, 
a  generic  disease;  desire  for  a  particular  piece  of  property 
is  a  specific  desire. 

Thus  the  human  mind,  Hke  an  inorganic  force  is  a 
specific  thing,  which  has  a  nature  of  its  own,  with  speci- 
fic characteristics,  with  specific  modes  of  action,  which 
are  not  produced  by  any  thing  on  earth,  which  are  not 
dependent  upon  their  surroundings,  which  are  the  same 
in  the  midst  of  all  environments,  and  which  no  surround- 
ing circumstances  can  to  any  great  extent  change. 

To  show  the  mental  process  through  which  these  sub- 
jective modes  lead  us  we  present  two  examples.  Take 
the  mental  mode  which  has  been  named  comparison. 
This  enables  us  to  perceive  likenesses  and  differences 
among  external  things;  these  are  its  objective  correspond- 
ents, its  objects.  Moved  by  this  as  an  impulse,  our 
minds  go  forth  instinctively  comparing  things,  and  classi- 
fying them  together  according  to  their  likenesses.  It 
urges  us  to  continue  this  process,  forming  larger  and 
larger  classes,  with  less  and  less  resemblances,  till  we 
finally  reach  unity,  or  one  that  includes  the  whole.  This 
is  a  spontaneous,  instinctive  mental  process.  Why  ?  Be- 
cause it  is  an  inherent,  inborn  mode  of  action  of  that 
immaterial  substance  which  we  call  mind. 

Another  inherent  mental  mode  takes  cognizance  of  cer- 
tain dual  relations  existing  among  external  things;  these 
are  its  objective  correspondents,  its  objects.  It  is  some- 
times called  casuality,  and  sometimes  the  deductive  faculty. 
From  accumulated  facts,  it  deduces  a  principle;  fi-om  data, 
it  deduces  a  conclusion;  from  properties  it  deduces  a  sub- 
stance; from  effects  it  deduces  a  cause;  from  the  seen  it 
deduces  the  unseen;  from  the  known  it  deduces  the  un- 
known.    Why  does  it  do  this?    Because  this  is  an  in- 


SUBJECTIVE  IMPLIES  THE  OBJECTIVE.      229 

herent  mode  of  action  of  that  immaterial  substance  which 

we  call  mind. 

We  now  advance  another  step.  These  natural  and 
necessary  modes  of  mind  imply  things  objective  to  the 
mind  to  which  they  are  related,— the  subjective  mode  im- 
plies a  corresponding  external  object.  The  subjective 
mode  of  love  implies  external  object  to  be  loved.  The 
subjective  mode  of  appetite  implies  objective  edible  sub-  ^ 
stances.  The  subjective  mode  of  fear  implies  objective 
danger,  or  the  existence  of  things  that  will  harm  the 
body.  '  The  subjective  mode  which  we  call  hope  implies 
the  existence  of  external  things  which  are  desirable. 
The  subjective  mode  which  has  been  called  sense  of  sight 
implies  the  objective  existence  of  light,  and  of  things  to 
be  seen.  The  subjective  mode  which  has  been  called 
sense  of  hearing  implies  objective  sounds.  The  subject- 
ive mode  of  comparison  implies  the  relation  of  likeness 
and  difference  among  external  things.  The  subjective 
mode  which  has  been  called  the  deductive  faculty  implies 
the  relation  of  property  and  substance,  cause  and  effect, 
premise  and  conclusion,  etc.  in  external  things.  Thus 
the  subjective  modes  of  our  mind  imply  the  existence  of 
all  the  objective  things,  properties,  and  relations  to  which 
we  are  in  any  wise  related,  or  of  which  we  are  capable  of 
obtaining  any  knowledge. 

These  subjective  implications  are  what  have  been 
called  intuitions.  The  subjective  mode  declares  the  ex- 
istence of  its  corresponding  object.  Most  of  the  subject- 
ive modes  meet  their  objects  so  eariy  that  their  declara- 
tion of  the  existence  of  their  objects  is  not  thought  of  as 
an  intuition.  Only  the  declarations  of  those  subjective 
modes  whose  objects  are  not  perceptible  through  the 
senses  have  been  treated  by  philosophers  as  intuitions ;  only 
these  are  of  any  importance  in  philosophy.  When  the 
bjects  cannot  be  discovered  by  the  senses,  the  realiability 


230  1*HE  HUMAN   MIND. 

ity  of  the  subjective  declarations,  or  intuitions,  comes  in 
question,  and  it  is  a  very  important  question.  But  all  the 
other  faculties  equally  declare  the  existence  of  their 
objects;  and  it  is  well  for  us  to  notice  this  fact,  and  look 
upon  them  as  so  many  verified  intuitions. 

The  external  objects  of  some  of  the  internal  modes  are 
things;  of  others,  properties  in  external  things;  of  others, 
relations   among  external   things.     The   objects  of  that 
subjective  mode  which  we  call  love  are  sentient  beings. 
The  object  of  the  subjective  mode  which  we  call  form  is 
the  objective  fact  or  property  of  form  in  things.     The 
object  of  that  subjective  mode  which  has  been  called  color 
is  the  external  fact  or  property  of  color  in  bodies.     The 
object  of  the  subjective  mode  called  comparison  is  the 
relation  of  likeness  and  difference  and  finally  unity  among 
objective  things.     The  objects  of  the  deductive  faculty 
are  the  dual  relations  among  objective  things.     The  de- 
clarations of   these    last  two  subjective  modes  philoso- 
phers  have   always  recognized  as    intuitions.     Because 
their  objects  are  not  tangible  things,  their  existence  has 
been  questioned,  and  the  declarations  of  these  two  sub- 
jective modes  have  been  brought  forward,    under   the 
names  of  the  intuition  of  unity  and  the  intuition  of  cause, 
as  proofs.     But  this  declaration  of  the  existence  of  their 
objects  is  no  more  positive  or  authoritative  than  the  declara- 
tion of  love  that  its  objects  exist,  or  than  the  declaration 
of  subjective  form  and  color  that  their  objects  exist. 

The  subjective  mode  declares  the  existence  of  the 
external  object,  and  hence  the  person  in  whose  mind  the 
declaration  is,  instinctively  believes  in  the  existence  of 
the  object,  even  before  it  is  discovered,  and  also  when  it 
cannot  be  sensibly  discovered.  When  the  animal  is  hun- 
gry, he  believes  in  the  existence  of  the  object  which  will 
satisfy  that  hunger,  and  he  goes  forth  confidently  in  search 
of  it.     So  does  man  instinctively  believe  in  the  existence 


INTUITIONS. 


231 


of  the  external  objects  of  all  his  subjective  modes,  whether 
those  objects  are  visible  or  invisible,  things,  properties, 
or  relations.     The  subjective  mode  is  to  him  a  positive 
declaration  of  the  existence  of  its  object.     It  is  not  in  his 
mind  a  deduction;  he  does  not  reflect  upon  the  subjective 
mode,  and  deduce  from  it  the  existence  of  its  object,  but 
he  goes  forth  unreflectingly,  instinctively  acting  according 
to  that  belief.     If  the  infant  could  reflect  upon  his  generic 
desires,  he  might  deduce  from  them  the  existence  of  their 
objects,  and  might  form  some  opinions  fi-om  the  nature  of 
the  modes,  of  the  nature  of  the  objects.     And  we  can  now 
study  human  nature,  and  see  what  man's  generic  desires, 
or  subjective  modes,  are,  and  from  them  deduce  the  exist- 
ence  of  their   objects;   and    our   deductions,  if  correctly 
made,  will  always  be  the  truth.     Our  subjective  modes 
imply  and  declare  the  existence  of  all  objective  things  to 
which  we  are  in  any  way  related,  and  thus  show  all  our 
external  relations.     Even  those  who  do  not  admit  the 
validity  of  the  subjective  modes  as  proofs  of  external 
things,  still  go  forth  in  their  activities  acting  according  to 
them,  just  as  though  they  did  believe  them  true  declara- 
tions, especially  when  they  act  instinctivelj^  unreflectingly. 

Kach  subjective  mode  is  to  the  person  himself  a  declara- 
tion of  the  existence  of  its  object.  This  declaration,  or 
spontaneous  belief,  is  an  intuition.  Thus  the  origin  and 
basis  of  intuitions,  over  which  there  has  been  such  a 
world  of  discussion,  is  explained.  First  there  is  the  mind; 
then  there  is  the  subjective  mode  of  mind;  that  asserts 
the  existence  of  its  object;  that  assertion  is  the  intuition. 
These  intuitions  are  spontaneous  beliefs.  Whether  they 
are  reliable  proofs  of  objective  things  or  not,  they  are  to 
us  spontaneous  and  necessary  modes  of  thinking. 

And  now,  are  they  reliable  evidences  of  objective  reality  ? 
In  a  former  chapter  we  have  a  list  of  propositions  which 


232 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


VERIFIED   INTUITIONS. 


233 


are  absolutely  true,  in  the  nature  of  things,  independent 
of  the  mind  that  think  them. 

These  are  the  court  of  final  appeal  in  all  questions  of 
philosophy.     As  far  as  absolute  truths  and  our  intuitions 
deal  with  the  same  subjects  they  agree.     It  is  because  of 
this  agreement  that  we  recognize  absolute  truths  as  such. 
This  does  not  throw  absolute  truths  back  upon  intuitions 
as  a  basis.     We  perceive  that  they  are  absolute  truths  by 
their  agreement  with  the  modes  of  our  minds,  or  with  our 
intuitions;  but  we  at  the  same  time  perceive  that  they  are 
not  dependent  upon  those  modes,  or  these  intuitions,  for 
their  existence  or  their  truthfulness.     As  an  illustration, 
we  perceive  the  fact  of  likeness  and  difference  in  physical 
things  by  the  agreement  of  that  fact  with  the  mode  of 
mind  in  comparison;  but  we  at  the  same  time  perceive 
that  that  fact  is  not  dependent  upon  this  mode  for  its  ex- 
istence, but  that  likeness  and  difference  do  actually  exist 
among'physical  things,  whether  we  think  of  them  or  per- 
ceive them,  or  not.     So  absolute  truths  are  not  dependent 
upon  our  mental  modes,  but  we  perceive  them  to  be  abso- 
lute truths  by  their  agreement  with  our  mental  modes.  If 
absolute  truths  and  our  mental  intuitions  did  not  agree, 
we  could  not  cognize  them,  thus  as  far  as  we  do  cognize 
them  our  intuitions   agree    with  them.      Our  intuitions 
never  declare  contradictions;  they  never  violate  the  law  of 
identity;  they  never  contradict  one  of  the  absolute  truths 
found  in  our  table.     Thus  many  of   our  intuitions   are 
verified  by  their  agreement  with  absolute  truths:  and,  as 
there   are   found  no  facts  to   the  contrary,  these  form  a 
legitimate  basis  for  the  generalization,  that  they   are   all 
true  and  reliable  witnesses  in  all  cases  to  which   their 

testimony  will  apply. 

But  other  facts  warrant  a  still  more  satisfactory  general- 
ization. Nearly  all  our  intuitions  are  verified  by  the  sense 
discovery  of  their  objects.     The  intuition  of  form  is  veri- 


fied by  the  discovery  of  objective  forms;  the  intuition  of 
colors,  by  the  discovery  of  objective  color;  the  intuition 
of  likeness  and  difference,  by  the  discovery  of  objective 
likeness  and  difference,  and  so  on.  Thus  all  the  intui- 
tions which  assert  the  existence  of  physical  things  and 
persons,  and  properties,  and  relations,  constituting  more 
than  ninety  one- hundredths  of  all  our  intuitions,  are 
shown  by  actual  discovery  to  be  voices  of  truth.  As 
none  of  the  voices  which  are  not  verifiable  are  known  to 
be  false,  this  forms  a  very  broad  basis  for  the  generaliza- 
tion that  they  are  all  true  and  reliable  witnesses.  When 
the  intuition  of  comparison  when  it  declares  the  objective 
existence  of  likeness  and  difference  is  found  to  be  true  by 
discovery,  shall  we  not  believe  it  when  it  declares  of  ulti- 
mate unity  ?  When  we  have  found  nearly  all  other  intu- 
itions to  be  true,  shall  we  not  believe  that  one  which 
declares  the  existence  of  a  cause  for  an  effect?  Knowl- 
edge is  nothing  but  the  verification  through  the  senses  of 
those  intuitions  which  relate  to  sensible  things.  We  go 
forth  in  activity  intuitively  believing  in  the  existence  of 
the  physical  world,  and  in  such  a  physical  world  as  does 
actually  exist,  and  through  the  senses  the  intuitions  meet 
their  objects,  and  become  actual  knowledge.  Thus  nearly 
all  our  intuitions  are  verified  and  shown  to  be  true  asser- 
tions of  the  actual  and  real.  The  few  intuitions  which 
cannot  be  thus  verified,  which  relate  to  super-sensible 
things  are  shown  to  be  true  by  the  multitude  of  others 
which  we  know  to  be  true. 

Some  intuitions  which  relate  to  physical  things  cannot 
be  verified  in  all  their  entirety.  When  an  intuition  is 
universal,  as  for  instance,  all  things  have  resemblances, 
or  all  changes  have  energizing  causes,  it  is  not  possible  to 
verify  it  by  an  actual  application  to  all  things.  Such 
an  intuition  is  verified  by  the  discovery  of  a  limited  num- 
ber of  facts.     The  intuition  declares  the  fact  to  be  true  of 


234 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


all  things;  we  learn  by  actual  discovery  that  it  is  true  of 
all  things  which  are  within  the  reach  of  our  discover>^ 
It  is  then  a  verified  intuition,  and  becomes  a  vahd  proof 
to  the  whole  extent  of  the  intuition.  All  known  facts, 
without  exception,  declare  the  trustworthiness  of  the  in- 
tuition. This  is  the  basis  of  a  generalization;  hence  an 
intuition  thus  partially  verified  is  formed  into  a  general- 
ization. The  intuition  alone  declares  the  universal  fact; 
then  finding  it  to  be  a  fact  in  many  cases,  we  form  upon 
this  discovered  basis  the  generalization  that  it  is  a  univer- 
sal fact.  Thus  the  existence  of  the  fact  in  the  undiscov- 
erable  is  proven  by  two  witnesses,  by  the  unverified  in- 
tuition, and  by  the  generalized  universal. 

The  intuition  alone  carries  with  it  a  necessary  belief  m 
the  mind  of  the  individual,— he  must  so  think  and  believe. 
All  men  have  the  same  intuitions.     When  therefore  a 
proposition  which   accords   with    a  human   intuition   is 
stated,  all  who  hear  and    understand  it    receive  it  and 
believe  it  because  it  falls  in  with  a  necessary  mode  of 
their  own  minds;  but  when  they  reflect  and  ask  them- 
selves the  ground  and  evidence  of  their  belief,  they  may 
not  be  able  to  find  a  satisfactory  reason  for  it.     The  pro- 
position has  been  stated,  and  they  have  believed  it;  but 
why  ?    They  may  see  no  objective  evidence  that  it  is  true. 
They  believe,  but  cannot  tell  why  they  believe.      The 
only  reason  is  that  the  proposition  accord^  with  a  neces- 
sary mode  of  mind,  an  intuition.     Those  who  have  repu- 
diated intuitions  as  witnesses   admit  that  we   must   so 
think,  but  they  ask  why,  and  demand  some  objective  evi- 
dence that  it  is  true.     The  only  reason  is  that  such  is  a 
necessary  mode  of  mind.     Those  who  believe  that  mind  is 
the  product  of  natural  causes  ought  to  believe  that  the 
necessary  processes  of  mind  are  reliable  declarations  of 
objective  things,  for  the  product  would  not  exist  in  the 
mind  if  the  producer  did  not  exist  in  the  objective. 


VERIFIED  INTUITIONS.  235 

But  it  is  certain,  as  we  have  before  seen,  that  the  modes 
of  mind  are  no  more  produced  by  external  things  than  is 
the  mode  of  gravity.     Only  the  already  existing  modes 
of  mind  enable  the  mind  to  cognize  these  objective  things, 
and  the  objective  things  could  not  produce  those  modes 
by  which  alone  they  are  cognized, — these  objective  things 
could  not  enter  the  mind  to  produce  anything  there  be- 
fore the  door  through  which  they  enter  existed.     When 
we  instinctively  look  for  resemblances,  and  proceed  to 
classify,   and  generalize,  and  judge  that  things  unknown 
resemble  things  known,  it  is  not  because  resemblances  do 
actually  exist    in   nature,    those    external   resemblances 
could  not  be  known  but  for  the  corresponding  mode  al- 
ready existing  in    the  mind.      If  the  postulate,   things 
have  resemblances,  is  stated  to  a  man,  he  believes  it,  and 
would  believe  it  if  he  had  no  external  evidence  of  it,  be- 
cause it  agrees  with  a  spontaneous  mode  of  his  mind,  an 
intuition.     But  he  goes  forth  in  action  and  finds  that  re- 
semblances run  through  all  things  which  he  can  discover. 
From  these  facts  he  makss    the  generalization  that  all 
things  have  resemblances,  and  now  positively  asserts  that 
there  can  be  nothing  in  any  world  that  has  not  some  re- 
semblances to  things  in  this  world. 

The  intuition  of  cause  and  effect  is  not  so  easily  veri- 
fied; the  facts  are  not  perceived  by  all  our  senses,  as  re- 
semblances are.     Causes  are  generally  invisible.     This  in- 
tuition is  mainly  verified  by  our  conscious  act  of  causa- 
tion, and  by  our  resistance  to  things  which  energize  upon 
us.     But  these  constitute  two  very  extensive  classes  of 
facts.     They  are  ample  verification  of  the  intuition,  and 
ample  basis  for  the  generalized  universal  that  all  changes 
have  energizing  causes.     This  postulate,  as  a  thus  veri- 
fied intuition,  and  a  generalized  universal,  is  a  sufficient 
ground  for  human  belief  respecting  things  which  are  be- 
yond the  reach  of  our  discovery. 


236 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


The  assertion  of  a  necessary  mode  of  mind  is  to  me  a 
truth.     As  no  natural  causes  can  be  found  for  the  modes 
of  any  of  the  forces,  I  believe  that  they  all  had  a  super- 
natural origin,— that  God  created  all  the  forces,  and  gave 
to  each  its  modes  of  action.     He  created  the  human  mind 
in  its  adaptation  to  objective  nature,  so  that  its  necessary 
modes,  and  its  intuitions,  correspond  with  the  facts  of  the 
physical  world.     He  gave  to  the  human  mind  such  modes 
that  its  spontaneous  and  necessary  activities  would  ex- 
press His  own  thoughts;  and  thus  the  realities  which  are, 
and  the  principles  and  modes  of  creation,  appear  in  hu- 
man consciousness,  in  the  necessary  modes  of  mind.     So 
far  as  truth  is  revealed  in  the  modes  of  mind,  man  may 
intuitively  discover  it ;    but   only   the  general  principles, 
and  existences  are  thus  revealed. 

The   intuitions   are  the  doors  of  admission  for  all  ac- 
quired truth,  and  they  are  credible  and  reliable  witnesses, 
as  far  as'^they  go,  in  all  philosophy,  and  science,  and  re- 
ligion.    No  science  or  philosophy,  no  knowledge  what- 
ever, is  possible  without  them.     They  are  the  basis  of  all 
belief ;  and  other  testimony  is  received  only  because  of  its 
agreement  with  them.     They  set  up,  and  they  pull  down ; 
and  nothing  can  long  stand  among  men  as  truth,  which  is 
at  war  with  them.     Even  the  revealed  Word  is  tested  and 
tried  by  them,  and  only  such  writings  as  are  in  harmony 
with  them  are  preserved  as  canonical ;   and   these   are  re- 
ceived by  men  mainly  because  of  their  agreement  with  the 
intuitions,  the  feelings  and  impulses,  the  needs  and  long- 
ings, and  hopes  and  fears   of  the  human  mind.      The 
intuitions  are  reliable  expressions  of  the   true  and  real. 
No  one   doubts  any  calculations  correctly  made  based 
upon  the  known  modes  of  gravity;  no  more  is  anyone 
justified  in  rejecting   any    calculations    correctly    made 
based  upon  the  necessary  modes  of  mind. 

A  further  fact  which  we  found  true  of  the  inorganic 


ACTS   NOT  CAUSED. 


237 


forces  is  that  they  are  capable  of  beginning  action  without 
being  acted  upon  by  anything  outside  of  themselves,  that 
in  all  their  activities  the  energy  they  use  is  contained  in 
themselves,  and  never  imparted  to  them  from  something 
else.  But  we  also  found  that  activities  are  often  depend- 
ent upon  conditions  supplied  by  other  agencies.  Now  the 
question  arises,  are  these  facts  also  true  of  mind  ?  what 
relations  have  external  things  to  the  action  of  mind  ?  In 
the  first  place,  here  as  among  the  inorganic  forces, 
objective  things  are  never  causes  of  the  action  of  mind. 
Nothing  is  a  cause  that  does  not  possess  and  exert  energy. 
Matter  never  possesses  and  exerts  energy.  The  mind,  in 
the  sense  of  touch,  comes  in  direct  contact  with  matter, 
and  perceives  it  and  such  of  its  properties  as  the  sense  of 
touch  is  prepared  to  cognize.  The  matter  does  not  act 
upon  the  mind,  does  not  do  anything  to  the  mind  ;  the 
mind  is  the  only  actor  in  this  case.  The  matter  and  its 
properties  are  conditions  of  the  action  of  the  mind  after 
this  manner.  The  sense  of  taste  immediately  perceives 
the  properties  of  substances  in  contact  with  it  which  it  is 
adapted  to  perceive.  Of  course,  the  mind  could  not  per- 
ceive these  properties  in  the  absence  of  the  substance  ; 
the  substance  and  its  properties  are  necessary  conditions 
of  the  mind's  action,  but  not  causes.  All  this  is  true  of 
the  action  of  mind  in  the  senses  of  smell  and  sight  and 
hearing.  In  none  of  these  cases  does  the  external  object 
act  upon  the  mind  ;  in  none  of  them  is  the  subjective  en- 
ergizing a  continuation  in  another  form  of  any  objective 
energizing ;  there  is  no  communication  of  energy  from  the 
condition  or  through  the  condition  to  the  mind.  All  the 
energy  exerted  by  the  mind  in  consequence  of  the  presence 
of  the  condition  is  inherent  in  the  mind.  Then  the  acts 
of  mind  in  sensation  are  never  caused,  they  are  never 
effects  of  external  causes,  they  are  not  impressions. 

If  these  acts  of  mind  are  not  effects  of  external  causes, 


2-78  THE   HUMAN   MIND. 

certainly  no  others  are,  for  in  no  other  cases  do  external 
objects  come  in  contact  with  mind.     In  no  case  where 
the  object  which  is  the  condition  of  the  mind's  action  is 
absent  from  the  mind,  either  in  space  or  time,  can  it  be  a 
cause  of  the  action  of  mind.     Sitting  here,   I  desire  a 
book.     I  do  not  see  it  or  hear  it;  nothing  passes  from  the 
book  to  my  mind;  it  is  separated  from  my  mind  by  an  in- 
terval of  space— nothing  can  do  where  it  is  not.     I  arise 
and  get  the  book.     It  was  not  a  cause  of  the  action  of 
my  mind,  nor  of  the  action  of  my  body,— it  did  not  ex- 
ert energy  upon  my  mind  to  cause  it  to  act.     My  mind 
starts  its  own  action,  and  moves  my  body,  using  only  its 
own  inherent  energy.     I  receive  a  letter  informing  me  of 
the  death  of  a  friend.     I  make  arrangements  and  go  to 
the  funeral.     The  person,  the  death,  the  letter,— none  of 
these  exert  energy  upon  my  mind,  to  cause  it  to  act. 

It  is  the  same  in  cases  of  remoteness  in  time.  Nothing 
that  was  in  the  past,  but  is  not  now,  can  be  a  cause  of  the 
present  action  of  the  mind.  That  which  does  not  now 
exist  cannot  now  exert  energy  upon  anything.  The  re- 
membrance of  a  past  and  gone  existence  may  be  the  con- 
dition of  the  action  of  mind  after  a  certain  manner;  but 
the  mind  in  the  performance  of  those  acts  uses  only  its 

own  inherent  energy. 

Things  anticipated,  purposes,  things  hoped  for,  ends  to 
be  obtained,— all  these  have  now  no  existence,  and  a 
thing  which  does  not  now  exist  cannot  now  energize  to 
produce  results.  True,  since  the  days  of  Aristotle  it  has 
been  customary  to  call  ends  to  be  attained  final  causes; 
but  this  is  not  the  sense  in  which  we  here  use  the  word 
cause,  and  it  is  unfortunate  for  philosophy  that  it  was  ever 
so  used.  That  which  does  not  now  exist  cannot  energize 
upon  the  mind  to  cause  it  to  act. 

The  properties  of  external  things  are  preceived  by  the 
senses,   and  become  subjective  material,  present  in  the 


PERSONAL  INFLUENCE. 


239 


mind.  If  those  properties  are  the  objects,  or  correspond- 
ences, of  any  particular  passion,  that  feeling  arises  in  their 
presence;  if  they  are  frightful  properties,  fear;  if  they  are 
belligerent  properties,  anger,  etc.  It  is  common  to  say 
that  these  properties  excite  the  passion.  But  these  prop- 
erties are  not  things  which  possess  the  property  of  energy; 
they  cannot  energize  to  produce  effects;  they  are  only  con- 
ditions of  these  acts  of  mind. 

When  one  person  influences  another,  and  that  influence 
results  in  the  passive  person  forming  certain  opinions,  or 
having  certain  feelings,  or  performing  certain  acts,  those 
opinions  or  feelings  or  acts  are  not  caused.     One  mind  does 
not  in  this  case  energize  upon  another  mind  to  cause  it  to 
act,  or  to  determine  the  mode  of  its  action,  it  only  pre- 
sents certain  conditions  in  the  presence  of  which  it  acts  in 
a  certain  manner.     The  influence  is  exerted  by  placing 
before  the  mind  of  the  other  person  the  conditions  in  the 
presence  of  which  he  will  form  certain  opinions,  or  have 
certain  feelings,  or  perform  certain  acts.     If  it  be  a  phy- 
sical object  that  is  placed  before  the  mind,  the  object  has 
the  same  relation  to  his  mind  that  other  physical  objects 
have  in  sense  perception.     If  the  influence  be  exerted  by 
argument,  entreaties,  or  authority,  the  process  is  no  dif- 
ferent, one  mind  does  not  energize  upon  the  other  mind  to 
move  it  a  certain  way.     Thus  we  find  that  mind  in  its 
activities  is  not  an  exception,  but,  like  all  the  other  forces, 
the  acts  of  mind  are  never  caused  by  agents  external  to 
itself,  no  energy  is  exerted  upon  it,  nor  imparted  to  it,  but 
in  all  its  acts  and  doings  it  uses  only  its  own  inherent 
energy.     Whatever  there  is  in  what  is  called  insensible 
influence,  mind  may  directly  act  upon  mind. 

In  reference  to  some  of  the  internal  workings  of  mind 
there  appears  to  be  a  direct  acting  of  mind  upon  mind. 
Whatever  may  be  our  opinions  of  the  relation  of  the  sub- 
jective modes,  or  faculties  of  mind,  to  the  whole  mind  in 


240 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


unity,  we  cannot  explain  the  operations  of  mind  without 
speaking  of  them  as  distinct  actors.  One  faculty  acts  upon 
another  faculty.  This  is  so  in  fact,  and  so  all  writers  upon 
psychology  are  compelled  by  the  fact  to  explain  ihe  oper- 
ations of  the  mind.  Those  faculties  which  are  called  pro- 
pensions,  or  propensities,  act  upon  the  will;  they  exert 
energy  to  push  the  person  out  in  the  performance  of  cer- 
tain acts;  and  thewnll  acts  upon  the  passions;  and  different 
passions  antagonize  each  other,  and  strive  for  the  mastery. 
This  we  may  say  is  one  part  of  mind  acting  upon  another 
part  of  mind,  as  we  say  the  hand  takes  hold  of  the  foot,  or 
we  may  say  it  is  mind  acting  upon  mind.  Whatever 
opinions  we  may  have  upon  this  point,  or  however  we  may 
express  them,  we  cannot  describe  the  processes  which  take 
place  in  our  minds  without  saying  that  one  faculty  acts 
upon  another.  But  only  a  part  of  the  faculties — the  pro- 
pensions  and  will — exert. energy  upon  the  other  faculties. 
The  intellectual  faculties  do  not  energize  upon  the  other 
.faculties  to  cause  them  to  act.  This  is  an  important  fact 
to  be  noticed  and  remembered,  the  intellectual  faculties  do 
not  energize  upon  the  other  faculties.  Here  is  a  process 
of  internal  working  of  which  we  find  no  parallel  among 
the  inorganic  forces.  If  a  passion  does  energize  upon  the 
will  to  move  it,  and  through  it  to  move  the  person  in  a 
certain  direction,  here  is  the  true  causal  relation, — one 
mode  of  mind  may  act  upon  another  mode  of  mind,  and 
cause  it  to  act,  or  to  determine  the  direction  of  its  activity. 
We  now  proceed  to  consider  the  bearing  of  the  foregoing 
facts  and  principles  upon  the  question  of  human  freedom. 
We  have  found  that  the  acts  of  mind  are  never  caused  by 
external  agencies.  Then  it  cannot  be  asserted  that  the 
acts  of  mind  are  effects  of  objective  things  and  therefore 
man  is  not  free.  To  this  assertion  we  reply,  the  acts  of 
mind  are  never  caused  by  external  things  or  influences. 
But  this  fact  does  not  prove  the  freedom  of  the  will.    An 


FREEDOM   OP   WILL. 


241 


act  may  not  be  caused,  and  j^et  be  a  necessar>^  act.  All 
the  sense  perceptions,  though  not  caused,  are  necessary 
acts.  If  the  hand  touches  a  body,  we  cannot  wall  not  to 
perceive  it.  If  the  image  of  a  body  enters  the  eye  and 
strikes  upon  the  retina,  we  cannot  will  not  to  see  it.  If  a 
sound  enters  the  ear,  we  must  hear  it.  If  a  substance 
possessing  properties  perceptible  by  the  sense  of  taste  be 
placed  in  the  mouth,  we  must  taste  it,  we  must  perceive 
those  properties.  We  all  understand  this  in  practical  life, 
and  know  that  if  w^e  would  not  see  an  object,  we  must 
shut  our  eyes,  or  look  some  other  way;  if  we  would  not 
taste  a  substance,  we  must  keep  it  out  of  our  mouths;  if 
we  would  not  hear  a  sound,  we  must  shut  it  away  from 
our  ears,  or  go  away  from  it.  Thus  the  acts  of  mind  in 
sense  perception  are  not  caused,  yet  they  are  necessary', 
and  here  is  no  freedom. 

Again:  When  certain  properties  enter  the  mind,  if  the 
man  gives  attention  to  them,  he  must  know  of  their  pres- 
ence, and,  although  they  are  only  conditions  of  the  action 
of  mind  in  a  certain  passion,  yet  that  passion  may  neces- 
sarily arise;  if  the  properties  are  frightening,  fear  may 
necessarily  arise;  if  they  are  provoking,  anger  may  neces- 
sarily arise.  In  the  presence  of  the  condition,  the  action 
of  the  mind  in  the  corresponding  passion  may  necessarily 
follow.  Thus  it  appears  that  in  all  the  receptive  processes 
of  mind,  on  the  presentation  of  the  condition,  the  mind 
necessarily  acts;  and  freedom  is  not  found  here. 

All  the  freedom  man  has  in  this  department  of  mental 
activity  rests  in  his  power  to  control  and  direct  his  atten- 
tion. If  a  man  does  not  wish  to  see  an  object,  he  can 
turn  and  look  another  way;  if  he  does  wish  to  see  it,  he 
can  turn  his  open  eyes  toward  it.  If  he  does  not  wish  to 
taste  a  substance,  he  can  keep  it  out  of  his  mouth;  if  he 
does  wish  to  taste  it,  he  can  put  it  in  his  mouth.  If  a 
man  wishes  to  believe  a  certain  doctrine,  he  can  place  be- 


242 


THF   HUMAN   MIND. 


fore  his  mind  the  conditions  of  that  belief;  if  he  does  not 
wish  to  believe  it,  he  can  turn  his  attention  away  from  the 
conditions  of  that  belief,  and  fix  his  mind  upon  the  con- 
ditions of  the  opposite  belief.     A  man's  power  over  his 
attention  enables  him  to  see  what  he  wishes  to  see,  and  to 
turn  away  from  or  shut  his  eyes  to  what  he  does  not  wish 
to  see,  intellectually,  as  well  as  physically.     Hence  man- 
kind are  responsible  for  their  beliefs, — their  beliefs  are  to 
a  large  extent  such  as  they  choose,  and  voluntarily  de- 
termine.    The  conditions  which  are  before  the  minds  of 
men  are  to  a  very  large  extent  such  as  they  themselves 
choose,  with  power  to  choose  the  opposite.     A  man  can 
thus  occasion  the  activity  of  such  of  his  faculties  as  he 
wishes  to  have  active,  voluntarily  raise  in  his  mind  a  pas- 
sion, or  increase  its  intensity,   by  giving  attention  to  its 
conditions;  or  he  can  quench  it  by  turning  his  attention  to 
other  objects,  and  fixing  his  mind  upon  other  subjects. 
Thus  men  may,  to  a  large  extent,  mold  tjieir  own  char- 
acters, determine  their  own  beliefs,  and  award  their  owa 
destinies. 

Among  the  in  working  activities  of  mind  we  find  other 
conditions  of  freedom.  I  admitted  that  when  certain  prop- 
erties enter  the  mind  through  the  senses,  the  correspond- 
ing passion  unavoidably  arises  into  activity.  But  in  this 
case  we  know  that  we  have  some  power  to  check  and  sub- 
due the  passion,  and  stop  that  emotional  activity  which 
unavoidably  arose.  We  have  power  to  do  this  to  some 
extent  by  turning  away  from  the  conditions  in  the  pres- 
ence of  which  it  arose,  and  thinking  of  something  else; 
but  that  is  not  what  I  here  mean.  We  all  know  that  if 
anger  has  arisen  in  us,  if  the  passion  is  not  too  strong,  we 
have  power  to  avoid  the  physical  acts  that  would  natural- 
ly follow,  and,  by  an  internal  mental  effort,  in  a  little  time 
to  diminish  the  intensity  of  the  passion,  and  perhaps  at 
last  entirely  subdue  it.     If  the  passion  is  too  greatly  ex- 


HUMAN   FREEDOM. 


243- 


cited,  we  lose  this  power,  and  are  swept  helplessly  along 
by  the  passion,  and  have  for  the  time  being  lost  our  free- 
dom. The  contrast  between  these  two  cases  shows  that  in 
the  former  case  we  have  freedom  in  the  power  to  govern 
and  subdue  the  passion. 

In  the  case  of  an  excited  propension  which  desires  some 
object,  it  importunes,  pushes,  exerts  energy  upon,  the  in- 
tellectual faculties  to  cause  them  to  devise  plans  and  means 
for  obtaining  that  object.     It  also  energizes  upon  the  wilt 
to  cause  it  to  act  to  execute  those  plans.     Here  is  the 
proper  causal  relation — one  faculty  exerts  energy  upon 
another  to  cause  it  to  act.     But  do  the  intellecual  faculties 
always  obey  this  pushing  impulse  ?    We  know  that  we 
have  often  felt  the  impulse  of  a  desire  pushing  the  intel- 
lectual faculties  to  plan  and  the  will  to  execute,  and  yet 
they  have  refused  to  obey  the  impulse,  and  have  acted 
contrary  to  it.     But,  it  may  be  said,  if  they  resist  the  im- 
pulse, they  have  some  reason  for  resisting  it.     Yes;  but 
that  reason  may  not  be  an  impulse,  a  mover,  a  cause.    We 
must  keep  in  our  minds  the  distinction  between  a  reason 
for  action  and  a  mover  to  action.     A  decision  made  in  obe- 
dience to  a  reason  for  action  in  opposition  to  a  motive  to 
action,  shows  the  power  of  mind  to  control  its  own  acts  in 
opposition  to  a  cause  or  mover.     The  judgment  decides 
that  it  would  not  be  best  to  obey  the  impulse,  and  the 
man  acts  according  to  that  judgment  in  opposition  to  the 
impulse.     That  judgment  is  not  a  cause  or  mover.     The 
impulse  exerts  a  causative  power  upon  the  will,  the  intel- 
lectual judgment  does  not,  and  to  act  in  favor  of  the  judg- 
ment in  opposition  to  the  mover,  is  an  uncaused  act,  a  free 
act.     An  intellectual  conception  of  a  remote  advantage  or 
disadvantage  is  not  a  cause,  mover,  motive, — it  does  not 
energize  upon  the  will.     That  man  can  act  according  to 
such  an  intellectual  conception  in  opposition  to  an  impulse^ 
a  mover,  a  cause,  shows  that  man  has  freedom,  and  that  it 


244 


THE   HUMAN   MIND. 


is  not  true  that  man  must  act  according  to  the  strongest 
motive.  The  confusion  which  has  existed  in  regard  to 
what  constitutes  a  cause,  or  motive,  has  befogged  the 
minds  of  men  upon  this  point.  A  cause  or  motive  is  that 
which  energizes  upon  the  will,  and  nothing  else  is  a  mo- 
tive. The  arguments  against  human  freedom  are  based 
upon  a  misconception  of  the  causal  relation.  Let  it  be 
remembered  that  this  formula— cause;  energizing;  effect 
— expresses  the  complete  causal  relation  in  every  possible 
case,  and  men  will  talk  a  good  deal  less  nonsense  than 
they  do  now.  Man  can  act  in  obedience  to  an  intellectual 
judgment  in  opposition  to  all  motives,  or  in  favor  of  a 
weaker  and  against  a  stronger  motive.  Then  man  is, 
within  certain  limits,  a  free  and  accountable  being. 

Thus  we  find  human  freedom  to  rest,  among  the  recep- 
tive processes  of  mind,  in  man's  power  to  control  and 
direct  his  attention;  among  the  inworking  processes  of 
mind,  in  his  power  to  check  and  subdue  a  passion;  among 
the  outgoing  activities  of  mind,  in  his  power  to  avoid 
those  physical  acts  which  would  naturally  follow,  and  in 
his  power  to  act  according  to  an  intellectual  judgment  in 
opposition  to  an  impulse,  or  motive,  mover,  cause. 

There  is  one  point  more  which  demands  our  attention. 
We  have  adopted  the  doctrine  of  the  indestructibility  of 
substance.  But  we  have  also  seen  that  this  does  not  prove 
perpetual  identity  of  being;  the  substance  may  continue 
to  be,  and  yet  be  changed,  decomposed,  disintegrated,  and 
enter  into  new  combinations  and  associations,  and  into  the 
structure  of  other  beings.  We  have  thought  it  probable 
that  the  vegetable  and  animal  forces  pass  through  some 
such  transformations,  and  enter  into  the  composition  of 
aew  beings.  What  evidence  have  we  that  a  like  fate  does 
not  await  men  ?  What  differences  can  we  discover  be- 
tween man  and  brute  upon  which  we  can  base  an  expec- 


DIFFERENCES   FROM   BRUTES.  245 

tation  that  man  will  continue  in  conscious  identical  being 

after  death  ? 

In  answer  to  this  question  I  present  the  following  con- 
siderations. We  have  found  all  along  a  correspondence 
between  the  modes  of  the  mind  and  the  objective  proper- 
ties and  things  to  which  they  relate,— the  modes  of  mind 
correspond  with  their  objective  relations.  Each  mode  im- 
plies the  existence  of  its  object;  the  intuition  which  arises 
from  it  declares  the  existence  of  the  object.  By  an  exam- 
ination of  the  subjective  modes  we  can  ascertain  their  cor- 
responding objects.  The  subjective  modes  of  any  living 
being  adapt  him  to,  and  indicate,  his  objective  relations. 
By  an  examination  of  his  subjective  modes  we  can  ascer- 
tain what  his  objective  relations  are.  He  has  in  his  nature 
all  the  modes  which  his  objective  relations  require.  He 
has  no  objective  relations  to  which  he  is  not  adapted  by 
his  subjective  modes.  If  he  has  no  subjective  modes 
which  relate  him  to  certain  objective  things,  he  has  no  re- 
lation to  those  things,  and  they  are  not  for  him. 

Now  let  us  look  at  the  subjective  modes  of  brute  and 
man,  and  note  their  differences,  and  see  what  objective 
differences  those  subjective  differences  imply.  The  brute 
has  no  relations  to  anything  that  is  not  an  object  of  some 
of  the  modes  existing  in  his  nature.  He  has  no  impulses, 
no  desires,  no  thoughts,  no  capabilities  which  indicate,  or 
relate  him  to,  anything  more  than  the  physical  and  tem- 
poral. He  has  no  thoughts  of  immortality,  no  desire  for 
it,  no  hopes  which  reach  toward  it,  and  no  capability  of 
comprehending  it.  He  has  no  thoughts  of  eternity,  or  of 
the  infinite,  or  of  virtue,  or  justice,  or  mercy;  nor  of  right 
or  wrong;  nor  of  worship,  or  prayer,  or  trust,  or  faith;  nor 
of  a  supreme  creator  and  governor;  nor  of  divine  provi- 
dence; nor  of  an  unseen  and  beneficent  object  of  trust; 
nor  of  a  moral  government  involving  responsibility,  merit 
and  demerit,  rewards  and  penalties  according  to  desert. 


I.T 


-24^  THE   HUMAN   MIND. 

He  has  modes  in  his  nature  which  reach  toward  all  things 
to  which  he  is  in  any  wise  related;  he  has  no  modes  reach- 
ing toward  any  of  these;  then  he  has  no  relations  to  any 
•of  these. 

Man  has  thoughts  of  all  these.  These  thoughts  are  the 
spontaneous  outgoings  of  those  indwelling  modes  in  his 
nature  which  the  brute  has  not.  He  has  a  mode  in  his 
nature  which  inclines  him  to  worship,  which  leads  him  in- 
stinctively to  perform  acts  of  worship,  which  gives  him 
thoughts  of  a  Being  worthy  of  worship,  which  prostrates 
him  before  that  being  in  adoration  and  supplication,  in 
fear  or  confidence  as  he  believes  his  own  conduct  to  be  bad 
or  good.  That  mode  in  his  nature  which  gives  him 
thoughts  of  right  and  wrong,  of  ought  and  ought  not, 
causes  him  to  expect  enjoyment  from  right  conduct,  and 
pain  from  wrong  conduct.  By  this  mode  man  is  related 
to  a  moral  government  of  rewards  and  penalties  according 
to  desert.  He  has  a  mode  in  his  nature  which  gives  him 
thoughts  of  endless  being,  which  awakens  in  him  longings 
for  it,  and  which  is  alone  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  confident 
hope.  These  modes  relate  man  to  all  their  objects;  to  God, 
to  a  moral  government,  and  to  immortality  and  eternal  life. 

Thus  the  natural  proofs  of  man's  immortality  are  found 
in  his  intuitions,  in  the  natural  and  necessary  modes  of 
action  which  exist  in  his  mental  constitution.  While  it 
is  true  that  "  Life  and  immortality  are  brought  to  light  in 
the  gospel,"  and  clearly  and  positively  only  there,  these 
inborn  intuitions  are  sufficient  to  give  man  a  belief  in  his 
own  immortality,  and  to  prepare  him  to  welcome  and  em- 
brace the  teachings  of  Revelation,  and  to  awaken  in  him 
expectations  that  he  will  live  forever.  This  is  the  spon- 
taneous, first  beHef  in  man,  and  this  evidence  is  a  suffi- 
cient basis  for  his  belief  as  long  as  he  is  willing  to  trust 
in  and  rest  upon  his  intuitions.  When  he  refuses  to  re- 
ceive this  testimony,  turns  away  from  it,  and  looks  for  the 


IMMORTALITY. 


247 


evidence  in  the  objective,  he  finds  everything  dying,  de- 
caying, ceasing  to  be,  and  doubt  and  darkness  overshadow 
him.     As  man  is  the  only  living  being  on  earth  of  whose 
endless  existence  we  have  any  proof,  if  he  looks  to  other 
beings  for  evidence,  he  does  not  find  it,  and  he  may  con- 
clude that  man  dies  like  the  beasts.     Against  such  a  con- 
clusion the  inborn  intuitions  of  human  nature  utter  a  loud 
and  constant  and  quenchless  protest.     These  have  given 
to  all  men,  in  all  lands  and  ages,  the  spontaneous  belief 
in  their  existence  after  death;  and  doubt  has  arisen  only 
when  these  witnesses  have  been  repudiated,  and  other 
witnesses  sought.     If  the  facts  and  circumstances  seem  to 
indicate  that  the  immaterial  part  of  brutes  will  exist  after 
death  only  as  disorganized  elements,  my  intuitions  teach 
me  that  such  will  not  be  my  fate,  but  that  I  shall  continue 
to  be  as  a  conscious,  personal,  organic  being,  in  unchanged 
and  changeless  identity. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
The  Use  of  Intuitions  in  Understanding  Nature. 


We  have  seen  that  our  intuitions,  or  mental  modes,  are' 
the  subjective  basis  of  all  objective  knowledge.  The  cor- 
respondence between  these  subjective  modes  and  the  ob- 
jects is  the  condition  of  knowledge.  The  intuitions  are 
the  subjective  preparation  and  adaptation  which  render 
knowledge  possible,  and  they  limit  and  define  all  possible 
knowledge.  Nothing  objective  can  be  directly  known  that 
has  not  a  corresponding  subjective  mode.  We  know  not 
how  many  things,  properties,  and  relations  there  may  be 
in  the  universe  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge,  concern- 
ing which  we  have  no  thoughts,  and  can  have  none,  be- 
cause we  have  no  corresponding  subjective  modes.  How- 
ever many  there  be,  they  are  to  us  forever  unknowable, 
and  we  can  have  no  thoughts  respecting  them.  Other 
beings,  with  other  subjective  modes,  may  think  of  them, 
and  perceive  and  know  them;  but  to  us  they  are  as  though 
they  were  not.  Everything  of  which  man  has  ever  had 
thoughts,  or  formed  any  kind  of  conceptions,  is  something 
which  has  its  likeness  in  the  subjective  modes,  or  its  like- 
ness to  things  which  have  their  subjective  correspondence. 
Even  if  it  is  an  imaginary  being,  it  is  made  up  of  those 
forms  and  properties  which  have  their  likenesses  in  the 
modes  of  the  mind,  and  which  are  already  known. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience  we  may  consider  the  use  of 
the  intuitions  under  three  objective  classes, — things,  prop- 
erties, and  relations.     Man  has  in  his  nature  an  intuition 


SPACE   AND  time. 


249 


•which  corresponds  with  the  objective  fact  of  thing,  or  sub- 
stance; so  that  when  mind  in  the  sense  of  touch  comes  in 
contact  with  space  fiUing  existence,  it  cognizes  it  as  some- 
thing, thing,  substance.     Every  man  has  such  thoughts. 
These  thoughts  are  among  the  common  every  day  exper- 
iences of  all  mankind.     When  called  upon  to  define  what 
they  thus  discover  and  think  of,  they  may  not  be  able  to 
state  any  fact  respecting  it  which  is  true  of  it  and  of  noth- 
ing else.     All  that  I  could  think  to  say  of  it  that  is  not 
true  of  anything    else  was.    It  of  itself  occupies  space; 
hence  I  define  substance  as  that  which  of  itself  occupies 
«pace.     However  we  may  define  it,  when  the  mind  comes 
in  contact  with  that  which  fills  space  to  the  exclusion  of 
•other  substance,  this  intuition  is  verified,  it  has  met  its 
object,  and  the  result  is  knowledge;  hence  I  say  that  we 
do  know  substance.    But  so  far  the  mind  only  knows  that 
it  is,  that  it  exists  in  space  and  occupies  a  portion  of  space. 
What  do  we  know  of  space  and  time  ?  and  how  do  we 
obtain  what  knowledge  we  have  ?     I  will  not  attempt  to 
define  space  and  time,  for  I  consider  them  undefinable. 
We  can  present  many  negative  statements  respecting  them: 
They  are  not  substance;  they  possess  no  properties  by  which 
they  can  be  defined;  they  do  nothing  to  which  we  can 
point  as  their  work.     I  know  of  no  positive  fact  which  can 
he  stated  of  them  which  would  be  true  of  them  and  of 
nothing  else.     Yet  they  are  in  every  man's  thoughts,  and 
they   are  spoken  of  and   talked   about  by  every  human 
being.     All  attempts  to  crowd  them  out  of  being,  to  rep- 
resent them  as  only  attributes,  or  as  having  only  a  sub- 
jective existence,  shock  common  sense,  and  contradict  all 
the  thoughts  of  every  man  respecting  them.     Here  they 
are,   then,  undefinable,  indescribable,  and  yet  as  famiUar 
to  us  as  the  ground  on  which  we  tread.     How  does  man 
know  them  ?     Has  that  ever  been  answered  ?     Probably 
ijome    will    think,    after   reading   this,  that  I  have   not 


250 


USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 


answered  it.  I  only  need  to  refer  the  reader  to  our  many- 
times  described  process  of  knowledge — a  subjective  mode 
or  intuition  meeting  its  object.  But  our  knowledge  or 
conception  of  time  and  space  is  imperfect  and  unsatis- 
factory, because  the  object  cannot  be  fully  met, — they  have 
no  substance,  properties,  or  modes  which  can  enter  the 
mind  through  the  senses  to  meet  the  intuition,  and  make 
it  to  become  actual  knowledge.  Then  the  mind  cannot 
image  in  itself  a  formless  and  boundless  thing.  Still,  the 
intuition  of  space  is  partially  verified,  as  I  have  before 
said,  by  limited  and  bounded  portions  of  space,  and  so  far 
we  have  actual  knowledge  of  it.  I  have  knowledge,  a 
clear  and  definite  conception,  of  the  portion  of  space  in- 
closed by  the  walls  of  this  room.  This  portion  of  space 
has  form  and  size,  and  I  can  construct  a  clear  image  of  it 
in  my  mind.  I  know  that  that  portion  of  space  is  a  real 
objective  existence,  and  not  a  mode  of  thought  or  an  at- 
tribute of  anything.  It  is  a  real  objective  existence,  just 
as  much  as  the  walls  that  inclose  it.  It  is  the  same  with 
all  other  limited  and  bounded  portions  of  space,  of  which 
I  know  the  form  and  dimensions.  But  I  know  that  the 
walls  of  this  room  effect  no  break  in  the  continuity  of 
space;  space  is  where  the  walls  are,  as  well  as  this  side 
and  beyond.  Thus  the  intuition  of  space,  which  is  of  un- 
limited space,  becomes  knowledge  only  of  limited  and 
bounded  portions  of  it.  Whatever  thoughts  we  have  of 
boundless  space,  they  are  the  thoughts  which  arise  from 
an  intuition  alone,  thoughts  which  have  not  become 
knowledge  by  meeting  their  object.  In  this  unverified 
field  of  the  intuition  we  can  examine  specimens  of  the 
thoughts  which  arise  from  all  the  intuitions  before  they 
meet  their  objects.  Knowledge  is  verified  intuitions,  but 
we  have  thoughts  of  things  arising  from  our  intuitions 
alone,  before  they  are  verified,  and  when  it  is  not  possible 
to  verify  them. 


INDIVIDUALITY.  25! 

Another  mental  mode  or  intuition  corresponds  precisely 
with  objective  time.  This  intuition  cannot  be  verified  by 
a  sense  discovery  of  whole  time.  It  is,  like  the  intuition 
of  space,  partially  verified  by  measured  and  marked  off 
periods  of  time.  We  know  in  consciousness  from  the  in- 
tuition  alone  of  the  lapse  of  time,  and  we  are  able  to  form 
judgments — more  or  less  correct — of  the  length  of  time 
that  has  intervened;  and  tell  whether  intervals  are  longer 
short,  equal  or  unequal,  uniform  or  irregular.  We  know 
that  measured  portions  of  time  are  more  and  less.  We 
know  that  the  swing  of  the  pendulum  occupies  time.  We 
know  an  hour,  a  day,  a  week,  a  month,  a  year.  So  far 
objective  time  has  become  actual  knowledge  to  us;  but  of 
unlimited  time  we  have  only  intuitional  thoughts,  unver- 
ified by  objective  discovery.  We  know,  through  a  pro- 
cess which  will  be  hereafter  described,  that  space  and  time 
are  limitless,  infinite;  but  only  finite  portions  of  them  be- 
come real  knowledge  to  us  by  verification  through  the 
senses. 

There  is  another  subjective  mode  which  has  been  de- 
nominated individuality.  This  corresponds  with  the  ob- 
jective fact  of  individual  things.  It  takes  no  cognizance 
of  relations,  but  conceives  each  individual  as  an  unrelated 
thing,  with  metes  and  bounds  in  space.  By  this  intuition 
things  are  thought  of  as  isolated  individuals,  without  any 
reference  to  their  relations.  It  is  thus  that  physical  ob- 
jects are  first  cognized.  The  man  has  the  conception  of 
thing  on  his  first  discovery  of  filled  space,  or  substance 
before  he  has  discovered  or  thought  of  any  of  its  prop- 
erties or  its  relations.  He  knows  nothing  of  it  but  as  a 
thing  existing  in  space.  The  thing  is  discovered  before 
any  of  its  properties  or  relations  are  discovered;  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  thing  precedes  a  knowledge  of  any  of  its  prop- 
erties or  relations.  When  its  properties — form,  size,  color, 
etc., — are  discovered,  his  conception  of  the  thing  is  not 


252  USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 

formed  by  an  aggregation  of  these  properties,  but  these  are 
added  to  the  already  existing  conception  of  thing,  and  the 
conception  now  is  of  thing  with  this  form,  this  size,  and 
so  forth.     It  is  not  first  known  by  comparing  it  with  some- 
'  thing  else,  but  when  two  things  become  thus  individually 
known,  they  are  compared  together.     Those  philosophers 
who  have  said,  "Knowledge  begins  with  concrete  things," 
have  spoken  the  truth;  but  there  is  not  much  concretion, 
for  all  that  is  known  at  first  is  the  bare  fact  of  space  filling 
existence.    Those  philosophers  who  have  said  that  knowl- 
edge begins  with  properties,  and  those  who  have  said  that 
if  begins  with  relations,  have  both  been  mistaken,  I  think. 
This  intuition  ever  afterward  conceives  things  as  isolated 
individuals.     By  far  the  largest  part  of  human  concep- 
tions is  of  things  as  isolated  individuals.    In  common  prac- 
tical  life  things   are   thus   thought  of  and   spoken  of  a 
hundred  or  more  times  to  every  one  time  that  their  rela- 
tions are  thought  of  or  spoken  of.     Men,  animals,  trees, 
houses,  all  physical  things,  are  mainly  thought  of  and 
dealt  with  by  man  in  practical  life  as  unrelated  individuals. 
Comparisons  are  often  instituted,  but  thousands,  millions 
of  times  every  day  things  are  thought  of  when  at  the  same 
time  no  thought  of  any  of  their  relations  to  other  things 
is  in  the  mind.     It  is  strange  that  so  little  attention  has 
been  given  to  this  fact  in  philosophy,  and  that  the  phi- 
losopher's philosophic  conceptions  of  things  in  their  rela- 
tions should  be  thought  to  be  the  only  possible  concep- 
tions.    The  major  part  of  human  thoughts  of  things  is  of 
them  as  isolated  individuals,  Umited  and  bounded  in  space. 
According  to  this  intuition  man  conceives  things,  not 
only  limited  and  bounded  in  space,  but  also  limited  in 
time,  with  beginnings  and  endings,  isolated  from  all  before 
and  after.     All  events  beginning  and  ending  are  thought 
of  by  it  without  any  reference  to  predecessors  or  succes- 
sors.    The  philosophy  of  Umitless  continuity,  of  which  we 


INDIVIDUAI.ITY. 


253 


hear  so  much  in  these  days,  is  based  entirely  upon  the  in- 
tuition of  comparison,  and  ignores  entirely  the  intuition  of 
individuality.     When  a  man  looks  at  a  house,  he  notices 
its  color,  form,  dimensions,  etc.,  but  he  does  not  think  of 
the  lumber  of  which  it  was  constructed,  of  the  trees  of  the 
forest  out  of  which  the  lumber  was  made,  and  so  on;  he 
looks  at  it  and  thinks  of  it  as  an  individual,  an  event,  be- 
ginning and  now  existing  in  time.     Nor  does  he  usually 
refer  back  to  the  owner,  the  builder,  the  architect.     Nor 
does  he  usually,  looking  forward,  think  that  it  will  by  and 
by  rot,  and  its  carbon  uniting  with  the  oxygen  of  the  air 
become  an  invisible  gas,  and  so  on.     This  is  not  the  way 
that  mankind  usually  think  of  houses,  or  anything   else. 
Almost  all  the  common  conceptions  of  mankind  respecting 
things,  are  of  them  as  temporal,  individual  events  in  time, 
beginning  to  be,  and  ceasing  to  be.     These  conceptions 
are  the  work  of  an  intuition  in  human  nature.     This  in- 
tuition has  its  objective  correspondences  in  the  innumer- 
able things  which  do  begin  and  end.     This  intuition  sep- 
arates things  from  their  predecessors  and  their  successors, 
from  all  that  went  before  and  all  that  may  come  after,  and 
thinks  of  them  without  thinking  of  their  antecedents  and 
sequents,  and  views  things  as  individuals  isolated  in  time, 
as  well  as  space.     In  the  exercise  of  this  intuition,  men 
have  no  difiiculty  whatever  in  conceiving  things  as  begin- 
ning and  ending.     Such  conceptions  have  filled  the  world 
of  thought  ever  since   man  had  a  being.     The  mass  of 
mankind  are  astonished  when  philosophers  come  in  and 
tell  them  that  it  is  not  possible  to  begin  and  end.     When 
philosophers,  in  the  exclusive  exercise  of  comparison,  run 
wild  with  unity,  they  deny  the  possibility  of  beginnings 
and  endings.     The  intuition  of  individuality  is  just  as  au- 
thoritative in  its  sphere  as  the  intuition  of  comparison. 
They  are  not  contradictor>^  but  deal  with  different  things; 
and  it  is  the  business  of  philosophical  science  to  find  out 


254 


USE   OF  INTUITIONS. 


what  things  begin  and  end,  and  what  things  are  eternal. 

The  intuitions  are  equally  necessary  to  knowledge  in  the 
department  of  properties.  The  mind  can  directly  perceive 
only  such  properties  as  have  corresponding  modes  in  the 
mind.  We  may  illustrate  this  by  reference  to  the  senses. 
The  mind  in  the  sense  of  taste  perceives  certain  properties, 
and  no  others;  of  form,  color,  etc.,  the  mind  can  take  no 
cognizance  through  that  sense.  Through  other  senses  the 
mind  can  cognize  other  properties.  But  we  know  that 
substances  have  other  properties  which  cannot  be  directly 
cognized  by  any  of  the  senses,  such  as  malleability,  duc- 
tility, elasticity,  and  a  multitude  of  others.  Why  cannot 
they  be  directly  cognized  ?  Because  the  mind  has  no  in- 
herent modes  corresponding  with  them.  Why  may  other 
properties  be  immediately  cognized  ?  Because  the  mind 
has  inherent  modes  corresponding  with  them. 

That  the  subjective  mode  must  exist  in  order  to  percep- 
tion and  knowledge  is  shown  by  facts  in  reference  to  the 
perception  of  the  properties  of  sounds.  The  cluck  of  the 
mother  hen  is  understood  by  her  young  the  first  time  they 
hear  it.  They  perceive  at  once  the  characteristics  of  that 
sound  which  distinguish  it  from  all  other  sounds.  Why 
does  not  the  rabbit  understand  that  call  ?  Because  he  has 
no  mental  mode  corresponding  with  it.  Why  does  the 
chick  understand  it  ?  Because  he  has  a  mental  mode  cor- 
responding with  it.  The  call  of  the  mother  among  all 
species  of  animals  is  understood  by  their  own  young  the 
first  time  they  hear  it.  There  is  a  subjective  preparation 
which  enables  them  to  perceive  the  peculiar  properties  of 
these  sounds,  and  to  cognize  them,  and  to  know  their 
meaning,  the  first  time  they  hear  them;  that  is,  they  have 
in  their  mental  constitutions  subjective  modes — as  we  have 
been  saying  all  along — which  correspond  with  these  ob- 
jective   sounds,    which    in   each    species    spontaneously 


SUBJECTIVE   PART  IN  KNOWLEDGE.  255 

cognizes  the  properties  in  sounds  which  are  peculiar  to  the 
call  of  that  species. 

The  human  mother  shrieks,  and  the  infant  cries.  The 
young  of  all  animals  cognize  instinctively,  and  on  first 
hearing,  the  alarming  and  warning  properties  of  sounds 
uttered  by  their  own  species,  and  also  the  properties  of 
sounds  expressive  of  pain,  and  the  properties  expressive  of 
joy,  and  of  anger,  and  of  love.  All  these  properties  of 
sounds  are  immediately  and  intuitively  known.  The  ex- 
planation of  all  this  is  that  there  are  subjective  modes 
which  correspond  with  these  objective  properties  in  sounds, 
and  when  the  properties  enter  the  mind  and  meet  the 
modes,  those  properties  are  immediately  cognized,  and 
their  meaning  known,— the  object  and  the  mode  meet, 
and  the  result  is  knowledge. 

We  have  already  mentioned  many  properties  of  physical 
things  which  are  thus  cognized.  All  immediately  discov- 
erable physical  things,  all  perceptible  properties  in  physi- 
cal things  and  in  sounds,  and  all  immediately  discoverable 
relations  among  physical  things  are  thus  directly  known. 
These  constitute  a  vast  fund  of  immediate  or  intuitive 
knowledge.  This  is  the  first  process  of  knowledge,  and 
the  knowledge  thus  obtained  may  be  called  primary 
knowledge.  But  besides  these  there  are  some  material 
substances  and  many  properties  which  cannot  be  thus  im- 
mediately known.  The  molecules  of  the  permanent  gases 
and  vapors  are  so  mobile  that  we  cannot  immediately  dis- 
cover them  by  the  sense  of  touch  as  substances  occupying 
space.  Some  of  them  possess  properties  which  are  directly 
discoverable  by  the  senses  of  smell  and  taste.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  those  which  are  not  thus  known  is  obtained  through 
indirect  and  mediate  processes.  I  need  not  here  explain 
the  processes  by  which  we  come  to  know  gases  and  vapors, 
and  to  distinguish  one  from  another;  but  I  do  say  that  in 
all  these  processes  the  intuitions  are  employed,  and  with- 


256 


USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  RELATIONS. 


257 


|:ii 


out  them  none  of  this  knowledge  is  possible,  and  in  all 
these  cases  the  knowledge  is  completed  by  comparing  and 
classifying  them  with  things  known  immediately.  Thus^ 
by  confining  a  portion  of  gas  or  vapor,  we  find  that  it  does 
occupy  space  to  the  exclusion  of  other  matter;  and  that  it 
has  weight,  and  when  the  moving  air  comes  against  us, 
we  discover  that  it  has  momentum,  and  know  thereby  that 
it  has  inertia.  Thus  we  discover  in  them  those  properties 
which  distinguish  matter,  and  we  classify  them  with  mat- 
ter, and  say  we  have  a  knowledge  of  them.  Thus  of 
things  which  cannot  be  immediately  cognized  by  the 
senses,  but  which  we  know  by  other  means  to  exist,  our 
conceptions  become  knowledge  by  classifying  them  with 
things  already  immediately  known. 

Many  properties  cannot  be  immediately  known,  because 
they  have  no  corresponding  subjective  modes.  A  man 
strikes  with  a  hammer  upon  a  piece  of  glass,  and  he  sees 
it  break  in  pieces.  Thus  he  discovers  a  property  of  glass, 
and  he  names  that  property  brittleness.  He  heats  a  piece 
of  iron,  and  pounds  it  with  a  hammer,  and  finds  that  he 
can  shape  it  without  breaking  it  in  pieces.  He  thus  dis- 
covers a  property  of  iron,  and  he  names  that  property 
malleability.  Now,  by  calling  these  properties  he  classi- 
fies them  with  properties  which  are  known  immediately, 
or  by  the  first  process  of  knowledge.  These  properties 
are  not  known  by  their  agreement  with  a  subjective  mode, 
but  by  their  Hkeness  to  things  which  are  thus  known. 
Such  is  the  nature  of  mind  that  things  are  deemed  known 
when  they  are  classified  with  things  already  known.  Thus 
the  field  of  knowledge  is  greatly  enlarged  by  adding  to 
immediate  knowledge,  things  known  by  their  likeness  to 
things  immediately  known. 

The  department  of  relations  is  the  most  important  phil- 
osophically. It  is  here  that  diversity  of  opinions  more 
extensively  prevails;  and  this  has  been  the  arena  of  a 


world  of  controversy.  People  generally  admit  that  we 
know  properties  through  the  senses,  and  most  admit  that 
we  know  concrete  things;  but  when  things  can  be  known 
only  through  their  relations,  many  deny  that  they  are 
known.  In  knowing  things  through  their  relations,  a 
something  is  discovered  by  the  ordinary  process  of  knowl- 
edge; the  mind  sees  in  it  a  relation  to  something  else,  and 
declares  that  that  other  thing  is,  though  it  may  not  be 
otherwise  discoverable.  The  mind  declares  the  relation, 
and  bridges  the  chasm  between  this  discovered  thing  and 
the  undiscoverable  thing,  and  declares  that  that  undis- 
coverable  thing  is.  Some  say  that  this  declaration  of  the 
mind  is  a  reliable  and  infallible  guide,  and  others  deny  its 
validity.     We  will  consider  some  of  the  most  important  of 

these  relations. 

First,  the  relation  between  property  and  substance.    We 
discover  a    property— for    example,    form— through   the 
senses.     The  mind  declares  that  that  property  has  a  rela- 
tion to  something  else  which  must  really  exist,  though  we 
cannot  by  any  other  means  know  it.     I  have  claimed  that 
the  postulate,  every  property  declares  a  substance,  is  a  de- 
rivative absolute  truth.     Claiming  that  nothing  but  sub- 
stance can  exist  independently  in  space;  as  a  property  can- 
not possibly  exist  independently  in  space,  if  a  property  is 
found  in  space,  we  know  that  its  substance  is  there.     But 
this  postulate  is  generally  regarded  as  only  an  intuition, 
or  necessary  mode  of  mind.     Then,  if  it  be  assumed  that 
substance  is  not  discoverable  by  the  senses,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  substance  is,  except  this  declaration  of  the 
mind.     Discovering  a  property,  this  necessary  mode  of 
mind  declares  that  its  substance  is.     Whether  we  believe 
that  this  declaration  is  an  absolute  truth,  or  a  necessary 
mode  of  mind,  if  we  deny  that  substance  is  discoverable 
by  the  senses,  we  must  admit  the  truthfulness  of  this  dec- 
laration, or  else  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of   anything: 


258  USE   OF    INTUITIONS 

but  properties,  appearances,  and  all  knowledge  of  things 
is  excluded.  Even  if  we  may,  as  I  have  claimed,  imme- 
diately perceive  substance,  it  is  only  the  bare  fact  of  real 
-existence,  and  all  knowledge  of  varieties  in  substance, 
and  of  distinctions  between  different  substances,  is  impos- 
sible, unless  we  admit  the  unquestionable  authority  of  the 
postulate:  A  set  of  properties  declares  the  existence  of  a 
substance,  and  a  different  set  of  properties  declares  the  ex- 
istence of  a  different  substance.  The  chasm  between  prop- 
erty and  substance  is  bridged  by  a  necessary  mode  of  mind, 
and  if  we  do  not  admit  that  it  is  thus  bridged,  if  we  do 
not  step  confidently  upon  this  bridge,  and  say  that  we 
know  what  is  beyond;  there  is  no  real  science  for  us  to 
study,  no  real  nature  for  us  to  investigate,  no  real  object- 
ive world.  I  believe  that  the  intuition  which  declares 
from  a  propert}^  the  existence  of  a  substance  is  verified  by 
the  actual  discovery  of  substance  through  the  sense  of 
touch;  but  this  is  only  a  verification,  and  does  not  render 
any  less  necessary  our  reliance  upon  the  validity  of  the 
intuition. 

Comparison  is  another  subjective  mode  of  which  great 
use  is  made  in  science  and  philosophy.  Some  philoso- 
phers who  deny  the  validity  of  subjective  modes  as  bases 
of  belief,  and  forbid  their  use  in  science,  assert,  neverthe- 
less, that  the  process  of  comparison  is  necessary  to  any 
objective  knowledge;  they  say  that  we  can  never  know 
any  thing,  till  two  things  are  presented  to  us,  and  we 
compare  them  together.  We  have  concluded  that  we  know 
things  first  as  unrelated  individuals,  and  that  two  things 
cannot  be  compared  till  they  are  both  separately  known. 
But  we  all  know  that  our  conception  of  a  thing  is  very 
unsatisfactory  till  we  have  compared  it  with  other  things, 
and  discovered  their  likenesses  and  differences.  Why  are 
our  conceptions  so  much  more  satisfactory  after  this  pro- 
cess ?     Can  any  reason  be  given  other  than  that  such  is 


IN  PHII.OSOPHY.  259 

the  nature  of  mind  ?    The  fact  that  external  things  have 
likenesses  and  differences  is  no  reason  why  we  should  have 
clearer  and  more  satisfactory  conceptions  of  them  after  we 
have  discovered  those  likenesses.    It  is  a  natural  and  nec- 
essary mode  of  mind,  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  perceive 
likenesses  and  differences,  by  which  we  are  led  to  spon- 
taneously look  for  them  and  expect  them,   and   which 
renders   our  knowledge  of  things   satisfactory  when  we 
have  discovered  them.     Such  is  the  nature  of  mind  that 
we  do  not  feel  that  a  thing  is  satisfactorily  known  till  we 
discover  its  relations  to  other  things. 

The  uses  which  have  been  made  of  this  subjective  mode 
in  philosophy  are  so  numerous,  diverse,  and  complicated 
that  to  describe  them  would  be  to  write  a  history  of  phi- 
losophy. But,  following  our  plan,  we  will  only  consider 
a  few  of  the  leading  and  most  important  uses  for  which  it 
has  been  employed. 

The  subjective  mode  declares  the  existence  among  ob- 
jective things  of  the  relation  of  likeness  and  difference. 
That  is  its  primary  intuition.     Through  the  senses  we 
discover  this  relation  among  objective  things,  and  the  in- 
tuition is  verified.     We  subsequently  extend  this  relation 
to  things  unknown  and  undiscoverable,  and  say  they  have 
their  likenesses  and  differences  to  each  other  and  to  things 
known.     This  relation  exists,  not  only  among  physical 
things,  but  also  among  immaterial  substances,  and  they 
have  their  likenesses  and  differences.    It  exists  also  among 
motions,  acts,  modes  of  doing,  thoughts,  opinions,  mental 
processes  and  modes.    The  intuition  is  also  applied  to  time 
and  space;  and  also  to  the  infinite  and  finite,  and  to  the 
eternal   and  the  temporal.     We  see  how  vast  its  field  is, 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  some  have  thought  it  to  em- 
brace the  whole  of  philosophy.     It  is  applied  to  a  mode 
which  remains  essentially  the  same,  with  some  changes, 
and  then  the  likeness  and  difference  are  both  within  the 


26o 


USE  OF  INTUITIONS. 


one.  It  is  applied  to  one  material  substance  which  is 
thought  to  be  always  the  same  substance,  appearing  in  a 
variety  of  forms,  and  then  the  likeness  and  difference  are 
both  within  the  one  thing.  It  is  also  applied  to  one  thing 
which  never  changes,  but  is  always  like  itself,  when  it  is 
called  identity.  It  receives  other  names  according  to  the 
object  to  which  it  is  applied,  and  the  use  to  be  made  of  it. 
In  descriptive  science  it  is  classification;  in  logic,  synthesis 
and  generalization;  in  metaphysics,  unity. 

The  first  use  of  this  subjective  mode,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  is  as  a  means  of  obtaining  knowledge  by  comparing 
and  classifying  things  discovered  and  but  unperfectly  con- 
ceived with  things  before  known.  The  discovery  of  the 
relation  of  likeness  between  two  things  is  the  first  step  in 
classification.  We  all  go  forth  instinctively  comparing 
things,  and  classifying  together  things  that  are  alike.  The 
disposition  to  do  this  is  an  instinctive  mode  of  our  minds, 
and  by  it  we  obtain  a  clearer  conception  of  things.  So  far 
it  is  a  purely  instinctive  process.  Then  men  do,  as  a  policy 
and  plan,  group  things  together  in  classes  for  the  con- 
venience of  science.  A  reason  can  be  given  for  this:  it  is 
the  inability  of  the  mind  to  grasp  in  a  comprehension  a 
great  multitude  of  individuals.  But  this  does  not  at  all 
explain  why  we  can  get  a  more  satisfactory  conception  of 
an  individual  thing  by  comparing  it  with  other  things. 
This  can  be  explained  only  by  saying  that  such  is  the 
nature  of  our  minds,  or  such  is  an  inherent  mode  of  mind. 

We  are  disposed  to  enlarge  these  classes  by  requiring 
fewer  resemblances,  and  throwing  out  more  and  more  dif- 
ferences, and  thus  to  group  classes  into  larger  and  fewer 
classes,  and  these  into  still  larger  and  fewer,  until  at  last 
all  things  are  gathered  into  one,  which  is  all  likeness, 
with  no  difference, — that  is,  unity,  identity.  This  in 
philosophy,  is  often  called  the  ''tendency  to  unity."  If 
it  is  a  tendency  it  is  a  tendency  of  something;  of  what,  if 


INTUITIONS  OF   COMPARISON.  26 1 

tiot  of  the  mind  ?     It  is  a  peculiarity  of  mind,  a  mode  of 
mind.     The  primary  intuition  of  comparison  is  likeness 
and  difference.     But  this  we  see  is  dual,  there  are  two: 
likeness  is;  unlikeness  is.     Each  of  these  is  a  declaration 
made  by  a  subjective  mode;  each  is  an  intuition.     The 
intuition  of  likeness,  as  far  as  it  finds  its  object.in  external 
things,  finds  unity  there— they  are  so  far  one.    It  declares 
of  the  existence  of  unity,  and,  followed  out  to  its  ultimate, 
it  terminates  in  absolute  unity,  without  any  differences. 
The  intuition  of  unlikeness  declares  of  the  existence  of 
diversity;  and,  carried  out  alone,  without  regard  to  its 
counter  intuition,  tends  to  disintegration  and  separation, 
and,  fixing  the  mind  upon  the  dissimilarities  of  things, 
leads  us  to  view  all  things  as  unlike,  and,  if  carried  out  to 
its  ultimate,  would  exclude  all  likeness  and  unity.     On 
the  other  hand,  the  intuition  of  likeness  directs  attention 
to  Ukenesses,  leads  the  mind  to  these,  and  away  from  dif- 
ferences, to  ultimate  unity.     Now,  both  of  these  intuitions 
exist  in  the  mind,  and  the  objects  of  both  exist  in  nature, 
and  both  must  be  used  to  obtain  a  correct  knowledge  of 
nature;  and  we  must  ascertain  by  observation  where  like- 
ness is,  and  where  unlikeness. 

But  we  see,  both  in  our  consciousness,  by  watching  the 
operations  of  our  own  minds,  and  in  the  prevailing  cur- 
rents in  the  history  of  philosophy,  that,  while  both  intui- 
tions exist  in  the  mind,  the  intuition  of  likeness  is  far  more 
dominant  and  controlling  in  human  thought  than  the  in- 
tuition of  unlikeness.     The  law  of  diversity  occupies  but 
a  small  space  in  philosophy;  while  the  law  of  unity  fills 
volumes,  and  gives  form  to  almost'  all  science  and  philos- 
ophy.    The  mind  turns  instinctively  away  from  diversity, 
and  has  a  strong  preference  for  unity.     Man  experiences 
little  satisfaction  in  disintegration,  he  does  really  enjoy  uni- 
fication.    This  is  in  him  a  constant  controlling  tendency. 
If  he  discover  a  thing,  he  wants  to  know  its  likenesses  to 


262 


USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 


other  things;  he  does  not  care  so  much  about  its  unlike- 
nesses ;  he  throws  them  out ;  he  does  not  notice  them, 
he  does  not  wish  to  notice  them;  he  designedly  and  in- 
stinctively turns  his  attention  from  them.  Thus  we  see 
how  much  stronger  is  our  love  for  likeness  than  our  love 
for  unlikeness,  how  much  more  it  is  a  controlling  and 
regulating  principle  in  the  mind.  Now,  it  is  this  prefer- 
ence for  likeness,  this  tendency  of  human  thought  toward 
unity,  this  disposition  to  turn  away  from  unlikeness,  to 
shut  out  of  notice  and  out  of  thought  diversity,  it  is  this 
instinctive  mode  in  the  operation  of  mind,  which  con- 
stitutes the  basis  of  the  intuition  of  unity.  The  predom- 
inance of  our  love  of  likeness  over  our  love  for  unlike- 
ness, leads  us  to  seek  for  likeness  without  unlikeness,  for 
unity  without  diversity,  and  declares  that  this  object  of 
our  desire  does  actually  exist.  The  operation  of  these 
two  intuitions  in  the  mind,  one  so  much  stronger  than  the 
other,  constantly  leads  the  mind  toward  unity,  and  ulti- 
mately to  pure  unity  without  difference  or  diversity. 

All  philosophers  have  admitted  the  existence  of  this  ten- 
dency to  unity,  and  this  intuition  of  unity.  Even  those 
philosophers  who  forbid  the  use  of  intuitions,  while  stout- 
ly denying  the  validity  of  intuitions  as  guides,  and  per- 
emptorily forbidding  their  use  in  philosophy,  do  them- 
selves, nevertheless,  yield  an  almost  slavish  obedience  to 
this.  Differences  of  opinion  arise  in  reference  to  it  when 
we  come  to  consider  how  to  use  the  intuition  of  unity,  to 
what  it  should  be  applied,  and  what  the  unity  is  to  which 
it  points.  Nothing  is  more  prominently  characteristic  of 
modern  physical  philosophy  than  the  abundant  use  of  this 
intuition;  but  in  most  cases  it  is  a  misuse.  It  is  used,  not 
merely  to  classify  things  together,  leaving  out  of  mind 
admitted  differences,  but  to  obliterate  differences,  and  run 
all  things  together  over  all  lines  of  distinction.  Things 
are   not  classified   on   the   ground  of  resemblances,  and 


INTUITION  OF  UNITY. 


263: 


traced  to  one  in  their  origin;  but  they  are  regarded  as  one 
in  substance.  Motion  and  force  are  one;  all  forms  of 
energy  are  one;  all  forces  are  one;  force  and  matter  are 
one;  matter  and  mind  are  one;  all  kinds  of  matter  are  one,-; 
all  things  are  one;  and  the  one  physical  universe  includes 
the  all.  All  things  are  one  substance;  hence  this  uni- 
versal philosophy  of  transmutation. 

Notwithstanding  its  abuses,  the  intuition  of  unity  is  of 
great  importance  in  philosophy.  I  will  present  some  ex- 
amples of  what  I  consider  its  legitimate  use;  first,  in  the 
formation  of  a  generalization.  Physicists  make  unre- 
stricted use  of  generalizations,  while  sternly  repudiating 
intuitions,  or  subjective  modes  as  guides.  Let  us  notice 
the  process  by  which  a  generalization  is  formed.  A  num- 
ber of  things  are  examined  and  are  found  to  be  alike  in 
some  respect.  These  facts  constitute  a  basis  for  a  gener- 
alization. We  conclude  that  all  things  of  this  class  are 
like  those  which  we  have  examined,— we  extend  the  fact 
or  principle  which  we  have  found  true  in  these  examined 
cases  unlimitedly  to  all  cases.  Why  do  we  do  this  ?  The 
basis  of  facts  is  limited;  the  generalization  is  unlimited. 
The  facts  themselves  can  give  us  no  information  beyond 
their  own  limits.  Upon  what  does  that  portion  of  the 
generalization  which  extends  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
basal  facts  rest?  We  believe  that  those  undiscovered 
things  are  in  this  respect  like  the  discovered  things;  what 
is  the  basis  of  this  belief?  That  belief  has  no  foundation 
but  our  confidence  in  the  intuition  of  unity.  That  portion 
of  the  generalization  which  extends  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  observed  facts  rests  upon  a  purely  mental  foundation. 
The  intuition  of  unity  extends  this  likeness  to  all  of  that 
kind  of  things.  Without  this  intuition  no  generalization 
would  be  or  could  be  made,— the  principle  could  never  be 
extended  beyond  the  limits  of  the  observed  facts.    It  seems 


264 


USE   OF  INTUITIONS. 


unreasonable  to  deny  all  reliable  authority  to  intuitions, 
while  placing  such  unlimited  confidence  in  this. 

We  will  now  consider  some  special  generalizations:  first, 
our  belief  in  what  is  called  the  uniform  course  of  nature. 
The  intuition  of  unity  applies  to   modes,  as  well   as  to 
things.     When  it   is   applied  to  two  or  more  things  or 
modes,  it  means  their  likeness  to  each  other;  when  applied 
to  one  mode  or  thing,  it  means  its  continued  likeness  to 
itself     When  we  have  seen  things  move  after  a  certain 
manner  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  we  expect  that 
they  will  continue  to  move  after  that  manner.     If  the 
motions  be  in  a  series,  or  successional  round  of  changes, 
we  expect  that  that  successional  round  will  continue  as  it 
has  been.    On  what  basis  does  this  expectation  rest  ?    We 
believe  that  the  course  of  nature  will  be  essentially  the 
same  next  year  that  it  has  been  this  year;  on  what  evi- 
dence is  that  belief  founded  ?     Why  do  we  believe  that 
winter  will  pass  awa3^  and  spring  come,  and  flowers  bloom, 
and  that  summer  with  its  accessories,  and  autumn  with  its 
burdens  of  freight  will  follow  ?     Men  will  answer.  Because 
it  has  uniformly  so  been  in  the  past.     But  the  past  can 
give  us  no  evidence  of  what  the  future  is  to  be,  unless  we 
assume  that  the  future  will  be  like  the  past;  and  it  is  the 
ground  of  that  assumption  that  we  are  inquiring  after. 
This  belief  rests  wholly  and  only  upon  our  confidence  in 
the  intuition  of  unity.     The  intuition  of  unity  declares 
that  what  has  been  for  a  considerable  length  of  time  in 
the  past  will  continue  to  be  the  same  in  the  future;  and 
men  go  forth  instinctively  so  thinking,  in  confident  ex- 
pectation, without  a  doubt  or  distrust,  on  the  platform 
projected  by  this  intuition,  entering  the  unknown  future. 
They  do  not  often  stop  to  ask  themselves  the  grounds  of 
this  confidence,  or  why  they  so  think;  and  none  are  more 
confident  than  those  who  deny  the  authority  of  intuitions. 
If  the  series  has  already  continued  long,  our  expectation 


LAW   OP   CONTINUITY.  265 

is  more  certain;  a  great  number  of  facts  strengthens  any 
generalization. 

The  generalization  which  has  been  denominated  the  law 
of  continuity  demands  our  attention.  This  law  asserts 
that  the  quantity  of  being  is  unchangeable.  It  may 
undergo  any  number  of  mutations  in  form,  but  the  quan- 
tity remains  forever  the  same.  I  understand  this  to  be  a 
generalization  based  upon  observed  facts.  Soqie  have 
endeavored  to  give  it  other  foundations.  Some  base  this 
law  upon  our  inability  to  conceive  of  a  beginning  or  end- 
ing of  being.  This  class  of  philosophers  base  all  fundamen- 
tal postulates  upon  human  impotence;  andif  philosophy  has 
no  better  foundation  than  our  ignorance  and  weakness,  it 
is  not  worth  our  time  talking  and  writing  about  it. 

Others  base  the  law  of  continuity  upon  what  is  supposed 
to  be  an  absolute  truth:  ''Nothing  can  never  become 
something,  and  something  can  never  become  nothing." 
If  this  is  understood  to  mean  that  nothing  can  never  make 
itself  to  be  something,  so  far  it  is  based  upon  a  derivative 
absolute  truth.  Nothing  can  never  make  any  thing  of 
itself,  nor  of  any  thing  else,  can  never  be  a  maker  or  doer; 
for  that  which  has  no  existence  cannot  do;  doing  without 
being  is  a  contradiction.  That  something  can  never  make 
itself  to  become  nothing,  is  probably  true,  if  by  thing  is 
meant  substance;  for  to  suppose  that  it  could  annihilate 
itself  would  be  contrary  to  a  pretty  well  established  gen- 
eralization, viz.:  that  substance  is  to  all  finite  power 
indestructible.  But  this  is  not  the  common  understanding 
of  the  postulate.  Men  who  quote  it  in  evidence  generally 
mean  by  it  that  no  power,  not  even  infinite  power,  can 
make  something  to  be  when  nothing  was  before,  can  begin 
being,  or  create  any  thing  without  using  previously  exist- 
ing material.  In  this  sense  the  postulate  is  neither  an 
absolute  truth,  nor  a  well  founded  generalization.  It  is 
not  an  absolute  truth,  for  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of 


266 


USE  OF  INTUITIONS. 


things  which  thus  limits  Omnipotence.     Creating  some- 
thing where  there  was  nothing  involves  no  contradiction, 
nor  does  it  violate  the  law  of  identity,  nor  contradict  any 
other  absolute  truth;  and  we  cannot  so  fathom  the  nature 
of  the  Infinite  as  to  know  what  He  can  do  or  not  do. 
The  only  limits  upon  divine  power  which  we  are  author- 
ized to  make  is  the  law  of  contradictions— He  cannot  lie, 
or  act  contrary  to  His  own  nature  and  laws.     Creating 
worlds  when  no  worlds  had  previously  existed,  without 
using  any  previously  existing  substance  out  of  which  to 
make  them,  is  not  included  in  this  limitation. 

It  is  not  a  well  founded  generahzation.     We  can  make 
no  generalization  of  what  the  infinite  can  do  or  not  do, 
except  from  what  He  has  done.     The  facts  upon  which 
our  generalization  must  be  based  are  these:     Matter  is, 
the  worlds  are;  we  know  they  could  not  have  brought 
themselves  into  being;  we  have  reasons  for  concluding 
that  they  could  not  have  eternally  been;  then  we  conclude 
that  He  created  them.     Any  generalization  founded  upon 
these  facts  must  be  that  He  can  increase  the  quantity  of 
being.     Nor  is  there  any  reason  why  we  must  suppose 
that  He  made  the  worlds  by  transforming  portions  of  His 
own  substance.     There  is  nothing  whatever  to  forbid  our 
believing  that  He  created  the  universe,  without  using  any 
previously  existing  substance  to  make  it  of. 

The  law  of  continuity,  so  far  as  it  is  an  expression  of 
truth,  is  a  generalization,  and  nothing  more.  It  is  formed 
as  all  other  generalizations  are.  The  facts  which  con- 
stituted its  base  when  it  was  first  made,  long  before  the 
indestructibility  of  matter  was  experimentally  proven, 
were  the  phenomena  which  are  the  objects  of  common 
every  day  observation.  Men  saw  matter  constantly 
changed  in  form,  but  unchanged  in  quantity— soil  became 
living  vegetables,  and  vegetables  returned  to  soil;  sub- 
stances were  chemically  changed  to  other  substances,  and 


LAW  OF  CONTINUITY.  267 

might  be  restored  again,  and  a  multitude  of  similar  facts. 
From  these  facts  men  made  the  generalization  that  matter 
might  be  transmuted  into  a  multitude  of  forms,  and  yet 
its  quantity  remain  the  same.     The  facts  alone,  of  course, 
could   teach   nothing   beyond  their  own  limits,  but  the 
intuition  of  unity  extended  what  appeared  to  be  true  in 
many  cases  to  all  cases,  and  that  generalization  has  been 
in  later  times  called  the  law  of  continuity.     When  this 
generalization  was  formed  and  became  prevalent,   then 
commenced   the   age  of  alchemy,  and  men  ran  wild  in 
attempts  to  transmute  valueless  substances  into  things  of 
value.     But  all  these  attempts  failed;  and  the  world  has 
ever  since  had  a  broad  smile  on  its  face  over  these  labor- 
ious and  learned  follies.     But  in  this  age  the  generaliza- 
tion has  been  revived,  and  proclaimed  with  a  great  flourish 
of  authority,  and  those  laborious  and  learned  follies  are 
being  again  repeated. 

Now,  after  a  full  examination  of  the  question,  to  what 
extent  is  the  law  of  continuity  true  ?     In  the  first  place, 
facts  alone  can  settle  this  question;  no  absolute  truth  nor 
intuition  settles  it.     Facts  seem  to  show  that  substance  is 
to  all  finite   power  indestructible,  and  unchangeable  in 
quantity.     Facts  also  show  that  no  elementary  substance, 
material  or  immaterial,  can  be  by  any  finite  power  trans- 
formed into  any  other  substance.     The  material  elements 
may  diversely  combine,  different  elements  together,  and 
the  same  elements  in  different  proportions,  and  thus  result 
in  the  production  of  a  great  variety  of  compound  sub- 
stances.    This  is  all  there  is  left  of  the  law  of  continuity. 
It  is  not  a  universal  generalization,  it  is  applicable  only  to 
substance;  and  as  far  as  transmutation  is  concerned  it  is 
never  true  of  substance.     Facts  of  change  are  very  numer- 
ous in  this  world;  and  from  these  facts  men  have  often 
made   the    generalization,     all   things   change.     But    it 
seems   there   are   exceptions,    the  elementary  substances 


268 


USE  OF  INTUITIONS. 


remain  perpetually  unchanged;  and  these  things  which 
are  excluded  from  the  last  part  of  the  law,  are  the  only- 
things  included  in  the  first  part  of  it. 

Another  very  extensive  class  of  facts  found  in  nature  is 
included  under  the  terms  motion  and  change, — changes  in 
form,  structure,  correlation,  and  position.  These  are  all 
results  of  energizing;  they  are  all  manifestations  of  power. 
Comparison  deals  with  these  as  with  all  other  facts.  It 
classifies  them,  Hke  with  like,  and  we  conclude  that  all 
like  ones,  or  each  class,  are  the  work  of  the  same  doer, 
and  we  name  the  doer  in  each  class,  and  thus  we  have 
electricity,  heat,  gravity,  and  so  forth.  Then,  urged  by 
the  intuition  of  unity,  men  contrive  some  way  to  unify 
these  several  doers.  Some  seek  to  unify  them  in  one  way, 
and  others  in  another;  but  all  seek  to  unify  them.  Some 
say  that  they  are  all  one  in  that  they  are  energy,  they  are 
only  different  forms  of  one  energy.  These  mistake  ener- 
gizing for  energy;  and  have  energy  an  entit}^  when  it  is 
only  a  property.  Others  unify  them  under  the  name  force; 
all  these  forces  are  one  force,  and  these  different  forces  are 
convertible  one  into  another.  This  is  found  to  be  a  false 
mode  of  unification,  for  they  are  not  convertible,  one  of 
them  is  never  transformed  into  another.  Others  say  they 
are  all  one,  and  that  one  is  the  divine  being. 

These  various  endeavors  to  unify  them  show  the  strength 
of  the  intuition  of  unity,  and  how  obedient  men  are  to  its 
impulse;  none  more  so  than  those  who  repudiate  intuitions 
as  guides. 

We  have  concluded  that  the  doers  in  nature  are  a  number 
of  separate  agents  which  cannot  be  substantially  merged 
into  each  other,  or  unified.  We  unite  the  several  indi- 
vidual doers  into  classes  for  the  convenience  of  science, 
and  have  the  inorganic  forces,  the  vegetable  forces,  the 
animal  forces,  and  the  intellectual  forces  of  man.  But 
they  cannot  be  in  any  manner  unified,  except  by  tracing 


INTUITION  OF  UNITY.  269 

them  all  to  one  in  their  origin,  and  regarding  them  as 
products  of  the  one  Creator. 

Whatever  mode  of  unification  we  adopt,  the  unity  we 
reach  must  contain  all  the  power  and  attributes  which  are 
found  in  all  the  individuals.  If  we  merge  them  all  into 
one,  that  one  must  contain  a  measure  of  power  equal  to 
the  sum  of  all  eo-existing  powers  in  the  universe,  and  also 
all  the  modes  and  qualities  which  are  found  in  all  the 
individual  powers.  If  we  find  sensation,  feeling,  intelli- 
gence, and  will  among  the  individuals,  these  must  exist 
in  the  aggregated  one;  if  that  one  is  the  original,  it  must 
have  contained  all;  for  nothing  can  come  out  of  a  thing 
that  is  not  in  it.  Really,  then,  the  one  that  we  reach  as 
the  original,  by  whatever  process  we  reach  it,  must  be  all 
powerful  and  intelligent. 

We  mention  another  class  of  things  which  comparison 
handles  in  the  same  way :    the  multitude  of  substances. 
These  are  in  thought  unified  in  the  general  term  substance. 
Then  we  see  the  efforts  of  men,  in  obedience  to  the  intui- 
tion of  unity,  to  unify  them  substantially,  in  Spinoza's 
one  sole  substance,  and  in  the  attempt  of  many  scientists 
to  show  that  all  material  substances  are  only  different  forms 
of  one  element,  and  in  the  one  sole  substance  of  Sir  Wm. 
Thompson,  and  in  the  opinion  that  all  material  substances 
are  but  modes,  or  energizings  of  the  divine  substance. 
While  these  instances  are  evidences  of  the  power  of  this 
intuition  in  human  thought,  I  think  they  are  all  a  misuse 
and  misapplication   of  the  intuition.     The  unity  of  all 
substances  is  to  be  found  only  in  their  one  original,  the 
one  out  of  which  they  all  came.     Thus  this  intuition  was 
designed  to,  and  thus  its  legitimate  use  does,  lead  us,  in 
all  channels  of  thought,  back  to  the  One  from  whom  all 
things  came,  the  sole  primary  self-existent. 

We  must  now  consider  for  a  few  minutes  how  the  intui- 
tion of  unity  handles  time  and  space.     We  know  time  by 


!|i| 


1:^ 


X 


I 


270  USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 

the  intuition  of  time  partially  verified  by  limited  and 
measured  periods  of  time.  This  would  limit  our  real 
knowledge  of  it  to  those  limited  periods.  Our  intuition 
may  be  of  infinite  time,  but  our  real  knowledge  is  of  only 
finite  time.  But  we  discover  that  the  means  by  which 
limited  periods  of  time  are  measured  effect  no  break  in  the 
continuity  of  time.  That  of  which  we  can  discover  no 
beginning  nor  end,  and  in  which  we  can  discover  no 
change,  the  intuition  of  unity  extends  beyond  the  limited 
known,  to  the  illimitable  unknown.  It  is  pure  unchange- 
ing  unity,  the  same  eternally,  and  it  is  at  once  recognized 
as  an  object  of  this  intuition.  We  know  that  we  can  say, 
time  is  now  and  here.  We  know  that  any  being  living  in 
any  world,  anywhere  in  the  universe,  can  say,  time  is  now 
and  here.  We  know  that  any  being  who  has  lived  in  the  past 
of  eternity  could  say,  time  is  now.  We  know  that  any  being 
who  may  live  in  the  future  of  eternity  can  say,  time  is 
now.  It  is  the  same  changeless  unity  in  all  eternity  and 
in  all  space,  forever  identical  with  itself.  This,  then,  is 
in  so  far  the  unity  after  which  the  mind  is  constantly 
reaching.  At  all  times,  and  in  all  places,  the  same,  eternal 
indentity.  We  have  now  reached  the  idea  of  the  infinite. 
The  intuition  of  unity  deals  the  same  with  space.  Our 
actual  knowledge  is  of  only  limited  portions  of  space;  but 
as  we  can  discover  no  boundaries  to  it,  nor  changes  in  it, 
the  intuition  of  unity  extends  it  beyond  the  known,  to  the 
illimitable  unknown.  We  know  that  we  can  say,  space 
is  here.  We  know  that  any  being,  on  any  world,  any- 
where in  the  universe,  in  all  past  time,  and  in  all  future 
time,  can  say,  space  is  here.  We  know  that  all  the  suns 
and  systems  of  worlds  are  in  space,  and  that  beyond  the 
bounds  of  all  worlds  and  systems  space  is.  It  is  in  all 
eternity  the  same  unchanged  and  changeless  unity,  forever 
identical  with  itself.  Here  again  we  find  a  unity  which 
is  in  so  far  that  unity  after  which  the  mind  is  constantly 


UNITY   OF  SPACE   AND   TIME. 


271 


reaching;  and  here  again  we  have  attained  to  the  idea  of 

the  infinite. 

Time  and  space  are  infinite,  each  in  its  own  respect,  like 
a  line  of  infinite  length.     But  a  line  of  infinite  length 
does  not  interfere  with  other  lines  of  infinite  length,  nor 
does  infinite  empty  space  interfere  with  the  existence  of 
an  infinite  which  fills  space,  or  with  one  that  does  not 
occupy  space.     Time  and  space  are  each  a  pure  unity  in 
itself;  but  they  are  empty  and  dead  unities.     The  intui- 
tion of  unity  is  not  content  to  stop  in  many  unities,  though 
one-line  infinites.     It  can  never  stop  short  of  the  infinite, 
but  it  must  be  one  all  inclusive  infinite.     Even  time  and 
space  themselves  must  be  included  in  the  infinite.    That 
one  need  not  be  without  attributes  or  activities,  as  time 
and  space  are;   but  it  must  be  without  differences,  unlike- 
ness,  one  that  changes  not,  the  same  "yesterday,  to-day, 
and  forever. ' '    Attributes,  activities,  thought,  intelligence, 
feeling,  will,  substance,  personality,  and  power  are  among 
the  things  included;   yet  in  all  He  must  be  infinite,  a 
universal,  all  inclusive,  infinite  One.     Here  the  intuition 
of  unity  can  rest.    Beyond  this  it  finds  nothing,  and  seeks 
for  nothing;  it  folds  its  wings  and  rests;  it  has  attained  its 
end;  it  has  reached  its  goal. 

We  have  included  time  and  space  in  the  one,  and  yet 
we  have  represented  them  as  eternal  self-existences.  The 
One  which  includes  all  other  things  as  their  originator, 
includes  time  and  space  as  attributes  of  His  own  nature. 
But  this  idea  that  time  and  space  are  attributes  of  God, 
must  not  be  so  understood — as  it  sometimes  has  been— as 
to  forbid  their  real  objective  existence.  That  which  is  an 
attribute  of  mind  may  also  have  an  objective  existence. 
The  intuition  of  unity  is  an  attribute  of  the  human  mind; 
but  that  fact  only  renders  more  certain  the  objective  exist- 
ence of  unity.  God  has  to  a  large  extent  objectified  His 
attributes  in  the  material  imi verse;   but  they  have  not 


272 


USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 


,j,. 


therefore  ceased  to  be  attributes.  So  time  and  space  are 
attributes  of  God,  and  yet  have  an  eternal  objective  exist- 
ence. I  have  no  occasion  nor  disposition  here  to  enter 
upon  a  defense  of  the  unconditioned.  Still  I  will  say,  if 
time  and  space  are  attributes  of  God,  He  acts  according 
to  them,  acts  them  out,  without  restraint;  and  objective 
time  and  space  exercise  no  governing  authority  over  Him. 
We  have  now  traced  the  working  of  the  intuition  of 
unity  from  simple  likeness  to  the  infinite,  all  comprehend- 
ing One.  Unity  among  co-existing  things  means  their 
likeness;  as  far  as  they  are  alike  they  are  one.  Unity  in 
a  single  thing  means  its  unchangeableness;  it  is  always 
one  and  the  same  thing.  Unity  among  co-existing  modes 
means  their  likeness;  as  far  as  they  are  alike,  they  are  one. 
Unity  in  a  single  mode  is  its  perpetual  likeness  to  itself; 
it  is  always  identical  with  itself  That  which  is  always 
and  everywhere  identical  is  illimitable,  infinite.  It  is 
impossible  by  an}^  process  to  unify  existing  things;  for 
however  completely  we  may  classify  them  together,  their 
differences  still  really  exist,  we  have  only  placed  them  out 
of  mind,  not  out  of  being.  The  things  which  compose 
the  universe  can  be  really  unified  only  in  their  origin. 
The  intuition  urges  us  onto  seek  for,  and  attain  to,  a  unity 
without  differences,  which  is  always  and  everywhere  iden- 
tical, and  therefore  infinite,  and  which  includes  all.  Such 
a  unity  is  found  only  in  the  true  and  living  God,  revealed 
to  us  in  His  word. 


!' 


Use  of  the  Intuition  of  Causality. 

We  considered  the  causal  relation  in  a  former  chapter 
and  found  it  to  be  always  expressed  by  the  formula.  Cause; 
energizing;  effect.  Thus  dismissing  the  multitude  of  other 
significations  in  which  the  word  cause  has  been  used,  and 
limiting  it  to  that  which  energizes  to  produce  effects,  our 
work  here  is  greatly  simplified. 


intuition  of  cause. 


273 


A  necessary  mode  of  mind  declares  that  objective  things 
-exist  in  the  relation  to  each  other  of  energizing  causes  and 
effects, — declares   that   this    relation    does  exist   among 
objective  things.     Whenever,  therefore,  one  of  the  related 
objects  is  discovered,  that  the  relation  may  be  completed 
according  to  this  subjective  mode,  the  other  is  declared  to 
be.     The  discovered  thing  is  seen  by  this  intuition  to  be 
:a  related  thing,  and  the  counter-part  of  the  relation   is 
declared  to  be.     We  did,  in  Chapter  Third,  conclude  that 
the  postulate,  Doing  declares  a  doer,  is  a  derivative  abso- 
lute truth;  and,  since  we  limit  the  word  cause  to  doer, 
this  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  every  change  must 
have  a  cause.     Thus  we  have  given  to  this  postulate  all 
the  certainty  of  an  absolute  truth.     But  it  is  also  an  intui- 
tion, and  it  is  as  an  intuition  that  we  are  now  dealing 
with  it.     On  the   discovery  of  energizing,  the  mind  de- 
clares  that   to  be  one  of  the  factors  in  this  relation,— 
declares  that  that  is  a  related  fact,  and  that  its  relative,  or 
counterpart,  energizer.  is.     On  the  discovery  of  an  effect, 
that  is  cognized  as  a  related  thing,  one  of  the  factors  in 
this  relation,  and  the  mind,  in  order  to  complete  this  rela- 
tion according  to  its  own  subjective  mode,  posits  the  other 
two  factors  of  the  relation,  and  declares  that  energizing 
and  energizer  are,  or  have  been. 

In  practical  life,  in  the  use  of  this  relation,  the  process 
is  usually  from  cause  to  effect.  We  are  all  the  time  trying 
to  accomplish  some  purposes.  We  think  what  steps,  what 
processes,  what  energizings,  will  accomplish  our  purposes. 
We  know  ourselves  as  causes  capable  of  a  great  variety  of 
energizings,  and  we  think  what  kinds  or  modes  of  energiz- 
ing will  secure  the  end  desired,  and  we  make  use  of  such 
as  we  think  adapted  to  our  purpose.  We  make  use  of 
natural  causes  by  supplying  the  conditions  of  their  activ- 
ity, or  by  supplying  the  conditions  upon  which  their 
activity  will  accomplish  certain  results.    Thus  the  relation 


274  USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 

between  the  cause  and  the  effect  is  perceived  by  the  mind 
beforehand,  and  made  use  of  in  the  accomplishment  of  our 
purposes.  We  go  forth  acting  according  to  this  relation 
as  it  subjectively  exists  in  our  minds,  as  though  it  did 
exist  objectively,  with  the  full  confidence  that  objective 
things  are  thus  related  to  each  other. 

In  philosophy  the  process  is  usually  from  effect  to  cause. 
We  see  things  moving,  and  we  ask,  What  moves  them  ?* 
We  see  changes  taking  place,  and  we  ask,  What  effected 
these   changes?    We  see   things  existing,  and  we  ask, 
What  caused  them  to  be  ?     Causes  are  generally  undis- 
coverable  by  the  senses.     In  many  cases  we  can  know  of 
their  existence   only  by   their  doings.     Still,  because  of 
this   necessary  mode  of  our  minds,  we  must  think  and 
believe  that  they  are.     It  is  sometimes  said  that  all  causes 
are  undiscoverable  through  the  senses.     This  statement 
is  too  general;  there  are  exceptions.     Electricity  is  discov- 
erable through  three  of  our  senses,  in  the  same  sense  that 
material  things  are  discoverable  through  their  properties. 
We  see  the  flash  of  the  spark;  we  hear  the  sound  that  it 
makes;  we  feel  it  as  it  passes  through  us.     Heat  is  sensibly 
discoverable.     Do  we  not  perceive  the  heat  as  sensibly  as 
we  do  the  stove  from  which  it  comes  ?  and  are  we  not  as 
certain  of  its  existence  as  we  are  of  the  existence  of  the 
stove  ?    lyight  is  discoverable  through  the  sense  of  sight. 
I^ighl  is  a  visible  cause,  a  visible  immaterial  substance. 
The  other  natural  causes  are  known  only  through  their 
doings.     But  when  magnetism  lifts  a  piece  of  iron  from 
the  table  against  the  pull  of  gravity,  and  moves  it  upward 
to  contact  with  another  piece  of  iron,  we  are  as  certain 
that  there  is  something  there  which  does  this  as  we  would 
be  if  we  could  see  it.     When  an  iron  rod  hangs  suspended 
in  the  coil  of  a  hollow  helix,  touching  nothing  but  air, 
and  we  take  hold  of  the  low^r  end  of  it,  and  pull  it  down, 
and  something  resists  our  pull,  and  when  we  let  go  of  it. 


INTUITION  OF  CAUSE. 


275 


it  springs  up  to  its  place  again,  we  are  as  certain  that 
there  is  something  which  does  this,  holds  and  lifts  this 
rod,  as  we  would  be  if  we  could  see  and  handle  it. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  this  is  only  a  subjective  neces- 
sity,—we  must  so  think,  but  is  it  certain  that  there  are 
invisible  causes  in  objective  nature,  as  we  suppose  ?  Our 
opinion  that  there  is  a  cause  based  on  the  discovery  of  an 
effect,  has  some  objective  confirmation.  Our  subjective 
decision  is  that  every  motion,  change,  phenomenon,  has  a 
cause.  We  find  from  an  examination  of  facts  that  ten 
different  doers  are  required  for  the  explanation  of  natural 
inorganic  phenomena.  We  subjectively  decide  that  they 
all  are.  This  subjective  decision  is  verified  by  the  sensible 
discovery  of  three  of  them.  Standing  at  a  distance  and 
looking  upon  the  raging  chaos  of  motion  in  a  burning 
building,  we  say  there  is  a  mover,  cause,  there.  Ap- 
proaching the  fire,  we  begin  to  feel  the  warmth  and  then 
the  burning;  now  we  have  sensibly  discovered  the  invis- 
ible cause.  Thus  three  of  the  ten  inorganic  causes  are 
sensibly  discovered. 

Again,  we  see  that  things  move  according  to  a  certain 
uniform,  invariable  mode,  in  the  midst  of  an  endless 
diversity  of  physical  circumstances.  That  mode  must  be 
a  mode  of  something,  a  property  of  something.  It  can- 
not be  a  property  of  the  diverse  physical  circumstances; 
it  is  a  property  of  something.  No  property  without  a 
substance.  Then  by  the  relation  of  property  to  substance, 
which  no  one  can  deny  without  denying  our  knowledge 
of  matter,  we  know  that  there  is  something  there  of  which 
this  mode  is  a  property.  Again,  the  changes  which  we 
see  going  on  in  nature  are  doings,  and  the  law  of  contra- 
dictions declares  that  there  must  be  existence  in  the  doer, 
that  these  doers  must  exist.  That  which  is  not  cannot  do. 
But  the  most  satisfactory  verification  of  this  intuition  is 
our  own  experience.     We  know  ourselves  as  causes  of 


4 


I 
i 


276  USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 

objective  motions  and  changes.  We  know  what  we  do 
when  we  effect  these  motions  and  changes.  We  look 
upon  these  motions  and  changes  which  we  produce  as 
effects.  We  look  out  in  nature  and  see  other  motions  and 
changes  that  we  do  not  produce;  they,  like  the  motions 
and  changes  which  we  produce,  are  effects;  and  we  very 
naturally  conclude  that  something  produces  them,  just  as 
we  produce  like  effects.  Then  things  come  against  us, 
and  do  to  us  as  we  do  to  other  things  when  we  move  them. 
Thus  we  know  that  there  are  in  the  objective,  things 
which  energize  upon  us,  which  energize,  which  possess 
the  property  of  energy.  We  have  ascertained  that  matter 
does  not  energize,  does  not  possess  the  property  of  energy. 
We  know  that  all  doers  must  be  substance.  Nothing  but 
substance  can  possess  the  property  of  energy,  or  any  other 
propert3\  Thus  our  belief  in  the  existence  of  invisible 
doers  in  objective  nature  does  not  rest  wholly  upon  the 
intuition  of  cause,  but  that  intuition  is  amply  verified  and 
confirmed  by  other  testimony. 

If  we  do  not  rely  upon  this  verified  intuition,  we  can 
know  nothing  of  energizing,  or  dynamic  energy,  in 
objective  nature.  How  do  men  know  that  there  is  any 
such  thing  as  dynamic  energy  in  objective  nature  ?  We 
see  bodies  moving;  we  see  one  body  moving  against 
another  body,  and  see  that  begin  to  move;  but  that  there 
is  any  energizing,  or  dynamic  energy  involved  in  the  phe- 
nomenon, we  can  never  know  through  our  senses.  Scien- 
tists talk  as  though  the  fact  of  dynamic  energy  in  natural 
phenomena  admitted  of  no  doubt;  yet  they  know  abso- 
lutely nothing  of  it,  and  can  never  know  anything  of  it 
through  the  senses.  They  see  motions  and  changes;  these 
are  effects;  and  from  these  they  declare  the  existence  of 
dynamic  energy;  that  is.  from  effects  they  declare  a  cause. 
Here  they  use  the  intuition  of  causality  with  the  most 
unlimited  confidence,  and  have  not  the  least  doubt  of  the 


INTUITION  OF  CAUSE.  277 

existence  of  that  which  it  declares  to  be.  Those  who 
place  such  unquestioning  confidence  in  this  intuition, 
when  it  declares  the  existence  of  dynamic  energy,  certainly 
cannot  doubt  its  testimony  when  it  declares  the  existence 
of  invisible  doers. 

Many  seem  to  think  that  when  they  have  reached 
dynamic  energy,  they  have  reached  a  cause.  We  have 
seen  that  dynamic  energy  is  only  the  energizing  of  some 
cause;  they  have  reached  only  energizing.  No  one  would 
have  been  at  all  satisfied  with  the  current  dynamic  philos- 
ophy but  for  the  illusion— not  to  say  deception— of  treating 
energizing  as  a  doer,  substance,  cause.  The  same  voice 
which  declares  the  existence  of  energizing — dynamic 
energy — declares  the  existence  of  the  energizer.  If  we 
believe  the  vpice  when  it  tells  of  energizing,  we  must 
believe  it  when  it  tells  of  the  energizer.  Thus  by  this 
intuition  we  are  made  acquainted  with  invisible  doers  in 
nature.  We  think  it  is  not  merely  onadoer,  because  there 
are  several  uniform  modes  of  doing, — the  modes  run 
uniformly  on  certain  lines,  but  there  are  several  lines. 
We  say  of  matter,  another  set  of  properties  indicates 
another  substance.  So  we  say,  another  set  of  doings  indi- 
cates another  doer.  Then  some  of  these  doers  exist  only 
within  the  limits  of  their  bodies;  while  others  extend 
indefinitely  beyond.  Some  are  perceptible  through  the 
senses;  and  others  are  not.  These  differences  indicate 
different  things.  Thus  men  have  concluded  that  there 
are  at  least  ten  doers  operating  in  inorganic  nature. 

But  the  use  of  this  intuition  is  not  limited  to  the  dis- 
covery of  invisible  causes  in  nature.  A  law  indicates  the 
existence  of  a  law-maker.  Government  indicates  the 
existence  of  a  governor.  A  plan  indicates  the  existence 
of  a  planner.  Design  indicates  the  existence  of  a  designer. 
Intelligent  action  indicates  the  existence  of  an  intelligent 
actor.     Looking  at  either  of  these,  we  see  that  its  nature 


278 


USE   OF   INTUITIONS. 


implies  the  existence  of  its  cause.  These  are  not  merely 
linguistic  relations;  but  language  has  been  thus  con- 
structed in  accordance  with  this  necessary  mode  of  mind, 
and  thus  conformed  to  facts.  Words  are  expressions  of 
thoughts;  and  words  are  related  as  thoughts  are  related; 
and  thoughts  are  related  as  things  are  related.  The  real 
objective  corresponds  with  the  intuitive  subjective.  The 
objective  fact  of  likeness  and  difference  corresponds  pre- 
cisely with  the  subjective  mode  of  comparison.  So  the 
objective  relation  of  cause  and  effect  corresponds  precisely 
with  the  subjective  mode  which  cognizes  it. 

There   are   many  other  applications  of  this  intuition. 
When  we  look  upon  anything,  and  see  that  it  is  a  con- 
structed thing,  see  that  its  parts  are  related  to  each  other 
according  to  some  thought,  or  according  to  some  plan, 
or  as  if  designed  to  secure  some  end,  which  plan  we  can 
read  in  its  structure,  and  which  end  is  suggested  to  us  by 
its  formation,  we  say  it  is  a  made  thing,  and  had  a  maker. 
When  we  look  upon  anything  and  see  that  it  is  a  depend- 
ent thing;  we  say  there  is  something  upon  which  it  depends. 
Now,  everything  which  is  finite  and  limited  is  a  depend- 
ent thing;  it  is  related  to  other  finite  things,  and  is  more 
or  less  affected  by  them,  and  dependent  upon  them — I  do 
not  say  for  its  existence,  but  for  what  it  is  and  does.     It 
may  have  existence  entirely  independent  of  other  finite 
things;   it   may   have  properties   and  modes  of  its  own 
entirely  independent  of  other  finite  things;  and  yet  finite 
things  condition  it,  and  more  or  less  shape  its  being  and 
doing.     The  dependence  of  finite  things  upon  each  other, 
the  relations  which  exist  among  finite  things,  show  that 
the  universe  is  a  made  thing;  and  the  perfect  and  universal 
adaptation  of  thing  to   thing  throughout  the   universe, 
shows  it  all  to  be  the  work  of  one  maker. 

In  the  foregoing  paragraph  we  have  given  some  reasons 
why,  in  viewing  the  universe,  we  look  upon  i I  as  an  effect. 


THE  WORIvD  AN  EFFECT.  279 

But  we  need  not  present  any  such  reasons.    In  the  natural 
and  spontaneous  action  of  the  human  mind,  this  intuition 
looks  upon  every  finite  thing  as  an  effect,  and  asks  for  its 
cause,  or  posits  before  it  a  cause.     We  need  to  know  no 
other  fact  about  a  thing  but  that  it  is  finite,  and  this  intui- 
tion asserts  that  it  had  a  cause.     If  we  can  see  its  bound- 
aries, or  if  we  know  that  it  has  limits,  our  minds  spon- 
taneously judge  it  to  be  an  effect,  and  look  for  its  cause. 
Or  if  we  have  any  reason  whatever  for  thinking  that  it 
began  to  be,  we  posit  its  cause  before  it.     Go  back,  back, 
from  one  stage  of  being  to  another,  no  matter  through 
how  many  aeons  of  duration,  if  we  come  to  a  beginning  of 
being,  we  declare  its  cause  before  it,~something  brought 
it  into  being.     It  is  only  when  we  reach  the  illimitable 
and  infinite  that  the  mind  ceases  to  demand  a  cause.     In 
the  self-existent  and  eternal  it  rests  satisfied;  as  an  intui- 
tion it  has  reached  its  ultimate.     It  has  no  disposition  to 
^o  any  farther,  or  to  ask  anything  more;  it  instinctively 
stops.     When  we  reason  about  it,  we  see  how  vain  would 
be  its  inquiry  if  it  was  disposed  to  go  further.     What  can 
be  before  the  eternal  to  cause  it  to  be?     What  can  be  out- 
side of  the  illimitable  to  cause   it  to  be  ?     There  is  no 
before  eternity,  nor  outside  of  the  illimitable. 

We  see  the  universe  made  up  of  two  classes  of  sub- 
stances, the  material  and  the  immaterial.  Each  class  is 
made  up  of  several.  The  individuals  of  one  kind  are 
passive  and  handled.  The  individuals  of  the  other  class 
are  active  doers.  These  doers  are  dependent  and  finite 
things.  Then  the  intuition  of  causality  declares  them  to 
be  effects,  created  things.  The  intuition  of  unity,  hand- 
ling these  several  doers,  unifies  them,  not  by  running  one 
into  another,  but  by  tracing  them  to  the  One  that  caused 
them  to  be.  Causality  declares  that  they  had  a  cause, 
and  unity  unifies  them  in  their  cause.     Thus  both  these 


!  1 


'* 


28o  USE  OF   INTUITIONS, 

intuitions  declare  the  existence  of  the  one  who  created  the 
agents  operating  in  nature. 

The  material  substances  are  also  dependent  and  finite 
things.  Hence  the  intuition  of  causality  declares  them  to 
be  created  things,  effects,  and  places  before  them  their 
cause.  They  are  several.  The  intuition  of  unity  unifies 
them,  not  by  the  process  of  conversion  nor  transmutation, 
but  by  tracing  them  all  to  the  One  out  of  whom  they  came. 
Both  of  these  classes  of  things  are  substance.  Have  we 
not  generalized  that  substance  is  unchangeable  in  quality  ? 
Yes;  by  any  finite  power;  but  we  cannot  thus  limit  the 
power  of  the  Infinite.  When  we  go  back  to  the  bounds 
of  the  finite,  we  step  off,  not  into  the  "unknown,"  but 
into  the  Infinite.  The  intuition  of  unity  gathers  all  things 
into  one  at  the  last,  and  obliterates  all  differences  and 
distinctions  in  the  one  Infinite.  Then  going  back  through 
all  the  changes  of  worlds  and  systems  of  worlds  till  we 
reach  the  formless  chaos  of  matter,  and  stand,  amid  dark- 
ness and  silence,  on  the  periphery  of  the  substance  of 
unborn  worlds,  because  even  this  is  finite,  the  intuition  of 
causality  demands  for  this  a  cause,  and  declares  that  God 
brought  it  into  being. 

In  concluding  this  chapter,  we  say  that,  notwithstand- 
ing scientists  deny  the  validity  of  intuitions,  and  forbid 
their  use  in  science,  without  them  there  can  be  no  real 
science  or  philosophy.  Without  them  no  philosophy  but 
idealism  is  possible,  and,  and  we  must  conclude  that  we 
know  nothing  of  objective  nature,  not  even  that  there  is 
any  objective  nature  to  study.  But  scientists  do  constantly 
use  them  themselves,  and  receive  them  as  proof  when 
they  further  their  purpose,  and  forbid  their  use  only  when 
they  seem  to  prove  what  they  do  not  want  proven.  They 
are  not  to  be  blamed  for  using  them,  for  they  could  do 
nothing  without  them;  but  after  admitting  their  validity 


GENESIS  OF  THINGS. 


281 


Ifl 


by  using  them  for  their  purposes,  they  have  no  right  to 
forbid  any  legitimate  use  of  them. 

Availing  ourselves  of  all  the  means  of  knowledge  within 
our  reach,  welcoming  all  light  from  all  sources,  the  genesis 
of  all  things  finite  is  traced  to  the  infinite.  One  God 
created  all  things.  He  created  all  material  substances, 
and  made  each  element  to  be  what  it  is,  and  to  possess 
such  properties  as  it  does  possess.  He  created  the  imma- 
terial substances,  and  gave  to  all  of  them  the  property  of 
energy,  and  fixed  in  each  such  modes  of  using  it  as  we 
see  manifested.  He  gave  to  these  doers  separate  and  self- 
perpetuating  existence,  and  left  them,  under  His  direction, 
to  work  out  His  general  plans  and  purposes.  Such  is  the 
natural,  obvious,  and  spontaneous  conception  of  the  origin 
of  things.  Any  other  conception  is  reached  by  a  strained 
effort  to  reach  some  other,  by  a  distortion  or  dislocation  of 
facts,  by  a  misuse  and  misapplication  of  principles,  by 
suppressing  testimony  and  excluding  witnesses,  by  de- 
signedly shutting  out  the  light.  **Men  love  darkness 
rather  than  light;  because  their  deeds  are  evil."  The 
cosmogony  of  Moses  is  the  cosmogony  of  rational  philos- 
ophy. The  conception  of  a  passive  physical  world  oper- 
ated upon  by  invisible  doers,  the  conception  of  undistorted 
human  consciousness  in  all  ages,  is  the  most  rational  con- 
clusion; and  science,  after  all  its  wanderings,  will  ulti- 
mately return  to  this  first  conception  of  primeval  man,  but 
with  a  clearer  conception  of  immaterial  substances  which 
are  not  gods  nor  genii. 


i 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Nature  and  God. 

Behind  our  intuitions,  behind  the  doers  in  nature,  out- 
side of  all  the  physical  and  tangible  universe,  there  is  an 
unmarked  and  boundless  ocean  for  thought  to  explore. 
By  some  it  is  called  the  Unknown,  by  some  the  Absolute 
and  Universal  Reason,  and  by  some  the  Infinite  God.   All 
landmarks  and  lines  of  latitude  and  longitude  there  must 
be  projections  from   consciousness  and  from   the  known 
physical.     It  is  the  delight  of  some  persons  to  explore 
this  trackless  ocean  of  metaphysics,  and  map  it  out  in  its 
application  to  the  known.     Is  it  an  infinite  void,  or  abso- 
lute and  impersonal   reason,  or  an  infinite  God?     Over 
these  questions  the  giants  delight  to  grapple.     How  came 
a  universe  to  be  ?     Why  are  things  as  they  are  ?     Why  do 
natural  agents  do  as  they  do  ?     Why  are  the  necessary 
modes  of  the  human  mind  such  as  they  are  ?     Back  of  all 
that  is  they  would  find  reasons  for  what  is,  and  back  of  all 
modes,  reasons  why  they  are  such  modes.     Some  would 
even  go  farther  back  than  this  and  find  some  one  reason, 
some  one  fundamental  principle  which  is  the  basis  of  all 
existence,  and  which  has  determined  the  nature  and  modes 
of  all  that  has  been  and  that  will  ever  be.     One  explorer 
after  another  launches  his  bark  upon  this  ocean,  constructs 
his  charts,  and  brings  back  to   the   common  world  the 
results  of  his  explorations.     But  most  men  start  with  their 
predilections  and  their  wishes,  which   give  direction  to 
their  research;  because  of  this  and  because  the  landmarks 
are  so   dim,  each  differs  in  some   respects  from  all  the 


WHY   MEN   BELIEVE.  283 

Others.  The  lines  projected  from  the  known  are  so  liable 
to  be  bent  by  prejudice  and  desire,  and  the  lines  are  so 
indefinite  that  comparatively  little  in  this  realm  is  so  cer- 
tain as  to  force  universal  acceptance.  These  explorations 
are  no  doubt  among  the  highest  and  most  profound  exploits 
of  which  the  human  mind  is  capable,  and  the  indeterm- 
inateness  of  the  results  keeps  it  an  ever  open  ocean  in 
which  the  intellectual  voyagers  may  hope  to  make  dis- 
coveries. 

Mine  be  a  less  ambitious  undertaking,  a  humbler  task. 
It  is  very  certain  that  things  are  as  they  are,  that  natural 
workers  do  as  they  do,  and  that  all  human  minds  act  after 
certain  and  the  same  general  forms  of  thought.     I  have 
not  undertaken  to  find  behind  these  things  and  modes  any 
reasons  why  they  are  so  except  that  their  Creator  saw  fit 
thus  to  create  them.     As  I  have  already  said,  for  the  prop- 
erties of  material  things,  for  the  modes  of  the  forces,  and 
for  the  intuitions,  or  necessary  modes  of  the  human  mind, 
I  find  no  reasons  but  the  will  and  wisdom  of  God  in  adapt- 
ing them  to  desired  ends  and  contemplated  purposes.     If 
I  step  off  from  the  visible  into  the  invisible,  I  step  not  into 
the  unknown,  nor  into  impersonal  reason,  but  into  God. 
I  take  what  I  discover  as  expressions  of  the  divine  wisdom 
and  will,  and,  without  trying  to  prove.that  there  is  a  God, 
start  with  the  question,  Why  does  man  believe  in  a  God  ? 
Whether  there  is  an  infallible  basis  of  certitude  to  be  found 
in  the  unfathomed  depths,  or  whether  men  may  still  find 
opportunity  for  doubt,  questioning,  and  demanding  proot 
for  every  antecedent,  we  know  that  most  of  mankind  will 
ever  believe  according  to   the  intimations  of  their  own 
inborn  intuitions.     Whether  such  a  course  is  reasonable 
or  not,  mankind  always  have  taken,  and  always  will  take, 
their  intuitions  as  basis  of  belief.     We  do  not  propose  to 
go  back  of  them  in  search  for  evidence;  the  willing  and 
obedient  are  satisfied  to  begin  here. 


:^ll 


i:| 


! 


I 


284  NATURE   AND   GOD. 

We  have  seen  that  the  intuitions  of  unity  and  causality 
conduct  us  to  one  infinite  cause  and  Creator.     But  this  is 
not  tue  conception  of  God  which  the  mass  of  mankind 
have  obtained  by  natural  means.  Only  the  very  few  have, 
without  the  aid  of  revelation,  reached  the  conception  of 
absolute  unity  in  God.     The  intuition  of  unity  has  been, 
practically  in  the  minds  of  men,  less  a  means  of  the  dis* 
covery   of  God   than  a  confirma.tory  testimony  of  other 
witnesses.     The  intuition  of  causality  has  led  the  mass  of 
mankind  to  a  belief  in  invisible  doers.     That  is  the  part 
that  this  intuition  has  performed  in  giving  man  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  invisible  God.     The  intuitions  which  have 
given  those  who  have  not  had  the  advantages  of  revela- 
tion a  belief  in  the  existence  of  gods,  and  finally  of  God, 
are  these;  an  intuitive  religious  consciousness  consisting  of: 
(i.)  The  intuitive  disposition  to  worship.     This  makes 
man  predisposed  and  inclined  to  worship.     This  as  a  sub- 
jective mode  declares  the  existence  of  its  object.     This, 
first  of  all,  suggests  to  man  the  existence  of  a  being  to  be 
worshiped.     This  is  the  basis  of  all  religion,  in  the  en- 
lightened, as  well  as  the  savage. 

(2.)  Conscience;  which  in  its  operations  in  human  nature 
is  a  perfect  model  of  a  moral  government,  and  declares  the 
existence  of  an  objective  moral  government,  with  a  moral 
governor,  and  man  the  subject. 

(3.)  The  instinctive  disposition  to  govern  and  be  gov- 
erned. This  is  the  subjective  basis  of  all  government 
among  men.  It  gives  to  man  an  instinctive  cognition  of 
the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  governmental  rela- 
tion among  men;  of  the  rights  of  duly  constituted  author- 
ity; of  the  duty  of  submission  and  obedience  to  such 
authority,  of  dependence  upon  the  governor;  and  it  origi- 
nates an  expectation  of  guardianship,  guidance  and  care. 
This  subjective  mode  suggests  an  objective  providential 
government  in  which  all  men  are  subjects.     The  con- 


RELIGIOUS   INTUITIONS.  285 

sciousness  that  we  are  subjects,  and  our  feeling  of  depend- 
ence declare  the  existence  of  one  to  whom  we  are  subject 
and  upon  whom  we  depend. 

(4.)  That  intuition  which  has  been  called  marvelous- 
ness,  the  desire  for  things  strange,  wonderful,  supernatural. 
This  leads  religionists  of  all  kinds,  in  all  nations  and 
ages  to  expect  and  demand  as  a  part  of  their  religion  the 
mysterious,  wonderful,  supernatural. 

(5.)  That  intuition  which  has  been  denominated  spirit- 
uality. This  enables  man  to  form  conceptions  of  spirit 
beings,  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  such,  declares  their 
existence,  prepares  man  to  believe  in  the  possible  exist- 
ence of  human  spirits  separate  from  the  body,  qualifies 
him  for  communication  and  intercourse  with  other  spirits 
without  the  use  of  physical  organs — perhaps  to  a  very 
limited  extent  with  human  spirits,  embodied  and  disem- 
bodied— but  more  especially  with  the  divine  Spirit,  in 
conscious  influence  and  presence,  by  which  God  is  known 
in  the  depths  of  the  soul  as  by  conscious  touch,  really  and 
certainly  known  in  His  attributes  of  love  and  tenderness 
and  care,  and  in  responsive  communication, — as  real  and 
certain  as  the  external  tangible  world;  not  believed  in  but 
known;  it  makes  Him  not  the  unknown,  or  the  inferred, 
or  the  deduced,  but  the  known. 

The  philosopher  whose  unbelief  has  shut  God  out  ot 
personal  contact  with  his  own  nature  is  poorly  prepared 
to  say  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not,  or  to  say  that  He  is 
unknown.  ' '  If  any  man  will  do  His  will,  he  shall  know 
of  the  doctrine."  To  the  rejector  God  may  be  unknown, 
but  to  the  devout  child  of  faith  He  is  the  known,  not 
through  logical  processes,  not  through  His  manifestations 
in  nature,  but  in  the  soul's  deep  communion.  "Whom 
the  world  cannot  receive,  because  it  seeth  Him  not,  neither 
knoweth  Him,  but  ye  know  him,  for  He  dwelleth  with 
you,  and  shall  be  in  you.'* 


:H 


{• 


I 


i 


i 

i 


286  NATURE   AND   GOD. 

Sad  that  some  men  with  the  brightest  intellects  should 
turn  away  from  the  evidence  they  have  within  them,  and 
plunge  into  the  depths  of  metaphysics  or  roam  the  universe, 
as  though  God  was  away  off  beyond  the  limits  of  star- 
sprinkled  space,  and  return  alone,  fatherless,  homeless, 
shut  up  in  a  cold,  void,  lightless  world,  an  atom  in  the 
jaws  of  fate,  measuring  a  moment  in  the  eternity  of  dark- 
ness, hoping  only  to  end  their  solitary  existence  and  cease 
to  be,  dead  to  the  infinite  Love  which  invests  them  with 
immortal  light  and  life,  and  who  ambient  waits  for  recog- 
nition and  trust.  "That  they  should  seek  the  Lord,  if 
haply  they  might /^^/ after  Him,  and  find  Him;  though 
He  is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us;  for  in  Him  we  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  being." 

Besides  the  foregoing  there  arises  in  our  experience  a 
feeling  of  helplessness,  of  conscious  inability  to  know 
and  do  the  right  unaided,  and  a  sense  of  incompatability 
between  our  hopes  and  our  conscious  deserts,  a  conscious- 
ness of  guilt  and  hopes  of  mercy.  These  feelings,  com- 
mon to  the  race,  prepare  man  to  gladly  welcome  the  an- 
nouncement made  by  divine  revelation:  "  God  so  loved 
the  world  that  He  gave  His  only  begotten  Son,  that  who- 
soever belie veth  in  Him  should  not  perish,  but  have  ever- 
lasting life," 

These  intuitions  together  constitute  a  religious  con- 
sciousness which  relates  us  to  a  supreme  being,  governor, 
father,  judge,  and  object  of  worship.  Such  a  subjective 
consciousness  leads  man  instinctively  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  its  objective  relative,  and  in  his  extremity  to 

cry  out  unto  God. 

The  being  thus  declared  was  at  first  very  naturally  iden- 
tified with  the  invisible  doers  declared  by  the  intuition  of 
causality  to  be;  and  the  result  was  a  belief  in  many  gods. 
A  few  of  the  profoundest  philosophers,  grounding  faith 
upon  these  intuitions,  and  following  to  the  ultimate  the 


GOD   IN  SCIENCE.  287 

intuition  of  unity,  have  reached  the  thought  of  the  one 
infinite  God.  These  intuitions  make  a  belief  in  some  in- 
visible god,  or  gods  almost  a  necessity  to  man,  a  necessity 
which  nothing  but  a  persistent  determination  not  to  admit 
the  testimony  of  the  intuitions  can  obviate;  and  then  the 
forced  unbelief  can  only  land  the  soul  in  an  agony  of  un- 
rest. As  a  man  who  professes  to  disbelieve  the  intuition 
of  causality  will,  in  all  his  dealings  with  nature,  act  as 
though  he  did  believe  it;  so  does  the  professed  Atheist  in 
his  unpremeditated  and  instinctive  doings  in  hours  of 
emergency,  act  as  though  he  did  believe  in  God.  What- 
ever be  the  declared  belief,  the  lost  and  trembling  soul, 
when  all  else  fails,  instinctively  turns  away  to  the  Father 
for  rescue. 

On  the  authority  of  these  intuitions  alone  we  may  pre- 
sume upon  the  existence  of  God.  Then  when  we  find  the 
verified  intuitions  of  unity  and  causality  corroborating 
these  and  adding  their  testimony,  we  find  it  to  be  a  fact 
as  well  established  as  almost  any  scientific  generalization. 
The  belief  in  the  existence  of  dynamic  energy  in  the 
objective  world  has  not  so  strong  a  foundation  as  the  belief 
in  God.  The  existence  of  God,  then,  becomes  a  fact 
which  casts  its  light  upon  the  mysteries  of  creation.  We 
have  thus  far  proceeded  in  the  light  of  our  senses  and 
reason,  including  absolute  truths  and  necessary  processes 
of  mind.  These  have  guided  us  to  God,  and  thus  cor- 
roborated those  intuitions  which  immediately  declare  Him. 
If  we  should  now,  firom  the  standpoint  of  a  divine  Creator, 
re-survey  nature,  we  would  have  no  occasion  to  alter  any- 
thing we  have  said.  Indeed,  we  have  all  along  presumed 
upon  His  existence;  for  from  such  a  presumption  it  is 
scarcely  possible  to  separate  the  willing  seekers  after  truth. 

Truth  is  one  and  never  contradictory.  If  in  examining 
one  department  of  nature  we  arrive  at  one  conclusion,  and 
in  otu:  survey  of  another  department  we  reach  a  different 


I  * 


288 


NATURE   AND   GOD. 


I 
I 


I 


conclusion,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  testimony  is  hot  con- 
flicting, but  that  we  have  misunderstood  the  voices,  or 
misinterpreted  the  language;  and  it  becomes  us  to  retrace 
our  steps,  review  our  observations,  and  correct  our  bear- 
ings, till  the  two  meet  in  harmony.  The  subjective  wit- 
nesses having  declared  that  there  is  a  God,  now  to  say 
that  we  must  study  nature  as  though  there  was  no  God, 
to  endeavor  to  explain  it  all  with  the  supposition  that 
there  is  no  God,  to  so  construe  the  testimony  of  nature  as 
to,  if  possible,  exclude  God,— this  is  a  forced  effort  to  try 
to  make  the  witnesses  in  one  department  of  nature  con- 
tradict the  witnesses  in  another  department.  The  sub- 
jective witnesses  declare  so  positively  that  there  is  a  God, 
that  none  who  receive  their  testimony  doubt  it.  This  is 
the  testimony  in  one  department  of  nature.  The  question 
now  is,  not  can  the  testimony  of  physical  nature  be  so 
construed  as  to  contradict  this  subjective  testimony,  but 
does  it  naturally,  and  according  to  its  most  obvious  mean- 
ing agree  with  it  ? 

The  subjective  witnesses  having  declared  the  existence 
of  God,  he  who  will  not  admit  this  testimony,  but  pro- 
poses to  solve  the  problem  of  the  universe  by  objective 
sense  discovery  only,  intentionally  disables  and  mains 
himself— for  what  purpose?  After  having  been  taught 
by  our  intuitions  and  our  reason  that  there  is  a  God,  if  we 
go  into  the  objective  world,  and  by  shutting  our  eyes  to 
some  facts,  distorting  others,  and  bringing  still  others  into 
unnatural  classifications,  by  refusing  to  look  beyond  ap- 
pearances for  substance  and  cause,  by  forbidding  the  use 
of  subjective  principles,  and  yet  surreptitiously  using  such 
as  will  further  our  purpose,  by  suppressing  testimony  and 
excluding  witnesses, — if  by  such  means  we  can  force  our- 
selves into  a  certain  state  of  opinion,  what  have  we  gained? 
and  what  motive  can  prompt  such  a  course  but  a  desire  to 
get  rid  of  the  belief  in  God  ?    I^t  not  him  who  thus  forces 


ATHEISTIC  SCIENCE  289 

his  own  unbelief  say  that  man  is  not  responsible  for  his 
beliefs. 

But  such  an  effort  to  prove  that  there  is  no  God  disqual- 
ifies men  for  any  correct  understanding  of  nature,  and 
renders  unnatural  and  false  any  system  of  science  they 
may  construct.  If  there  is  a  God  who  created  and  who 
governs  the  universe,  any  system  of  nature  which  ignores 
this  fact,  which  explains  and  adjusts  and  relates  things 
so  as  to  exclude  all  intimations  of  Him,  must  be  erron- 
eous and  false  science.  If  He  created,  any  theory  which 
excludes  His  agency  in  creation,  must  be  false.  If  He 
adjusted  things,  any  theory  which  supposes  self- adjust- 
ment, must  be  false.  If  He  created  things  as  distinct 
substances  and  distinct  beings,  any  theory  which  supposes 
a  transformation  of  one  thing  into  another,  must  be  false. 
Thus  it  matters  not  what  phenomena  of  nature  we  un- 
dertake to  explain,  if  there  is  a  God,  they  must  be  ex- 
plained one  way;  if  there  is  no  God  they  must  be  explained 
another  way.  If  there  is  a  God,  then  there  can  be  no  true 
science  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  no  God,  or  while 
excluding  Him,  or  while  leaving  Him  out  of  our  explana- 
tions. If  there  is  a  God,  if  He  is  the  most  important  of 
all  the  agencies  in  creation,  if  you  believe  and  know  that 
He  is  and  does,  you  may  know  beforehand  that  any  sys- 
tem of  the  universe  which  purposely  excludes  Him,  which 
gives  Him  no  place  in  the  universe,  which  purposely 
adjusts  every  part  of  the  system  so  as  to  allow  Him  no 
place,  must  be  false  and  valueless  as  a  system  and  as 
science. 

The  systems  of  dynamism  and  atomism,  so  characteris- 
tic of  the  philosophy  of  modern  science,  are  maintained 
with  the  avowed  and  advocated  policy  of  admitting  into 
the  calculation  nothing  but  matter,  motion  and  energy,  and 
the  exclusion  of  all  subjective  and  metaphj^sical  witnesses. 
But  for  this  suppression  and  exclusion  many  of  the  the- 


! 


: 


290  NATURE   AND   GOD. 

ones  peculiar  to  modern  science  could  not  have  attained 
the  place  they  now  occupy  in  the  public  mind;  the  ver- 
dict in  their  favor  has  been  obtained  by  the  suppression 
of  the  most  important  testimony  and  by  presumptions  in 
conflict  with  all  our  highest  intuitions  and  universal  rea- 
son. Let  all  the  witnesses  come  upon  the  stand,  let  rea- 
son's voice  be  heard,  let  human  nature  in  all  its  entirety 
speak,  and  they  have  no  chance  for  life  and  being. 

There  can  be  no  true  philosophy  of  science  while  men 
build  upon  false  views  of  the  causal  relation,  nor  as  long 
as  men  refuse  to  look  beyond  phenomena  for  causes,  nor 
as  long  as  men  deem  it  not  essential  that  phenomena  have 
energizing  causes.  It  is  time  that  science  be  rescued  from 
this  phenomenalistic  policy.  It  is  time  that  the  pubUc 
know  what  a  thing  it  is  which  is  called  modern  science. 
It  is  time  that  this  everlasting  doing  without  any  doer  be 
expunged  from  the  speculations  of  sensible  men., 

I  would  not  under  value  the  facts  discovered  by  this 
sharply  looking  age;  for  these  we  give  scientists  all  due 
credit.  Still  greater  have  been  the  achievements  of  this 
age  in  the  application  of  discovered  facts  to  the  utilities  of 
life.  But  it  is  not  for  these  that  scientists  glory  most,  but 
for  their  generalizations,  their  theories,  and  their  specu- 
lative systems.  In  reference  to  these  modem  science  is 
not  a  marked  success. 

Scientists  scorn  metaphysics,  and  yet  hold  most  tena- 
ciously to  the  law  of  continuity,  applying  it  to  motion, 
energy,  force,  matter,  life,  mind,  political  economy,  social 
science,  philosophy,  and  religion,  explaining  all  as  an 
endless  stream  of  existence,  unchangeable  in  quantity  but 
evolving  itself  into  endless  new  and  varied  forms.  We 
have  found  that  this  law,  as  far  as  it  asserts  transmutation 
has  no  application  to  substance,  and  as  far  as  it  asserts 
continuity  has  no  application  to  anything  else. 

This  law  has  been  identified  with  the  law  of  cause  and 


LAW  OF  CONTINUITY.  29 1 

effect,  and  thus  for  it  is  claimed  all  the  authority  possessed 
by  that.  In  the  everchanging  form  of  existence,  that 
which  precedes  is  the  cause,  and  that  which  succeeds  is 
the  effect.  All  the  different  forms  of  matter  are  one  and 
transmutable,  and  the  days  of  alchemy  are  back  upon  us. 
The  trouble  with  all  this  is  that  no  such  transformations 
ever  do  occur.  Oxygen  never  consents  to  become  hydro- 
gen; nor  carbon,  nitrogen;  nor  iron,  gold.  Gravity  obsti- 
nately refuses  to  become  heat,  and  every  other  force  to 
become  any  other.  The  process  of  causation  is  contin- 
ually going  on  before  us;  yet  no  man  has  ever  seen  one 
case  where  the  cause  passes  over  into  and  becomes  the 
effect.  This  is  a  case  where  we  can  appeal  to  facts  and 
experiments,  and  have  a  demonstrative  answer  to  our 
inquiry,  and  facts  demonstrate  that  such  a  doctrine  or 
process  of  causation  has  no  place  among  natural  phe- 
nomena. 

This  supposed  law  of  continuity  has  been  used  in  ex- 
planation of  the  genesis  of  things,  without  a  creator;  and 
in  solving  the  question  of  the  how  of  creation,  admitting 
a  creator.  Starting  with  the  one  sole  substance  of  Spinoza, 
unchangeabfe  in  quantity,  the  process  of  creation  was  a 
self-evolution  of  this  one  substance  into  multiplied  sub- 
stances, till  the  present  universe  of  complicated  varieties 
of  being  and  life  appeared;  the  product  of  a  self-evolving, 
unintelligent,  unconscious  substance.  This  is  pantheism. 
Facts  declare  that  no  such  transformations  now  occur,  and 
lead  us  to  believe  that  none  ever  did  thus  occur. 

Others,  admitting  that  creation  began  with  a  self-exist- 
ent, intelligent  Creator,  assert  that  creation  was  a  conver- 
sion of  portions  of  His  own  substance  into  finite  sub- 
stances; and,  as  the  quantity  is  unchangeable,  all  that 
has  gone  out  of  God  must  be  included  in  Him  to  preserve 
His  infinity,  and  we  and  matter  are  parts  of  God — how  far 
is  this  removed  from  pantheism  ? 


u 


ill 


It 


'i  r 


292  NATURE  AND  GOD. 

I  do  not  suppose  that  it  is  possible  for  us  to  understand 
the  how  of  creation;  but  I  deny  that  this  supposed  law  of 
continuity  imposes  any  restrictions  upon  divine  power.  A 
generalization  based  upon  finite  powers  is  limited  to  the 
finite,  and  can  declare  nothing  in  reference  to  the  infinite, 
—the  generalization  is  as  finite  as  the  facts  from  which  it 
is  deduced.  God  cannot  act  a  contradiction  without  de- 
stroying His  own  unity.  But  not  being  at  one  time,  and 
being  at  another  time  are  no  contradiction.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  things  or  in  any  absolute  truth 
which  forbids  the  supposition  that  God  created  matter 
without  using  any  previously  existing  substance  to  make 
it  of.  The  intuition  of  causality  requires  us  to  posit  some- 
thing before  every  thing  finite  that  is;  but  all  that  it  re- 
quires when  anything  begins  to  be,  is  that  some  agent 
with  adequate  powers  energized  to  produce  it.  Our  in- 
tuitions do  not  inquire  whether  it  was  made  out  of  previ- 
ously existing  substance  or  not.  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt 
the  power  of  the  infinite  God  to  create  new  substance 
where  nothing  before  was.  I  think  that  those  Theists 
who  thus  limit  the  power  of  God  at  the  behest  of  a  mis- 
applied finite  generalization,  concede  quite  too  much  to 

unbelief. 

Concepts  of  God. 

In  view  of  our  doctrine  that  immaterial  substance  is  ex- 
tended, and  in  view  of  our  definition  of  substance — space- 
filling existence — the  reader  has  perhaps  wondered  what  I 
would  say  of  God  as  immaterial  substance.  One  of  the 
insolvable  problems  of  philosophy  has  ever  been.  How  can 
a  substance  which  has  no  space  relations  operate  upon  a 
substance  which  has  space  relations?  how  can  a  thing 
which  is  not  extended  operate  upon  a  thing  which  is  ex- 
tended ?  I  will  not  try  to  solve  this  problem,  for  to  me  it 
contains  a  contradiction.     I  simply  say  that  an  unex- 


HAS    GOD  SPACE   REI.ATIONS? 


293 


tended  thing  cannot  at  the  same  time  operate  over  an  ex- 
tended surface.  Place  one  measuring  rule  upon  another, 
both  of  the  same  length,  can  we  say  that  one  is  extended, 
and  the  other  is  not  ?  I  can  see  no  alternative  of  opinion 
here.  To  become  related  to  a  thing  which  has  space  rela- 
tions, is  itself  a  space  relation.  To  declare  that  God  has 
no  space  relations,  is  to  shut  Him  off  from  all  relations  to 
finite  beings. 

Under  the  doctrine  that  immaterial  substance  has  no 
extension,  I  can  see  only  two  possible  conceptions  of  God: 
either  He  is  a  collection  of  attributes,  or  else  He  is  the 
unknownable.  What  is  God  ?  He  is  omnipotence,  om- 
niscience, ubiquity,  infinity,  and  eternity.  Or  we  may 
express  Him  in  more  personal  attributes  and  say,  He  is 
holiness,  truth,  love,  justice,  and  mercy.  Then  we  com- 
mit the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  attributes  may  exist 
and  act  apart  from  substances.  This  view  bore  its  fruit  in 
the  mythology  of  Greece,  in  the  personification  and  wor- 
ship of  attributes  as  so  many  distinct  Gods. 

Or,  secondly,  we  must  look  upon  Him  as  the  solitary 
infinite  One,  dwelling  disconnected  and  remote  from  every 
thing  else  in  the  universe,  having  nothing  to  do  with  mat- 
ter or  men.  This  ultimate  the  penetrating  mind  of  the 
Hindoo  long  ago  reached  in  the  person  of  Brahm.  Modern 
philosophers  have  reached  about  the  same  conception  in 
the  "unconditioned,"  the  ''absolute,"  and  the  ''unknown." 
It  matters  not  what  path  of  speculation  we  pursue,  if  we 
start  with  the  assumption  that  immaterial  substance  is 
unextended,  has  no  space  relations,  we  can  reach  no  ulti- 
mate but  Brahm  or  the  Unknown.  The  wonder  is  that 
men  should  travel  so  long  a  circuit  to  reach  it.  It  is  be- 
cause the  conception  is  so  at  war  with  all  the  intuitions  of 
human  nature  that  it  is  long  before  men  can  bring  them- 
selves to  accept  the  legitimate  end  of  their  own  philosophy. 
The  ultimate  appears  to  me  to  be  plainly  contained  in  the 


294 


NATURE   AND   GOD. 


« 


i 


first  proposition.  If  God  has  no  relations  to  space,  He 
has  no  relations  to  anything  which  has  relations  to  space. 
I  know  that  many  assert  the  first  proposition,  and  yet, 
overwhelmed  with  the  evidence  of  God's  relations  to  earth 
and  man,  reject  the  ultimate  conclusion;  but  this  they  do, 
as  it  appears  to  me,  at  the  expense  of  their  consistency, 
and  embrace  a  contradiction. 

I  do  not  presume  to  try  to  solve  the  mystery,  of  the 
infinite.  But  this  we  know  that  an  attribute  cannot  exist 
without  substance,  and  that  we  have  no  special  interest 
in  the  existence  of  an  abstract,  unrelated  infinite.  If 
God  is  substance,  and  if  He  operates  simultaneously  over 
an  extended  surface.  He  is  as  extended  as  that  surface. 
If  He  is  here,  he  has  a  space  relation.  Here,  there, 
everywhere  are  meaningless  terms  to  apply  to  Him,  if  He 
has  no  space  relations.  Presence  is  a  space  relation, 
omnipresence  is  an  infinite  space  relation.  If  God  does 
He  is  where  He  does;  then  He  is  in  a  certain  place  in 
space.  Doing  without  being  w^here  the  doing  is,  is  a 
contradiction.  If  He  does  over  an  extended  surface. 
He  is  as  extended  as  that  surface.  If  He  does  in  two 
places  remote  from  each  other,  he  is  in  both  places— He  is 
where  He  does— then  His  substance  extends  through  the 
distance  which  separates  those  places.  Extension  is  dis- 
tance in  space  occupied  by  substance.  Is  He  in  all  parts 
of  a  measured  distance  in  space,  extending  through  that 
distance,  and  yet  not  extended  ? 

How  can  he  who  thinks  that  God  is  the  only  doer  in 
nature  assert  that  He  is  not  extended.  Gravity  and  all 
the  other  forces  are  in  every  atom  of  a  body  of  matter. 
Are  these  forces  God,  in  every  atom  of  that  body,  as 
broad  and  deep  and  long  as  that  body,  and  yet  has  He  no 
extension  ?  That  which  is  in  different  portions  of  space 
at  the  same  time,  has  extension.  Because  a  material  body 
is  in  different  parts  of  space  at  the  same  time,  shall  we 


HAS  GOD  EXTENSION? 


295 


say  it  has  extension  and  then  when  an  immaterial  sub- 
stance is  in  the  same  different  parts  of  space,  shall  we  say 
it  has  no  extension  ?  Every  substance  which  is  in  differ- 
ent parts  of  space  at  the  same  time  is  extended. 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  by  giving  God  extension  we 
make  Him  divisible  into  parts,  and  thus  destroy  His  unity 
and  infinity.  We  talk  about  parts  of  space,  and  in  our 
thoughts  there  are  parts  of  space,  but  space  is  indivisible, 
and  infinite.  There  are  different  portions  of  space,  but  no 
divisible  parts.  No  more  do  we  make  God  divisible  into 
parts  by  conceiving  different  extended  portions.  The  unity 
of  time,  space  and  God  is  not  destroyed  by  any  proper 
use  of  the  word  parts  in  reference  to  them.  '  'All  of  God 
is  everywhere,"  it  has  been  said.  Yes;  all  His  attributes, 
not  all  His  substance.  All  the  properties  of  a  material 
substance  are  in  every  atom  of  it.  All  the  attributes  and 
powers  of  God  are  in  every  point  of  space.  The  concep- 
tion of  God  which  was  born  in  the  darknes  of  pagan 
philosophy  is  still  retained  by  Christian  Theists  when 
they  approach  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  philos- 
ophy; but  when  they  speak  of  God  according  to  the  con- 
ception derived  fcom  the  Word  of  God,  they  scarcely  use 
a  sentence  that  does  not  give  Him  space  relations. 

If  the  writers  of  the  Scriptures  had  written  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  imparting  a  conception  of  the  infinite, 
eternal  and  almighty  One,  revealing  Himself  in  all  the 
detailed  relations  of  time  and  space,  localized  here  and 
there,  they  could  scarcely  have  done  more  than  they  have 
in  this  direction.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end,  the 
Bible  assigns  space  relations  to  God;  and  yet  must  men 
continue  to  echo  the  pagan  postulate  which  conducts  us 
only  to  Brahm  or  the  unknown  ? 

In  reference  to  God's  present  relation  to  the  universe 
there  are  a  variety  of  opinions.  Some  think  that  He  has 
no  agency  in  natural  phenomena,  and  some  that  He  is  the 


I  I 


I 


296 


NATURE  AND  GOD. 


only  agent  in  nature.  l>t  us  see  how  nature  is  explained 
by  those  who  think  His  agency  not  necessary.  Men  have 
been  studying  natural  phenomena  in  all  ages.  At  first 
they  projected  from  themselves  an  explanation,  and  con- 
cluded that  all  moving  things  were  moved  by  spirits  in 
them,  or  by  the  gods.  In  course  of  time  they  noticed 
that  the  same  motions  uniformly  occur  in  the  presence  of 
the  same  physical  conditions,  and  they  began  to  attribute 
the  motions  to  the  physical  conditions.  This  practice 
continued  and  extended  more  and  more  as  science  ad- 
vanced, until  at  last  men  came  to  conclude  that  all  motions 
in  nature  could  be  attributed  to  physical  conditions  as 
causes.  It  is  the  boast  of  science  that  it  has  crowded  the 
supernatural  back,  back,  back,  step  by  step,  until  some 
have  thought  it  possible  to  crowd  it  entirely  out  of  the 
universe,  and  that  all  natural  phenomena  could  be  ex- 
plained by  supposing  only  natural  causes. 

The  uniform  mode  of  motion  discovered  in  the  presence 
of  certain  physical  conditions  began  in  course  of  time  to 
be  called  a  law  of  nature.  When  a  man  has  discovered 
the  particular  mode  of  doing  which  uniformly  appears  in 
the  presence  of  certain  physical  circumstances  he  has  dis- 
covered what  is  called  a  law  of  nature.  Many  such 
discoveries  were  made,  so  that  in  time  there  came  to  be 
very  many  laws  of  nature  known  to  science.  Then  these 
modes  of  doing,  or  laws,  began  to  be  called  causes,  and 
were  spoken  of  and  treated  voluminously  as  agents  or 
doers,  and  vast  fields  of  phenomena  were  explained  by 
them  as  natural  cause,  doers.  I  need  not  labor  to  show  to 
intelligent  readers  the  folly  of  treating  modes  of  motion, 
modes  of  doing,  as  doers.  But  I  will  take  a  single  ex- 
ample as  an  illustration  of  the  process  of  explaining 
natural  phenomena  by  natural  causes. 

Water  rises  from  the  surface  of  the  ocean  in  the  form  of 
vapor,  forms  a  cloud,  is  carried  by  wind  over  the  land, 


EXPLANATION   OF  RAIN. 


297 


and  falls  as  rain  upon  the  earth.  Now  for  the  explana- 
tion. It  is  the  nature  of  water  at  certain  temperatures, 
and  in  a  less  degree  at  the  lowest  temperature,  to  rise  in 
the  form  of  vapor.  This  is  attributed  to  the  nature  of  the 
water.  Some  other  substances  become  vapor  much  more 
readily  and  rapidly  than  water,  while  some  other  sub- 
stances must  be  raised  to  a  verj^  high  temperature  before 
they  become  vapor.  These  differences  are  attributed  to 
differences  in  the  properties  of  the  substances.  This  vapor, 
being  no  heavier  than  the  atmosphere,  rises  and  diffuses 
itself  freely  among  the  molecules  of  the  air.  A  current  of 
wind  passing  by  carries  this  vapor  over  the  land.  The 
wind  has  a  natural  explanation.  When  the  atmosphere  in 
one  locality  becomes,  from  any  cause,  more  rare  than  the 
common  standard,  it  rises,  and  the  heavier  air  around 
rushes  in  to  fill  the  partial  vacuum  thus  produced.  This 
rushing  air  we  call  wind.  The  motion  of  the  wind  drives 
the  molecules  of  the  water  vapor  together,  they  cohere 
and  form  fine  drops.  They  then  become  visible,  and  we 
say  a  cloud  is  formed.  Or  a  portion  of  this  vapor  enters  the 
ascending  current  of  air  and  is  carried  into  the  cold  upper 
regions,  and,  deprived  of  its  heat,  the  molecules  fall  to- 
gether in  fine  drops,  and  a  cloud  is  formed.  This  process 
of  striking  or  falling  together  continues,  the  drops  become 
larger,  and  fall  to  the  earth  in  the  form  of  rain.  Then  we 
can  see  natural  reasons  why  this  water  vapor  is  carried 
over  some  countries  and  not  over  others — the  prevailing 
direction  of  the  wind,  intervening  mountains  whose  chilly 
tops  catch  and  retain  the  water  vapor,  etc. 

Now,  have  we  not  given  a  tiatural  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  rain  ?  We  have  not  had  to  introduce  the 
supernatural,  nor  mention  any  natural  doers,  except  phy- 
sical circumstances.  We  have  given  such  an  explanation 
as  the  scientists  of  which  we  are  now  speaking  give  of 
natural  phenomena,  such  as  seem  to  satisfy  them,  and  such 


298 


NATURE  AND   GQD. 


:1 


as  a  great  many  people  appear  to  think  are  complete  ex- 
planations.    But  what  have  we  done  ?     We  have,  accord- 
ing to  the  fashion  of  phenomenalists,  described  the  passing 
panorama  of  successive  phenomena;  but  we  have  not  gone 
down  once  into  the  strata  of  causes  or  doers  which  under- 
lies all  this.     What  held  the  molecules  of  water  together 
in  the  first  place,  more  strongly  in  water  than  in  some 
other  substances,  and  less  strongly  than  in  others  ?    What 
separated  the  molecules  of  water  and  pushed  them  off  in 
the  form  of  vapor  ?    What  Hfted  the  water  vapor  up  from 
the  earth  against  the  force  of  gravity  ?     What  holds  the 
molecules  of  air  apart  in  the  form  of  a  gas  ?     What  presses 
the  molecules  of  air  together  and  on  to  the  surface  of  the 
earth  ?     In  other  words,  what  moves  the  air  in  the  form 
of  wind  ?     What  pushes  the  molecules  of  air  apart  in  the 
rarer  more  than  in  the  denser  portions  ?    When  the  mole- 
cules of  water  were  driven  together,  what  joined  and  held 
them  together  ?    When  the  drops  had  become  larger,  what 
drew  them  to  the  earth  ? 

All  these  questions  demand  doers,  none  of  which  were 
alluded  to  in  our  explanation  of  the  phenomena.  In  each 
of  these  cases  there  is  doing,  and  there  must  be  a  doer  or 
doers.  We  see  from  this  how  far  short  all  these  panoramic 
explanations  of  natural  phenomena  come  of  being  real  and 
complete  explanations,  and  that  they  are  really  only  de- 
ceptive illusions. 

In  all  these  cases  there  are  doings;  are  they  the  work  of 
natural  doers  ?  Suppose  we  conclude  that  they  are,  then 
these  doers  require  an  explanation,  and  we  ask,  why  do 
they  do  as  they  do  in  these  cases  ?  Before  this  question 
we  and  all  men  stand  stark  and  silent.  In  all  the  history 
of  philosophy  there  has  never  been  a  single  reason  given 
or  proposed  why  these  natural  doers  do  as  they  do.  Why 
does  gravity  draw  matter  together  ?  A  perpetual  scientific 
blamk.     Here,  then,  we  ar   at  the  end  of  natural  explana- 


IS   GOD  THE  DOER?  299 

tion.  It  may  be  said  that  they  do  as  they  do  because  it 
is  their  nature  to  do  so.  Then  we  ask,  whence  came  their 
nature  ?  from  whence  did  they  derive  their  specific  modes 
of  action  ?  To  this  no  man  can  give  any  answer  but,  *  'In 
the  beginning  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth," 
and  gave  to  each  of  these  doers  its  specific  modes  of  action. 
But  are  we  sure  that  these  doings  are  the  work  of  natural 
doers  ?  Possibly  we  have  gone  a  step  too  far,  and  called 
them  doers  when  they  are  only  modes  of  the  divine  doing. 
As  I  look  out  of  my  window  I  see  a  beautiful  white  cloud 
floating  by,  and  I  say,  the  wind  carries  that  cloud,  in  the 
same  sense  that  the  car  carries  a  man;  but  the  car  does  not 
carry  the  man,  the  car  is  not  the  mover  that  moves  the 
train.  Nor  can  I  think  that  God  is  now  moving  that 
cloud  along.  I  have  a  very  satisfactory  consciousness  of 
the  divine  presence;  He  is  all  about  me  and  in  me.  He 
knows  all  my  thoughts,  and  I  believe  that  He  sometimes 
directs  my  thoughts,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  He 
is  now  energizing  to  move  that  cloud  through  the  air. 
The  physical  circumstances  which  we  find  to  uniformly 
attend  this  phenomenon,  and  the  natural  doers  which  we 
may  suppose  in  this  case  appear  to  me  to  be  the  preferable 
explanation.  If  God  does  all  these  things  directly,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  storms  would  not  always  come  just 
as  and  where  they  do,  and  that  the  rain  would  not  always 
fall  just  where  it  does  and  where  it  does  not.  If  He  dis- 
tributes the  rain  directly,  we  can  see  no  reason  why  He 
should  not  send  some  over  Egypt  and  the  Sahara  desert. 
But  we  can  see  physical  conditions  which  have  some  rela- 
tion to  these  phenomena  and  seem  to  be  at  least  necessary 
conditions  of  their  occurrence  as  they  do  occur.  If  He 
does  all  these  things  directly  He  has  certainly  made  Him- 
self very  dependent  upon  physical  circumstances;  He  acts 
a  certain  way  only  in  the  presence  of  certain  physical  con- 
ditions, and  in  the  absence  of  those  conditions  He  does 


^« 


i 

iM 


300 


NATURE  AND   GOD. 


not  act  at  all.  It  appears  to  me  that  those  who  say  that 
God  has  no  agency  in  nature,  and  those  who  say  He  is 
the  only  agent  in  nature,  occupy  the  two  extremes  between 
which  the  real  truth  lies.  But  we  will  have  to  consider 
this  question  a  little  more  in  detail. 

Some  who  believe  that  matter  is  eternal,  and  some  who 
believe  that  God  created  new  substance  out  of  which  to 
form  a  universe,  think  that  He  is  the  immediate  and  only 
doer  in  nature.     This  has  been  the  opinion  of  some  relig- 
ionists perhaps  in  all  ages.    Descartes  gave  currency  and 
authority  to  it  in  modem  philosophy.  When  it  was  thought 
that  the  unity  and  transmutability  of  the  inorganic  forces 
were  proven,  many  theologians  said,    ^'Yes;  and  that  one 
is  God."     Those  who  thought  that  by  proving  the  self- 
active  power  of  the  natural  forces  and  their  unity  they  had 
rendered  the  supposition  of  a  God  unnecessary  were  thus 
met:  "You  have  shown  that  force  is  self-active,  and  that 
really  there  is  only  one  force  operating  in  nature;  that  is 
what  we  have  always  said.    God  is  the  only  moving  power 
in  nature.     Your  philosophy  confirms  our  doctrine." 

But  the  transmutability  and  unity  of  the  forces  have 
turned  out  to  be  fictions.  Now  these  cannot  be  used  to 
turn  God  out,  nor  to  show  His  immanence;  and  His  rela- 
tions to  nature  remain  unaffected  by  these  doctrines.  And 
now,  are  all  the  doings  in  nature  the  doings  of  God  ?  Are 
the  forces  separate  and  independent  agents  ?  or  are  they 
the  energizings  of  God  ?  Are  there  any  self-active  agents 
on  earth  ?     If  there  are,  which  and  what  are  they  ? 

Our  consciousness  of  separateness,  and  independence,  and 
freedom,  and  accountabiUty,  is  proof  to  us  that  the  energy 
active  in  our  minds  and  bodies  is  not  the  immediate  ener- 
gizing of  God,  and  that  we  are  self-active  agents.  Each 
man  knows  for  himself  that  he,  and  not  God,  is  the  doer 
in  all  his  conscious  and  voluntary  activities.  We  have, 
then,  in  conscious  human  beings  examples  of  agents  which 


SELF-ACTIVE   DOERS. 


301 


are  capable  of  separate  and  independent  action.  We  thus 
know  that  there  are  agents  on  earth  which  do  control  and 
direct  their  own  energy,  and,  within  certain  limits,  deter- 
mine when  and  how  they  shall  act.  They  have  their 
inherent  fixed  modes  of  action,  which  limit  their  activities 
to  certain  channels.  Within  those  limits  we  can  act  or  not 
act,  and  perform  one  or  another  kind  of  acts,  as  we  please. 

We  have,  then,  the  existence  of  self- active  agents  as  a 
fact  in  nature.  Here  is  a  class  of  agents  which  we  know 
to  exist  in  nature.  How  extensive  is  this  class?  What 
things  are  included  in  this  class  ?  The  close  resemblance 
between  the  forces  active  in  the  animal  body  and  those  in 
man,  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  to  the  contrary,  places 
them  in  this  class. 

There  are  many  objections  to  the  supposition  *  that  even 
the  inorganic  forces  are  the  immediate  energizing  of  God. 
The  uniformity  in  their  modes  of  action  indicates  that 
each  is  an  entity  with  a  nature,  modes,  and  powers  of  its 
own.  As  properties  indicate  a  substance,  and  a  particular 
set  of  properties  indicates  a  particular  substance,  and  the 
same  set  of  properties  always  the  same  substance ;  so  the 
uniform  modes  of  the  forces  identify  each  as  always  the 
same  substance.  It  is  true,  God  could  limit  Himself  to 
certain  modes  in  certain  circumstances.  He  might  say  to 
Himself,  I  will  in  certain  circumstances  always  act  in 
certain  ways ;  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  conditions,  I 
will  always  perform  certain  acts.  I  will  always  draw  sep- 
arate bodies  together  with  a  degree  of  energy  just  pro- 
portioned to  the  quantity  of  matter ;  and  I  will  proportion 
my  drawing  inversely  to  the  square  of  the  distance  between 
them.  He  might  say  and  do  thus;  but  it  seems  far  more 
probable  that  He  has  created  a  separate  agent  to  do  this 
work,  as  He  has  done  in  the  creation  of  man,  and  fixed 
in  its  nature  such  modes  of  doing  that  it  will  always  act 
according  to  this  manner.     Then  the  fact  that  we  can  see 


Ill 


^02  NATURE  AND   GOD. 

that  a  radiating  force— a  substance  located  in  a  body,  and 
radiating  from  it  in  all  directions— would  decrease  in 
quantity  in  any  given  space  as  the  square  of  the  distance 
increases,  seems  to  render  it  very  probable  that  the  force 
is  there  located,  and  thus  radiates.  But  if  God,  who  is 
equally  and  everywhere  present,  thus  does,  we  can  see  no 
reason  why  the  power  varies  as  the  square  of  the  distance, 
except  that  it  be  His  will  thus  to  act. 

The  dependence  of  the  doers  in  nature  upon  conditions 
for  their  powers  to  act,  seems  inconsistent  with  the 
character  of  the  infinite  God.  Some  of  the  forces  cannot 
act  in  the  absence  of  certain  conditions.  Is  this  true  of 
God  in  reference  to  physical  things  ?  It  is  true.  He  might 
say,  in  the  presence  of  certain  physical  conditions,  I  will 
energize  to  unite  substances  chemically ;  in  the  absence 
of  those  conditions,  I  will  not  energize  to  unite  them :  if 
they  are  dissolved  in  water,  I  will  energize  to  unite  them ; 
if  they  are  not  dissolved  in  water,  I  will  not  energize  to 
unite  them.  He  might  say,  in  the  presence  of  conditions 
supplied  by  man.  I  will  energize  to  carry  a  bullet  through 
a  man's  head;  and  then  on  that  condition,  I  will  im- 
mediatelv  commence  the  work  of  decomposition  and  decay 
in  that  man's  body.  He  might  say  and  do  all  this,  but 
it  does  not  seem  to  me  at  all  probable  that  He  does. 

By  such  a  plan  of  management  He  would  place  Him- 
self under  bonds  of  necessity  to  always  act  according  to 
certain  modes  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  physical  condi- 
tions. He  cannot  act  otherwise  than  according  to  those 
modes.  He  must  always  act  as  gravity  acts,  as  the 
chemical  force  acts,  as  the  crystallizing  force  acts,  as  cohe- 
sion acts,  as  electricity  and  magnetism  and  heat  and  light 
act.  In  the  circumstances  in  which  they  act.  He  must  act 
according  to  their  modes,  and  He  can  act  no  other  way. 
On  the  occurrence  of  the  conditions.  He  must  act, 
He  has  no  power  not  to  act.     The   conditions   having 


IS  GOD  THE   DOKR  ? 


303 


been  supplied  by  some  finite  agent,  He  has  no  option, 
He  must  act,  right  or  wrong,  or  whether  the  results 
are  good  or  bad.  He  must  do,  and  he  must  do 
according  to  those  pre-determined  modes,  whatever  the 
results  may  be.  We  would  think  it  wrong  to  bind  our- 
selves under  bond  which  compelled  us  to  do,  right  or 
wrong,  and  to  do  after  certain  fixed  modes,  even  when  the 
results  of  so  doing  would  be  evil  and  crime.  If  the  inor- 
ganic forces  are  God's  immediate  doing,  He  has  thus 
placed  Himself  under  the  absolute  necessity  of  obedience, 
to  act  according  to  the  dictation  of  the  most  degraded  and 
corrupt  human  beings;  He  has  made  Himself  their  agent, 
their  slave,  to  dp  their  bidding,  and  thus  He  becomes  a 
participant  ia  all  the  crimes  committed  by  man.  The 
incendiary  by  supplying  the  conditions,  compels  God  to 
consume  a  house  or  a  city.  The  murderer,  by  supplying 
the  conditions,  compels  God  to  carry  a  bullet  through  the 
heart  of  a  man.  God  is  the  executive  agent  in  the  carn- 
age of  war,  and  the  power  employed  in  all  the  crimes  com- 
mitted by  man.  All  this  He  does  at  the  behest  of  humam 
passion,  and  in  helpless  obedience  to  all  that  is  most  de- 
praved in  man.  If  it- be  said  that  God  controls  and 
determines  the  conditions  also,  and  thus  acts  only  when 
and  as  He  wishes  to  act,  then  we  land  in  absolute,  irre- 
sponsible fatalism. 

It  is  objected  to  this  by  some,  that  making  God  the 
creator  of  separate  and  self-active  agents  only  removes  the 
responsibility  one  step  farther  back,  and  he  is  still  respon- 
sible for  all  they  do.  Then  is  God  responsible  for  all  the 
deeds  of  man  ?  Is  there  no  responsibility  outside  of  the 
Creator?  Is  God,  and  He  only,  responsible  for  all  the 
wrongs,  and  sins,  and  crimes  of  man  ?  Is  he  to  be  blamed 
for  all  His  created  self-acting  agents  do?  He  has  endowed 
the  inorganic  forces  with  modes  which  are  necessary  for 
such  a  universe  of  related  things  as  now  exists.    Without 


304 


NATURE   AND   GOD. 


these  forces  and  without  their  present  modes  of  action  no 
such  universe  could  be.  The  acts  which  they  perform 
when  left  to  themselves  are  generally  such  as  God  ap- 
proves, and  such  as  He  designed.  They  of  themselves 
commit  no  crimes.  If  man  supplies  the  conditions  of 
their  doing  wrong,  not  they,  nor  the  God  that  made  them, 
is  blamable  for  the  wrong.  He  made  them,  endowed 
them  with  their  modes,  willed  the  good,  created  them  so 
that  they  would  of  themselves  work  out  the  good;  but 
man  comes  in  and  supplies  the  conditions  of  their  doing 
evil.  If  it  was  God,  an  intelligent,  knowing  being,  that 
was  there  doing,  knowingly  doing  the  wrong,  yet  bound 
by  his  own  self-imposed  law  so  that  He  mjist  do  it  at  the 
command  of  criminal  man.  He  would  share  the  responsi- 
bility. But  when  unconscious  and  unknowing  agents  are 
sent  forth  to  work,  with  modes  which  of  themselves 
accomplish  only  good,  if  man  turns  them  to  evil,  upon 
him  only  rests  the  responsibility. 

God  created  the  forces,  and  gave  them  their  modes.   He 
also    created    material   substances,  and  gave  them  their 
properties.     The  properties  of  the  material  substances  are 
employed  in   the   commission  of   crime,  as   well   as   the 
modes  of  the  forces.     The  properties  of  arsenic  are  such 
that  if  it  is  administered  to  a  man,  he  dies.     Because  of 
these  properties  in  arsenic,  has  any  one  ever  attempted  to 
make  God  to  share  in  the  responsibility  for  a  murder  com- 
mitted by  administering  arsenic?     No  one  thinks  of  at- 
taching blame  to  the  Creator  when  man  takes  advantage 
of  the  properties  of  matter  to  do  evil.     When  man  takes 
advantgae  of  the  modes  of  the  forces  to  do  evil,  the  case 
is  precisely  the  same.     But  if  God  was  Himself  the  doer, 
and  voluntarily,  or  from  self-imposed  necessity,  exerted  His 
energy  to  do  the  deed  of  wrong,  and  without  His  energiz- 
ing the  deed  could  not  be  performed.  He  would  be  respon- 
sible for  the  wrong. 


IS   GOD   RESPONSIBLE?  305 

But  there  may  be  cases  where  the  forces  effect  what 
appear  to  us  to  be  disasters  in  which  man  has  no  part. 
The  ravenous  instincts  of  beasts  of  prey  are  the  direct 
creation  of  God.  Yes,  and  if  the  objects  of  prey  do  not 
die  by  some  other  animal,  they  will  soon  die  of  old  age, 
the  direct  work  of  the  forces  in  their  own  bodies  as  God 
made  them.  He  designed  that  they  should  die.  If  ani- 
mals ate  only  vegetable  food,  far  less  animal  life  could  be 
than  under  the  present  order  of  things.  By  endowing 
much  of  the  food  of  animals  with  animal  life,  the  sum  of 
animal  life  on  earth  is  greatly  augmented.  If  animal  life 
is  a  higher  and  more  desirable  state  of  being  than  vege- 
table life,  if  sensibility  is  a  blessing,  an  enjoyment,  the 
sum  of  enjoyment  on  earth  is  far  greater  than  it  could  be 
if  animals  ate  only  vegetable  foods.  For  a  part  of  the 
food  of  animals  to  be  endowed  with  life  and  enjoyment 
for  a  time,  and  then  die,  is  better  than  to  have  it  all 
insensate,  and  incapable  of  any  enjoyment.  The  present 
arrangement  secures  the  greatest  total  sum  of  enjoyment. 
If  it  is  wrong  for  a  wolf  to  kill  a  sheep  for  food,  it  is 
wrong  for  man  to  do  so.  More  large  animals  are  killed 
for  food  by  man  than  by  all  the  beasts  of  prey  on  earth. 
But  animals,  having  the  instinct  of  prey,  may  be  by  it 
prompted  to  destroy  a  child  or  a  man,  and  we  call  it  a 
calamity.  God  may  or  may  not  have  designed  that  par- 
ticular event.  Without  this  arrangement  the  sum  of 
enjoyment  would  be  much  less;  with  it  a  calamity  is 
possible. 

A  storm  may  bury  a  fleet;  an  avalanche  a  hamlet ;  a^ 
earthquake  a  city.  Without  gravity  no  system  of  worlds, 
or  even  individual  worlds,  could  be.  Without  molecular 
repulsion,  heat,  gravity,  the  chemical  force,  and  so  forth, 
no  system  of  nature,  no  life  could  be ;  with  them  storms, 
avalanches,  and  earthquakes  are  possible.  The  properties 
of  matter  are  involved  in  these  catastrophies,  as  much  as 


3o6  NATURE  AND  GOD. 

the  modes  of  the  forces.  No  one  thinks  of  blaming  God 
for  these  catastrophies  through  the  properties  of  matter ; 
no  more  is  He  to  be  blamed  for  them  through  the  modes 
of  the  forces.  But  if  He  is  the  immediate  and  constant 
doer,  voluntarily,  or  under  self-imposed  necessity,  ener- 
gizing to  effect  them,  He  is  responsible  for  them.  They 
occur  under  the  operation  of  means  and  agents  with  prop- 
erties and  modes  without  which  the  good  could  not  be. 
The  finite  is  imperfect;  and  the  question  is,  shall  the 
finite  and  imperfect  be?  or  shall  only  the  infinite  and  per- 
fect be,  sole  dweller  in  the  abode  of  eternity  ?  But  some 
of  these  catastrophies  God  may  have  designed,  designed 
for  the  accomplishment  of  greater  ultimate  good.  They 
utter  His  awful  voice,  and  manifest  His  dread  power,  and 
prostrate  man  in  awe  before  Him. 

Some  have  designated  the  universal  force  operating  in 

nature   by   the   word  will.     I  do  not  suppose  that  they 

mean  an  impersonal  will,  an  attribute  merely,  without  any 

persons  of  whom  it  is  an  attribute.     This  is  only  another 

way  of  stating  the  doctrine  that  God  is  the  immediate  and 

constant  doer  in  nature.     There  is  a  manifestation  of  will 

in  the  creation  of  matter  and  forces,  and  endowing  them 

with  properties  and  modes,  relating  them  to  each  other  iu 

a  system,  and  so  arranging  them  that  they  will  work  out 

certain  contemplated  ends.     All  this  shows  that  there  was. 

in  creation  an  exercise  of  will,  directed  by  intelligence  to 

the  attainment  of  certain  desired  and  designed  ends.     But 

there  is  no  manifestation  of  will  in  the  operation  of  the 

forces  in  nature.     The  modes  of  the  forces  are  fixed,  and 

not  optional.     They  must  act  according  to  their  modes ;. 

there  is  no  alternative  power;    they   must  act,  and   act 

according  to  their  modes.      The  forces  are  separate  and 

independent  agents,  acting  under  an  absolute  necessity  to 

do,  and  to  do  according  to  certain  fixed  modes.     Will 

appears  only  in  their  creation. 


god's  agency  in  nature. 


307 


Here  another  question  arises  in  reference  to  God's  present 
relations  to  nature.  Has  He  created  material  substances 
as  means,  and  immaterial  substances  as  doers,  and  left  the 
doers  to  work  upon  the  means,  and  run  the  universe  alone? 
No  view  we  can  take  of  God,  whether  we  consider  Him  as 
creator,  proprietor,  or  intelligent  ruler,  can  lead  us  to  so 
suppose.  If  He  created,  he  had  some  purposes  in  creation. 
If  he  is  proprietor,  He  has  some  interest  in  and  care  over 
His  patrimony.  If  He  has  blind,  insensate,  unintelligent 
agents  at  work,  no  man  would  leave  them  without  super- 
intendence. Those  who  deny  God's  supervision  over  His 
subordinate  agents,  do  not  leave  men  working  under  them 
without  looking  after  them,  and  directing  them  when  they 
deem  it  necessary  or  best.  The  course  they  adopt  in 
reference  to  subordinates  in  their  employ,  is  the  course 
they  would  adopt  if  they  were  in  God's  place,  and  that  is 
the  only  rational  supposition  in  reference  to  Him. 

But  how  can  God  direct  the  operations  of  His  agents  for 
the  accomplishment  of  special  purposes,  without  violating 
the  "laws  of  nature  ?"  How  does  man  do  it  ?  He  sees  a 
stream  of  water  flowing  down  to  a  lower  level.  He  sup- 
plies the  conditions  in  which  the  water  in  falling  may  be 
used  for  running  machinery.  He  learns  that  heat  will 
change  water  into  steam,  and  that  during  its  expansion  a 
great  amount  of  energy  is  exerted.  He  places  around  it 
such  conditions  that  that  push  may  be  used  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  many  purposes.  He  learns  that  in  certain 
circumstances  combined  electricity  is  decomposed,  and  that 
then  it  will  attract  its  opposite  kind,  and,  if  not  obstructed, 
go  any  distance  to  join  it.  He  supplies  those  circum- 
stances, and  the  force  executes  his  will.  In  all  these  cases 
the  man  has  not  violated  the  laws  of  nature.  He  has  only 
supplied  the  conditions  upon  which  the  action  of  the  forces 
would  accomplish  certain  desired  results.  Man  can,  by 
removing  the  conditions  of  the  action  of  a  force,  prevent 


'  <>\ 


3o8  NATURK  AND   GOD. 

its  action,  and  prevent  the  results  which  would  follow  its 
action.     He  can,  by  supplying  the  conditions  of  its  action, 
bring  to  pass  the  results  which  naturally  follow  its  action. 
He  can  turn  the  direction  of  its  energy,  and  apply  it  to 
this,  or  that.     He  may  supply  conditions  in  the  presence 
of  which  its  energizing  will  accomplish  certain  results;  or 
he  may  supply   other  conditions,  and  other  results  will 
follow.     Cannot  He  who  created  these  agents  do  as  much 
with  them  ?    This  is  all  that  is  necessary  that  He  may  ex- 
ercise a  special  providence  over  His  creatures,  and  answer 
the  prayers  of  His  trusting  children. 

The  results  of  the  action  of  the  forces  in  nature  are 
contingent  upon  conditions  supplied  sometimes  by  other 
inorganic  forces,  sometimes  by  vegetable  forces,  sometimes 
by  brute  beings,  sometimes  by  human  beings,  and  some- 
times by  God  himself.  This  contingency  in  the  results  of 
the  energizing  of  the  forces,  when  they  come  into  rela- 
tions with  conscience  and  intelligence  and  free  will  in  man, 
suppUes  the  objective  conditions  of  moral  accountability, 
and  renders  man  in  his  state  and  relations  on  earth  a  fit 
subject  of  moral  government.  Thus  we  have  the  grounds 
of  a  rational  theodicy,  and  the  establishment  of  human 

responsibility. 

The  views  of  nature  which  we  have  been  endeavoring 
to  expound,  are  the  views  which  spontaneously  arise  in 
the  minds  of  men  from  observation  and  experience.  We 
have  thus  only  been  putting  on  paper  the  common  con- 
sciousness of  mankind,  and  showing  its  consistent  accord- 
ance with  true  scientific  and  philosophical  principles.  The 
language  of  common  life  and  common  literature  accords 
perfectly  with  the  exposition  of  nature  here  given.  When 
men  undertake  to  correct  this  common  consciousness,  and 
substitute  in  its  place  some  other,  they  cannot  expound 
nature,  nor  describe  its  process,  without  using  language 
which  implies  much  that  has  been  here  written.     We  are 


CONCLUSION.  309 

constantly  in  intercourse  with  nature,  daily,  hourly,  deal- 
ing with  it,  conforming  to  and  using  its  modes  or  laws, 
and  witnessing  its   doings.     Its  obvious  processes  and 
modes  are  plainly  discovered  by  every  one.     Its  occult 
doers  and  doings  are  beyond  the  reach  of  direct  observa- 
tion.    But  the  conception  which  spontaneously  arises  in 
the  human  mind  in  studying  nature,  in  the  minds  of  every 
generation,  is  passive  matter  and  invisible  doers.     This 
conception  we  have  found  to  be  rational,  and  consistent 
with  absolute  truths,  with  facts  and  with  our  intuitions. 
In  this  age  the  endeavor  is  made  to  substitute  in  place  of 
this  conception  self-existent  motion  in  matter.     This  phi- 
losophy could  make  no  headway  till  it  invalidated  all  the 
final  tests  of  truth, — it  must  first  convince  mankind  that 
it  is  impossible  to  know  anything,  then  this  might  have 
as  much  claim  upon  credence  as  any  conception.     A  phi- 
losophy so  contrary  to  the  common  consciousness  of  man- 
kind, and  to   all  the  basal  principles  of  truth,  so  at  war 
with  human  intuitions,  and  so  destructive  of  all  that  men 
cherish  as  most  valuable,  is  destined  to  an  ephemeral  ex- 
istence, and  will  soon  take  its  place  among  the  debris 
of  exploded  vagaries.     If  men  could  succeed  in  convinc- 
iHg  the  world  that  matter  and  motion  comprise  the  whole 
of  existence,  what  have  they  gained.     They  have  blotted 
out  the  highest  hopes  of  man.     They  have  destroyed  his 
belief  in  the  existence  and  providence  of  God,  or  crowd- 
ed  God  back  into  the  unknown  and  voiceless  seons  of 
past  eternity,  away  from  all  relations  to  living  mortals, 
beyond  the  reach  of  prayer  and  trust,  covered  the  race 
with  blasting,  enveloped  the  world  in  night,  and  buried 
the  prospects  of  the  race,  both  on  earth  and  in  the  here- 
after, in  the  grave  of  endless  loss.     Rather  let  me  cast 
some  rays  amid   the   darkness,    pour  some   disinfectant 
among  the  plagues  of  earth,  throw  around  human  destiny 
here  and  hereafter  the  halo  of  hope,  and  lead  man  to  find 
his  ultimate  rest  in  the  bosom  of  our  Father. 


INDEX. 


( ( 


(C 


i< 


it 


li 


(( 


<4 


(C 


Absolute  truths,  chapter  on, 

definition  of,  -        -        . 

reliability  as  guides, 
table  of,  -        -        -        - 

use  of  in  science. 
Action  and  reaction,  modes  of  explaining, 
Action  through  intervals  of  space, 
Acts  of  mind  not  caused,         -         -  -        - 

All  things  included  in  three  denominations. 
Atomic  theory  of  matter  described,     -         -       - 
Attention,  power  to  control,         -  >         -       . 

Attraction  through  intervals  of  space, 
Bacon,  Francis,  influence  on  science,    - 
Boscovich,  theory  of  matter,     -        -        -        - 
Causality,  intuitions  of,         -        -        -        - 

Causal  formula, 

Causal  relation  absent  in  the  table, 

'*         *'         as  adopted  by  evolutionists, 
Cause  defined,  .        .        .        .        , 

energy  always  a  property  of, 

absent  in  the  table, 

every  dependent  thing  demands  a, 

every  finite  thing  demands  a, 

opinions  respecting, 
Causes  are  never  produced,         -         .        .         , 

*'       three  discovered  by  the  senses,     - 
Chains  of  causes  and  effects,  no  such  things, 

Classification  of  forces, 

Color  in  bodies  explained,  ... 

Comparison,  intuitions  of,        -        -        -        - 
Comteanism,  -  -        -        «        . 

Conservation  of  energy,  -         -        -        - 

Continuity,  law  of,         -     -        -        -  10,42 

Cook,  Joseph  P.,  Jr.,  on  the  ether, 


i  i 


(( 


<< 


(( 


(C 


PAGE. 

'      32-45 

.       34 

36 

34-5 
23 

52 
-     84-86 

237-238 
41 

51 
241 

78-79 

26 

49 
235-272 

164 

■         165 

137 
160 

160-163 

166 

279 

279 

11,12 

172 

274 
174 

182 

72,154 
258-263 

132 

120-126 

,265,291 
64 


il 


i 


♦ 


]  I 


312 


INDEX. 


{( 


(( 


(i 


( ( 


t  i 


t  ( 


(( 


41 

I 
I 


Darwin,  definition  of  nature,        .        -        - 

' '        formation  of  an  eye, 
Derivative  absolute  truths,  -         -         - 

Deschanell,  quotation  respecting  light,     - 
Doer,  definition  of,  _  _  .         - 

Doers  in  nature,  immaterial  substance,     - 
Dynamic  theory  of  matter,  .  .         - 

"         energy,  what  is  it  ? 

**  "        not  a  cause,     -         -        - 

Effects,  classes  of,  "     .    "        "        ' 

Energizing  necessary  to  motion. 

Energy  a  property,  .        -        -        - 

chapter  on,     -  -  -        -        - 

conservation  of,  - 

definition  of,  .  .         -        - 

employed  in  holding  at  rest,  -         -     ] 

dynamic  is  energizing, 
is  not  a  property  of  matter, 
never  imparted,  _      -         -        -         ] 

Environments  as  causes,         -  -        -        - 

Ether,  the  luminiferous,         .        -        -        - 
Evolution,  philosophy  of,  -         -         -         -  . 

' '  results  of, 

Theistic, 

Facts  and  their  teaching,  chapter  on,     - 
Fichte,  on  process  of  knowledge, 
First  term  in  formula  of  causal  relation. 

Force,  definition  of, 

Forces  are  substance,  .         -         -         -         • 

' '       results  of  supposing  them  to  be  God, 
Fundamental  truths  as  they  affect  science, 
Gases,  dynamic  theory  of,         -         -         • 

"  "  "        '*   disproof  of. 

Generalizations,  -  .        -        -  - 

"  how  they  are  formed,    - 

'*  of  the  infinite  based  on  the  finite. 

Generalized  universals,        -        -  - 

God,  concepts  of,     -         -         -  -         -         - 

His  present  relation  to  the  universe,     - 
His  relation  to  space,        -         -         -         - 

origin  of  our  ideas  of,  .         -         - 

superintends  the  work  of  His  agents, 


( ( 


( ( 


(< 


i( 


PAGE. 
135 

39.  40 

lOI 

33 
146 

53-57 
I 5-1 18 

277 

169 

,  74»  89 

76,  114 
10-130 
20-126 

77.  "4 
27-130 

116 

83-87 

08,  185 

136 

61-70 

131 
138 
140 

74-87 
194 

167 

74 

75 
302 

14 

60-91 

•    61-70 

41 
263 

292 

22 

292 

295 

293 

284 

307 


INDEX. 

God,  the  universal  doer  in  nature  ?        -        - 
Hall,  Wilford,  -         -  .         >         . 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  -        .        .        . 

Heredity,  ---... 

Hickok,  L^aurens  P.    theory  of  matter, 
Hume,  quotation  in  reference  to  cause.     - 
Hypotheses,  use  of  in  science, 
Hypothetical  method,         -         .         -         - 
Ideals,  -  -  ►  .         ^        . 

Identity,  personal,  -         -         -         - 

Immaterial  doers  in  nature, 

substance,        -         -         -         . 

theory  applied  to  science, 
Immediate  perception,        -        -        .        . 

Immortality, 

Impact,  what  occurs  in,     - 

Included  absolute  truths,        -         -         - .       - 

Individuality,  intuition  of,  ... 

Inductive  method, 

Inertia,  chapter  on,  -        - 

laws  of,  

the  force  of,  -        .        -        . 

has  two  modes,  .         -         .         . 

Infinite,  ideas  of,  how  reached, 
Intuition  of  unity,  origin  of,  ... 

;*        "       ''       use  of. 
Intuition  of  cause  conducts  to  God, 

Intuitions,  - 211, 

as  evidences  of  external  truth, 
of  comparison, 

of  causality,         -         .         _         .  209, 
use  of  in  science,  chapter  on, 
Jevons,  W.  S. ,  on  the  ether, 
Kant,  action  between  separate  bodies,     - 

"      on  process  of  knowledge, 
Kinetic  energy,  definition  of,  ... 

"  "        loss  in  changing  direction, 

Knowledge,  process  of,  chapter  on, 
' '  conditions  of, 

theories  of,  -        -        ^        - 

subjective  preparation  for. 


({ 


(< 


ii 


t  i 


(< 


(( 


t< 


( t 


313 

PAGE. 
144-146 

175  note 

171.  213 
189 

49 
160,  164 

25 

25 

207 

191 

146 

48 

152 

196 

245,246 

108 

37 

251-253 
21 

102-109 

.102-107 

108 

106,  109 

270,  271 

261,  262 

262,  272 
284 

229-231 

234 

209 

272-280 

248-281 

65,  66 

85 

193 

"5 

92 

192-223 

192 

^93 
198-205 


3U 


IKDKX. 


FAGEL 
255 
10,  42,   265,  291 
196 


Knowledge,  secondary, 
L,aw  of  continuity. 

Laws  of  Nature,  

Life  an  immaterial  substance,      - 
Likeness  in  modes,  etc.,  .         -         -         - 

Locke,  -  .        -         -         -        - 

Lotze,  theory  of  matter,  .        -        -        - 

Mathematical  proofs,  ,         .         -         - 

Matter,  chapter  on,  -         -         -         -         - 

*'       theories  of,  .         -         -         - 

properties  of,      -         -         ■         '         ' 
no  power  to  start  itself  in  motion,    - 
Metaphysics  in  relation  to  science, 
Metaphysical  method,  -        -         -         -    , 

Metaphysics,  the  four  doctrines  generally  received, 
Middle  term  in  causal  formula, 
Mind  as  immaterial  substance,     - 
chapter  on,  -        -        ' 

faculties  of,         -         -         -         -         ' 
generalizations  from  other  forces  apphed  to, 

has  extension, 

"     modes  of, 

Modes  of  investigation,      .      '         '         "         ' 
Molecules  as  detached  bodies, 
Motion  between  two  forces,      -         -        -        - 
"       chapter  on,         ■     .         -         -         - 
definition  of,       -  .         -         -         - 

in  liquids  and  solids, 
in  the  supposed  ether, 
•  •  **  *'  "      how  stopped, 

obstructed  by  other  forces, 
''       perpetual,         -         -         -         -         - 

"  as  heat,      -         -         -         - 

"  "  circular,  -         -  94  > 

Nature  and  God,  chapter  on,  -         -         - 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,         -        -        -         '    ,     " 
Order  of  nature,  origin  of  the  generalization,    - 
Organic  forces,  chapter  on,  -         - 

"         **        conditions  of  their  action, 

•'         **        never  produced,     - 

uncaused  modes  of  action, 


( i 


i  t 


i  t 


175 

259 

193 

49 
129 

46-73 

49-51 

71 

89 

9-20 

23 

17 
168 

224 

224-247 

227 

225 

197 

-    227 

21-31 

57 

95 

88-101 

88 

96,  97 
98 

99 
90 

89-100 

91,  92 

105,  106 

282-309 

26,  100 

264 

175-191 
180 

178 

179 


INDEX. 

Organic  forces,  unchangeable  in  quantity,     - 
Organic  forces  spontaneously  act, 

*'      phenomena,  .  .         .         > 

Perpetual  motion,  -         -         - 

must  be  without  obstruction, 


t* 


t  ( 


Phenominalism,  as  it  affects  science, 

**  as  the  basis  of  evolution, 

Polarization  of  light,  explanation  of, 
Potential  energy,  definition  of,  -      .  - 

Process  of  knowledge,  chapter  on, 
Properties  of  matter,  defined  and  classified, 
**         ''         **       how  discovered,     - 
**         **         *'      immediate  knowledge  of, 
Property  and  substance,  .        .         -         . 

"         definition  of,        -  -         .         - 

Realism,  as  it  affects  science, 
Relation  of  metaphysics  to  science. 
Relations,  knowledge  of,         -         -         -         - 

Reproduction,  

Repulsion  through  intervals  of  space,     - 
Resistance  as  a  means  of  knowledge, 
Schelling, 


(< 


(( 


Science  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  no  God, 
Self-active  agents,         -  .... 

Sensationalism  as  it  affects  science,     - 
Senses,  the,  as  media  of  knowledge. 
Space,  intuition  of,  -         .         .         . 

knowledge  of,      -         -         -         - 

unity  of, 

Spencer,  Herbert,  definition  of  evolution, 

Spinoza, 

Substance,  definition  of,  -         -  - 

immediately  known, 
material  and  immaterial  distinguished, 
**  means  of  knowing, 

"  realistic  views  of,     - 

Summary  of  principles,        .... 
Table  containing  the  true  causal  relation. 
Tables  containing  no  causal  relation, 
Theistic  evolution,       -         -         -         -         . 
Third  term  in  formula  of  the  causal  relation. 


315 

PAGE. 
176 
186 

175 
89 

90,    106 

15.  68,  131 
133 

153 
119 

192-223 

71 

72,  73 
219 

257 

33 

15 
9-20 

256 

189 

79 
-  215,217 

194 


(( 


41 


289 
301 

15 
219-223 

211 
249,  250 
270 
132 
291 

32,  46 

215 
48 


40, 


III,   215 
46-48 

175 

170 

164,    165,    166 

140 

.         168 


3i6 


INDEX. 


•I 


1  t 

'\  ' 

i  I 
J 


Thompson,  Sir  William,  on  the  ether. 

K  ''         "         theory  of  matter, 

Time  an  attribute  of  God, 

"    intuition  of,  -         -        '         ' 

"     knowledge  of,  -         *         ' 

**     unity  of  is  eternity. 
Unity  applied  to  doers, 

''     how  it  conducts  to  God, 

*'     how  it  handles  time  and  space,    - 

**     origin  of  the  intuition, 

"     use  of  the  intuition, 
**Unseen  Universe,"  quotation  from, 
Watson,  Professor  John,  quotation  from, 
Will,  freedom  of,     -         -         ■         "         ' 
Young,  Dr.  Thomas,  quotation  from. 


FAGE- 

65 
49,  81 

271 

209 

251 

270 

268 

271 

270 

261 

248-281 

104 

240-244 
^5 


►  "♦<>*- 


Pagess,  15th  line  from  bottom,  for  ''all  molecules;'  read 
the  violecules. 

Page  72,  2d  line  of  2d  paragraph,  instead  of  one  ''sub- 
ject;' read  one  substance. 

Page  8s,  3rd  line  from  top,  strike  out  "while  her 

Page  228,  4th  lifiefrom  top,  for  "generic  disease;'  read 
generic  desire. 

Page  260,  1 2th  line  from  top,  instead  of  "unperfectlf 
read  imperfectly. 


«M"'   'W  Wi 


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